6 juillet 2021 | International, C4ISR
DARPA Selects Raytheon, BAE Systems, Northrop Teams to Develop Event-based Sensors
DARPA Selects Raytheon, BAE Systems, Northrop Teams to Develop Event-based Sensors
14 novembre 2018 | International, Terrestre
In the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, production of heavy armored vehicles like tanks and troop carriers almost became a lost art in America. The Army and Marine Corps repeatedly deferred development of new vehicles, leaving industry with little work besides upgrading combat systems developed during the Reagan years. As a result, there are only two integrated manufacturing sites left where new heavy vehicles can be produced -- one for tanks, the other for almost everything else.
I wrote about the nation's sole surviving tank plant on November 2. Today's piece is about the plant where almost everything else is produced -- the sprawling BAE Systems manufacturing complex at York, Pennsylvania. BAE Systems is a contributor to my think tank and a consulting client, so I have a fairly detailed understanding of what goes on there. At the moment, York is in the midst of a renaissance, having recently won orders for a new Army troop carrier and a new Marine amphibious vehicle.
It is also upgrading the Army's Bradley fighting vehicle and Paladin self-propelled howitzer. The company is investing heavily in new machining systems and other capital equipment to sustain an expected surge in output, and is hiring hundreds of workers who must be trained to a high level of proficiency in specialized skills such as the welding of aluminum armor. This is all good news for the local economy, but to a large degree what BAE Systems is doing at York involves building back capacity that was lost during the Obama years.
BAE Systems has been highly successful at booking new business in the armored-vehicle segment of the military market as Army and Marine leaders have become increasingly worried about their reliance on Cold War combat vehicles. An industrial-base study released by the White House in September stated that over 80% of new armored-vehicle production for the two services will occur at York. The study speculated that all the new work might stress the production capabilities of the site.
However, that issue was thoroughly analyzed by the Army before it awarded recent contracts for Paladin howitzer upgrades and a new Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle to replace Vietnam-era troop carriers in its armored brigades. The Army found no significant capacity constraints so long as BAE makes suitable investments and hires skilled workers. The findings of the Army's industrial-base analysis are not reflected in the White House report. Here are a few reasons why capacity concerns are overblown.
First, although York is the final assembly point for diverse armored vehicles, it is only one part of a nationwide manufacturing network on which BAE Systems relies to produce combat vehicles. The company operates other manufacturing facilities in Alabama, Oklahoma and South Carolina, including one of the nation's largest integrated forges for producing track components. It also works closely with Army depots (as does the tank plant), and has a supplier network containing over a thousand industrial partners.
Second, preparation of the White House report predated release of some details concerning how BAE Systems plans to invest in robotic welding, advanced machining technology and other cutting-edge capital equipment. The combination of these investments and programs with schools near manufacturing sites to train the necessary workforce will provide BAE Systems with more production capacity than it requires to address projected levels of demand.
Third, the current level of production capacity at York is the inevitable result of uneven demand from U.S. military customers over the last decade. The White House report identifies lack of stable funding as a key factor explaining the fragility of the military supplier base, but fails to explicitly make the connection in explaining why York is facilitized to its current capacity level. BAE Systems is now investing heavily to meet future demand, but it is understandably wary about building capacity much beyond what it expects to need.
The latter factor is critical in understanding why there are only two sites left in America capable of integrating heavy armored vehicles. There were many more in the past when high levels of demand were sustained for decades, but industry can't carry capacity indefinitely if no customer is prepared to fund the resulting costs. The reason the workforce assembling Abrams tanks at the Ohio plant dwindled to less than 100 personnel during the Obama years was that nobody was buying tanks. This is not a hard connection to grasp.
York has some advantages over the tank plant because it produces a diverse array of vehicles for multiple customers, and the industrial skills required are fungible across its portfolio. But if the Army or Marine Corps were to trim their production objectives for ground vehicles as they have repeatedly over the last decade, it is inevitable that production capacity will adjust to match the reduced level of funding. That's how an efficient industrial base works: supply matches demand.
At the moment, the York plant is generating products that satisfy all customer technical standards. There are no outstanding issues -- which is a good thing, because BAE Systems and its legacy enterprises have been the sole providers of Marine amphibious vehicles since World War Two and today manufacture a majority of the combat vehicles in the Army's armored brigades. Company executives do not anticipate problems as they gradually ramp up to two shifts per day at the site.
But the point they stressed to me is that York is the central node of an industrial network scattered across the nation, and there is adequate capacity going forward not only to meet expected demand, but also to cope with potential surges. The company estimates that combined demand from the Army and the Marine Corps will be the equivalent of one-and-a-half armored brigades worth of equipment per year, and that should be easily manageable within the limits imposed by planned capacity.
They are confident the company can deliver what warfighters need, when they need it.
