6 mai 2022 | International, Aérospatial

Avion de combat européen: "Il faut qu'on y arrive et on va y arriver" selon le patron d'Airbus

Invité de BFM Business, le directeur général d'Airbus a assuré que l'Europe avait besoin de développer son avion de combat "pour être compétitive sur le long terme".

https://www.bfmtv.com/economie/entreprises/defense/avion-de-combat-europeen-il-faut-qu-on-y-arrive-et-on-va-y-arriver-selon-le-patron-d-airbus_AV-202205060186.html

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  • New England guardsmen test their skills in Cyber Yankee 2020

    6 août 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

    New England guardsmen test their skills in Cyber Yankee 2020

    Mark Pomerleau Members of the National Guard from New England states concluded a two-week cyber exercise that sought to test the cyber skills of guardsmen and critical infrastructure operators. Cyber Yankee 2020, which took place July 21-31 in New Hampshire, involved more than 200 National Guard members and their civilian counterparts from across New England states, along with some active-duty partners and participants from local, state and federal agencies. In its sixth year, there was less attendance than previous years due to the coronavirus pandemic, but several were able to participate remotely. “Cyber Yankee is primarily a hands-on keyboard cyber incident response exercise for National Guard soldiers and airmen in FEMA Region 1, which are the six New England states,” said Lt. Col. Woody Groton, a member of the New Hampshire National Guard and the director for Cyber Yankee, according to a Facebook post by the New Hampshire Air National Guard. Groton said in a video that the exercise is primarily focused on the electrical and water sector. The exercise is “a great training opportunity for us to work with those people who would actually own the network that we would potentially respond on and for our soldiers and airmen to get that experience and for the engineers from those various entities, they get the training in working with us,” he said. The Guard units within the various states are a critical resource to defend against cyberattacks when they overwhelm localities. “If a large-scale attack happened against a power company, water company, or any other critical department around the state, we would be able to get activated and help them mitigate the threat,” Capt. Frederick Bond, 103rd Air Control Squadron cyberspace operator and exercise Team 3 lead from the Connecticut National Guard, said in a release. “It's similar to when a storm comes and we help remove fallen trees or shovel snow from roofs to help get critical infrastructure going again.” The friendly blue team had to deal with simulated attacks from an opposing red team. Social media posts were used to simulate a real internet environment, where forces must sift through the noise and discern what information is needed to make decisions and identify threat actors. In one case, these actors defaced a public website. “We found some discrepancies including website, it looks like it may have been defaced. The team is digging into finding the source of that defacement and then making steps to correct it,” Master Sgt. Eric Lewis, a blue team member in the New Hampshire Air National Guard, said in a video. Other actions tested included protecting computer files from being stolen or manipulated. “We received intel that potential threat actors may be using a certain capability to transfer files,” said Senior Airman Stephen LaLuna, 103rd Communications Flight cyber systems operations specialist with the Connecticut National Guard. “We see the traffic that's using it, that sets off a flag on our end to look deeper into that. If we determine it is malicious, we send it up the chain with our findings and recommendations to block it.” Officials explained that one of the most critical aspects of these training events is the partnerships built between Guard units, critical infrastructure operators and government entities so that when a crisis breaks out, everyone is acquainted. “We have built enduring partnerships with state government and the critical infrastructure sector. Something that if we did have a major cyberattack against one of those, we would be ready to respond and already know each other,” Groton said. Correction: An earlier version of this story misidentified Lt. Col. Woody Groton. He is with the Army National Guard. https://www.c4isrnet.com/cyber/2020/08/03/new-england-guardsmen-test-their-skills-in-cyber-yankee-2020

  • Pentagon is rethinking its multibillion-dollar relationship with U.S. defense contractors to boost supply chain security

    14 août 2018 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR

    Pentagon is rethinking its multibillion-dollar relationship with U.S. defense contractors to boost supply chain security

