8 juillet 2024 | International, Aérospatial
Navy tests using drones for medical supply deliveries during RIMPAC
A Navy warship launched and recovered six drones used to deliver vital supplies and take the burden off manned aircraft.
23 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial
Tony Osborne June 22, 2020
Germany is set to become the first of the Eurofighter Typhoon partner nations to retrofit an active, electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, a move that should bolster the fighter's export potential.
The German Parliament has given a green light for Berlin to spend €2.8 billion ($3.1 billion) to install the Euroradar consortium's Captor-E radar in all—around 106—of the German Air Force's Tranche 2 and 3 aircraft from around 2023. Contracts should be signed in the coming weeks.
Export customers will receive Captor-E first. Kuwait has ordered 28 aircraft, and Qatar 24, and a batch of Kuwaiti aircraft will be delivered this year. But program officials believe that with the AESA finally receiving partner nation backing, the Typhoon's chances in competitions closer to home may have moved up a notch.
AESA-equipped Typhoons are proposed for both Finland and Switzerland. But the radar's capabilities could not be evaluated when the fighter took part in trials in those countries, as the participating aircraft were not fitted with it; its competitors were.
All four Eurofighter partner nations, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, supported development of the radar, done by a consortium of Leonardo, Hensoldt and Indra, but have been reluctant to make the retrofit investment. That is due in part to budgets, but also reflects their satisfaction with the currently installed mechanically scanned Captor. The AESA, however, boosts radar performance and range, giving the aircraft a sensor that can match the performance of the MBDA Meteor beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile. A mechanical repositioner helps widen the radar's field of view to around 200 deg., from 120 deg. with the existing mechanically scanned radar.
For the German retrofit program, Hensoldt will take a leading role in the production and delivery of the radars and act as the design authority, while Airbus will act as the test and integration lead.
“With this decision, Germany is taking on a pioneering role in the field of key technology for the Eurofighter for the first time,” says Hensoldt CEO Thomas Muller. “It is a signal for Europe that Germany is investing in a technology that is of crucial importance for European defense cooperation.”
Airbus Defense and Space CEO Dirk Hoke says the addition of the radar will increase the mission effectiveness of the aircraft and help integrate it with the Franco-German Spanish Future Combat Air System.
Leonardo, which led Captor-E development, will provide support to Hensoldt in its role as design authority. Leonardo will also supply the radar's processor.
Three different versions of the Captor-E have been developed or are under development. The German retrofit program calls for the installation of the Mk. 1 radar, which has been developed from the Mk. 0 radar that will be delivered to Kuwait and Qatar. The Mk. 1 adds new modes and a multichannel receiver. Along with being retrofitted to the German Tranche 2 and 3 aircraft, it also likely will be fitted to the 38 new-build aircraft planned under Berlin's Quadriga buy to replace its existing Tranche 1 Eurofighters, which lack the computing and electrical power for an AESA installation.
Work has also begun on the Radar 2 being developed for the UK, which will feature an electronic attack capability. It is expected to enter service in the mid-2020s, and the UK plans to install it on its Tranche 3 model aircraft.
Spain too is planning a retrofit program with the Mk. 1 radar, but also limited to its Tranche 3 fleet. Airbus revealed last November, however, that the novel coronavirus pandemic appears to have delayed Madrid's plans.
An AESA has been part of the Eurofighter's development road map for around 15 years. The consortium had originally hoped that it could form part of the Tranche 3 fleet. The capability was also part of the consortium's ultimately unsuccessful offer for India. But it was not until 2014 that the first Captor-E development radar began flying in the aircraft, making an appearance at the 2014 Farnborough Airshow.
The AESA radar capability is added through the Eurofighter's Phase 3B Enhancement (P3E(b)) package that will be delivered to Kuwait. Leonardo completed flight trials in support of the Mk. 0 radar development and P3E(b) in late May.
Along with the Quadriga purchase, known in Germany notionally as Tranche 4, the country is also planning to use the Eurofighter, as well as the Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet, to replace the Panavia Tornado fleet, although these plans are subject to parliamentary approvals that could come as late as 2022-23 (AW&ST May 4-17, p. 50). Egypt is also reportedly interested in purchasing up to 24 Eurofighters, possibly as part of a multibillion euro procurement from Italy that also includes jet trainers, helicopters and warships.
 
					8 juillet 2024 | International, Aérospatial
A Navy warship launched and recovered six drones used to deliver vital supplies and take the burden off manned aircraft.
 
