14 septembre 2024 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité
17-Year-Old Arrested in Connection with Cyber Attack Affecting Transport for London
17-year-old arrested over cyber attack on TfL, exposing 5,000 customers' sensitive data. Investigation ongoing.
13 novembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial
Can a new Franco-German export agreement clear the air for Europe’s future fighter?
By: Sebastian Sprenger
COLOGNE, Germany — French and German officials celebrated the signing of a new defense export agreement last month as a watershed moment, but political and industrial mistrust remains a wild card for the Future Combat Air System program — an envisioned sixth-generation fighter jet.
The export pact, which entered into force in late October with the formal exchange of government notes, is meant to streamline a contentious process that has clouded bilateral defense cooperation for some time. Namely, the agreement dictates that joint government programs, like FCAS fighter jet, be free from interference by partner nations when it comes to eventual exports.
The clause is mainly aimed at Germany, where politicians and lawmakers tend to scrutinize weapons deliveries to countries with known or suspected human rights abuses more heavily than their French colleagues.
The situation has grown more tense since the October 2018 death of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who Western officials believe was murdered by order of Saudi Arabia. Germany has since frozen all exports to the kingdom, prompting an outcry from France, where companies had to stall deliveries of equipment to Saudi Arabia in all cases where even a small number of components originated from Germany.
The new agreement ensures “nobody can throw a wrench” into the other's export planning, says Matthias Wachter, chief defense analyst at the Federation of German Industries lobbying group. Having such a guarantee in writing is good news for FCAS and its ground-focused sister project, the Franco-German future main battle tank known as the Main Ground Combat System, he added.
The language of the export pact is reminiscent of the 1971 Schmidt-Debré agreement, named for the German and French defense ministers at the time and panned in the left-leaning Spiegel magazine as an “embarrassing pact” when reporters found out about the then-secret understanding a year later.
Fast-forward almost 50 years, and defense cooperation remains a thorny subject between the two countries destined to spearhead Europe's envisioned military autonomy in the coming decades. And there are also long-standing cultural differences that linger. There is a perception among some German lawmakers, for example, that cooperation with Paris inevitably means ceding power to French influence to the point that Germany plays only second fiddle, according to Wachter.
That sentiment has led appropriators to craft a package deal for FCAS that would release funding for the next phase — building subcomponent demonstrators — only when there are assurances that Germany's tank makers, namely Rheinmetall, play a prominent role in the Main Ground Combat System effort. With armored vehicles traditionally being a strong suit for German industry, some here have privately complained about the 50-50 division of responsibility.
“It's an emotional issue here in Germany,” Wachter said.
Once the money begins to flow for an additional set of contracts early next year, there is a litany of questions yet to be sorted out. The fate of intellectual property rights, for example, remains unsorted, according to the analyst. In addition, as of late October, there was no agreement on Spain's industrial work share. Spain is something of a junior partner in the FCAS project, though officials in Madrid have said they expect equal treatment as a full member of the trinational project team.
The Spanish government in the summer designated defense electronics company Indra as the national lead for the fighter program. The move angered Airbus, where officials were hoping to give their Spanish subsidiary a role that would satisfy Madrid's demands for industrial participation.
Another potential point of contention has to do with military requirements for the future fighter. Perhaps the most prominent issue is that French officials want a carrier-capable jet, which Germany does not need.