6 juillet 2021 | International, C4ISR
DARPA Selects Raytheon, BAE Systems, Northrop Teams to Develop Event-based Sensors
17 mars 2020 | International, Terrestre
The reboot of the Bradley replacement reminded many on the Hill of past procurement disasters like the Future Combat System. Can the Army exorcise the specter of FCS? By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. CAPITOL HILL: “This is the Army's third attempt at replacing the Bradley,” the grim-faced chairman of defense appropriations, Rep. Pete Visclosky, warned Army officials last week. “We've been told, time and again, that this time it is different.... but the first large acquisition program that has come out of the Army Futures Command has fallen flat. You do need to convince this committee today that our continued support of modernization will eventually be a good investment.” At three hearings in the last two weeks, members of the House bombarded Army leaders with questions about the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle, the semi-robotic replacement for the Reagan-era M2 Bradley. The Army cancelled its original competition after every vendor either dropped out or failed to meet requirements, then rebooted OMFV on a new, less rushed schedule that began with humbly seeking industry's input on what was actually possible. “We learned early on this program [that] there was confusion over the requirements,” the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. James McConville, told appropriators. With the new approach of listening assiduously to industry, he said, “we think we can save time up front and get the vehicle we need...and have requirements that we know industry can meet.” That was met with some skepticism. “That sounds great, general, but I wonder why we didn't start this process, you know, a long time ago,” replied the panel's ranking Republican, Rep. Ken Calvert. “What happened?” “I think what happened, Congressman, is we have learned,” said McConville, not quite answering the question. “We are learning with industry. We're learning with our acquisition folks who are used to doing it the old way, where we spent [10-14 years] developing requirements [and] a system, and then investing a lot of money in it, and finding out at the end we didn't get what we wanted. So, we are stopping early and we are redefining the way we do the process to encourage innovation.” So what's the new schedule? That's the question Rep. Paul Mitchell asked, without getting a clear answer, in two different House Armed Services Committee hearings, on March 3rd and March 5th. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/03/can-the-army-convince-congress-its-learned-from-fcs
13 septembre 2019 | International, Aérospatial
FORT BENNING, Ga. – The Army tested its current and future equipment and warfighting methods for the potential next war in a massive, weeks-long simulated experiment that wrapped up recently. The Unified Challenge 19.2 experiment in August involved more than 400 participants working with 55 formations, 64 concepts and 150 capabilities, said Col. Mark Bailey, chief of the Army's Futures and Concepts Center's Joint Army Experimentation Division. The exercise ran Aug. 5-23. The simulation allowed Army leaders to “understand some of the complex patterns” that come out of the very complex systems that the United States and its adversaries are using, or developing to use, in future scenarios, Bailey told reporters this week. Much of what was tested couldn't be done in the real world because it hasn't been invented yet. For example, the Army's priorities in the Cross Functional Teams, from Future Vertical Lift to the Next Generation Combat Vehicle, are years away from fielding their platforms to the force, but through mathematical models and algorithms, researchers can plug in the day and play out a very detailed set of events. And the scope of the experiment dove deeper than what a typical tabletop exercise or wargaming scenario might. It allowed experimenters to see down to the small unit level and all the way up to the division and corps level what would likely play out if those formations collided with a near-peer competitor on foreign turf in a battle for territory. Chris Willis, the chief of the Maneuver Battle Lab's Model and Simulations Branch, said that for the first time, experimenters were able to use “nonlethal effects” in a simulation — electronic jamming, cyber-attacks and other methods — to support maneuver warfighting. That helped them gather data on concepts that Army leaders have been considering and theorizing about for years. But the multi-domain operations tools that were used in simulation were not being flung about the simulated battle space by random privates. Currently, the experiments look at having commanders below the brigade level aware of what MDO tools are at their disposal and how to get access to them when needed from higher echelons, which would likely house them. “The brigade would get access to some effects but those wouldn't rest inside of the brigade proper,” said Col. Chris Cassibry, director of the Maneuver Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate's Concepts Development Division. Cassibry emphasized that at this stage it's more important for the brigade commander to understand what's happening across the battlefield and use those effects to execute maneuver. For instance, the idea is that by enabling space and cyber assets, ground forces can have more freedom to maneuver. That was assumed to be the case but the complex simulation has put some data behind the concept for researchers to now analyze. A lot of what presented challenges that will consume commanders of the future was creating “windows of domain superiority,” Bailey said. Converging effects The basic plan is to converge effects, fires or non-kinetic or other types, which create that window. Commanders can plan for that and they do. But to do that at the speed that leaders believe MDO will unfold presents a whole other set of challenges. “Things happen so fast you must have this flexibility to do that in a moment's notice so that when you identify a target on a battlefield and don't have the artillery tube in range you have to quickly identify what else you have in range to hit that target,” Bailey said. And also, to understand that even if you switch “guns” quickly enough to another asset, drone, missile, electronic warfare, that means the new tool you've chosen will now not be used on another quickly emerging target or threat. That's where artificial intelligence must fill the gap, by offering up those menus of options for commanders and identifying the targets so that the human can then fire. Unified Challenge is a twice a year event; this was the second. Though it provides a lot of data, it's not something easily replicable. That means that in the near term, smaller experiments will unfold using some of the lessons learned from the larger experiment, further refining concepts and next steps on many of the ways in which the Army goes after MDO. The next step will be for the Futures and Concepts Center to compile a report of lessons learned and recommendations moving forward with some of the platforms, capabilities and doctrine. That will be delivered to the center director in the coming months, and once approved, spread across the Army to inform smaller scale experiments with portions of the larger effort to develop MDO doctrine and materiel, Bailey said. https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/09/12/massive-simulation-shows-the-need-for-speed-in-multi-domain-ops