Casualty evacuation: Fine-tuning the RCAF’s CMERT capability

Sur le même sujet

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  26 mars 2020 | Local, C4ISR, Sécurité

  All-volunteer cyber civil defence brigade assembles to fight COVID-19 hackers

  Number of online attacks on health care institutions jumped 475 per cent in one month, says one report Murray Brewster Civil defence used to involve air raid wardens, ambulance drivers and rescue teams. That was at the height of the Cold War, and the hot wars of the 20th century that preceded it. These days, it means taking the fight online — against hackers and cyber criminals looking to take down or ransom critical infrastructure, such as hospitals. The COVID-19 crisis has prompted Canadian IT professionals to form an all-volunteer cyber defence team to protect Canada's hospitals, health-care providers, municipalities and critical infrastructure from online attacks during the COVID-19 crisis. The SecDev Group, which has pioneered advanced analytics and cyber safety, has been spearheading the recruitment effort and has asked information technology professionals to step up and provide preventative measures and remedial services. 'Preying on fear' "Hackers are targeting hospitals and health care providers, preying on their distraction, fear and anxiety and their hope for a cure," said Rafal Rohozinski, principal and CEO of the SecDev Group "Posing as public health officials from the World Health Organization, [the] Centers for Disease Control and UNICEF, cyber criminals are flooding hospitals, medical laboratories, vaccine testing facilities, municipalities and critical service providers with phishing emails, forcing some to shut down." Trudeau leaves door open to using smartphone data to track Canadians' compliance with pandemic rules Twelve companies and associations have signed on to the initiative. Together, they plan to set up a secure online exchange to match high-tech professionals — who will volunteer their services free of charge — with agencies and institutions that need help to shore up their cyber protection, or to deal with an intrusion. "It's both a patriotic and public service reflex," said Rohozinski. "If the internet goes down, and in particular if critical institutions that we count on — like hospitals, like cities, like utilities — start to be ransomed or start to go down because of cyber malfeasance, we're all in a lot of trouble." The exchange website is still in the process of being built, but Rohozinski said it will launch within days. Online attacks exploded since pandemic began Across the globe, the number of coronavirus-related attacks on health-care institutions has increased by 475 per cent in just the past month, according to a SecDev Group assessment. At the moment, no Canadian hospitals or institutions have reported being attacked. Rohozinski said there have been signs of trolling by both cyber criminals and so-called "state actors" — including some of the Russian groups identified by U.S. intelligence as being behind the tampering in the 2016 presidential election. The Communications Security Establishment (CSE), Canada's electronic intelligence service, has said it has taken down some fake websites that were posing as government departments and institutions and trying to scam people. The U.S. Health and Human Services Department was recently targeted and the FBI has warned that hospitals in the states with the highest rates of infection — California, New York and Washington — should be on the alert for attacks from foreign actors. Hammersmith Medicines Research, a British company that is on standby to perform medical trials on any potential COVID-19 vaccine, was hit with an online attack last week, according to published reports. Over the last few days, according to a Bloomberg news report, hackers targeted hospitals in Paris with a major cyberattack. A hospital in the Czech Republic was also hit last week in what is thought to have been a ransomware attack, which forced administrators to take the network offline. Forbes Magazine reported late last week that the cybercrime groups behind the DoppelPaymer and Maze ransomware threats had promised not to target health care organizations during the COVID-19 crisis — but at least one of the groups was reportedly linked to a recent attack. Remote work networks are vulnerable An executive at one of the companies now volunteering for the cyber civil defence initiative said one area where institutions likely need help is in protecting the virtual private networks (VPNs) of employees who've been forced to work from home because of the crisis. Robert Mazzolin, the chief cyber security strategist at the RHEA Group, said the VPN systems used by most hospitals, power plants and other utilities were never designed to support so many secure connections outside the workplace. "The world is fundamentally different than it was a week ago and I don't think any large corporation or institution realistically would have been prepared to see virtually its entire workforce be working from home via remote connections," said Mazzolin, a former brigadier-general who was responsible for cyber operations in the Canadian military. Canada's cyber spies taking down sites as battle against COVID-19 fraud begins Canada's health sector at risk of cyberattacks as COVID-19 fear spreads: CSE "That places a large stress on an institution's communications workforce. The threats out there, including ransomware — it's important to be able to defend VPNs that are stretched well beyond their normal capacity and limits." He said his company and staff, who regularly work for the European Space Agency, will be able to provide insight and capability that will complement existing networks. The mandate of CSE is to protect the federal government's electronic network and — through its cyber security centre — to provide advice and guidance to people and businesses looking for cyber security information. Rohozinski said there's a difference between providing advice and actively helping in the defence and the initiative has CSE's support. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/covid19-cyber-companies-1.5508570

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  3 août 2024 | Local, Terrestre

  Concerns raised about new Canadian Army trucks

  Training with the new Light Tactical Vehicles is to begin later in August and they're expected to be transported to Latvia by October.

