9 janvier 2018 | Information, Naval
En 2017, Services publics et Approvisionnement Canada, le ministère de la Défense nationale, Innovation, Sciences et Développement économique Canada et la Garde côtière canadienne ont travaillé avec des représentants de l'industrie canadienne de la défense comme l'Association des industries canadiennes de défense et de sécurité (AICDS) et l'Association des industries aérospatiales du Canada (AIAC), par l'intermédiaire du Groupe consultatif de l'industrie de la défense, afin d'élaborer les principes de gestion de la PI en approvisionnement maritime et de défense.
Les Principes de gestion de la PI en approvisionnement maritime et de défense (Principes) fournissent une base stratégique générale pour la gestion de la PI en approvisionnement maritime et de défense par le gouvernement du Canada. Les Principes :
Les Principes cadrent avec la Politique sur les marchés du gouvernement du Canada et la Politique sur le titre de propriété intellectuelle découlant des marchés d'acquisition de l'État, qui prescrivent des approches pangouvernementales de la gestion de la PI notamment pour qualifier la titularité de la PI issue des marchés publics.
Les Principes reflètent les principaux points d'accord entre le gouvernement et l'industrie de la défense du Canada s'agissant de l'approche que devrait suivre en matière de gestion de la PI pendant la durée de cycle de vie des actifs maritimes et de défense.
Les Principes définissent l'encadrement du gouvernement et de l'industrie dans l'élaboration des exigences, la conception des processus d'évaluation des offres et d'adjudication et dans la rédaction de contrats. Ils guident aussi la gestion de la PI pendant la durée de cycle de vie des actifs en réconciliant les intérêts nationaux du gouvernement et les intérêts de l'industrie à optimiser les bénéfices pour le Canada.
Les Principes reconnaissent que l'élaboration, la protection et la commercialisation de la PI sont critiques parmi un ensemble de priorités qui encadrent de manière plus générale l'essor socio-économique du Canada, notamment la prospérité et les emplois.
Les principes reconnaissent que la gestion de la PI entre le gouvernement et l'industrie intervient dans des secteurs stratégiques qui sont l'objet d'évolutions technologiques rapides mais également de capacités et de vulnérabilités émergentes. En conséquence, les gouvernements sont exposés à des cycles d'approvisionnement plus courts qui peuvent leur imposer de se retourner plus rapidement vers les marchés pour bénéficier des évolutions technologiques et pour optimiser les ressources.
D'autre part, l'industrie propose des avancées technologiques et de nouveaux produits et services tout au long du cycle de vie des actifs qui peuvent modifier le rendement ou le coût des approvisionnements. Les principes reconnaissent que tirer parti d'un marché aussi dynamique requiert de discuter de la PI très tôt dans le processus d'approvisionnement mais également de considérer la PI en fonction du cycle de vie des actifs ou des services.
Dans ce contexte, des stratégies de gestion de la PI adaptée, souple et fondée sur des principes et des objectifs peut contribuer au renforcement des capacités gouvernementales, à l'optimisation des ressources mais également à l'essor technologique et économique.
