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  12 mai 2020 | International, Naval

  Build a fleet, not a constituency

  By: Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton The U.S. Navy's long-awaited award of a contract to design and build a new class of frigates has brought with it calls to dramatically expand the planned class of 20 ships to a fleet of 70 or more hulls. Like recent congressional efforts to build more of today's amphibious ships or destroyers, these recommendations risk putting the Navy on an unsustainable path and could fail to influence Chinese or Russian adversaries the U.S. fleet is intended to help deter. The Navy clearly needs guided-missile frigates. By bringing comparable capability with less capacity, frigates will provide a less expensive alternative to Arleigh Burke destroyers that are the mainstay of today's U.S. surface fleet. Freed of the requirement to conduct almost every surface combatant operation, destroyers would have more time to catch up on maintenance and training or be available to conduct missions demanding their greater missile capacity like Tomahawk missile strikes or ballistic missile defense. However, the frigate's size — less than a destroyer, more than a littoral combat ship or corvette — also limits its ability to support U.S. Navy wartime operations. Frigates like the Franco-Italian FREMM can conduct the full range of European navy operations such as local air defense, maritime security and anti-submarine warfare, or ASW. But the American FREMM variant will not have enough missile capacity for large or sustained attacks like those conducted by the U.S. Navy during the last several years in the Middle East, or like those that would be likely in a conflict with China. And although they could defend a nearby ship from air attack, the planned U.S. frigates could not carry enough longer-range surface-to-air interceptors to protect U.S. carrier and amphibious groups, or bases and population centers ashore. Proponents argue frigates' capacity limitations could be mitigated by buying more of them, better enabling distributed maritime operations and growing naval presence in underserved areas like the Caribbean and Arctic. In a post-COVID-19 employment environment, accelerating frigate construction could also create jobs by starting production at additional shipyards. Although they cost about $1 billion each to buy, the money to buy more frigates — at least initially — could be carried in the wave of post-pandemic economic recovery spending. But after a few years, that spigot will likely run dry, leaving the Navy to decide whether to continue spending about half the cost of a destroyer for a ship that has only a third as many missiles and cannot conduct several surface warfare missions. The more significant fiscal challenge with buying more frigates is owning them. Based on equivalent ships, each frigate is likely to cost about $60 million annually to operate, crew and maintain. That is only about 25 percent less than a destroyer. For the U.S. Navy, which is already suffering manning shortages and deferring maintenance, fielding a fleet of 70 frigates in addition to more than 90 cruisers and destroyers will likely be unsustainable. Instead of simply building more frigates to create jobs and grow the Navy, Department of Defense leaders should determine the overall number and mix of ships it needs and can afford within realistic budget constraints. The secretary of defense recently directed such an effort, which continues despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. This commentary's authors are participating in the study. As recommended in a recent study, instead of buying more frigates to expand the fleet's capacity, the Navy would be better served by adding missile-equipped corvettes like those in European or Asian navies. These ships could carry as many missiles as the Navy's planned frigate but would not incorporate capabilities for area air defense or ASW. The smaller size and reduced capability of corvettes would reduce their sticker price to about one-third that of a frigate, and their sustainment cost to about a quarter that of destroyers. The lower price for corvettes would allow more of them to be built and deployed, where they could team with other surface forces to provide additional missile magazines that could be reloaded by rotating corvettes to rear areas. In peacetime, corvettes would enable the Navy to expand presence and maritime security to underserved regions and provide more appropriate platforms for training and cooperation. Frigates will still be needed, even with a new corvette joining the U.S. fleet. Frigates would replace destroyers in escort operations to protect civilian and noncombatant ships, like supply vessels. They would also conduct maritime security operations in places such as the Persian Gulf or South China Sea, where piracy, trafficking and paramilitary attacks occur. Most importantly, frigates would lead ASW operations, where their towed sonar systems could be more capable than the systems used by current destroyers. Although ASW is an important naval mission, buying more frigates than planned to expand the Navy's ASW capacity is unnecessary and counterproductive. The Navy could gain more ASW capacity at lower cost and with less risk to manned ships by complementing its planned 20 frigates with unmanned systems including fixed sonars like SOSUS, deployable sonar systems that sit on the ocean floor, unmanned surface vessels that tow sonars and trail submarines, and unmanned aircraft that can deploy and monitor sonobuoys or attack submarines to suppress their operations or sink them. The U.S. Navy is at the beginning of a period of dramatic change. New technologies for autonomy, sensing, weapons and networking are enabling new concepts for naval missions at the same time fiscal constraints and pressure from great power competitors are making traditional approaches to naval operations obsolete or unsustainable. The Navy's frigate award is a great start toward the future fleet, but the Navy needs to take advantage of this opportunity and assess the best mix of ships to field the capabilities it needs within the resources it is likely to have. Bryan Clark is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, where Timothy A. Walton works as a fellow. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/11/build-a-fleet-not-a-constituency/