					9 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial
L'Usine Nouvelle consacre cette semaine un important dossier à l'aéronautique civile et militaire. Eric Trappier, président du GIFAS, y accorde une interview (voir synthèse de presse du 2 juillet). Un article détaillé est par ailleurs dédié aux PME françaises qui trouvent dans les activités défense un amortisseur dans le contexte de la crise du secteur aérien. « Notre dualité est un facteur de robustesse », souligne Bruno Berthet, président de Rafaut. Gauthier Connectique, PME exclusivement positionnée sur l'aéronautique civile il y a dix ans, a opéré avec succès sa diversification. « Entre la décision de se diversifier et les premières commandes, il faut compter environ trois ans. Le fait d'avoir déjà comme clients Dassault Aviation, Safran et Thales nous a beaucoup aidés », explique son président, Luc Sevestre. Le cluster Normandie AeroEspace (NAE), qui regroupe plus d'une centaine de PME de l'aéronautique, a également lancé des actions pour obtenir une habilitation et une accréditation défense, et monte des rencontres avec des représentants du ministère des Armées, de la DGA et des grands industriels de l'armement. L'Usine Nouvelle du 9 juillet
 
					31 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial
By: Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark The head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said last week his top priority is establishing an Aegis Ashore system on Guam by 2026. New air defenses will help protect U.S. citizens and forces in Guam; but as Japan's government found, Aegis Ashore may not be the best option to protect military and civilian targets from growing and improving Chinese and North Korean missile threats. Guam is pivotal to U.S. and allied military posture in the Western Pacific. Home to Andersen Air Force Base and Apra Harbor, it is far enough from adversaries like China and North Korea to negate the threat from more numerous short-range missiles but close enough to support air and naval operations throughout the Philippine Sea and South and East China seas. Although the current Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery on Guam can defend against some ballistic missiles, its single AN/TPY-2 radar is vulnerable and cannot provide 360-degree coverage. Moreover, THAAD's focus on high altitudes makes it a poor fit to defeat lower-flying aircraft or cruise missiles that would likely be used by China's military against Guam. The island needs a new air defense architecture. Aegis Ashore is highly capable, but has its own limitations. Designed primarily to counter small numbers of ballistic missiles, its fixed missile magazine and radar would be vulnerable to attack and would fall short against the bombardment possible from China. Instead of installing one or more Aegis Ashore systems on Guam, a more effective air and missile defense architecture would combine the latest version of the Aegis Combat System with a disaggregated system of existing sensors, effectors, and command-and-control nodes. A distributed architecture would also be scalable, allowing air and missile defenses to also protect U.S. citizens and forces operating in the Northern Marianas. Guam's geography enables longer-range sensing than would be possible from a ship or a single Aegis Ashore radar. Fixed, relocatable and mobile radio frequency sensors should be positioned around the island's perimeter, such as compact versions of SPY-6 or Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor radars and the passive Army Long-Range Persistent Surveillance system. During periods of heightened tension, passive and active radio frequency and electro-optical/infrared sensors could also be deployed on unmanned aircraft and stratospheric balloons to monitor over-the-horizon threats. This mixed architecture would provide better collective coverage and be more difficult to defeat compared to one or two fixed Aegis Ashore deckhouses. To shoot down enemy missiles and aircraft, the architecture should field mobile, containerized launchers for long-range interceptors like the SM-6 and SM-3 rather than Aegis Ashore's finite and targetable in-ground vertical launch magazines. They should be complemented by medium- to short-range engagement systems to protect high-value targets such as the Patriot, the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System or the Army's planned Indirect Fire Protection Capability, as well as non-kinetic defenses such as high-powered microwave weapons and electronic warfare systems that could damage or confuse the guidance systems on incoming missiles. Today, destroyers patrol the waters around Guam to provide ballistic missile defense capacity beyond that available with THAAD. A new distributed architecture would place more capacity ashore to free surface combatants from missile defense duty. In a crisis or conflict, the architecture could add capacity with surface action groups and combat air patrols capable of intercepting threats at longer ranges. Instead of Aegis Ashore's large, single C2 node, a distributed architecture would virtualize the Aegis Combat System to allow multiple facilities or mobile vehicles to serve as miniature air operations centers. The mobility of sensors, effectors and C2 nodes in this architecture would enable the employment of camouflage, concealment and deception, including decoys, to complicate enemy targeting and increase the number of weapons needed to ensure a successful attack. INDOPACOM's plan for implementing new Guam air defenses should also apply lessons from Japan's aborted Aegis Ashore program, whose accelerated timeline contributed to the selection of the least expensive and technically risky option — two fixed Aegis Ashore systems — and the discounting of alternatives. Adm. Phil Davidson's 2026 goal of improving Guam's defenses faces a similar risk. Bound by an iron triangle, Guam's air and missile defenses can be good, fast or cheap — but not all three. If 2026 is held as a rigid constraint, the only solution able to meet the schedule and requirements may be the familiar, and ineffective, fixed Aegis Ashore architecture. Compared to one or two Aegis Ashore sites, a distributed architecture may require slightly more time to develop or funds to field. But a phased approach could introduce new systems as funding becomes available and allow expanding the system's capability to meet the evolving threat. For example, SPY-6 radars, C2 bunkers and composite THAAD-Patriot-NASAMS batteries could be fielded before 2026, quickly followed by the introduction of mobile assets. Guam and the Northern Marianas are essential to U.S. strategy and operations in the Western Pacific. Their defenses have long been ignored, and Adm. Davidson should be lauded for charting a path forward. A disaggregated architecture, however, will be more likely to realize INDOPACOM's vision of resilient and scalable air and missile defense. Timothy A. Walton is a fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Defense Concepts and Technology, where Bryan Clark is a senior fellow. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/30/guams-air-defense-should-learn-lessons-from-japans-aegis-ashore/