Retour aux nouvelles

5 novembre 2019 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

A new Defence Procurement Agency – Would it solve anything?

By Brian Mersereau

Defence Watch Guest Writer

During the recent federal election, the issue of considering a new Defence Procurement Agency or DPA surfaced again.

The Liberals made such an organization part of their defence platform this time around as part of their plan to improve military procurement.

While positive outcomes could result from a new organizational structure, simply installing one will not in and of itself create an efficient procurement model. It most certainly will not address in any substantive manner why taxpayers pay far too much to acquire the defence capabilities Canada needs to protect our sovereign interests in a world that has become increasingly unstable in recent years.

It appears that, in many cases, Canada pays more per unit of capability to satisfy its defence needs than most of its allies. Unfortunately, though quite logically, this phenomenon has effectively shrunk the size of our armed forces as the number of platforms we can afford to acquire continues to dwindle due to high costs.

While this approach can create short-term jobs, they are ultimately unsustainable since there is no international market for our higher-priced solutions. This is not the direction in which Canada should be headed.

Before Canada decides to move ahead with a new procurement agency, it should assemble a “smart persons” panel or forum to thoroughly review the existing system and establish the mandate and objectives of whatever type of organization results from said review. Such a review group must be composed of people from the public and private sector with significant experience, not skewed with staff whose procurement experience primarily consists of exposure to the Canadian “way”.

During this review, the panel must examine various issues which are currently perceived to be an impediment to the efficiency of Canada's procurement system. Based on my own years of experience on both the buy and sell sides of the procurement equation, the following areas merit some serious thought:

Organizational Structure

The fewer individuals, departments and oversight committees with their fingers in the “procurement pie”, the quicker and more coherently things will get done. Even at today's interest rates, time really is money for all involved in the process. Adding more time to a schedule for another management review quite often has a negative impact.

While I understand governance and oversight committees have their place, their overinvolvement can produce negative outcomes if mandates are not absolutely clear and if individuals on these committees have limited experience with respect to the issue at hand.

Risk

Canada's ongoing method for defence procurement is that it will not assume any risk on their side of a contract. If Canada insists the private sector must accept all risk, the private sector will so oblige – but at a significant price and to the detriment of schedules and timelines. As contract prices necessarily increase, so do governments costs to manage the contract.

In reality, the most efficient procurement solution for Canada would see some elements of risk managed by the buyer, rather than entirely borne by the seller. More consideration needs to go into balanced risk-sharing formulas.

Process

Canada has an extremely hands-on procurement process for major systems during the competitive phase, as well as during the implementation of the contract. Even in this digital age, Canada hamstrings its own progress with the sheer degree of detail and bureaucracy it requires; unbelievably, freight trucks are still required to deliver proposals.

It seems as though, on occasion, the buyer thinks it knows more about designing and engineering the defence systems Canada needs than the actual designers and engineers for whom it is a primary occupation. Requirements of little or no consequence are painstakingly spelled out in the greatest of detail. Such an approach has a tremendous impact on the amount of time consumed by both the buyer and seller, again driving up costs and extending schedules. Less “hand holding” by the customer must be seriously considered.

Sole Source

In the procurement world, “sole source” is often viewed as a dirty phrase. Frequently, Canada attempts to run competitions in scenarios where the chances of achieving any meaningful savings or benefits related to competition are low at best. This takes years and drives costs higher at no measurable gain for the buyer. The parameters of when and under what circumstances Canada should move directly to a sole source should be thoroughly reviewed. Significant resources are being wasted managing nearly meaningless processes.

Skills

Canada's internal skill set for managing large, complex defence procurements does not appear to be adequate. As a result, it turns more and more often to the expertise of external third parties in order to keep up with large private sector firms at the negotiation table from a knowledge and experience standpoint. While there will always be a need for some third-party expertise, project managing many external suppliers in the negotiation phase – each of whom have their own agendas – only further complicates the already convoluted procurement process. Canada would be much better off with an enhanced internal core staff.

If Canada takes the time to review the appropriateness of some form of DPA model, it must cast the net wider and review other critical aspects of the procurement process – or else any organizational changes will inevitably succumb to the systematic inertia of the overall process. A failure to do so means Canada will continue struggling mightily to stand-up the level of defence and security necessary to secure its citizens in an increasingly turbulent world.

https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/a-new-defence-procurement-agency-would-it-solve-anything

Sur le même sujet

  • Sweden’s Saab undecided on whether it will participate in Canadian fighter-jet competition

    4 septembre 2019 | Local, Aérospatial

    Sweden’s Saab undecided on whether it will participate in Canadian fighter-jet competition

