28 septembre 2022 | International, Autre défense

French 2023 defense budget adds $3 billion to fund 'war economy'

The increase was forecast by Defense Minister Sebastian Lecornu when he met with French lawmakers this summer.

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/09/28/french-2023-defense-budget-adds-3-billion-to-fund-war-economy/

Sur le même sujet

  • Did the US Marine Corps give up on a big ship-based surveillance drone too soon?

    23 septembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR

    Did the US Marine Corps give up on a big ship-based surveillance drone too soon?

    David B. Larter WASHINGTON — The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps both say they need expanded surveillance capabilities for a potential fight with China, but the Marines have cut bait on a big, ship-based system that some analysts say would make a big difference for both services. The Chief of Naval Operations' air warfare lead said earlier this month that every carrier strike group commander needs more surveillance, and he wants to find a way to get more pure intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance drones flying off the flight decks of Navy ships as soon as possible. That aligns with the Marine Corps' goals of having more ISR and network connectivity resident in the amphibious ready group/Marine expeditionary unit construct, as it is in the carrier strike group with the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye. But with the Marine Corps moving away from a large unmanned platform known as the “Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) Expeditionary,” it's unclear if the Navy and Marine Corps will be able to find common ground on the way forward. When asked if the Navy was moving toward more organic ISR on Navy flight decks, Air Warfare Director Rear Adm. Gregory Harris told the virtual audience at the annual Tailhook symposium that he was trying to find alignment with the Marine Corps' need for a medium-altitude, long endurance drone system. “Every strike group wants to know more and more and more about his battlespace,” Harris said. "As we look at future vertical lift and the Marine Corps looks at their MUX or Medium Altitude Long Endurance system, [we're talking] about how we can find synergy between the Marine Corps and the Navy's pieces of the MUX/MALE program and our future vertical life (unmanned portion) — we want to bring that as far left as we possibly can in terms of synergy between the Navy and Marine Corps. “But I promise you there is not a strike group commander or fleet commander that can get enough ISR out there. And that aspect, from a distributed maritime operations standpoint, what we can bring from the strike group whether it comes off a carrier, a DDG or the future frigate or comes off Triton, that is fantastic.” The Marines were examining a tilt-rotor drone that could take off from from a DDG or a big-deck amphibious ship, but Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation Lt. Gen. Steven Rudder told USNI News in March that the Marines couldn't get the kind of range and endurance they wanted from a tilt-rotor done while packing all the power and cooling it needed for high-end communications and early warning systems. “What we discovered with the MUX program is that it's going to require a family of systems. The initial requirement had a long list of very critical requirements, but when we did the analysis and tried to fit it inside one air vehicle,” they realized they had competing needs, Rudder told USNI. Analysts are divided on whether that's the right idea. Bryan McGrath, a retired destroyer skipper and consultant with The FerryBridge Group, said the Marines gave up too early on the concept, and that it works against the Marine's stated goal of becoming an arm of naval power. “The Marine Corps wishes to go forward fast, and that is a land-based, medium-altitude, long-endurance UAV solution,” McGrath said. “I think it's suboptimal. I think it is a blow to this whole concept of integrated American naval power.” Packing all that capability into a land-based system tethers the capability to basing rights agreements. But another consideration is that capability will be at the mercy of the theater commander, which means the Marines may get less use out of them than they anticipate. “I believe the Marines will find that those assets will be a lot more difficult to keep control of than they think they will be with respect to tasking once they are in theater.” McGrath said. "There will be customers for those ISR assets that will greatly exceed the tactical level of the requirement. “I think the Marines are making a mistake not working closely with the Navy to come up with an organic, ship-based MALE solution. All this does is push the horizon for such a necessary component of the ISR-T grid for the Western Pacific even further into the future. And all for a suboptimal, short-term approach to trying to solve its problems, and I think they are going to find that it will not solve their problems.” But the Marines are nothing if not aggressive, and Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger has clearly prioritized speed in his quest to reshape the service. Dakota Wood, a retired Marine officer and analyst with The Heritage Foundation thinks that's the right approach. “I think they have to go separate paths,” Wood said when asked about the Marines' embrace of land-based air. "I think the more you combine multi-service efforts into a single program, it gets bogged down by all the competing requirements. “The expense goes up, the ability to deliver capability ends up being less than was originally hoped for. And then these competing, or even conflicting requirements clash and it mucks up the whole thing.” Breaking the MUX program into multiple systems has the advantage of spreading out capabilities, and relying on platforms already in production will speed everything along, Wood said. “I'm a huge advocate of prototyping and trying multiple paths, and that costs a bit of money to do that, but you end up with a variety of platforms, all with unique contributions to the overall capability set,” he said. “The Navy has a habit of loading on additional requirements. They look for very robust, long-lifespan capabilities. And of course, the expense and complexity go up. Manufacturing time goes up. There is a delay in getting a capability in the fleet. I like the Marine Corps' aggressive posture: There is a sense of urgency.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/09/21/did-the-us-marine-corps-give-up-on-a-big-ship-based-surveillance-drone-too-soon/

