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  16 avril 2020 | Local, Naval

  Russia’s Arctic Agenda and the Role of Canada

  Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 51 By: Sergey Sukhankin April 15, 2020 05:24 PM Age: 14 mins New research (which includes two articles written by Russian experts) published by the prominent think tank the Canadian Global Affairs Institute has spurred interest and hopes in Russia's expert community about the possibility of normalizing ties between Russia and Canada through cooperation in the Arctic region (Russiancouncil.ru, April 3; Cgai.ca, accessed April 12). This cooperation could potentially be premised on two main pillars. First would be the mutual rejection of “internationalization” of the Arctic. Both Canada and Russia—for whom the Arctic region is an issue of foreign policy (Russiancouncil.ru, July 1, 2019) —feel ill at ease with the increasing involvement of non-Arctic states in the region, particularly, China. Russian information outlets noted the level of distress when the Chinese icebreaker Snow Dragon completed its first-ever voyage through the Arctic Ocean off the coast of Canada, accumulating “a wealth of experience for Chinese ships going through the Northwest Passage in the future” (Regnum, September 17, 2017; see EDM, October 3, 2017). Second, Moscow seeks to exploit regional frictions and disagreements between Canada and the United States (Pentagonus.ru, accessed April 10) to boost its own position/influence in the region. Russian sources recall the year 2010, when then–Secretary of State Hillary Clinton publicly challenged Canada's stance on the status of the Northwest Passage, which Ottawa considers part of Canadian territory (Foreignpolicy.ru, February 20, 2015). In the past, both the Russian tone and general assessment of Canada's role in the Arctic were denigrating, claiming Ottawa lacked agency. Perhaps the clearest expression of this sentiment came from the director of the Institute of Strategic Planning and Forecasting, Professor Alexander Gusev, who, in 2015, declared that “they [Canada] are only performing the role assigned by the US” (Odnako.org, March 30, 2015). After 2016, however, Russia dramatically changed its coverage of the US-Canadian dispute in the Arctic region, with Moscow increasingly employing reconciliatory rhetoric toward Ottawa and employing ever more assertive public diplomacy tools. One notable example of this new approach is Moscow's reliance on pro-Russian experts based in Canada. In 2016, speaking in Sochi, on the margins of that year's Valdai Club session, Professor Piotr Dutkiewicz (a former director of the Institute of European and Russian Studies at Carleton University, in Ottawa) stated, “[T]his area [the Arctic region] will be the first one where we will feel real changes in our relations... Arctic cooperation will become the focal point thanks to which our two sides [Canada and Russia] will be extending their areas of collaboration” (Izvestia, October 28, 2016). Moreover, as repeatedly stated by Federation Council member Igor Chernyshenko (a senator from Murmansk Oblast), the Arctic region could become a “bridge,” helping Canada and Russia overcome the existing difficulties in their bilateral ties. Last May, he announced, “[W]e invited them [the Canadian side] to return to a dialogue. We proposed holding a conference between Russian and Canadian universities in northwest Russia, maybe in Murmansk Oblast. They supported this idea” (TASS, May 25, 2019). Notably, the last such event was held in November 2014, in Canada, hosted by the aforementioned Carleton University. In addition to trying to foster bilateral academic ties, Russia's outreach to Canada on Arctic issues involves sustained information campaigns via RT and similar multi-language information outlets with international reach. In particular, Russian propaganda narratives routinely overemphasize the extent of current US-Canadian disagreements in the Arctic. At the same time, foreign-audience-facing Kremlin-linked media outlets underscore the allegedly negative role of President Donald Trump (and his policies toward Canada) in aggravating the existing disputes. RT widely claimed that “after Trump's inauguration, he began pressing Ottawa on economic issues and extended claims on Canadian possessions in the Arctic region.” It also highlighted US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo's remarks suggesting that “Russia is not the only country with illegitimate claims [in the Arctic] ...the US has a lasting dispute with Canada over its claims on sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. Finally, RT's propaganda reporting also relied on a statement by Pavel Feldman, the deputy director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Forecasts at the Moscow-based Peoples' Friendship University of Russia (RUDN). Feldman is quoted as saying, “[T]he US and Canada carry on a heated competition over the Arctic region; yet, publicly, these countries are trying to position themselves as partners” (RT, October 16, 2019). In recent months, this increasing Russian attention to Canada as an Arctic power and a key element of regional stability and order has started to be expressed at the highest levels in Moscow. Poignantly, President Vladimir Putin declared in a public address at the start of this year that Russia “is open to cooperation with Canada on the basis of mutual respect and consideration of each other's interest.” Putin added, “[O]ur countries are neighbors in the Arctic region and bear joint responsibility for the development of this vast region, for preservation of the traditional lifestyle of its native populations and the careful treatment of its brittle ecosystem” (Vzglyad, February 5, 2020). Such reconciliatory rhetoric should, however, be taken with a heavy dose of caution in Ottawa: from the earliest days of the Soviet Union, Moscow's stance on the Arctic region has been deliberately flexible and tightly premised on being able to demonstrate its military potential in the High North and to intimidate other regional players. The Russian Federation has increasingly undertaken the same policy course since 2014 (see EDM, April 9). Incidentally, on January 31, 2020, two Russian Tu-160 heavy strategic bombers approached Canadian airspace—maneuvers that the Russian Ministry of Defense explained away as “planned exercises” (Vpk.name, February 3). It is worth pointing out that the US North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is unable to identify and track Russian bombers of this type until they are close enough to launch missiles at targets on the continent. Furthermore, it is worth keeping in mind that, in fact, Russia (not the US) is Canada's direct competitor when it comes to territorial claims in the Arctic (the Lomonosov Ridge)—a point explicitly corroborated by Russia's Arktika 2007 expedition, which explored this disputed undersea area and famously planted a Russian flag at the North Pole, on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean (Izvestia, August 3, 2007). Lastly, it may be worth keeping an eye on one of the proposed amendments (soon to be officially adopted) to the Russian Constitution on the “prohibition of actions related to the alienation of Russian territory, or the propaganda thereof” (TASS, February 25). This amendment—reportedly drafted with predominantly Kaliningrad and Vladivostok in mind—is likely to also be applied to some Arctic territories that are of equally strategic interest to Canada. https://jamestown.org/program/russias-arctic-agenda-and-the-role-of-canada/

