6 mai 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité, Autre défense

Contract Awards by US Department of Defense - May 3, 2019

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Insitu Inc., Bingen, Washington, was awarded a maximum $23,000,000 modification (P00019) for an existing non-competitive, single award, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract (H92222-16-D-0031) for Mid-Endurance Unmanned Aircraft Systems (MEUAS) 1.5B intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) services. The $23,000,000 increase to a ceiling of $273,000,000 prevents gaps in ISR services until all task orders are transitioned to the current competitive MEUAS III contracts. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance funds in the amount of $7,354,530 are available for obligation at the task order level. U.S. Special Operations Command Headquarters, Tampa, Florida, is the contracting activity.

NAVY

Valiant Global Defense Services Inc., San Diego, California, is awarded $15,913,990 for firm-fixed-price task order M67854-19-F-7884 under previously award contract M67854-19-D-7876 to provide support services for the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Training Support Service (MTSS), MAGTF Staff Training Program (MSTP). Services will include pre-deployment training programs to Marine Corps operating forces, as well as command, control, communications, and computer mobile training team training at the functional and executive level to commanders and battle staffs, and technical training for operators and information managers. Work will be performed in Quantico, Virginia, and is expected to be completed by November 2020. Fiscal 2019 operations and maintenance (Marine Corps) funds in the amount of $5,380,849 will be obligated at the time of award and these funds will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This order was competitively awarded under a multiple award task order contract. The Marine Corps Systems Command, Quantico, Virginia, is the contract activity.

Lockheed Martin Corp., Fort Worth, Texas, is awarded $7,514,515 for modification P00015 to a previously awarded fixed-price-incentive-fee contract (N0001918C1048) to establish organic depot component repair capabilities for the F-35 Lightning II Air Interceptor System in support of the Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy. Work will be performed in Rochester, Kent, United Kingdom (81.6 percent); and Fort Worth, Texas (18.4 percent), and is expected to be completed in March 2023. Fiscal 2017 aircraft procurement (Air Force); and fiscal 2019 aircraft procurement (Navy, Marine Corp. and Air Force) funds in the amount of $7,514,515 are being obligated at time of award, $3,757,257 of which will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. This contract combines purchases for the Air Force ($3,757,257; 50 percent); Marine Corps ($1,878,629; 25 percent); and Navy ($1,878,629; 25 percent). The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity.

ARMY

A4 Construction Company Inc.,* Sandy, Utah, was awarded a $12,309,817 firm-fixed-price contract for construction of a Special Operation Forces Human Performance Training Center. Bids were solicited via the internet with eight received. Work will be performed in Fort Carson, Colorado, with an estimated completion date of May 6, 2021. Fiscal 2019 military construction funds in the amount of $12,309,817 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Omaha, Nebraska, is the contracting activity (W9128F-19-C-0018).

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Federal Prison Industries, Inc.,** doing business as UNICOR, Washington, District of Columbia, has been awarded a maximum $9,558,000 firm-fixed-price, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for parkas. This is a one-year base contract with two one-year option periods. Locations of performance are Washington, District of Columbia; and Kentucky, with a May 2, 2020, performance completion date. Using military service is Navy. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2019 through 2020 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (SPE1C1-19-D-F024).

*Small business

**Mandatory source

https://dod.defense.gov/News/Contracts/Contract-View/Article/1836925/source/GovDelivery/

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