    By Ellen Nakashima The Pentagon has a new goal aimed at protecting its $100 billion supply chain from foreign theft and sabotage: to base its weapons contract awards on security assessments — not just cost and performance — a move that would mark a fundamental shift in department culture. The goal, based on a strategy called Deliver Uncompromised, comes as U.S. defense firms are increasingly vulnerable to data breaches, a risk highlighted earlier this year by China's alleged theft of sensitive information related to undersea warfare, and the Pentagon's decision last year to ban software made by the Russian firm Kaspersky Lab. On Monday, President Trump signed into a law a provision that would bar the federal government from buying equipment from Chinese telecommunications firms Huawei and ZTE Corp., a measure spurred by lawmakers' concerns about Chinese espionage. “The department is examining ways to designate security as a metric within the acquisition process,” Maj. Audricia Harris, a Pentagon spokeswoman, said in a statement. “Determinations [currently] are based on cost, schedule and performance. The department's goal is to elevate security to be on par with cost, schedule and performance.” The strategy was written by Mitre Corp., a nonprofit company that runs federally funded research centers, and the firm released a copy of its reportMonday. “The major goal is to move our suppliers, the defense industrial base and the rest of the private sector who contribute to the supply chain, beyond a posture of compliance — to owning the problem with us,” said Chris Nissen, director of asymmetric-threat response at Mitre. Harris said the Pentagon will review Mitre's recommendations before proceeding. She added that the Department of Defense, working with Congress and industry, “is already advancing to elevate security within the supply chain.” Testifying to Congress in June, Kari Bingen, the Pentagon's deputy undersecretary for intelligence, said: “We must have confidence that industry is delivering capabilities, technologies and weapon systems that are uncompromised by our adversaries, secure from cradle to grave.” Security should be seen not as a “cost burden,” she told the House Armed Services Committee, “but as a major factor in their competitiveness for U.S. government business.” The new strategy is necessary, officials say, because U.S. adversaries can degrade the military's battlefield and technological advantage by using “blended operations” — hacking and stealing valuable data, manipulating software to sabotage command and control systems or cause weapons to fail, and potentially inducing a defense firm employee to insert a faulty component or chip into a system. “A modern aircraft may have more than 10 million lines of code,” Mitre's report said. “Combat systems of all types increasingly employ sensors, actuators and software-activated control devices.” The term “Deliver Uncompromised” grew out of a 2010 meeting of senior counterintelligence policy officials, some of whom lamented that the Defense Department was tolerating contractors repeatedly delivering compromised capabilities to the Pentagon and the intelligence community. Addressing the security issue requires greater participation by counterintelligence agencies, which can detect threats against defense firms, the report said, and ideally, the government should establish a National Supply Chain Intelligence Center to monitor threats and issue warnings to all government agencies. Ultimately, the military's senior leaders bear responsibility for securing the supply chain and must be held accountable for it, the report said. The Defense Department, although one of the world's largest equipment purchasers, cannot control all parts of the supplier base. Nonetheless, it has influence over the companies it contracts with as it is the principal source of business for thousands of companies. It can shape behavior through its contracts to enhance supply-chain security, the report said. Legislation will be needed to provide incentives to defense and other private-sector companies to boost security, Mitre said. Congress should pass laws that shield firms from being sued if they share information about their vulnerabilities that could help protect other firms against cyberattacks; or if they are hacked by a foreign adversary despite using advanced cybersecurity technologies, the report said. Contractors should be given incentives such as tax breaks to embrace supply chain security, the report suggested. The Department of Homeland Security is addressing the security of the information technology supply chain through its newly established National Risk Management Center. “What we're saying is you should be looking at what vendors are doing to shore up their cybersecurity practices to protect the supply chain,” said Christopher Krebs, DHS undersecretary for the National Protection and Programs Directorate. The National Counterintelligence and Security Center, an agency of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence that coordinates the government's counterintelligence strategy, said in a report last month that software-supply-chain infiltration has already threatened critical infrastructure and is poised to endanger other sectors. According to the NCSC, last year “represented a watershed in the reporting of software supply chain” attacks. There were “numerous events involving hackers targeting software supply chains with back doors for cyber espionage, organizational disruption or demonstrable financial impact,” the agency found. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/the-pentagon-is-rethinking-its-multibillion-dollar-relationship-with-us-defense-contractors-to-stress-supply-chain-security/2018/08/12/31d63a06-9a79-11e8-b60b-1c897f17e185_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.265ce85b6eb1

  • The future of NORAD and continental defence

    20 avril 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

    The future of NORAD and continental defence

    April 17, 2020 On today's Defence Deconstructed Podcast, we are rebroadcasting a recording of the “The future of NORAD and continental defence” panel with moderator Sarah Goldfeder and featuring Michael Dawson, Richard Heitkamp, and Stephen Fuhr from our 29 Jan. 2020 Modernizing North American Defence conference. Defence Deconstructed is part of the CGAI Podcast Network and today's episode is brought to you by the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CADSI). This conference was made possible by the MINDS program from the Department of National Defence. Participant Biographies: Dave Perry (host): Senior Analyst and Vice President with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Sarah Goldfeder: CGAI Fellow, Principal, Earnscliffe Strategy Group. Michael Dawson: Former Political Advisor to the Commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM. Richard Heitkamp: Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs (Western Hemisphere), U.S. Army JS J5. Stephen Fuhr: former Chair, House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence. https://www.cgai.ca/the_future_of_norad_and_continental_defence

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