17 février 2021 | Local, Aérospatial
Estimated reading time 7 minutes, 45 seconds.
The Canadian government is inviting aerospace and other interested companies to qualify for the Strategic Tanker Transport Capability (STTC) project.
Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) posted the notice on the government Buy and Sell website Feb. 12 as a first step in a three-phase procurement process to replace the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) CC-150 Polaris strategic airlift fleet.
The invitation to qualify (ITQ), which closes on Feb. 26, is intended to identify respondents able to meet the project's security and other core requirements before moving to the tender phase. Once a qualified suppliers list is established, Procurement Canada and the Air Force will then review and refine the project requirements with companies before developing a draft request for proposal (RFP), to be issued by fall 2021.
The review phase “is intended to be a collaborative process and may involve interactions such as workshops, one-on-one sessions (commercially confidential meetings), and written questions and answers,” according to the ITQ documents. “Canada will consider the feedback provided by qualified suppliers.”
A formal RFP, the third phase, is expected by late 2021 or early 2022.
While the process means only qualified suppliers will be invited to submit bids, the government “reserves the right . . . to re-evaluate any aspect of the qualification of any Qualified Supplier at any time during the aircraft procurement process and change their status to ‘unqualified' if they no longer meet the requirements provided in this ITQ,” according to the document. In addition, “Canada may, at its sole discretion, re-open Phase 1 – ITQ.”
The RCAF is seeking a multi-role platform that can be configured for air-to-air refueling, personnel airlift, strategic government transport, aeromedical evacuations and freight movement, among other roles. The aircraft may also be used to support disaster relief, search-and-rescue and contributions to peace operations; it must also include the capacity to detect, avoid and defeat air-to-air and air-to-ground threats. In its tanker role, the aircraft must be able to refuel allied fighter jets on NATO and NORAD operations.
Though the ITQ does not specify a quantity, the fleet must be large enough to concurrently provide support to three lines of tasking of “unrestricted global air mobility movements” over a 24-hour period.
The STTC project was outlined in the Liberal government's June 2017 defense policy as initiative 47 to recapitalize strategic tanking and airlift with a next generation platform to replace the CC-150. The Polaris is a modified variant of the Airbus A310-300 built in the late 1980s, and operated by 437 Transport Squadron at 8 Wing Trenton, Ontario. A fleet of five was acquired in 1992 from Canadian Airlines, and two were converted to tankers in 2008.
While the two CC-150Ts have been providing air-to-air refueling globally (their crucial role alongside other coalition tankers in the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria was highlighted in a recent RAND research brief), they only recently received full operational capability to conduct mid-air refueling on NORAD operations — a role that had previously only been done by the CC-130H Hercules tankers operated by 435 Transport and Rescue Squadron from 17 Wing Winnipeg, Manitoba, and U.S. Air Force aircraft.
Boeing and Airbus have indicated interest in the program. Boeing is offering the KC-46 Pegasus, a militarized variant of the 767 widebody, while Airbus is promoting the A330 multirole tanker transport (MRTT), a variant of the A330-200 airframe. CBC has reported the government may also be assessing “whether any deal can be found among commercial airlines that are currently looking for financial relief from Ottawa,” including Air Canada.
“We look forward to working with the government of Canada and engaging in [the] Strategic Tanker Transport Capability project,” Boeing Defense, Space & Security said in a statement. “Boeing's KC-46A is a wide-body, multi-role tanker, and is already certified to refuel Canadian, allied and coalition military aircraft. In addition to serving as an aerial refueling tanker, the KC-46 can be configured to accommodate cargo, passengers, or to serve as an aero-medical evacuation aircraft or any combination of all three. . . . The KC-46 offers superior interoperability, supportability and affordability benefits – coupled with a robust industry plan that will bring real, guaranteed jobs to companies all across Canada. With 183 aircraft on order and growing international interest, we expect the fleet to surpass 200 aircraft by 2029.”
“We welcome Canada's invitation to qualify for the Strategic Tanker Transport Capability project,” said Simon Jacques, president of Airbus Defence and Space Canada, in a statement. “We believe that our A330 MRTT multirole-tanker is the best option in the market, and are confident that our offer will fulfill all current and future requirements for this key capability for the RCAF.”
Prospective bidders will be expected to provide aircrew and maintenance training programs, and establish initial sustainment and long-term in-service support “that assures operational readiness and maintains mission effectiveness of the capability throughout its service life,” according to the ITQ.
As part of the STTC project, the Air Force will improve infrastructure for 437 Squadron. In December, the government released an advanced procurement notice for a new or renovated hangar at the main operating base in Trenton, as well as upgrades to the apron and taxiways. A request for proposals is expected by summer 2021.
