Britain Spent So Much On Two Giant Aircraft Carriers, It Can’t Afford Planes Or Escorts

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  18 décembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial

  China is driving use of armed drones in Mideast, says British think tank

  By: Zeina Karam, The Associated Press BEIRUT — The use of armed drones in the Middle East, driven largely by sales from China, has grown significantly in the past few years with an increasing number of countries and other parties using them in regional conflicts to lethal effects, a new report said Monday. The report by the Royal United Services Institute, or RUSI, found that more and more Mideast countries have acquired armed drones, either by importing them, such as Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, or by building them domestically like Israel, Iran and Turkey. China has won sales in the Middle East and elsewhere by offering UAVs at lower prices and without the political conditions attached by the United States. The Associated Press reported earlier this year that countries across the Middle East locked out of purchasing American-made drones are being wooed by Chinese arms dealers, helping expand Chinese influence across a region vital to American security interest. It noted the use of Chinese armed drones across Mideast battlefields, including in the war on Yemen, employed by the Emirati Air Force. Iran has also violated Israeli airspace with armed UAVs from bases in Syria, provoking armed Israeli response on the suspected bases. The RUSI report, titled “Armed Drones in the Middle East: Proliferation and Norms in the Region,” said that by capitalizing on the gap in the market over the past few years, Beijing has supplied armed drones to several countries that are not authorized to purchase them from the U.S., and at a dramatically cheaper price. "China, a no-questions-asked exporter of drones, has played and is likely to continue playing a key role as a supplier of armed UAVs to the Middle East," it said. The report explored where and how each of the states have used their armed drones and whether they have changed the way these countries approach air power. It found that Iran, the UAE and Turkey all changed the way they employ air power after they acquired armed drones. For Turkey and the UAE, armed drones enabled them to conduct strikes in situations where they would not have risked using conventional aircraft, it said. Iran developed armed drones from the outset specifically to project power beyond the reach of its air force, which is hamstrung by obsolete aircraft and sanctions, the report added. The report said it remains to be seen whether and how the loosening of restrictions on the export of armed drones by the Trump administration will alter dynamics in the region. The administration in April permitted U.S. manufacturers to directly market and sell drones, including armed versions, although the government must still approve and license the sales. Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, who authored the report along with Justin Bronk, said proliferation of armed drones in the Middle East is unlikely to stop and could accelerate despite changes introduced by the U.S. administration. “Over the past two years the sales have increased massively and they are likely to increase even more,” she said. “This kind of collaboration is just going to grow especially in cases where countries don't have the capacity to build them themselves.” https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2018/12/17/china-is-driving-use-of-armed-drones-in-mideast-says-british-think-tank

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  31 juillet 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Guam’s air defense should learn lessons from Japan’s Aegis Ashore

  By: Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark The head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said last week his top priority is establishing an Aegis Ashore system on Guam by 2026. New air defenses will help protect U.S. citizens and forces in Guam; but as Japan's government found, Aegis Ashore may not be the best option to protect military and civilian targets from growing and improving Chinese and North Korean missile threats. Guam is pivotal to U.S. and allied military posture in the Western Pacific. Home to Andersen Air Force Base and Apra Harbor, it is far enough from adversaries like China and North Korea to negate the threat from more numerous short-range missiles but close enough to support air and naval operations throughout the Philippine Sea and South and East China seas. Although the current Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery on Guam can defend against some ballistic missiles, its single AN/TPY-2 radar is vulnerable and cannot provide 360-degree coverage. Moreover, THAAD's focus on high altitudes makes it a poor fit to defeat lower-flying aircraft or cruise missiles that would likely be used by China's military against Guam. The island needs a new air defense architecture. Aegis Ashore is highly capable, but has its own limitations. Designed primarily to counter small numbers of ballistic missiles, its fixed missile magazine and radar would be vulnerable to attack and would fall short against the bombardment possible from China. Instead of installing one or more Aegis Ashore systems on Guam, a more effective air and missile defense architecture would combine the latest version of the Aegis Combat System with a disaggregated system of existing sensors, effectors, and command-and-control nodes. A distributed architecture would also be scalable, allowing air and missile defenses to also protect U.S. citizens and forces operating in the Northern Marianas. Guam's geography enables longer-range sensing than would be possible from a ship or a single Aegis Ashore radar. Fixed, relocatable and mobile radio frequency sensors should be positioned around the island's perimeter, such as compact versions of SPY-6 or Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor radars and the passive Army Long-Range Persistent Surveillance system. During periods of heightened tension, passive and active radio frequency and electro-optical/infrared sensors could also be deployed on unmanned aircraft and stratospheric balloons to monitor over-the-horizon threats. This mixed architecture would provide better collective coverage and be more difficult to defeat compared to one or two fixed Aegis Ashore deckhouses. To shoot down enemy missiles and aircraft, the architecture should field mobile, containerized launchers for long-range interceptors like the SM-6 and SM-3 rather than Aegis Ashore's finite and targetable in-ground vertical launch magazines. They should be complemented by medium- to short-range engagement systems to protect high-value targets such as the Patriot, the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System or the Army's planned Indirect Fire Protection Capability, as well as non-kinetic defenses such as high-powered microwave weapons and electronic warfare systems that could damage or confuse the guidance systems on incoming missiles. Today, destroyers patrol the waters around Guam to provide ballistic missile defense capacity beyond that available with THAAD. A new distributed architecture would place more capacity ashore to free surface combatants from missile defense duty. In a crisis or conflict, the architecture could add capacity with surface action groups and combat air patrols capable of intercepting threats at longer ranges. Instead of Aegis Ashore's large, single C2 node, a distributed architecture would virtualize the Aegis Combat System to allow multiple facilities or mobile vehicles to serve as miniature air operations centers. The mobility of sensors, effectors and C2 nodes in this architecture would enable the employment of camouflage, concealment and deception, including decoys, to complicate enemy targeting and increase the number of weapons needed to ensure a successful attack. INDOPACOM's plan for implementing new Guam air defenses should also apply lessons from Japan's aborted Aegis Ashore program, whose accelerated timeline contributed to the selection of the least expensive and technically risky option — two fixed Aegis Ashore systems — and the discounting of alternatives. Adm. Phil Davidson's 2026 goal of improving Guam's defenses faces a similar risk. Bound by an iron triangle, Guam's air and missile defenses can be good, fast or cheap — but not all three. If 2026 is held as a rigid constraint, the only solution able to meet the schedule and requirements may be the familiar, and ineffective, fixed Aegis Ashore architecture. Compared to one or two Aegis Ashore sites, a distributed architecture may require slightly more time to develop or funds to field. But a phased approach could introduce new systems as funding becomes available and allow expanding the system's capability to meet the evolving threat. For example, SPY-6 radars, C2 bunkers and composite THAAD-Patriot-NASAMS batteries could be fielded before 2026, quickly followed by the introduction of mobile assets. Guam and the Northern Marianas are essential to U.S. strategy and operations in the Western Pacific. Their defenses have long been ignored, and Adm. Davidson should be lauded for charting a path forward. A disaggregated architecture, however, will be more likely to realize INDOPACOM's vision of resilient and scalable air and missile defense. Timothy A. Walton is a fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Defense Concepts and Technology, where Bryan Clark is a senior fellow. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/07/30/guams-air-defense-should-learn-lessons-from-japans-aegis-ashore/

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  4 mars 2021 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Defense Intelligence Agency awards IT services contract worth up to $12.6 billion

  The military intelligence agency named 144 companies that can receive pieces of the contact.