Feds give Lockheed Martin first shot at $60-billion warship contract

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  12 février 2020 | Local, Naval

  Canada's submarine fleet spent 'zero days' at sea last year: government documents

  All four of Canada's submarines were tied up last year for repairs and maintenance — news that has the opposition Conservatives questioning whether the Liberal government can keep the second-hand fleet afloat for another two decades. In response to a written question before Parliament, the Department of National Defence said the boats "spent zero days at sea" in 2019, but three of the four would return to service at some point this year. Over the year, HMCS Victoria, HMCS Windsor, HMCS Chicoutimi and HMCS Corner Brook were in various stages of repair and maintenance. They also went into drydock for long-term upgrades meant to ensure the submarines remain operational until the end of the next decade. The Liberal government's 2017 defence policy does not envision replacing the subs until 2040, but a written statement recently put before the House of Commons indicates the navy wants to keep the boats "operationally effective until the mid-2030s." Conservative defence critic James Bezan said the acquisition of new submarines is not something Canada can put off for 20 years — and the Department of National Defence and the Liberal government should begin seriously looking for replacements. 'Do they have a plan?' "The boats are getting older and need to be replaced sooner, but I'm not sure that's resonating with the minister's office or the [Prime Minister's Office]," Bezan said. "You have to ask yourself the questions. Do they have a plan to replace the submarines? And do they even care that we have submarines?" The boats were docked last year after an intense sailing schedule for two of the four submarines over 2017 and 2018. HMCS Chicoutimi spent 197 days at sea helping to monitor sanctions enforcement off North Korea and visiting Japan as part of a wider engagement in the western Pacific. HMCS Windsor spent 115 days in the water during the same time period, mostly participating in NATO operations in the Atlantic. Bezan said he is not questioning Canada's need for submarines, pointing out that the navy has three coastlines to monitor, countries such as China and India are investing heavily to build up their own fleets and Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic has surpassed Cold War levels. "The best way to fight a submarine is with a submarine," said Bezan. "There is a growing need for submarines to ensure our sovereignty around North America. It is also the best way to patrol our Arctic waters." Frigates first The Liberal government has just started the process of replacing the country's patrol frigates — the backbone of the navy — through an estimated $60 billion program that will roll out over the next two decades. Following the release of the federal government's new defence policy in June 2017, a senior government official, speaking on background, cited the cost and complexity of rebuilding the surface fleet as justification for postponing the purchase of new submarines. The commander of the navy, Vice-Admiral Art McDonald, said that after some early struggles, the submarine program has reached what he described as "a steady state," and he's convinced the boats can be operated safely for years to come. "We know there's still excellent life in the Victoria-class submarine. I've seen that personally," McDonald told CBC News in a recent interview. "We'll be able to operate those boats into the 2030s, but to do that we'll have to continue with the routine investments we've made in them." Submarines are not cheap. Defence department figures tabled before Parliament show the navy has invested upward of $325 million in submarine maintenance, repairs and upkeep each year for the last two years. The bulk of the cash went to repairing HMCS Corner Brook, which has been undergoing an extended upgrade since 2015 following an accident four years earlier when it smashed into the bottom of the ocean off British Columbia. The boat is one of the three Canadian subs expected to be back in the water this year for "contractor trials" meant to confirm the repairs. The Chrétien government bought the submarines second-hand from Britain in 1998 at a cost of $750 million. Since then, National Defence has pumped billions into repairing and converting them for Canadian use. The program suffered a major setback in 2004 when HMCS Chicoutimi caught fire on its maiden voyage, killing one sailor. Almost a decade ago, navy planners started making a case for a replacement program. They told the former chief of the defence staff, the now-retired general Walt Natynczyk, that the military needed bigger, quieter submarines that could perform stealth missions, launch undersea robots and fire guided missiles at shore targets. The briefing was obtained in 2012 by The Canadian Press under access to information legislation. A year later, the commander of the navy at the time, the now-retired vice-admiral Paul Maddison, told a Senate committee the navy meant to operate the boats until at least 2030. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/submarines-canada-fleet-repairs-canadian-navy-1.5458632

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  8 juillet 2024 | Local, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Intelligence artificielle