Contenders will also have to comply with Canada's Industrial and Technological Benefits policy, which requires the successful bidder to make investments in Canadian industry and academic research equal to the value of the contract. With STTC, the government will be seeking investments that align with key industrial capabilities, including aerospace systems, systems integration, in-service support and training and simulation.
https://skiesmag.com/news/canada-seeking-qualified-bidders-polaris-replacement/
10 septembre 2023 | Local, Terrestre
Thirty years ago this week, Canadian soldiers on a peacekeeping mission fought a pitched battle against Croatian forces near the town of Medak in the former Yugoslavia. Today, military members marked the anniversary of the Battle of Medak Pocket with a low-key ceremony at the national peacekeeping memorial in Ottawa.
29 mai 2023 | Local, Naval
Almost a decade ago, the notion of a conflict between the United States and its allies on one side and China on the other was described as the “unthinkable war” by major foreign policy and defence observers. Lately, it’s become clear that those same experts are thinking through the unthinkable.
5 novembre 2019 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
By Brian Mersereau Defence Watch Guest Writer During the recent federal election, the issue of considering a new Defence Procurement Agency or DPA surfaced again. The Liberals made such an organization part of their defence platform this time around as part of their plan to improve military procurement. While positive outcomes could result from a new organizational structure, simply installing one will not in and of itself create an efficient procurement model. It most certainly will not address in any substantive manner why taxpayers pay far too much to acquire the defence capabilities Canada needs to protect our sovereign interests in a world that has become increasingly unstable in recent years. It appears that, in many cases, Canada pays more per unit of capability to satisfy its defence needs than most of its allies. Unfortunately, though quite logically, this phenomenon has effectively shrunk the size of our armed forces as the number of platforms we can afford to acquire continues to dwindle due to high costs. While this approach can create short-term jobs, they are ultimately unsustainable since there is no international market for our higher-priced solutions. This is not the direction in which Canada should be headed. Before Canada decides to move ahead with a new procurement agency, it should assemble a “smart persons” panel or forum to thoroughly review the existing system and establish the mandate and objectives of whatever type of organization results from said review. Such a review group must be composed of people from the public and private sector with significant experience, not skewed with staff whose procurement experience primarily consists of exposure to the Canadian “way”. During this review, the panel must examine various issues which are currently perceived to be an impediment to the efficiency of Canada's procurement system. Based on my own years of experience on both the buy and sell sides of the procurement equation, the following areas merit some serious thought: Organizational Structure The fewer individuals, departments and oversight committees with their fingers in the “procurement pie”, the quicker and more coherently things will get done. Even at today's interest rates, time really is money for all involved in the process. Adding more time to a schedule for another management review quite often has a negative impact. While I understand governance and oversight committees have their place, their overinvolvement can produce negative outcomes if mandates are not absolutely clear and if individuals on these committees have limited experience with respect to the issue at hand. Risk Canada's ongoing method for defence procurement is that it will not assume any risk on their side of a contract. If Canada insists the private sector must accept all risk, the private sector will so oblige – but at a significant price and to the detriment of schedules and timelines. As contract prices necessarily increase, so do governments costs to manage the contract. In reality, the most efficient procurement solution for Canada would see some elements of risk managed by the buyer, rather than entirely borne by the seller. More consideration needs to go into balanced risk-sharing formulas. Process Canada has an extremely hands-on procurement process for major systems during the competitive phase, as well as during the implementation of the contract. Even in this digital age, Canada hamstrings its own progress with the sheer degree of detail and bureaucracy it requires; unbelievably, freight trucks are still required to deliver proposals. It seems as though, on occasion, the buyer thinks it knows more about designing and engineering the defence systems Canada needs than the actual designers and engineers for whom it is a primary occupation. Requirements of little or no consequence are painstakingly spelled out in the greatest of detail. Such an approach has a tremendous impact on the amount of time consumed by both the buyer and seller, again driving up costs and extending schedules. Less “hand holding” by the customer must be seriously considered. Sole Source In the procurement world, “sole source” is often viewed as a dirty phrase. Frequently, Canada attempts to run competitions in scenarios where the chances of achieving any meaningful savings or benefits related to competition are low at best. This takes years and drives costs higher at no measurable gain for the buyer. The parameters of when and under what circumstances Canada should move directly to a sole source should be thoroughly reviewed. Significant resources are being wasted managing nearly meaningless processes. Skills Canada's internal skill set for managing large, complex defence procurements does not appear to be adequate. As a result, it turns more and more often to the expertise of external third parties in order to keep up with large private sector firms at the negotiation table from a knowledge and experience standpoint. While there will always be a need for some third-party expertise, project managing many external suppliers in the negotiation phase – each of whom have their own agendas – only further complicates the already convoluted procurement process. Canada would be much better off with an enhanced internal core staff. If Canada takes the time to review the appropriateness of some form of DPA model, it must cast the net wider and review other critical aspects of the procurement process – or else any organizational changes will inevitably succumb to the systematic inertia of the overall process. A failure to do so means Canada will continue struggling mightily to stand-up the level of defence and security necessary to secure its citizens in an increasingly turbulent world. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/a-new-defence-procurement-agency-would-it-solve-anything