15 octobre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
NAVY
Electric Boat Corp., Groton, Connecticut, is awarded a $434,370,635 contract for lead yard support and development studies and design efforts related to Virginia class submarines. Work will be performed in Groton, Connecticut (94.1%); Newport News, Virginia (4.8%); and Newport and Quonset, Rhode Island (combined 1.1%), and is expected to be complete by September 2020. The contract provides lead yard support for Virginia class submarines that will maintain, update and support the Virginia class design and related drawings and data for each Virginia class submarine, including technology insertion, throughout its construction and post-shakedown availability period. The contractor will also provide all engineering and related lead yard support necessary for direct maintenance and support of Virginia class ship specifications. In addition, the contract provides development studies and design efforts related to the Virginia class submarine design and design improvements; preliminary and detail component and system design; integration of system engineering, design engineering, test engineering, logistics engineering and production engineering. The contractor will continue development studies and design efforts related to components and systems to accomplish research and development tasks, and prototypes and engineering development models required to fully evaluate new technologies to be inserted in succeeding Virginia class submarines. Fiscal 2014, 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 shipbuilding and conversion (SCN) (Navy); and fiscal 2019 research, development, test and engineering (RDT&E) (Navy) funding in the amount of $68,321,021 will be obligated at time of award. Fiscal 2014 shipbuilding and conversion (Navy) funds in the amount of $4,050,000; and fiscal 2019 research, development, test and engineering (Navy) funds in the amount of $7,341,250 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year — fiscal 2018 SCN (38.8%); fiscal 2017 SCN (34.9%); fiscal 2019 RDT&E (10.7%); fiscal 2014 SCN (7.1%); fiscal 2019 SCN (5%); fiscal 2016 SCN (3.4%). This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-1(a)(2)(iii) — only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity (N00024-20-C-2120).
Space Ground Systems Solutions LLC, West Melbourne, Florida, awarded a $17,082,880 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract modification to overall ceiling for previously awarded contract (N00173-15-D-2015) for spacecraft engineering, software, research and development services to the Naval Center for Space Technology (NCST). Specifically, the indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ) provides support for software engineering development, maintenance, enhancement and configuration management support for all components contained within the Neptune™ software suite under the direction of the NRL Configuration Control Board, and the VMOC™ software framework under the direction of the VMOC™ program management and software engineering teams. Funding will be obligated for each task order and no funds are obligated on the base IDIQ contract. Work will be performed in Washington, District of Columbia (50%); and West Melbourne, Florida (50%), and is expected to be completed by March 2020. The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity.
Rolls-Royce Corp., Indianapolis, Indiana, is awarded a $9,066,270 modification (P00013) to a previously awarded firm-fixed-price contract (N00019-17-C-0081). This modification exercises an option to procure three spare AE1107C engines in support of the V-22 Osprey program for the government of Japan. Work will be performed in Indianapolis, Indiana, and is expected to be completed in November 2020. Foreign military sales funds in the amount of $9,066,270 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity.
ARMY
Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., Huntsville, Alabama, was awarded a $60,619,031 modification (P00185) to contract W31P4Q-08-C-0418 for engineering, logistics, integration, test and evaluation, and program management activities. Work will be performed in Huntsville, Alabama, with an estimated completion date of March 31, 2021. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds in the amount of $5,000,000 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, is the contracting activity.
BAE Systems Ordnance Systems Inc., Radford, Virginia, was awarded an $8,309,050 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to incorporate a requirement to stabilize the legacy nitroglycerin area facility at Radford Army Ammunition Plant. One bid was solicited with one bid received. Work will be performed in Radford, Virginia, with an estimated completion date of Dec. 31, 2021. Fiscal 2019 procurement of ammunition, Army funds in the amount of $8,309,050 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, is the contracting activity (W52P1J-20-F-0021).
DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY
Northrop Grumman Systems Corp., El Segundo, California, has been awarded a maximum $24,299,972 firm-fixed-priced delivery order (SPRPA1-19-F-LT31) against a five-year basic ordering agreement (SPRPA1-15-G-001Z) for rudders in support of the F/A-18 aircraft platform. This was a sole-source acquisition using justification 10 U.S. Code 2304 (c)(1), as stated in Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-1. This is a seven-year contract with no option periods. Location of performance is California, with an Aug. 31, 2026, performance completion date. Using military service is Navy. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2020 through 2026 Navy working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Aviation, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Belleville Shoe Co.,* Belleville, Illinois, has been awarded a maximum $12,524,036 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for Air Force temperate weather, Coyote boots. This was a competitive acquisition with two responses received. This is a one-year base contract with three one-year option periods. Location of performance is Illinois, with an Oct. 10, 2020, performance completion date. Using customer is Air Force. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2019 through 2020 defense working capital funds. The contracting agency is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (SPE1C1-20-D-1208).