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  28 novembre 2018 | Local, Aérospatial

  Aerospace execs call for government strategy to support key industrial capabilities

  Chris Thatcher Canada will struggle to retain its position as a leading player in the global aerospace market without a government-backed industrial policy. That was the stark message form a trio of industry executives to the Canadian Aerospace Summit in mid-November as the sector embarks on Vision 2025, an exercise involving industry, federal and provincial governments, and other stakeholders to develop recommendations the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada (AIAC) hopes will lead to a long-term, fully-funded sector strategy. “I think it is important we have a sound industrial policy in Canada,” said David Gossen, president of Halifax-based IMP Aerospace and Defence. “It's clear every nation [that has an indigenous capability] is doing all they can to protect that industry. I think we need to follow that same principle.” As an engineering and in-service support (ISS) provider to the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), Gossen has seen the business model transform in recent years as OEMs have transitioned from long-term partners to fierce competitors for maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) work. He's watched emerging markets start to create their own domestic support capabilities–in some cases after requesting IMP know-how. And he's seen established aerospace nations erect barriers to protect their own ISS providers. He's also watched the boom and bust cycle of Canada's shipbuilding industry on the East Coast and drawn lessons he fears aerospace is in danger of repeating. “We don't [want to] spend 10 years trying to figure out how we rebuild [our] industry,” he cautioned. Many of Gossen's concerns were echoed by fellow panellists Dan Goldberg, president and chief executive officer of Ottawa-based Telesat, and Amandeep Kaler, chief executive officer of aerostructure manufacturer Avcorp Group. Goldberg said the 50-year-old satellite communication services provider is being buffeted by similar dynamics as traditional players seek greater protection at home and emerging markets strive to gain entry. “Our industry is changing dramatically,” he said. For manufacturers like Avcorp, a component and repair services supplier to international OEMs and airlines for over 16 years, “our business is being reshaped,” said Kaler, noting the growth of build-to-print suppliers in government-support markets. “The race for best price is not going to slow down anytime soon,” he said. “You can let it happen or you can take the steps . . . to be the leading-edge of that by bringing your own capabilities and leveraging other technologies that are available to us in Canada.” To survive, all three executives pointed to the need for expertise and intellectual property in niche capabilities. But they acknowledged government planning and support will be necessary if aerospace is going to capitalize on new technologies. While Telesat, for example, would prefer its satellites to be manufactured and integrated by Canadian suppliers, many of which have the technical ability, “at the end of the day we are a for-profit company . . . and we are going to procure satellites from the group of companies that can give us the best overall value proposition,” said Goldberg. If Canadian suppliers are to compete in the company's project for a new constellation of low orbit satellites, they will have to make “meaningful investments,” which will require provincial and federal assistance, he acknowledged. “I can say their competitors outside of Canada are receiving that kind of support,” he said. Goldberg flagged niche capabilities such as digital processing in space, phased array antenna technologies, and optical communications which several Canadian companies already provide. “They need to evolve their technologies to deliver what we need, and that is going to be a big investment on their part,” he said. Kaler and Gossen highlighted niche areas like robotics, automation, business aircraft, artificial intelligence as well as simulation and training systems and ISS, both of which were identified in a 2013 report by Tom Jenkins of Open Text, Canada First: Leveraging Defence Procurement Through Key Industrial Capabilities. Though government departments have refined the list of key industrial capabilities since the report was published, the strategy to leverage them is still pending. “Every segment will say we need to be supported. The reality is we can't be everything; we need to pick those we're good at and ensure we have good policies to support them,” said Gossen. “We need a healthy debate within government and industry to identify what those capabilities are,” he added, alluding to the promise of Vision 2025, an exercise now underway and led by Jean Charest, a former Québec premier and federal cabinet minister. “If I were a government policymaker, I'd start with what are we good at today and where these global markets are going, and then try and connect the dots between the two. And then I would start making some bets,” said Goldberg. “If the government doesn't start leaning in on some of these policies, all of these capabilities will completely atrophy.” In a controlled market such as defence, where governments often protect domestic manufacturers and build new capabilities, Gossen also argued for a similar approach to level the play field. Canadian suppliers need government help understanding where they can sell, he said, noting “a lot of markets are just closed to us.” Playing the sovereignty card, he said Canadian companies “should have the ability to service Canada's military equipment,” and suggested an industrial strategy could ensure “homefield is always protected.” https://www.skiesmag.com/news/aerospace-execs-call-for-government-strategy-to-support-key-industrial-capabilities

