9 mars 2023 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR

Boeing, Shield AI Set to Collaborate on Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy for Defense Programs

Teams will explore integrating artificial intelligence technology on current and future programs for military customers

https://boeing.mediaroom.com/news-releases-statements?item=131225

Sur le même sujet

  • Russie: grandes manœuvres de l'armée, avec des militaires chinois

    24 septembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre

    Russie: grandes manœuvres de l'armée, avec des militaires chinois

    La Russie a lancé lundi 16 septembre de grandes manœuvres militaires annuelles, mobilisant jusqu'à samedi 128.000 hommes dans le centre du pays, dont des militaires et des avions chinois, avec pour scénario de repousser une attaque islamiste. Organisées essentiellement dans la région d'Orenbourg, frontalière du Kazakhstan, les manœuvres Tsentr-2019 impliqueront «plus de 20.000 engins militaires, environ 600 appareils volants et jusqu'à 15 navires», selon un communiqué du ministère russe de la Défense. En plus des soldats russes, des troupes venues de Chine, d'Inde, du Pakistan et de plusieurs pays d'Asie centrale doivent participer à ces manœuvres. Une vingtaine d'avions et d'hélicoptères chinois prendront notamment part aux exercices. Ceux-ci se se basent sur un scénario dans lequel un pays indéterminé, converti à l'islamisme radical, entre en conflit avec la Russie. «Un Etat imaginaire émerge au sud-ouest de la Russie. Ses leaders partagent les idées extrémistes des organisations terroristes internationales. Ce pays imaginaire, possédant une armée développée, tente d'exercer une pression sur la Russie, y compris militaire», e expliqué la semaine dernière le vice-ministre russe de la Défense, Alexandre Fomine. «L'escalade des tensions évolue finalement vers un conflit armé», a-t-il poursuivi, cité par l'agence officielle TASS, au cours d'un briefing. La première phase des manœuvres sera consacrée à coordonner le commandement, repousser des attaques aériennes et mener des opérations de reconnaissance. Dans la seconde phase, la coalition internationale formée par la Russie dans ces exercices mènera des frappes massives contre l'ennemi, précise le ministère de la Défense. La Russie organise chaque année, au mois de septembre, de grandes manœuvres militaires. Les précédentes, organisées en Sibérie orientale et dans l'Extrême-Orient russe, avaient mobilisé 300.000 hommes et tout l'arsenal moderne de l'armée russe, dont les missiles Iskander, capables de transporter des ogives nucléaires. L'année précédente, les exercices nommées Zapad-2017 («Ouest-2017») s'étaient déroulés près de la frontière avec la Lituanie et la Pologne, provoquant la fureur de l'Otan et de plusieurs pays européens qui avaient dénoncé une provocation. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/russie-grandes-manoeuvres-de-l-armee-avec-des-militaires-chinois-20190916