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  8 juillet 2024 | Local, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Intelligence artificielle

  NATO, Canada, and the Demands of the New Battlefield Prime Minister Justin Trudeau with then-Latvian Prime Minister Krisjanis Karins at the Adazi Military base in Latvia, where Canada leads a NATO battle group, Monday, July 10, 2023/Adam Scotti By Elinor Sloan; Policy Magazine July 4, 2024   As we approach the July 9-11 NATO 75th anniversary summit in Washington, it is useful to recall that today, as in 1949, Canada’s primary security interest in NATO is to help prevent a general war on the European continent. Such a war, we know, would directly impact Canadian lives and prosperity.   An important part of preventing war is deterrence. Ever since Russia invaded Crimea, NATO has focused on using conventional military capabilities to deter potential Russian aggression against a NATO member. At first, the Alliance chose a tripwire approach. It deployed a small military force to the Baltics with the idea that Russia would be deterred by a recognition of the Article 5 implications of that deployment – that military action against a NATO member along its border would directly impact other members, triggering a larger Allied response.   NATO deployed battle groups to each of the Baltic countries, as well as Poland, with the Latvian one led by Canada. There was no thought that this tripwire force could actually repel Russian military action.   Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 gave pause to the tripwire approach. Within four months, NATO abandoned it in favor of a combat force that could face off against any potential Russian aggression. It ordered the conversion of the battle groups into full brigades; Canada has committed to transforming the one it leads in Latvia to a multinational brigade by 2026. The combat brigades are meant to be equipped for warfighting. In this regard, the war in Ukraine has given some indicators as to our new conventional military requirements.   Physical mass still matters. Far from the small, high-tech military forces that were at one time seen as the way of the future, the war in Ukraine has revealed that industrial-scale mass has returned to relevancy on the modern battlefield. Traditional combat platforms remain relevant. NATO’s new defence plans indicate the collective defence of Europe demands many familiar things: fighter jets, tanks, artillery, air defence, and long-range missiles. In the Ukraine war, old-fashioned artillery has inflicted the majority of casualties, and fighting without armour has proven costly.   The battlefield has become transparent. Sensors can detect almost any movement, while drones provide continuous battlefield reconnaissance. Forces must be dispersed, constantly on the move, and equipped with digital networks that can connect them across the battlefield and back to headquarters. Technology and access to sensor data enable decision-making at lower levels. Platoon-level forces can see and strike at targets with information that at one time would have been only available at the higher echelons.   Drones are forming an increasingly important and effective complement to traditional military platforms. Ukraine has used thousands of first-person view drones with small payloads to supplement larger artillery barrages against Russian forces. It has crippled Russian air defences by deploying decoy drones that make Russia light up its radars and instantly send targeting data back to larger ground-launched tactical missiles. It has coordinated the use of maritime drones and cruise missiles to take out a large portion of Russia’s Black Sea fleet.   Examples of the electromagnetic spectrum being exploited and blocked in electromagnetic warfare/NATO Joint Air Power Competence Centre   Electronic warfare (EW) remains salient at every high-tech juncture. Advanced sensors, robotics, precision munitions, and battlefield connectivity are all at risk of EW disruption—and are a target of adversary EW disruption—as each side seeks the electromagnetic advantage.   Seeping into all of these elements is artificial intelligence (AI). AI is highlighting the importance of mass and industrial strength – since the ability to pick out thousands of targets points to the necessity of having thousands of weapons to strike them. It is processing and disseminating data to battlefield commanders at superhuman speed, blurring the line between intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance on the one hand, and command and control on the other. And AI is being developed as a solution to EW jamming, by enabling a drone to home-in on its target even if the signal connection to its pilot operator is cut. The combination of traditional military requirements, cutting-edge technology, and fledgling but advancing AI is creating what some have called a “new kind of industrial war.”   Canada will be challenged to respond to these military requirements. On the personnel side, it struggles to maintain its existing recruitment levels, much less to field a larger force. Our North, Strong and Free, Canada’s defence policy released in April 2024, states a priority of modernizing the Canadian Armed Forces’ recruitment process to rebuild the military by 2032.   In the area of military capabilities, the policy includes acquiring long-range missiles for the Army; modernizing its artillery; upgrading or replacing its tanks and light armoured vehicles; and acquiring both strike drones and counter-drone assets that can neutralize adversary drones. The Army is in the early stages of modernizing its electronic warfare capabilities, as well as acquiring command and control systems at the tactical and operational levels for digital connectivity on the battlefield. The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces have launched their first Artificial Intelligence Strategy, stating AI will be foundational to defence modernization. Yet they have just begun to identify the AI-enabled capabilities that our military will need. The challenge with respect to acquiring military capabilities is not so much in securing funding. Rather, it lies in recruiting and retaining personnel with advanced technological skills, and in navigating a defence procurement system which, through the accumulation of bureaucratic steps over many years, is now layers deep and overly time consuming. For good reason, the recent defence policy includes a review of Canada’s defence procurement system.   Ensuring there is no general war on the European continent endures as Canada’s key security interest in NATO. Central to this is credible conventional military deterrence. People and equipment are the core elements. A streamlined, effective personnel recruitment system, and defence procurement process, are the critical enablers.   Elinor Sloan is a Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University. She previously served as a defence analyst in the Department of National Defence. Prior to completing her PhD at Tufts University, she was a logistics officer in the Canadian Armed Forces.