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  9 novembre 2017 | Local, Aérospatial

  Airbus eyes Canadian military deal, further cooperation with Bombardier

  OTTAWA/MONTREAL (Reuters) - Airbus SE (AIR.PA) could cooperate further with Bombardier Inc (BBDb.TO) beyond a recent venture in the CSeries jets, if its fighter jet is permitted to compete in a Canadian military procurement, and its partners agree, an executive said on Wednesday. Canada said last year it will launch an open competition to replace its aging fleet of fighter jets and a request for proposal for the open competition is expected in 2019. Dirk Hoke, chief executive of Airbus Defense and Space, said the Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jet could be an option for further collaboration with Bombardier, although he did not specify further. “We will definitely also look at additional potential further cooperation with Bombardier beyond just the CSeries,” Hoke told Reuters on the sidelines of an Ottawa aerospace conference, adding that he was “very optimistic and positive about us entering this competition.” Airbus last month agreed to take a majority stake in Bombardier's CSeries jets program, bolstering the Canadian plane's sales and giving it a possible way out of a damaging trade dispute with Boeing Co (BA.N) and U.S. regulators. The CSeries trade dispute has muddied a potential interim military contract between Boeing and Canada for 18 Super Hornet fighter jets, creating new opportunities for rivals like Airbus, Dassault Aviation SA (AVMD.PA) and Lockheed Martin(LMT.N). Boeing and Canada had initially discussed purchasing the fighters as a stop-gap measure while the country prepared an open five-year competition to replace its aging fleet of 77 Boeing CF-18 fighter jets. Canada has halted talks with Boeing because of the dispute. Hoke said Airbus is not considering jumping into the interim bid for fighter jets and is waiting to see the specifics from the Canadian government on the open competition. “Right now, we have a very positive feeling about it but of course we have to see ... what (are) the specifications that have been finally defined and confirmed.” In 2016, Canada selected Airbus C295W aircraft for its fixed-wing search and rescue program, estimated at C$3 billion ($2.36 billion). Boeing has accused Bombardier of receiving illegal subsidies and dumping the CSeries at “absurdly low” prices in the U.S. market to win a key April 2016 order from Delta Air Lines Inc (DAL.N). The U.S. Commerce Department has notched up proposed trade duties on U.S. sales of CSeries jets at nearly 300 percent, in a case that will be decided next year at the International Trade Commission.