8 avril 2022 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

AÉRO MONTRÉAL EST À LA RECHERCHE D'UN(E) COORDONNATEUR(TRICE) DE PROJETS, DÉFENSE ET SÉCURITÉ EN AÉROSPATIALE (SDQuébec)

AÉRO MONTRÉAL EST À LA RECHERCHE D'UN(E) COORDONNATEUR(TRICE) DE PROJETS, DÉFENSE ET SÉCURITÉ EN AÉROSPATIALE (SDQuébec)

https://www.aeromontreal.ca/aero-montreal-est-recherche-e-coordonnateurtrice-projets-defense-securite-aerospatiale-sdquebec.html

Sur le même sujet

  • Cost of 15 new Canadian warships rises to $70 billion: PBO report

    25 juin 2019 | Local, Naval

    Cost of 15 new Canadian warships rises to $70 billion: PBO report

    By Christian Paas-Lang Canada's 15 new warships will cost almost $70 billion over the next quarter-century, according to Parliament's budget watchdog, and the cost could change further depending on the final design of the ships and when they actually get built. The estimate, released in a report by the parliamentary budget office Friday, is up substantially from a Canadian government estimate in 2017 that pegged the price of the project at between $56 billion and $60 billion. The 2017 estimate was itself a revision of the project's original $26-billion price tag. Also in 2017, the PBO estimated the total cost of the ships to be $61.8 billion, but its report released Friday updates that to reflect the design of the ships — frigates known as “Type 26” — which wasn't known at the time. It also accounts for delays in the project. The Canadian government will now pay out $69.8 billion over 26 years, the PBO estimates. In a statement released shortly after the PBO report, the Department of National Defence said it remained “confident” in its 2017 estimate, and that the “vast majority” of the difference between the estimates came from the PBO's choice to include taxes in its projections. Taking away taxes brings the two estimates to within 10 per cent of each other, the DND said. But the department conceded that any small difference means hundreds of millions of dollars in costs for taxpayers. The PBO report says the difference in the estimates is due to a later start date for construction and a heavier ship design. The report assumes ships will start being built by the 2023-2024 fiscal year, three years later than its 2017 projection. As the timeline extends into the future, costs increase due to inflation. The PBO originally projected a displacement, or weight, of 5,400 tonnes for each ship but the Type 26 design is a heftier 6,790 tonnes per ship, an increase of more than 25 per cent. The report also includes an analysis of what effect further significant delays would have on the project. For a one-year delay, the PBO estimates, an extra $2.2 billion will be added to the project cost, and a two-year delay would cost the government $4.5 billion. In an interview Friday, the top bureaucrat in charge of procurement at the DND expressed skepticism that the heavier ships will result in as much increased cost as the PBO suggests, but he did say the potential for delays was something he is “watching more carefully.” “The labour piece is always where uncertainty can remain,” said Pat Finn, the department's associate deputy minister for material, noting labour can make up around 40 per cent of the cost of a ship. Finn said the DND is in the “same place” as the PBO on the cost of “slippage” — delays in the project — but that he is confident the structure of the National Shipbuilding Strategy will mean the project could benefit from a skilled workforce and ongoing expertise. The purchase of additional Arctic patrol ships, announced last month, means there will not be a lapse in efficiency at Irving's Halifax shipyard, which is building the warships, Finn said. He set a goal for start of construction earlier than the PBO assumes in its report. “We would say between mid-2022 and mid-2023, we're in-contract and cutting steel,” Finn said. Potential delays would certainly increase costs, and it would be “absolutely no shock if there was additional delays,” said Dave Perry, a procurement expert with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. “To this point in time, the government has not been able to meet any of the timelines that have been put forward publicly,” he added. Still, the closer you get to construction, Perry said, the less uncertainty there should be about costs and the potential for further delay. The last thing that might change the final cost of the ships is the specifics of what components are chosen to fill out the design — which radar equipment, for example, Perry said. The DND is deciding on those components as it reconciles the requirements of the ships with costs. “You could potentially get a few-percentage-point swing” in price in either direction based on those choices, said Perry. “But if you're talking about several tens of billions of dollars, a few-percentage-points swing is real money.” https://globalnews.ca/news/5418997/canada-warships-cost/