  NATO, Canada, and the Demands of the New Battlefield Prime Minister Justin Trudeau with then-Latvian Prime Minister Krisjanis Karins at the Adazi Military base in Latvia, where Canada leads a NATO battle group, Monday, July 10, 2023/Adam Scotti By Elinor Sloan; Policy Magazine July 4, 2024   As we approach the July 9-11 NATO 75th anniversary summit in Washington, it is useful to recall that today, as in 1949, Canada’s primary security interest in NATO is to help prevent a general war on the European continent. Such a war, we know, would directly impact Canadian lives and prosperity.   An important part of preventing war is deterrence. Ever since Russia invaded Crimea, NATO has focused on using conventional military capabilities to deter potential Russian aggression against a NATO member. At first, the Alliance chose a tripwire approach. It deployed a small military force to the Baltics with the idea that Russia would be deterred by a recognition of the Article 5 implications of that deployment – that military action against a NATO member along its border would directly impact other members, triggering a larger Allied response.   NATO deployed battle groups to each of the Baltic countries, as well as Poland, with the Latvian one led by Canada. There was no thought that this tripwire force could actually repel Russian military action.   Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 gave pause to the tripwire approach. Within four months, NATO abandoned it in favor of a combat force that could face off against any potential Russian aggression. It ordered the conversion of the battle groups into full brigades; Canada has committed to transforming the one it leads in Latvia to a multinational brigade by 2026. The combat brigades are meant to be equipped for warfighting. In this regard, the war in Ukraine has given some indicators as to our new conventional military requirements.   Physical mass still matters. Far from the small, high-tech military forces that were at one time seen as the way of the future, the war in Ukraine has revealed that industrial-scale mass has returned to relevancy on the modern battlefield. Traditional combat platforms remain relevant. NATO’s new defence plans indicate the collective defence of Europe demands many familiar things: fighter jets, tanks, artillery, air defence, and long-range missiles. In the Ukraine war, old-fashioned artillery has inflicted the majority of casualties, and fighting without armour has proven costly.   The battlefield has become transparent. Sensors can detect almost any movement, while drones provide continuous battlefield reconnaissance. Forces must be dispersed, constantly on the move, and equipped with digital networks that can connect them across the battlefield and back to headquarters. Technology and access to sensor data enable decision-making at lower levels. Platoon-level forces can see and strike at targets with information that at one time would have been only available at the higher echelons.   Drones are forming an increasingly important and effective complement to traditional military platforms. Ukraine has used thousands of first-person view drones with small payloads to supplement larger artillery barrages against Russian forces. It has crippled Russian air defences by deploying decoy drones that make Russia light up its radars and instantly send targeting data back to larger ground-launched tactical missiles. It has coordinated the use of maritime drones and cruise missiles to take out a large portion of Russia’s Black Sea fleet.   Examples of the electromagnetic spectrum being exploited and blocked in electromagnetic warfare/NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre   Electronic warfare (EW) remains salient at every high-tech juncture. Advanced sensors, robotics, precision munitions, and battlefield connectivity are all at risk of EW disruption—and are a target of adversary EW disruption—as each side seeks the electromagnetic advantage.   Seeping into all of these elements is artificial intelligence (AI). AI is highlighting the importance of mass and industrial strength – since the ability to pick out thousands of targets points to the necessity of having thousands of weapons to strike them. It is processing and disseminating data to battlefield commanders at superhuman speed, blurring the line between intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance on the one hand, and command and control on the other. And AI is being developed as a solution to EW jamming, by enabling a drone to home-in on its target even if the signal connection to its pilot operator is cut. The combination of traditional military requirements, cutting-edge technology, and fledgling but advancing AI is creating what some have called a “new kind of industrial war.”   Canada will be challenged to respond to these military requirements. On the personnel side, it struggles to maintain its existing recruitment levels, much less to field a larger force. Our North, Strong and Free, Canada’s defence policy released in April 2024, states a priority of modernizing the Canadian Armed Forces’ recruitment process to rebuild the military by 2032.   In the area of military capabilities, the policy includes acquiring long-range missiles for the Army; modernizing its artillery; upgrading or replacing its tanks and light armoured vehicles; and acquiring both strike drones and counter-drone assets that can neutralize adversary drones. The Army is in the early stages of modernizing its electronic warfare capabilities, as well as acquiring command and control systems at the tactical and operational levels for digital connectivity on the battlefield. The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces have launched their first Artificial Intelligence Strategy, stating AI will be foundational to defence modernization. Yet they have just begun to identify the AI-enabled capabilities that our military will need. The challenge with respect to acquiring military capabilities is not so much in securing funding. Rather, it lies in recruiting and retaining personnel with advanced technological skills, and in navigating a defence procurement system which, through the accumulation of bureaucratic steps over many years, is now layers deep and overly time consuming. For good reason, the recent defence policy includes a review of Canada’s defence procurement system.   Ensuring there is no general war on the European continent endures as Canada’s key security interest in NATO. Central to this is credible conventional military deterrence. People and equipment are the core elements. A streamlined, effective personnel recruitment system, and defence procurement process, are the critical enablers.   Elinor Sloan is a Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University. She previously served as a defence analyst in the Department of National Defence. Prior to completing her PhD at Tufts University, she was a logistics officer in the Canadian Armed Forces.  

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  7 décembre 2024 | Local, Terrestre

  BAE wins $2.5B deal to supply more CV90 vehicles to Denmark, Sweden

  Denmark and Sweden are collectively spending $2.5 billion to bolster their CV90 combat vehicle stock while still supplying more vehicles to Ukraine.