9 août 2018 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR

MDA director provides rough sketch of possible space-based missile defense sensor layer

By:

HUNTSVILLE, Ala. — Missile defense leaders within the Pentagon as well as Congress are pushing for more missile defense capability in space and the Missile Defense Agency Director Gen. Samuel Greaves laid out a rough idea of what a space-based missile defense sensor layercould look like.

The missile defense community has been talking “seriously” about a sensor layer in space “actively over the last year,” Greaves said in an August 8 speech at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium.

While many decisions still have to be made regarding requirements definitions, development paths and the acquisition process, “the key thing,” Greaves said, “is that there is serious consideration and support being given to the need to deploy these space sensors because we must do so.”

Greaves laid out a very rough sketch of what the agency is looking for to build a robust sensor layer.

First, the MDA might use something like a current system from the U.S. Air Force — the Overhead Persistent Infrared OPIR Global Scanning system — to alert and characterize activity in space, essentially “to be the bell ringer if something is going on,” Greaves said.

Full Article: https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/smd/2018/08/08/mda-director-provides-rough-sketch-of-possible-space-based-missile-defense-sensor-layer/

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  • The new strategy from Navy’s cyber command

    17 août 2020 | International, Naval

    The new strategy from Navy’s cyber command

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While that is and will always remain a possibility, technology has provided our adversaries with the ability to achieve their objectives without traditional military force,” the document read. “Currently, our adversaries are engaging us in cyberspace and the costs are cumulative – each intrusion, hack or leak may not be strategically consequential on its own, but the compounding effects are tantamount to what would have been considered an act of war.” The Navy, and military by extension, must be prepared to contest this activity. “I am certain the opening rounds of a 21st century great power conflict, particularly one impacting the maritime domain, will be launched in the electromagnetic, space, or cyber domains. If the Navy is to fight and win, Navy networks must be able to survive those hits and ‘fight hurt,'” Vice Adm. Timothy White, who rarely speaks publicly, said in the forward to the strategy. “Our people must be trained and exercised to fight through those hits. This contest spans the continuum of competition and conflict. We must win this contest during the day-to-day competition of ‘peacetime operations,' where our networks are already in close contact, under constant probing and attack. If we do not, we will be at a severe disadvantage during crisis and lethal combat.” The plan, which continues to nest within the Navy's overarching vision of Distributed Maritime Operations, features a three pronged vision; acting first in full spectrum information warfare, fighting and winning in a fully contested battlespace and promoting modernization and innovation. Moreover, the plan tweaks the five goals outlined in the previous strategic plan 2015-2020. They include: Operating the network as a warfighting platform: Following several high profile network breaches, the Navy must tighten the screws on its IT. 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  • Can data be shared among US, Chinese and Russian aircraft? Sudan did it.

    21 novembre 2018 | International, Aérospatial

    Can data be shared among US, Chinese and Russian aircraft? Sudan did it.

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  • Downward trend: Southeast Asian countries cut defense spending

    27 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

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