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7 novembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité
Ce qu’est l’Europe de la défense. Ce qu’elle n’est pas
(B2) Alors que le serpent de mer de l'armée européenne ressurgit par la gr'ce d'Emmanuel Macron (*), il n'est pas inutile de revenir sur terre. Ce qui existe aujourd'hui ... et ce qui n'existe pas en matière de défense au niveau européen. La réalité inscrite dans les Traités européens actuels est la politique (européenne) de sécurité et de défense commune (PeSDC). Ou en langage commun, l'Europe de la défense. Elle n'est cependant pas comparable à ce qui se définit au plan national comme une politique de défense. Que ce soit dans le langage des pro ou des anti-intégrations européennes, cet aspect est bien souvent gommé. Or, il est primordial d'avoir une vue ‘honnête' et ‘objective' de la situation actuelle. Une politique nationale de défense D'un point de vue national, une politique de défense se définit tout d'abord par une autorité qui imprime sa marque et un circuit décisionnel court (comme en France avec un président de la république acteur principal) ou plus long (comme en Allemagne avec une décision du gouvernement, une approbation du parlement). Elle répond à une stratégie de défense, qui est élaborée par strates successives, en répondant à des antécédents historiques et une logique politique. Elle se développe ensuite dans un budget d'investissement d'une armée, des équipements militaires, des troupes, une logique d'action et une légitimité dans l'opinion publique qui accepte, plus ou moins, un engagement militaire intérieur ou extérieur, à risque ou non. L'Europe de la défense : un projet politique L'Europe de la défense est tout d'abord un projet politique, qui vise à affirmer la place de l'Europe dans le monde, au service d'une politique étrangère. Elle ne consiste pas ainsi à assurer la défense du territoire ni la protection des citoyens (malgré les déclarations politiques en ce sens). Elle ne procède que d'une coordination des efforts des États membres. Son circuit décisionnel repose ainsi toujours, à toutes les étapes, de l'initiative à l'approbation puis au commandement et au contrôle, sur un accord de tous les États membres, de façon collégiale. Mettre tout le monde d'accord au même moment sur un enjeu commun est un véritable ‘challenge'. Elle a comme objectif unique d'avoir une capacité d'intervention, limitée, dans des missions ou opérations de paix ou de consolidation de l'état de droit. Elle n'est pas ainsi une force d'intervention tout azimut, n'a pas de commandement militaire direct (national) ou intégré (comme l'OTAN), ni de troupes ou de forces disponibles en permanence ni en propre. Elle ne peut intervenir qu'à l'extérieur des frontières, avec le consentement des États concernés (ou au moins de leurs gouvernements) et de la communauté internationale. On est ainsi très loin des ‘fondamentaux' d'une armée européenne. Quand on met face à face ainsi les principes d'une défense nationale et ceux de l'Europe de la défense, il est inévitable que la seconde soit moins efficace que la première. On peut considérer qu'il s'agit d'une faiblesse temporaire, due aux personnalités politiques du moment. Ce peut être le cas parfois. Mais il ne faut pas minorer les faiblesses structurelles dû à un fait principal : l'Europe n'est pas un État mais une structure juridique et économique de concertation et de coopération avant tout. Si on veut donner un aperçu plus mathématique, j'ai évalué, sous forme d'une note — sur une échelle de 0 à 3 — quels points remplit l'Union européenne, une fois mis en place tous les projets évoqués ces derniers temps. On va ainsi d'une note de 0 à 3 selon les thèmes : de 0 pour les équipements et les forces disponibles à 2 pour le budget de recherche, en passant par le mode de décision et le consensus politique que je cote à 1 sur 3. Article complet: https://www.bruxelles2.eu/2018/11/07/ce-quest-leurope-de-la-defense-ce-quelle-nest-pas/
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25 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial
Space Force invokes Defense Production Act to prop up small launch market
Nathan Strout The Space and Missile Systems Center will award ride-share contracts to six small launch providers under the Defense Production Act, providing support to a market the Pentagon has repeatedly said is vulnerable to coronavirus-related financial restraints. The six companies approved by the Industrial Base Council are Aevum, Astra, X-BOW, Rocket Lab USA, Space Vector and VOX Space. Each company will be awarded sole-source contracts for two ride-share missions to be conducted over the next 24 months. The value of the contracts was not included in the announcement originally posted on SAM.gov on June 16. Funding for the 12 ride-share missions will come from the Defense Production Act Title III funding effort, which is backed by the recently passed coronavirus relief act. The Pentagon has singled out the small launch market as being particularly hard hit by the COVID-19 pandemic over the last few months. On April 20, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord warned that the small launch market was one of three sectors she was most worried about. In a later statement to C4ISRNET, the Space and Missile Systems Center elaborated on her remarks. “There is concern that the current financial and market constraints resulting from the COVID-19 have reduced funding sources necessary to continue development and operations for the nascent small launch industry,” said Col. Rob Bongiovi, director of SMC's launch enterprise directorate. “Much of the industry have limited flight capability or are in the critical transition from development to flight and this funding restriction may prevent or delay these systems. The Space and Missile Systems Center is evaluating the impacts to the small launch industrial base to consider actions to enable a robust U.S. launch industrial base.” In response, the Space Force Acquisition Council held an emergency meeting with representatives from the U.S. Space Force, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Space Development Agency and others. A survey was sent out to members of the Space Enterprise Consortium to see how the Defense Department could help. SMC Commander Lt. Gen. John “JT” Thompson hinted earlier in the week that Defense Production Act awards would be forthcoming for the small launch market. “In the small launch environment, Secretary Lord and [U.S. Space Force Service Acquisition Executive Will] Roper have both commented about how important small launch is to our enterprise, and I can't give you the details right now but I would anticipate here very shortly some very critical Defense Production Act awards to our small launch providers to keep that industry going,” Thompson said. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/06/19/space-force-invokes-defense-production-act-to-prop-up-small-launch-market/