January 10, 2020 | International, C4ISR, Security
Mark Pomerleau
In 2018, the Department of Defense began following a new philosophy for cyber operations to better protect U.S. networks and infrastructure.
Known as “defend forward,” the approach allows U.S. cyber forces to be active in foreign network outside the United States to either act against adversaries or warn allies of impending cyber activity that they've observed on foreign networks.
After the U.S. military killed an Iranian general in a Jan. 2 drone strike and after national security experts said they expect Iran might take some retaliatory action through cyber operations, the specter of increased cyber attacks against U.S. networks puts Cyber Command and its new approach front and center.
“This Iran situation today is a big test of the ‘defend forward' approach of this administration,” James Miller, senior fellow at Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory and former undersecretary of defense for policy, said at a Jan. 7 event hosted by the Council on Foreign Relations. “Will [Cyber Command] take preventative action? Will they do it in a way that our allies and partners support and that can be explained to the public?”
While Iran fired several missiles Jan. 7 at a base in Iraq where U.S. troops lived as an initial response to the drone strike, many national security experts expect Iran could continue cyber actions as further retaliation for the strike. Iran could also ratchet up its cyber operations in the United States following the collapse of portions of the 2015 nuclear deal between the United States, Iran and five other nations to curb Iran's nuclear weapons capability in return for sanctions relief.
Over the past 12 months, the White House and Congress streamlined many of the authorities used to conduct cyber operations to help cyber forces to get ahead of threats in networks around the world. One such provision in last year's annual defense policy bill provides the Pentagon with the authority to act in foreign networks if Iran, among other named nations, is conducting active, systematic and ongoing campaigns of attacks against the U.S. government or people.
Cyber Command declined to comment on what, if anything, they were doing differently since the drone strike.
Some experts, however, have expressed caution when assessing how well this defend forward approach has worked thus far given it is still relatively new.
“The jury is very much still out here,” Ben Buchanan, assistant professor and senor faculty fellow at Georgetown University, said at the same event. “We don't have a lot of data, there's been a lot of hand-wringing ... about these authorities and about how Cyber Command may or may not be using them. I just don't think we've seen enough to judge whether or not ... [it is] meaningfully changing adversary behavior.”
Others have also expressed reservations about how effective Iran can even be in cyberspace toward U.S. networks.
“Iran is a capable cyber actor, Iran is a wiling cyber actor. That means Iran will conduct cyberattacks,” said Jacquelyn Schneider, Hoover fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. “It's not like they have this capability and they've been deterred in the past and maybe now they're going to turn it on. I think they've been trying this entire time.”
Complicating matters further could be other actors trying to take advantage of U.S.-Iran imbroglio for their own interests.
Priscilla Moriuchi, senior principal researcher and head of nation-state research at threat intelligence firm Recorded Future, said over the past several months, there have been reports of Russian state-affiliated actors hijacking Iranian cyber infrastructure to conduct operations masquerading as Iranians.
“That creates its own uncertainty,” she said at the same event. “Another level of potential what we call inadvertent escalation if a country perceives that they are attacked by Iran but in reality, it” wasn't.
https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/2020/01/09/how-tensions-with-iran-could-test-a-new-cyber-strategy/
February 18, 2022 | International, Aerospace
A government spokesman confirmed to Defense News that the 68 F-15s in line for the upgrade will be single-seat F-15Js that have previously gone through the Multi-Stage Improvement Program. That leaves the fate of 34 jets still up in the air.