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  17 décembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Getting Brexit Done Brings Defense Challenges

  Tony Osborne Boris Johnson's election landslide on Dec. 12 makes Brexit on Jan. 31 a certainty. But as the chants of “Get Brexit Done”—a slogan used by the Conservative party in their election messaging—fade away, Britain's place in the world appears infinitely more vulnerable. Johnson's parliamentary majority means he can now sweep aside any opposition to pursue his vision of Brexit. But he was not the only victor. The Scottish National Party secured 48 of Scotland's 59 seats, which the party says is a mandate for a second independence vote. If it were to succeed, there would be far-reaching consequences to Britain's national defense capability. Scotland is home to strategically important air bases and, most significantly, the UK's Trident-based nuclear deterrent. Johnson is unlikely to approve such a referendum at least in the short-term, but the Scottish nationalists could make life difficult for his government, and preventing a referendum could be seen as undemocratic. The complexities of having Northern Ireland as the only part of the UK to share a land border with an EU country, the Republic of Ireland, mean that after a Brexit there will be a border in the Irish Sea between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. This, too, could have security implications and lead to renewed violence from unionist groups, as they see their political influence being eroded. Nationalists see an opportunity for a united Ireland once again. There is also uncertainty about the futures of Gibraltar and Diego Garcia. Exiting the EU means British security forces no longer will be linked to EU databases on criminals, organized crime and terror. Questions also have arisen about Russia's influence in the British democratic process, with Johnson suppressing publication of an intelligence report on Russian infiltration in British politics during the election run-up. And there is a fiscal aspect as well. Since the Brexit vote in 2016, Britain's GDP has begun to stagnate as economic output and investments fall away. National debt also is rising. The British Parliament's own analysis suggests GDP could be 7% lower over the next 15 years than without Brexit, and even with a free-trade agreement established with Europe. Questions then would arise about whether Britain could afford to maintain military spending. Currency fluctuations will affect big-budget programs such as the ongoing purchase of the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Britain is one of a handful of NATO countries with defense spending at or above NATO's target of 2% of GDP. The Conservative manifesto published in the run-up to the election calls for this to increase by at least 0.5% above inflation every year. Britain's defense budget for 2019-20 was £39.5 billion ($52.7 billion), and this will rise to £41.3 billion for 2020-21. The government will maintain and renew the Trident nuclear deterrent but also support the defense industry with “ambitious global programs,” including local construction of Type 31 frigates and local production of the Boxer armored vehicle. In December, the Royal Navy commissioned the second new Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier, HMS Prince of Wales, in a further step toward restoring the country's carrier capability. Following operational trials in the fall off the Eastern U.S., more are planned around the UK during 2020, paving the way for the first operational deployment in May 2021. The UK plans to have 35 F-35s in service by the end of 2022, and the government has committed to buying all of the 138 F-35s it planned to purchase when it joined the JSF program in the early 2000s. Whether that commitment is met and if the UK will purchase additional variants could be determined in a strategic defense and security review planned for 2020. With the retirement of the Panavia Tornado last March, the Eurofighter Typhoon fleet has become the heavy-lifter of the UK's air defense mission and is continuing air strikes against Islamic State group sites in Iraq and Syria along with the UK's MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aircraft systems. The UK now is stepping up development of a Typhoon replacement for the mid-2030s with the Tempest future combat air system, supported by Italy and Sweden. More nations could join in 2020, with Japan a key target. And with delivery of the first of nine Boeing P-8 maritime patrollers, the UK is back in the long-range antisubmarine-warfare business, with an initial operating capability expected in April. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/getting-brexit-done-brings-defense-challenges

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  29 juillet 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  Japan wants to be an official F-35 partner. The Pentagon plans to say no.