  • Saab partners for Canada’s FFCP bid

    3 mars 2020 | Local, Aérospatial

    Saab partners for Canada’s FFCP bid

    Saab today confirmed the four corporate partners that will be part of its bid for Canada's Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP), which aims to replace the Royal Canadian Air Force's ageing fleet of CF-188 Hornet's with 88 new-generation fighters. Saab is leading one of three supplier teams currently involved in the procurement competition, which centres around the Saab Gripen E, Boeing F/A-18 Super Hornet and Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II fighter jets. Branded as Gripen for Canada Team, Saab's corporate team members for the bid include IMP Aerospace & Defence, CAE, Peraton Canada and GE Aviation. “We have assembled a dynamic roster of innovative leaders within Canada's aerospace industry, across multiple regions to offer the best solution for Canada's future fighter,” said Jonas Hjelm, senior VP and head of Business Area Aeronautics. “Saab is committed to securing long-term relationships in Canada that will create a significant number of highly skilled, sustainable jobs for Canadians within domestic and international supply chains.” Canada's evaluation criteria for its Future Fighter procurement is based on technical merit (60 per cent), cost (20 per cent) and economic benefits (20 per cent). In late-February 2020, the federal government announced it would extend the FFCP submission deadline from March 30 to June 30, but maintained its schedule to choose the winning bid in 2022 and have the first aircraft delivered by 2025. The 20 per cent weighting toward economic benefits is ultimately defined by dollar-for-dollar obligations – meaning, the fighter supplier provides Canadian companies with revenue opportunities equal to value of the purchased fighters. Defence Investment: Strong, Secure and Engaged Saab explains IMP Aerospace & Defence would contribute with in-country production and in-service support for the life of the Canadian Gripen fleet. CAE would provide training and mission systems solutions, while Peraton Canada would provide avionic and test equipment component maintenance, repair and overhaul, and material management. GE Aviation would provide and sustain the fighter's engines in Canada. https://www.wingsmagazine.com/saab-partners-for-canadas-ffcp-bid/

  • Comment: It’s time for us to start thinking about new subs

    8 juin 2020 | Local, Naval

    Comment: It’s time for us to start thinking about new subs

    A commentary by an adjunct professor in global affairs at the University of Prince Edward Island and a fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute Deficits and debt are spiking, and the pandemic has overwhelmed treasury decisions. But, at some point soon, Ottawa needs to make a decision on whether to acquire a submarine replacement. It generally takes 15 years to procure new major capital equipment for the Canadian military, and the four existing Victoria-class diesel-electric submarines acquired secondhand from Britain in 1998 have a planned operational life to 2035. Overlaying this is the reality that the two sources of past Canadian sub buys, the British and the Americans, now operate nuclear-only undersea fleets. Past attempts at Canada going nuclear in the 1964 and 1987 defence white papers revealed that option as too costly and politically contentious. When then-defence minister Peter MacKay floated the idea again in 2011, it met opposition pushback, despite the advantages nuclear subs hold in being able to transit Arctic ice, and was quickly dropped. Even the price tag of a non-nuclear acquisition deterred the Trudeau government from including a replacement project in its 2017 Strong, Secure, Engaged defence policy or the National Shipbuilding Strategy, a multi-decade attempt to provide the Navy and coast guard with built-in-Canada vessels. Instead, the government opted for an estimated $2.5-billion modernization project in the mid-2020s to keep the Victorias going to 2035. With no options for new or even second-hand buys from our two closest allies, consideration will have to turn to one of three options, one of which is to build overseas, preferably in collaboration with a country with similar requirements like Australia or Japan, or to build at home using one of the National Shipbuilding Strategy yards. Neither will be cheap. A 2003 Department of National Defence audit picked a $3-billion to $5-billion price tag for four brand new subs. That was 17 years ago. Of course, Ottawa could scrap the 100-year-old submarine service entirely as Denmark did in 2004 once the best-before date passes. However, going the Danish route would result in the loss of a vital capability that, by its very nature, is unknown to most Canadians. Subs, after all, work best when they are out of sight. What is known though are the headlines: the tragic 2004 fire aboard the HMCS Chicoutimi, the 2002 flooding in the HMCS Corner Brook and its grounding in 2011. Despite being purchased in 1998, years of sitting mothballed in British waters, the need to restart spare-part supply lines and to “Canadianize” the subs to our navy's operational standards meant that Victorias did not achieve full operational status until 2015. This year, it emerged that not one of the four subs actually went to sea in 2019 due to maintenance and repair issues. Yet beneath the surface, there is much to consider in renewing the capability. Canada's submarines, current and past, have provided our decision-makers with vital functions that few other countries possess. Submarines are known popularly for their weapons, but it is the combination of their very presence and intelligence and surveillance capabilities, including the ability to loiter for weeks undetected, that are their greatest assets. For a country with the world's longest coastline, bordering three oceans, submarines have proved instrumental in upholding Canadian sovereignty and strengthening critical alliances. A mere “notice of intention” to deploy an Oberon-class submarine altered the political calculus of Spain during the 1995 “Turbot War” off Newfoundland in Ottawa's favour. The Victorias regularly deploy to the Arctic during the summer months for covert surveillance missions. In the Caribbean, these subs participate in anti-drug monitoring. Further afield are the 100-day-plus missions in 2017-18 in the Mediterranean and East Asia. Working with NATO and Japanese allies, respectively, the subs were involved in training, counter-smuggling and counter-terrorism operations. In an attempt to boost familiarity with a complex and tense region, the Pacific deployment represented the first time a Canadian sub had deployed to Japan in 50 years. Tellingly, the subs are also up for consideration for deployment to monitor the enforcement of UN sanctions against North Korea. Even before the onset of COVID-19, the Indo-Pacific was the scene of a naval arms buildup between major regional players, China, Japan, South Korea, India and Australia. Now, factor in the worsening tensions between Beijing and Washington. With Canada looking to uphold multilateral security norms and diversify trade relations, helping secure our own waters and those of allies will become more important, not less in the years ahead. Now is the time to consider a future replacement — a lot happens in 15 years. https://www.timescolonist.com/opinion/op-ed/comment-it-s-time-for-us-to-start-thinking-about-new-subs-1.24147700

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