    THE CANADIAN PRESS Days after Airbus Defence and Space pulled out of the $19-billion race to replace Canada's aging fighter jets, the only European firm still eligible to compete says it has not decided whether it will. Saab Canada president Simon Carroll says the Swedish firm is interested in entering its Gripen jet against its two remaining competitors, both of which are from the United States: Boeing's Super Hornet and Lockheed Martin's F-35. However, Mr. Carroll told The Canadian Press on Tuesday that his company is still analyzing the competition's nitty-gritty details – including a security requirement that forced out two other European jet makers. All bidders are required to explain by Sept. 20 how they plan to ensure their planes can integrate with the top-secret Canada-U.S. intelligence network known as “Two Eyes,” which is used to co-ordinate the defence of North America. But in announcing its withdrawal from the competition on Friday, Airbus said meeting the requirement would place “too significant of a cost” on non-U.S. aircraft. French firm Dassault cited the same requirement when it pulled its Rafale jet in November. “We are still looking at that security assessment side of things from the Two-Eyes perspective,” Mr. Carroll said. “We don't see any major issues with it as this point in time. Having said that, we're still reviewing everything through the whole [request for proposals] at this point in time and we will reserve the right to make our judgment on whether or not we provide a bid.” Airbus also raised concerns about changes to a long-standing policy that requires bidders on military contracts to legally commit to invest as much money in Canadian products and operations as they get out of contracts they win. Bidders can now instead establish “industrial targets,” lay out a plan for achieving those targets and sign non-binding agreements promising to make all efforts to achieve them. Such bids do suffer penalties when the bids are scored, but are not rejected outright. That change followed U.S. complaints the previous policy violated an agreement Canada signed in 2006 to become one of nine partner countries in developing the F-35. The agreement says companies in the partner countries will compete for work associated with purchases of the planes. While Saab has previously raised its own concerns about the change, saying it would shortchange Canadian taxpayers and industry, Mr. Carroll said it was “not a hurdle” and that “we think we have a very good offering for what we can offer in Canada.” Even participating in the competition is not a cheap proposition for fighter-jet makers; while Carroll would not speak to the potential cost to Saab, analysts have previously pegged the cost in the millions of dollars. While companies are expected to submit their plans to meet the Two Eyes security requirement on Sept. 20, the government has said it will provide feedback and let bidders amend their submissions. Final bids aren't expected until next winter, with a formal contract signed in 2022. The first plane won't arrive until at least 2025. Successive federal government have been working to replace Canada's CF-18s for more than a decade. Mr. Carroll praised the government for being transparent as it has worked for years to launch the competition, which followed an aborted attempt between 2010 and 2012 to buy F-35s without a competition. “We're supportive of the government processes and what they've done moving forward,” he said. “The transparency from the government has been very good. They've given ample opportunity for us to review documents. They've been very open in saying that these are the dates and these are the times.” https://www.theglobeandmail.com/canada/article-swedens-saab-undecided-on-whether-it-will-participate-in-canadian/

  • Cost of Canadian Coast Guard patrol ships jumps by $500 million in less than a year, MPs told

    17 janvier 2024 | Local, Naval

    Cost of Canadian Coast Guard patrol ships jumps by $500 million in less than a year, MPs told

    The project budget for the two Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships is now $2.1 billion, up from a previous estimate of $1.6 billion.

  • Canada Wants Armed Drones in the Air by 2025

    14 août 2020 | Local, Aérospatial

    Canada Wants Armed Drones in the Air by 2025

    Ottawa is on the lookout for unmanned aircraft that can conduct long-range surveillance and precision air strikes. The program is expected to cost from $1 billion to $5 billion. By Justin Ling The Canadian government is finally forging ahead with plans to set up its own fleet of armed drones, joining several of its NATO allies. Ottawa is looking for an unmanned aircraft that can reach anywhere in its massive territory, keep an eye on its territorial waters, and, when necessary, acquire targets and fire missiles. It looks increasingly likely that Canada will be buying something resembling the MQ-9 Reaper, a preferred plane for the U.S. armed drone program. In a briefing for industry players, a representative from the procurement arm of the Canadian government laid out Canada's desire for its long-range, medium-altitude drone. The total cost for the program could range from $1 billion to $5 billion. Part of what makes a drone system more attractive than a conventional aircraft is that it can loiter over a target area for upwards of six hours, meaning it can track individuals for long distances and periods of time. A spokesperson for the Department of National Defence confirmed that “domestically, the RPAS (remotely piloted aircraft system) will be routinely used for surveillance and reconnaissance of Canadian Maritime approaches and the Arctic.” That sort of capability will be useful as the Northwest Passage becomes more easily navigable, and foreign ships begin moving through the Arctic seaway. As VICE News reported in 2017, the Canadian Air Force posited that its drones could aid in search-and-rescue operations in the Arctic; intercept drug shipments in the Carribean; bomb targets in Afghanistan; and surveil public protests in Toronto. The government spokesperson stressed that “while RPAS will not need to routinely carry weapons during operations in Canadian airspace, situations may arise that would require such capabilities.” As with any fighter jets flying in Canadian airspace, they stressed, they would be bound by Canadian law and the military chain of command. Abroad, the drones would operate under the same law of armed conflict that governs conventional aircraft. In 2015, not long after Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was elected, Ottawa signalled interest in purchasing armed drones, which can be brought online much faster than the current generation of fighter jets—they require much less pilot training, for example. Upon taking office, Trudeau promised to reboot a procurement process to replace its aging CF-18 fighters—a process that is still moving sluggishly, as his government initially followed through on a promise to scrap plans to purchase the U.S.-made F-35, only to turn back around and allow it to vie for the contract all over again. As an interim measure, the Canadian military has had to buy a package of refurbished CF-18s to keep up its coastal surveillance and its obligations under NORAD, and to ensure it is able to participate in foreign operations if asked. The current drone plan, which would see the first aircraft arriving by 2024 and operational the following year, would go a long way to filling a potential and much-feared operational gap. Last year, the government announced two possible suppliers for the platforms: Quebec-based L3 Technologies and a partnership between the U.S. government and General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. L3 Technologies is working with Israel Aerospace Industries to pitch a modified version of its Heron drone, which has become a favourite of the Israeli Defence Forces (Canada has actually leased these systems from Israel). General Atomics is proposing Canada buy the MQ-9B SkyGuardian—a successor to the MQ-9 Reaper and the MQ-1 Predator, which became synonymous with the Obama administration's overseas drone operations. Somewhat confusingly, L3 Technologies is also producing parts of the SkyGuardian platform. It's still possible that Canada could go with a third supplier. https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/v7gqvm/canada-wants-armed-drones-in-the-air-by-2025?

Toutes les nouvelles