http://www.tpsgc-pwgsc.gc.ca/app-acq/amd-dp/propriete-intellec-property-fra.html
25 avril 2019 | Information, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
GUIDE À L'INTENTION DES ENTREPRISES QUI SOUHAITENT FAIRE DES AFFAIRES EN FRANCE https://www.desjardins.com/ressources/pdf/c00-entreprendre-le-marche-francais-f.pdf
14 novembre 2019 | Information, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
KEN HANSEN Ken Hansen is an independent defence and security analyst and owner of Hansen Maritime Horizons. Retired from the Royal Canadian Navy in 2009 in the rank of commander, he is also a contributor to the security affairs committee for the Royal United Services Institute of Nova Scotia. For people inside the Department of National Defence, a minority Parliament – coupled with election promises for increased social spending and tax cuts – represents an uneasy calculus. Defence spending is always on the chopping block because it represents the largest pool of discretionary spending in the federal budget, and every party spent the recent federal election campaign being vague about military policy – offering some kind of oversight-body reform or scrutiny over the billions of dollars that have been earmarked, even as they lent their support to ensuring the military has the equipment it needs. In particular, the single largest program in Canadian defence history – the Canadian Combat Ship plan for 15 warships – will be a tantalizing target for politicians looking to get rid of perceived fat. Such cuts to shipbuilding programs have even already become normalized: The order for Halifax-class frigates were trimmed to 12 from 18 in 1983 and the Iroquois-class destroyers to four from six in 1964, to name just two. The political leaders weren't wrong when they said the military procurement system is broken. But regardless of which party had won this past election, and no matter what tweaks at the edges that the Liberal minority government and its potential supporters pursue, the reality is that the core issue remains unaddressed: Treasury Board's bulk approach to purchasing the country's military kit. Treasury Board policy states that bulk buys are how military procurement should be done, to ensure the lowest per-unit cost. But this forces tough decisions about what to buy, since the larger the order, the longer it will take to produce them all – not to mention the problems involved with trying to predict the future of warfare. Information systems become outdated in five years; weapons and sensors in 10. With a planned operating life of 25 years, any ships ordered today will be out-of-date by the time the first are delivered, and fully obsolete by the time the last one arrives. Block purchasing leads to block obsolescence. Traditionally, when technological change threatens to render military systems obsolete, the best way to hedge was to order in batches of the smallest number acceptable. In the years before the world wars, for instance, countries working to build competent naval forces put less emphasis on fleet numbers and more on technology and industrial capacity until the last moments before conflict. Technological competence was as important as numbers for fleet commanders. Another outcome of bulk buys is that the volume means that they happen only every two to three decades (or longer, in the worst cases). With such lengthy dry spells between purchases, it is impossible to retain corporate knowledge in either the defence or civilian branches of government. More frequent purchasing keeps the process alive in both practice and concept, with lessons learned that can be implemented by the same people who made the mistakes in the first place. Such irregularly timed purchases have created desperation among defence planners whose vision of the future consists of short golden days of competence and pride, followed by long years of rust-out and irrelevance. Unwittingly, the dark decades were in large part of the military's own making because of its desperate desire to acquire the absolute best model available – a practice known as “gold-plating” – instead of working steadily to build capacity and skill that would address long-range fleet needs. This is a collision of interests. The Treasury Board looks only at capital-acquisition decisions from the perspective of the buyer. It's left to the military to worry about how long they may have to operate obsolescent or obsolete equipment and systems, and to do the necessary mid-life upgrading, which is partly why costs balloon spectacularly. Life-cycle cost data is actually far more important that the initial sticker shock of the newest and shiniest model advocated by the military's leadership. The mindset needs to change. Politicians who implement bureaucratic change will probably see some improvements in decision-making. But the biggest obstacle to defence procurement is that bulk purchasing is our lone approach, and that it happens only every few decades. Regular, planned capital acquisition is the best path forward, but all paths to the future must first run through the Treasury Board. No amount of political policy adjustment can change that. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-the-real-obstacle-for-reforming-military-spending-isnt-in-the-defence/
22 avril 2020 | Information, Aérospatial, C4ISR
Nathan Strout A new satellite that will provide weather data for U.S. military operations has passed its critical design review, Ball Aerospace announced April 20, and the company is now moving forward into full production. The Weather System Follow-on satellite is meant to fill three vital space-based environmental monitoring gaps identified by the Defense Department: ocean surface vector winds, tropical cyclone intensity and low-Earth orbit energetic-charged particles. The satellite will include a passive microwave-imaging radiometer instrument for the first two missions, which will provide timely weather collection in support of maneuvering forces. A government-furnished energetic-charged particles sensor will be used for the third mission, which will provide important space weather capabilities such as the ability to characterize operational orbits, space situational awareness and information on the ionosphere. “Measuring and understanding the physical environment is critical to military operations, from determining tropical cyclone intensity for asset protection and maneuver operations to how wind and sea state play into assured access and aircraft carrier operations,” Mark Healy, Ball Aerospace's vice president and general manager of national defense, said in a statement. In addition, the WSF satellite will collect information on sea ice characterization, soil moisture and snow depth. Ball Aerospace is the prime contractor for the entire WSF system, meaning it will deliver the space vehicle along with instrument, spacecraft and system software and algorithms for data products. The company was initially awarded $93,713,423 in November 2017 to design the system, and a year later was awarded an additional $255,418,494 to develop and fabricate the satellite. According to the Space Force, the WSF satellite is projected for a launch in fiscal 2024. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/04/21/ball-hits-milestone-with-weather-system-follow-on/