10 janvier 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité
Mark Pomerleau
In 2018, the Department of Defense began following a new philosophy for cyber operations to better protect U.S. networks and infrastructure.
Known as “defend forward,” the approach allows U.S. cyber forces to be active in foreign network outside the United States to either act against adversaries or warn allies of impending cyber activity that they've observed on foreign networks.
After the U.S. military killed an Iranian general in a Jan. 2 drone strike and after national security experts said they expect Iran might take some retaliatory action through cyber operations, the specter of increased cyber attacks against U.S. networks puts Cyber Command and its new approach front and center.
“This Iran situation today is a big test of the ‘defend forward' approach of this administration,” James Miller, senior fellow at Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory and former undersecretary of defense for policy, said at a Jan. 7 event hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations. “Will [Cyber Command] take preventative action? Will they do it in a way that our allies and partners support and that can be explained to the public?”
While Iran fired several missiles Jan. 7 at a base in Iraq where U.S. troops lived as an initial response to the drone strike, many national security experts expect Iran could continue cyber actions as further retaliation for the strike. Iran could also ratchet up its cyber operations in the United States following the collapse of portions of the 2015 nuclear deal between the United States, Iran and five other nations to curb Iran's nuclear weapons capability in return for sanctions relief.
Over the past 12 months, the White House and Congress streamlined many of the authorities used to conduct cyber operations to help cyber forces to get ahead of threats in networks around the world. One such provision in last year's annual defense policy bill provides the Pentagon with the authority to act in foreign networks if Iran, among other named nations, is conducting active, systematic and ongoing campaigns of attacks against the U.S. government or people.
Cyber Command declined to comment on what, if anything, they were doing differently since the drone strike.
Some experts, however, have expressed caution when assessing how well this defend forward approach has worked thus far given it is still relatively new.
“The jury is very much still out here,” Ben Buchanan, assistant professor and senor faculty fellow at Georgetown University, said at the same event. “We don't have a lot of data, there's been a lot of hand-wringing ... about these authorities and about how Cyber Command may or may not be using them. I just don't think we've seen enough to judge whether or not ... [it is] meaningfully changing adversary behavior.”
Others have also expressed reservations about how effective Iran can even be in cyberspace toward U.S. networks.
“Iran is a capable cyber actor, Iran is a wiling cyber actor. That means Iran will conduct cyberattacks,” said Jacquelyn Schneider, Hoover fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. “It's not like they have this capability and they've been deterred in the past and maybe now they're going to turn it on. I think they've been trying this entire time.”
Complicating matters further could be other actors trying to take advantage of U.S.-Iran imbroglio for their own interests.
Priscilla Moriuchi, senior principal researcher and head of nation-state research at threat intelligence firm Recorded Future, said over the past several months, there have been reports of Russian state-affiliated actors hijacking Iranian cyber infrastructure to conduct operations masquerading as Iranians.
“That creates its own uncertainty,” she said at the same event. “Another level of potential what we call inadvertent escalation if a country perceives that they are attacked by Iran but in reality, it” wasn't.
https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/2020/01/09/how-tensions-with-iran-could-test-a-new-cyber-strategy/
27 décembre 2023 | International, Terrestre
Nearly a year after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the embattled nation's allies are becoming skittish and donations of money and materiel are threatening to dry up. Could 2024 be the year that decides the war's outcome?
9 décembre 2024 | International, Aérospatial
“These challenges are significant and we need to figure out how to get after them," Vice Chief of Space Operations Gen. Michael Guetlein said.
10 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial
By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — The U.S. Air Force will delay a full-rate production milestone for the KC-46 aerial refueling tanker to the end of fiscal 2024 to correspond with a fix for one of the aircraft's key systems, the service announced late Monday. The Pentagon's independent weapons tester — Director of Operational Test and Evaluation Robert Behler — intends to conclude operational testing of the KC-46 only after prime contractor Boeing fixes the tanker's critical deficiencies and has finalized its production configuration. “Accordingly, the Air Force will defer the KC-46 full rate production decision until after the completion of [initial operational test and evaluation], and the receipt of the statutorily-required Beyond Low Rate Initial Production report from [Behler],” the Air Force said in a statement. The KC-46 program has several remaining category 1 deficiencies, the term used by the Pentagon to describe the most serious form of technical problems. Two of the deficiencies involve the aircraft's remote vision system, which is a series of cameras and sensors used by the boom operator to see outside the KC-46 and refuel other aircraft. The Air Force has contended that the RVS does not properly function in all weather and lighting conditions; the service has refused to deploy the KC-46 until the problem is fixed. Boeing in April agreed to completely redesign the system on its own dime, which will take until at least 2023. One other issue involves the KC-46 boom, which was developed to meet NATO-specific requirements but cannot refuel the A-10 aircraft. The Air Force is paying to redesign the boom actuator, as the service signed off on the original design and did not realize until afterward that it did not meet the specifications needed to refuel the A-10. In March, the Air Force announced an additional category 1 deficiency after maintainers found fuel leaking between the tanker's primary and secondary fuel protection barriers. It is unclear whether this is still a problem, as Boeing had already developed a fix and began retrofitting aircraft when the issue was revealed. “Given its confidence in deficiency resolution timelines for both the aerial refueling boom and Remote Vision System, the Air Force is rescheduling the KC-46's Full Rate Production Decision milestone to late Fiscal Year 2024,” the service stated. The Air Force notes that delaying the full-rate production decision will not affect the program's cost — which is locked into place courtesy of a firm, fixed-price deal with Boeing that holds the contractor financially responsible for cost overruns;nor will it cause the service to alter its current delivery schedule. Boeing is already producing KC-46s at “full rate,” which for the program is 15 tankers per year. It delivered the first KC-46 to McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas, in January 2019. Since then, Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma, and Pease Air National Guard Base, New Hampshire, have also taken on new KC-46s. Boeing is set to produce 179 KC-46s over the program of record. The company has racked up cost overruns of about $4.6 billion in excess of the $4.9 billion contract it was awarded in 2011. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/06/09/the-air-force-delays-a-full-rate-production-decision-for-the-kc-46/