  By: Aaron Mehta , Valerie Insinna , and Mike Yeo WASHINGTON and MELBOURNE, Australia — Japan has formally expressed interest in joining the F-35 program as a full partner, but the Pentagon plans to shoot down that request, Defense News has learned. Sources say Japan's request to join the partnership creates major political headaches for the Pentagon, with fears it would cause new tensions among the international production base for the joint strike fighter and open the door for other customer nations to demand a greater role in future capability development. In a June 18 letter from Japan's Ministry of Defense to Pentagon acquisition head Ellen Lord, obtained by Defense News, Atsuo Suzuki, director general for the Bureau of Defense Buildup Planning, formally requests information on how Japan could move from being a customer of the F-35 to a full-fledged member of the industrial base consortium. “I believe becoming a partner country in F-35 program is an option,” the letter reads. “I would like to have your thoughts on whether or not Japan has a possibility to be a partner country in the first place. Also, I would like you to provide the Ministry of Defense with detailed information about the responsibilities and rights of a partner country, as well as cost sharing and conditions such as the approval process and the required period.” “We would like to make a final decision whether we could proceed to become a partner country by thoroughly examining the rights and obligations associated with becoming a partner country based on the terms and conditions you would provide,” the letter concludes. Lord, the Pentagon acquisition head, is scheduled to meet with Japanese officials this week, and the question of membership is expected to come up. But Tokyo won't like the answer. Although Lord's office will be responsible for carrying the final message to Japan, the F-35 Joint Program Office told Defense News that the partnership remains limited to the initial wave of F-35 investors. “The F-35 cooperative Partnership closed on 15 July 2002,” stated Brandi Schiff, a spokesperson for the F-35 JPO. The decision was documented in an April 2002 memo by the Pentagon's acquisition executive stating that, “except for those countries with which we are already engaged in Level III System Development and Demonstration partnership negotiation by 15 July 2002, we will not be able to accommodate any additional Level III partners due to our inability to offer equitable government-to-government benefits and U.S. industry's inability to offer equitable 'best value' workshare arrangements,” according to Schiff. The F-35 partners in 2007 reiterated in a separate memo that only the partners who participated in the development phase of the F-35 program would be eligible to remain partners during the production, sustainment and modernization stages. A source familiar with internal discussions says the Pentagon is concerned that letting Japan become a program partner would lead to other nations demanding similar access. Japan's query is hitting the F-35 program at a time of change. Vice Adm. Mat Winter, the head of the JPO, retired this month after only two years on the job, and Turkey's pursuit of a Russian air defense system has resulted in them being booted from the F-35 consortium, with all work being done by its companies to end early next year. So in many ways, Japan asking to be made a full partner now makes sense, said a former senior official in the F-35 program, who agreed to speak on background out of respect for current decision makers. “You now lost a partner in Turkey, so there is a vacant parking space, so to speak. And other than the U.S. services, [Japan] will be the one nation with the most F-35s,” the former official said, noting two changes that have happened in just the last year. “Ultimately, the Department of Defense, in coordination with the State Department, made up the rules," the former official said. "The Department of Defense can change the rules.” Global impact There are two tiers of participation in the F-35 program. The first-tier members are considered “partners” in the program, which comes with direct involvement in the joint program office. That includes having national representatives stationed in the JPO, weighing in on decisions about future capabilities, and deciding what future industrial participation looks like. And that industrial participation is important — building parts of the jet that go into the global supply chain is expected to net the partner nations billions in revenue over the lifetime of the program. The partners are made up of the first nine nations to sign onto the program: Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The second tier consists of “customers” for the jet, comprising nations that came later to the program. Those nations command less industrial participation, lack voting power on what future development of the jet looks like, and do not have officials assigned to the JPO. That tier is made up of Israel, South Korea, Belgium and Japan, but could expand in the future with Finland, Singapore and other nations. In December 2018, Japan announced a plan to expand procurement of F-35s from 42 to 147 jets, making it the single largest F-35 operator outside of the United States, as well as one of only three foreign nations to operate the F-35B jump-jet model. But Tokyo appears interested in increasing its teaming with the program, in large part because it wishes to take part in guiding new capabilities development as the plane gets ready for its Block 4 upgrade. “There are various merits in participating