  • 3 ways America can fix its vulnerability to cruise missiles

    30 octobre 2019 | International, Naval

    3 ways America can fix its vulnerability to cruise missiles

    By: Bradley Bowman and Andrew Gabel September's drone and cruise missile attack on a major Saudi energy facility highlights the challenges associated with cruise missile defense. Americans might be tempted to dismiss this attack merely as evidence of a Saudi vulnerability, with little relevance to the U.S. homeland. However, given that an American-built air defense system failed to stop the attack, this would be a mistake. As China and Russia continue to develop and deploy advanced cruise missiles to threaten the United States, urgent action is required. In recent years, the Pentagon has focused on protecting the homeland from ballistic missile attacks by building a ballistic missile defense system consisting of radars and interceptors. This system can provide some protection against a limited ballistic missile attack on the United States, but it is not designed to protect American cities from cruise missile attacks. Unlike ballistic missiles, which arc high into the atmosphere and beyond before striking their target, cruise missiles fly at low altitudes, where ground-based radars struggle to detect them. And to defeat a cruise missile, the Department of Defense must first be able to detect and track it. America's adversaries “currently hold our citizens and national interests at risk,” the commander of Northern Command, Gen. Terrence O'Shaughnessy, testified before the Senate in April. “The homeland is not a sanctuary. For that reason, improving our ability to detect and defeat cruise missile attacks is among my highest priorities.” It is not difficult to understand why. Seeing this long-standing vulnerability, America's great power adversaries have worked to improve their cruise missile capabilities. Today, for example, Russia possesses a submarine-launched cruise missile that Moscow could use to circumvent existing U.S. missile defenses and target key East Coast military bases and population centers. And the cruise missile capabilities of U.S. adversaries are only growing more formidable. In April testimony before the Senate, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy John Rood warned that potential adversaries are developing sophisticated “cruise missile systems with increased speed, range, accuracy and lethality.” For its part, Russia is developing hypersonic cruise missiles. Russian President Vladimir Putin claims one of these cruise missiles could fly as fast as nine times the speed of sound. The Kremlin is also pursuing nuclear-powered cruise missiles with virtually unlimited range. Not to be outdone, China is developing its own hypersonic cruise missiles, supplementing its existing cruise missile stocks. Against both Moscow and Beijing's cruise missile arsenals, America's current defenses are inadequate. So what's to be done? The first step is for the Department of Defense to quickly assign a lead in the Pentagon for homeland cruise missile defense, which would enable key decisions related to the homeland cruise missile defense architecture — including decisions related to sensors and shooters, as well as command and control, battle management, and communications. This would help expedite efforts to integrate ballistic missile defense and cruise missile defense. Second, Congress should support efforts to deploy without delay the space-based sensors necessary to detect, track and ultimately defeat advanced cruise missiles and other missile threats to our homeland. Third, the Department of Defense should proactively look to partner with its impressive array of allies and partners to field — both at home and abroad — advanced cruise missile defense capabilities without delay. Consider the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These allies are already part of a long-standing intelligence sharing arrangement with the United States, known as the “Five Eyes agreement.” As Atlantic Council Senior Fellow William Greenwalt has suggested, systematically expanding this arrangement to institutionalize the shared development of military technology makes sense. Cruise missile defense might be one of several good places to start. Israel represents another obvious partner, as it possesses a proven track record on missile defense innovation, deep real-world experience, an admirable sense of urgency and a long history of cooperation with the U.S. on missile defense. Indeed, Israel and the U.S. have worked together for years to develop the Arrow and David's Sling missile defense systems. If we combine these international partnerships with the innovation prowess of the American private sector — as well as timely, predictable and sufficient funding from Congress — much can be done to address areas of shared vulnerability. That includes cruise missile defenses for both the American homeland and forward-deployed U.S. troops. The September attack on the Saudi energy facility may seem of little concern to most Americans, but that attack should serve as a warning regarding the unique challenges associated with cruise missile defense. If Iran could pull off such an attack, imagine what Moscow and Beijing may be able to do. If our great power adversaries believe a surprise cruise missile attack against the U.S. homeland or American positions abroad might succeed, it increases the chances that Beijing or Moscow would undertake such an attack. The Pentagon assessed in its Missile Defense Review earlier this year that advanced cruise missile threats to the homeland “are on the horizon.” The attack last month in Saudi Arabia suggests that horizon might be closer than Americans think. Bradley Bowman is the senior director for the Center on Military and Political Power with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Andrew Gabel is a research analyst. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/10/29/3-ways-america-can-fix-its-vulnerability-to-cruise-missiles/

  • Europe’s next-gen fighter club faces a dilemma: Who else can join?

    17 août 2020 | International, Aérospatial

    Europe’s next-gen fighter club faces a dilemma: Who else can join?

    By: Sebastian Sprenger COLOGNE, Germany — With mainland Europe and the United Kingdom pursuing their own sixth-generation fighter programs, differing views have started to emerge about how many nations should partake in the action. At issue is whether the British Tempest and the German-French-Spanish Future Combat Air System can coexist in the long run without cannibalizing the continent's defense budget. What's more, while leaders in the U.K. have openly advertised their appetite to pick up partner countries for Tempest, Paris and Berlin are divided about admitting additional members, besides Spain, for fear of slowing down their effort. German defense officials early this year told Bundestag lawmakers they consider it risky to keep the circle of participants too small because team Tempest could go around snagging up contributors, though that concern has yet to bear out. To Dirk Hoke, the CEO of Airbus Defence and Space, the issue comes down to the budget. His company is the co-lead for the FCAS program along with France's Dassault Aviation. Notably, the French have the lead for the Next-Generation Fighter, envisioned as the central aircraft for the larger program of supporting drones and command-and-control equipment. “Europe can't afford two new systems,” Hoke said in a virtual panel discussion organized by a German defense industry lobbying association. That is especially the case, he argued, because a competition between the U.K. and members of the European Union would reinforce the perception that Britain's divorce from the bloc has weakened the intra-continental defense alliance — a notion that leaders on both sides of the Channel have been trying to dispel. Finding a way to merge FCAS and Tempest should become a top priority for decision-makers once a Brexit agreement on future trade and defense relations is in the bag, according to Hoke. Until then, he said, “we simply have to be patient.” In order to be prepared for “an opportunity to negotiate at eye level,” both projects should continue to work through their technology development so that eventual touchpoints for cooperation are already far along, he explained. In contrast, Dassault Aviation CEO Eric Trappier has urged caution when it comes to broadening the FCAS circle too soon. “I don't know if there won't be some new partners in the future,” he said during a company earnings call late last month. “We must not exclude them.” Noting that Spain already was admitted to the program after Germany and France had kicked it off, Trappier said the companies involved were still learning to work together. “We have to get to know each other and share our work together,” he said. “If we change partners every six months, I can tell you that we will not reach 2040,” he added, referring to the envisioned in-service date for the futuristic weapon. The next big milestone for the program is fielding a demonstrator aircraft in 2026. https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2020/08/17/europes-next-gen-fighter-club-faces-a-dilemma-who-else-can-join

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