*Small Business
https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/1988088/source/GovDelivery/
4 janvier 2024 | International, Naval
The sea service in late 2023 identified non-kinetic effects — digital weaponry and other high-tech attacks — as a decider of future conflicts.
31 juillet 2024 | International, Aérospatial
7 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial
Integrating missile defense – shooting down incoming missiles – with missile offense – destroying the launchers before they fire again – requires major changes in how the military fights. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR.on July 07, 2020 at 4:00 AM WASHINGTON: Don't try to shoot down each arrow as it comes; shoot the archer. That's a time-honored military principle that US forces would struggle to implement in an actual war with China, Russia, North Korea, or Iran, warns a new report from thinktank CSIS. New technology, like the Army's IBCS command network – now entering a major field test — can be part of the solution, but it's only part, writes Brian Green, a veteran of 30 years in the Pentagon, Capitol Hill, and the aerospace industry. Equally important and problematic are the command-and-control arrangements that determine who makes the decision to fire what, at what, and when. Today, the military has completely different units, command systems, doctrines, and legal/regulatory authorities for missile defense – which tries to shoot down threats the enemy has already launched – and for long range offensive strikes – which could keep the enemy from launching in the first place, or at least from getting off a second salvo, by destroying launchers, command posts, and targeting systems. While generals and doctrine-writers have talked about “offense-defense integration” for almost two decades, Green says, the concept remains shallow and incomplete. “A thorough implementation of ODI would touch almost every aspect of the US military, including policy, doctrine, organization, training, materiel, and personnel,” Green writes. “It would require a fundamental rethinking of terms such as ‘offense' and ‘defense' and of how the joint force fights.” Indeed, it easily blurs into the even larger problem of coordinating all the services across all five domains of warfare – land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace – in what's known as Joint All-Domain Operations. The bifurcation between offense and defense runs from the loftiest strategic level down to tactical: At the highest level, US Strategic Command commands both the nation's nuclear deterrent and homeland missile defense. But these functions are split between three different subcommands within STRATCOM, one for Air Force ICBMs and bombers (offense), one for Navy ballistic missile submarines (also offense), and one for Integrated Missile Defense. In forward theaters, the Army provides ground-based missile defense, but those units – Patriot batteries, THAAD, Sentinel radars – belong to separate brigades from the Army's own long-range missile artillery, and they're even less connected to offensive airstrikes from the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The Navy's AEGIS system arguably does the best job of integrating offense and defense in near-real-time, Green says, but even there, “different capabilities onboard a given ship can come under different commanders,” one with the authority to unleash Standard Missile interceptors against incoming threats and the other with the authority to fire Tomahawk missiles at the enemy launchers. This division of labor might have worked when warfare was slower. But China and Russia have invested massively in their arsenals of long-range, precision-guided missiles, along with the sensors and command networks to direct them to their targets. So, on a lesser scale, have North Korea and Iran. The former deputy secretary of defense, Bob Work, warned of future conflicts in which “salvo exchanges” of hundreds of missiles – hopefully not nuclear ones – might rocket across the war zone within hours. It's been obvious for over a decade that current missile defense systems simply can't cope with the sheer number of incoming threats involved, which led the chiefs of the Army and Navy to sign a famous “eight-star memo” in late 2014 that called, among other things, for stopping enemy missiles “left of launch.” But that approach would require real-time coordination between the offensive weapons, responsible for destroying enemy launchers, command posts, and targeting systems, and the defensive ones, responsible for shooting down whatever missiles made it into the air. While Navy Aegis and Army IBCS show some promise, Green writes, neither is yet capable of moving the data required among all the users who would need it: Indeed, IBCS is still years away from connecting all the Army's defensive systems, while Aegis only recently gained an offensive anti-ship option, a modified SM-6, alongside its defensive missiles. As two Army generals cautioned in a recent interview with Breaking Defense, missile defense and offense have distinctly different technical requirements that limit the potential of using a single system to run both. There are different legal restrictions as well: Even self-defense systems operate under strict limits, lest they accidentally shoot down friendly aircraft or civilian airliners, and offensive strikes can easily escalate a conflict. Green's 35-page paper doesn't solve these problems. But it's useful examination of how complex they can become. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/07/future-missile-war-needs-new-kind-of-command-csis/