in continuous capability development and delivery deliberation process by partner countries. In addition, there is a further need to obtain flight safety information for accountability to the public,” the letter from the Japanese defense ministry reads. “I understand that partner countries are allowed to join [JSF Executive Steering Board], to be involved in capability improvement, to dispatch their personnel to JPO, to participate in parts production and to access further information.” The emphasis on the need to obtain flight safety information is notable, after an F-35A crashed into the ocean in April, resulting in the loss of both the plane and its pilot. Japanese officials have since blamed the crash on spatial distortion for the pilot. However, customer nations receive the same safety information that partners do, albeit slightly delayed due to the need to clear information. The letter also acknowledges that “partner countries share significant costs,” an indication that Japan would be willing to pony up more cash in order to join the inner circle of F-35 members. From a pure program logistics perspective, Japan becoming a partner would not be a problem, and in fact program officials would likely find it easier to deal with the largest foreign buyer of the F-35 as a partner rather than customer overall. The politics, however, quickly get tricky. Should Japan be allowed to join, the former official noted, “you've opened Pandora's box.” The former official specifically said that South Korea, due to its complicated political relationship with Japan, and Israel, which was the first nation to be added as a customer after the partnership option was closed, would try to use Japan's joining the program as a way in, as well. The official also highlighted Belgium, for now the sole NATO ally buying the F-35 as a customer and not a partner, as a nation with a strong case for promotion should Japan be allowed in. The best argument DoD could make would be that the sheer size of Japan's buy deserves special privileges, but that sets a bar that other nations could look to climb and effectively buy their way into a partnership. “This is a very interesting political football that DoD has to wrestle with. This is a bigger political decision than a programmatic one,” the former official noted. “I personally think DoD doesn't want the headache if they say yes.” No other countries have made formal requests to join the program, Schiff confirmed. Requests for comment from Lord's office, as well as the Japanese MoD, were not returned by press time. Benefits for Japan In terms of industrial participation, there are opportunities for Japanese firms to pick up work that has been removed from Turkey, said Richard Aboulafia, an analyst with the Teal Group. Major Turkish defense firms have had a hand in building hundreds of parts for the jet. Turkey's expulsion from the program, which includes the United States blocking Turkey's planned procurement of 100 fighters, means that production will at least temporarily move to the United States, with a plan to farm it out to other partners in the future. Turkey's aerostructures work could be picked up by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and to a lesser extent Kawasaki and Subaru, Aboulafia said. But he said he was “baffled” by the idea Japan would want more industrial participation at the same time they have publicly moved away from its domestic final assembly and check out (FACO) facility, which since 2013 has handled final production on Japan's domestic F-35s. The FACO facility, which is operated by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, will continue to carry out production work until FY22 to fulfill the F-35As contracted by Japan between FY15 and FY18. Instead, Aboulafia sees Japan's interest as being driven by a desire for future developments, given the decision to increase the island nation's planned procurement of the jet. “If they are going to base their fighter force on this plane for decades to come, they clearly want a say in how this plane is upgraded,” he said. “It's a sovereignty thing.” And floating in the background is another potential complicating factor for the Pentagon: Japan's continued drive to develop an indigenous fighter. Japan is developing a new fighter type to replace the indigenous Mitsubishi F-2 fighter currently in service, and wants the new design to enter service in the 2030s. It is also looking at development pathways for this project, with a fully indigenous design, collaboration with a foreign partner, or a spinoff from an existing fighter design being considered as possible options. The country is already conducting research and development into a number of relevant areas for fighter design, including stealth technologies, fighter engines and active electronically scanned radars, and had previously built a technology demonstrator, the X-2 Shinshin, and carried out a series of test flights with this aircraft to validate these technologies. Asked if the Japanese could be considering the fighter program in their decision to pursue membership in the F-35, Aboulafia bluntly responded, “How could they not?” Schiff, the JPO spokesperson, said the F-35 remains a critical focal point of the U.S.-Japan alliance. “Any opportunities to strengthen the alliance through interoperability and cooperation will be emphasized. As an FMS customer, Japan participates in F-35 user groups and other bi-lateral forums and engagements," she said. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2019/07/29/japan-wants-to-be-an-official-f-35-partner-the-pentagon-plans-to-say-no/