9 janvier 2018 | Information, Naval

Gestion de la propriété intellectuelle en approvisionnement maritime et de défense

L'industrie et le gouvernement collaborent sur les principes de gestion de la propriété intellectuelle en approvisionnement maritime et de défense

En 2017, Services publics et Approvisionnement Canada, le ministère de la Défense nationale, Innovation, Sciences et Développement économique Canada et la Garde côtière canadienne ont travaillé avec des représentants de l'industrie canadienne de la défense comme l'Association des industries canadiennes de défense et de sécurité (AICDS) et l'Association des industries aérospatiales du Canada (AIAC), par l'intermédiaire du Groupe consultatif de l'industrie de la défense, afin d'élaborer les principes de gestion de la PI en approvisionnement maritime et de défense.

Les Principes de gestion de la PI en approvisionnement maritime et de défense (Principes) fournissent une base stratégique générale pour la gestion de la PI en approvisionnement maritime et de défense par le gouvernement du Canada. Les Principes :

  • reflètent les intérêts nationaux du gouvernement et les besoins stratégiques en matière de capacités maritimes et de défense
  • reflètent les intérêts de l'industrie de la défense dans la protection de la PI établie à titre privé en tant qu'actifs commerciaux et économiques précieux et en tant que facteur de création et de maintien d'une industrie maritime et de défense canadienne innovatrice
  • reconnaissent que l'élaboration, la protection et la commercialisation de la PI font partie des priorités liées à la mise en œuvre de l'ensemble du programme socioéconomique du Canada, comme la croissance économique et les emplois
  • reconnaissent que la gestion de la PI entre le gouvernement et l'industrie de la défense intervient dans des secteurs stratégiques et dynamiques sujets à des avancées technologiques importantes, et soulevant des enjeux militaires émergents aux plans des capacités et des vulnérabilités
  • servent de cadre à des approches adaptables, souples, fondées sur des principes et axées sur les résultats qui mettent en œuvre des stratégies de gestion de la PI qui aident le gouvernement à se procurer les capacités nécessaires et à optimiser les ressources tout en renforçant l'innovation et la durabilité
  • servent d'encadrement à l'identification des exigences en matière de PI, à la rédaction des marchés ainsi qu'à la conception et l'évaluation des soumissions depuis les premiers stades d'approvisionnement, tout comme servent d'encadrement de gestion de la PI tout au long du cycle de vie des actifs maritimes et de défense

Les Principes cadrent avec la Politique sur les marchés du gouvernement du Canada et la Politique sur le titre de propriété intellectuelle découlant des marchés d'acquisition de l'État, qui prescrivent des approches pangouvernementales de la gestion de la PI notamment pour qualifier la titularité de la PI issue des marchés publics.

Principes de gestion de la propriété intellectuelle en approvisionnement maritime et de défense

Les Principes reflètent les principaux points d'accord entre le gouvernement et l'industrie de la défense du Canada s'agissant de l'approche que devrait suivre en matière de gestion de la PI pendant la durée de cycle de vie des actifs maritimes et de défense.

Les Principes définissent l'encadrement du gouvernement et de l'industrie dans l'élaboration des exigences, la conception des processus d'évaluation des offres et d'adjudication et dans la rédaction de contrats. Ils guident aussi la gestion de la PI pendant la durée de cycle de vie des actifs en réconciliant les intérêts nationaux du gouvernement et les intérêts de l'industrie à optimiser les bénéfices pour le Canada.

Les Principes reconnaissent que l'élaboration, la protection et la commercialisation de la PI sont critiques parmi un ensemble de priorités qui encadrent de manière plus générale l'essor socio-économique du Canada, notamment la prospérité et les emplois.

Les principes reconnaissent que la gestion de la PI entre le gouvernement et l'industrie intervient dans des secteurs stratégiques qui sont l'objet d'évolutions technologiques rapides mais également de capacités et de vulnérabilités émergentes. En conséquence, les gouvernements sont exposés à des cycles d'approvisionnement plus courts qui peuvent leur imposer de se retourner plus rapidement vers les marchés pour bénéficier des évolutions technologiques et pour optimiser les ressources.

D'autre part, l'industrie propose des avancées technologiques et de nouveaux produits et services tout au long du cycle de vie des actifs qui peuvent modifier le rendement ou le coût des approvisionnements. Les principes reconnaissent que tirer parti d'un marché aussi dynamique requiert de discuter de la PI très tôt dans le processus d'approvisionnement mais également de considérer la PI en fonction du cycle de vie des actifs ou des services.

Dans ce contexte, des stratégies de gestion de la PI adaptée, souple et fondée sur des principes et des objectifs peut contribuer au renforcement des capacités gouvernementales, à l'optimisation des ressources mais également à l'essor technologique et économique.

http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/propriete-intellec-property-fra.html

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