May 6, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security, Other Defence
U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND Insitu Inc., Bingen, Washington, was awarded a maximum $23,000,000 modification (P00019) for an existing non-competitive, single award, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract (H92222-16-D-0031) for Mid-Endurance Unmanned Aircraft Systems (MEUAS) 1.5B intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) services. The $23,000,000 increase to a ceiling of $273,000,000 prevents gaps in ISR services until all task orders are transitioned to the current competitive MEUAS III contracts. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $7,354,530 are available for obligation at the task order level. U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters, Tampa, Florida, is the contracting activity. NAVY Valiant Global Defense Services Inc., San Diego, California, is awarded $15,913,990 for firm-fixed-price task order M67854-19-F-7884 under previously award contract M67854-19-D-7876 to provide support services for the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Training Support Service (MTSS), MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP). Services will include pre-deployment training programs to Marine Corps operating forces, as well as command, control, communications, and computer mobile training team training at the functional and executive level to commanders and battle staffs, and technical training for operators and information managers. Work will be performed in Quantico, Virginia, and is expected to be completed by November 2020. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance (Marine Corps) funds in the amount of $5,380,849 will be obligated at the time of award and these funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This order was competitively awarded under a multiple award task order contract. The Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia, is the contract activity. Lockheed Martin Corp., Fort Worth, Texas, is awarded $7,514,515 for modification P00015 to a previously awarded fixed-price-incentive-fee contract (N0001918C1048) to establish organic depot component repair capabilities for the F-35 Lightning II Air Interceptor System in support of the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy. Work will be performed in Rochester, Kent, United Kingdom (81.6 percent); and Fort Worth, Texas (18.4 percent), and is expected to be completed in March 2023. Fiscal 2017 aircraft procurement (Air Force); and fiscal 2019 aircraft procurement (Navy, Marine Corp. and Air Force) funds in the amount of $7,514,515 are being obligated at time of award, $3,757,257 of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract combines purchases for the Air Force ($3,757,257; 50 percent); Marine Corps ($1,878,629; 25 percent); and Navy ($1,878,629; 25 percent). The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. ARMY A4 Construction Company Inc.,* Sandy, Utah, was awarded a $12,309,817 firm-fixed-price contract for construction of a Special Operation Forces Human Performance Training Center. Bids were solicited via the internet with eight received. Work will be performed in Fort Carson, Colorado, with an estimated completion date of May 6, 2021. Fiscal 2019 military construction funds in the amount of $12,309,817 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska, is the contracting activity (W9128F-19-C-0018). DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY Federal Prison Industries, Inc.,** doing business as UNICOR, Washington, District of Columbia, has been awarded a maximum $9,558,000 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for parkas. This is a one-year base contract with two one-year option periods. Locations of performance are Washington, District of Columbia; and Kentucky, with a May 2, 2020, performance completion date. Using military service is Navy. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2019 through 2020 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (SPE1C1-19-D-F024). *Small business **Mandatory source https://dod.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/1836925/source/GovDelivery/
November 21, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR
By: Agnes Helou BEIRUT — The so-called Arab NATO, a U.S.-led initiative, has the potential to address threats to the Gulf and the Middle East. So what is delaying the creation of such an alliance? An Arab NATO would consist of six Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman and Qatar) plus Egypt and Jordan. “It is an American idea that has been approved by the Arab Gulf countries, but it didn't take shape yet. I expect such a NATO to be successful, but we are still at the beginning,” explained Maj. Gen. Hamad bin Abdallah al-Khalifah, the commander of the Royal Bahraini Air Force. Last month, the Bahraini minister of foreign affairs said at the IISS Manama Dialogue 2018 that the idea of an Arab NATO would become reality by 2019. One sign of progress: Gulf countries already share military capabilities and in joint training and operations, such as the Saudi-led airstrikes in Yemen. “We have been sharing information between coalition fighters all along the operations, and we have been training alongside with the Gulf countries through joint exercises, and this enhances our capabilities,” al-Khalifah said. On the other hand, there are clear challenges ahead for such an Arab NATO. These include issues of interoperability; the eight nations operated different types of military platforms. For instance, Egypt operates the Russian Mig-25M and the American F-16, while Saudi Arabia operates the American F-15SA and the European Eurofighter Typhoon and the UAE operates the F-16 and the French Mirage. Replying to a question about data sharing between various platforms, Rick Groesch, Lockheed Martin vice president for the Middle East, said: “When a country buys U.S. equipment, there are certain things signed up in their agreement. In other words, a country can't put a non- U.S. weapon on a U.S. weapon system without approval from the government.” But data sharing is not the only obstacle for an Arab Nato. The relationship between Qatar and other Gulf countries following a blockade of the former remains unresolved. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain cut relations with Qatar in June 2017 in a form of land, maritime and air blockade. Another shared concern among the eight countries is Iran and its proxy militias. Commander of U.S. Air Forces Central Command, Lt. Gen. Joseph Guastella, mentioned Iran specifically as a threat to stability in the Gulf region, during the 2nd Manama Airpower Symposium on Nov. 13. “Iran continues to cause risks to other nations and act as a destabilizing agent across this region. They aim to disrupt the balance of power and place at risk the livelihood of citizens,” Guastella said. “When the Iranian military exercises are aimed at the blocking at the Strait of Hormuz, the potential of miscalculation of military intent has strategic consequences. Their actions are directly aimed to threaten all of our economies." Observing similar alliances may prove helpful in standing up an Arab NATO, he added. “There is value in looking at what NATO has been able to do and the successes of an alliance that has guaranteed essentially stability for the region there for decades," he said. "Could some of those lessons apply here? Could some similar alliance of like-minded nations in the Gulf come together in a way that offers the same stability it is offered? Could some of this be applied here? I think the answer is yes, and I think that the step to reach it should be considered by all nations involved.” https://www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2018/11/20/whats-standing-in-the-way-of-an-arab-nato