  • France and Belgium strengthen their cooperation in land defence

    17 juin 2024 | International, Terrestre

    France and Belgium strengthen their cooperation in land defence

    BRUSSELS, June 17 (Reuters) - France and Belgium signed a memorandum of understanding on Monday to strengthen their cooperation in land defence with both countries acquiring each a 10% stake in John Cockerill Defense, the defence unit of Belgian equipment maker John Cockerill. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-belgium-strengthen-their-cooperation-land-defence-2024-06-17/

  • NATO advances in its new operational domain: cyberspace

    6 juillet 2018 | International, C4ISR

    NATO advances in its new operational domain: cyberspace

    By: Sorin Ducaru As NATO prepares for its annual summit, to be held July 11-12 in Brussels, media attention has been focused on whether member states will boost their defense spending and readiness across the traditional operational domains of land, air and sea. This reflects a needed focus on important, but frankly longstanding alliance priorities. What many NATO-watchers are missing, however, is NATO's full embrace of its newest operational domain: cyberspace. Just two years ago, at the Warsaw Summit, allied nations recognized cyberspace as a new “operational domain in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air, on land and at sea.” Since the Warsaw Summit, NATO has developed an ambitious roadmap to implement the cyber operational domain approach, with profound implications along lines of effort, such as: training, capability development, organizational construct, operational planning, training, exercises and strategic communications. Work in these areas is conducted with the aim to augment the cyber resilience and achieve mission success, in a cyber environment that is increasingly contested by adversaries. This is in line with the alliance's cyber pledge to prioritize investment in cyber skills and capabilities. Furthermore, the recognition of cyberspace as an operational domain opens the way for the integration of voluntary sovereign national cyber contributions into NATO operations and missions. Keeping in line with the other operational domains, NATO itself will not acquire offensive capabilities, but will rely on the contributions of its member nations. Already, the United Kingdom has led the efforts. In a Chatham House address last year, Sir Michael Fallon, former U.K. defense secretary, announced publicly that “the United Kingdom is ready to become one of the first NATO members to publicly offer such support to NATO operations as and when required.” At the NATO defense ministers' meeting last November, allies agreed on a framework of political and legal principles to guide the integration of voluntary cyber contributions from member nations. The framework ensures that any allied engagement in cyberspace will abide by NATO's defensive mandate, political oversight and compliance with international law. This is also in line with allies' support for the development of norms and confidence building measures, for security and stability in cyberspace. This year, allies' defense ministers agreed to establish a Cyber Operations Centre as part of the new NATO command structure, the first cyber-dedicated entity within NATO's command structure. This is the first step toward integrating cyber capabilities into NATO planning and operations, but specific considerations should be kept in mind. In the physical domains of land, air and sea, operational planning refers to of the physical forces or capabilities provided. In the cyber domain, integration will focus on the effects generated by the voluntary national cyber contributions, rather than the capabilities themselves, given that most cyber tools are unique and discrete. Within NATO, there has been a growing emphasis on developing the “digital IQ” of the allied military. In Portugal, a NATO Cyber and Communication-Information Systems Academy is being set-up, while cyber resilience is now featured in coordinated training curricula in every NATO member state. Cyber has been also streamlined across all NATO exercises. The NATO Cyber Center of Excellence in Estonia organizes two annual cyber-dedicated exercises. The first, “Cyber Coalition,” is testing the alliances readiness and response procedures and policies in situations of wide-reaching, persistent cyberattacks. The second exercise, under the Locked Shields banner, tests the skills of cyber experts in red-team/blue-team war games scenarios. This year, NATO's blue team won the exercises, signaling the growing interest of member nations to strengthen NATO's new operational domain. “All crises today have a cyber dimension,” noted Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg earlier this month. Soon after in London, Stoltenberg hinted that the July NATO summit will “take decisions on integrating national cyber capabilities into NATO operations.” This reflects a game-changing approach in terms of mainstreaming cyber across strategy and tactics, training and exercises, as well as military planning in all operational domains. This is consistent with the recent U.S. Department of Defense strategy, which aims to “invest in cyber defense, resilience and the continued integration of cyber capabilities into the full spectrum of military operations.” It is no secret that, in cyberspace, we are under attack as we speak. As the threat landscape expands, so does NATO's commitment to the new cyber operational domain. Ambassador Sorin Ducaru is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. Between September 2013 and November 2017, he was NATO assistant secretary general and chair of NATO's Cyber Defense Committee and Cyber Defense Management Board, having a leading role in NATO's cyber policy development and implementation. He is also a special advisor of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace. https://www.fifthdomain.com/opinion/2018/07/05/nato-advances-in-its-new-operational-domain-cyberspace

Toutes les nouvelles