AM General unseats Oshkosh to build Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

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  25 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  The U.S. Navy’s New Drone Could Team Up With Stealth Fighters

  The U.S. Navy is spending $13 billion buying 72 MQ-25 Stingray tanker drones for its 11 aircraft carriers. The idea is for the Boeing BA-made MQ-25s to refuel manned fighters, extending their range while also relieving the fighter squadrons of their own tanking duties. But the MQ-25 always had potential to be more than just an aerial-refueler. With its stealthy airframe and high endurance, it could be a surveillance plane and even a light strike platform, too. At least one fleet community isn't waiting for the Navy and Boeing to adapt the MQ-25 to other missions. The fleet's airborne command-and-control weapons school at Naval Base Ventura County in Point Mugu, California, already thinks of the Stingray as more than a tanker. Robbin Laird, a military analyst and writer, spoke to Cmdr. Christopher Hulitt, the head of the school, and summarized the conversation at Second Line of Defense. Laird and Hulitt's main point is that the Navy is acquiring new aircraft with highly-sophisticated communications systems and sensors. The F-35C stealth fighter. The E-2D early-warning plane. The MQ-4C high-altitude drone. And the MQ-25. Where before, E-2s would fly over a maritime battle, detecting targets and relaying commands to fighters, now a new system is coming together. The F-35C, E-2D, MQ-4C and MQ-25 all possess the qualities of a sensor- and command-and-control platform. So instead of passing information just one way—from an E-2 to a fighter—in coming years info could begin moving in all directions. An F-35C in stealth mode might detect an enemy ship using its passive sensors and beam, via secure datalink, the target's general location to the nearby MQ-25 that just refueled the F-35C. The MQ-25 could hand off the data to an E-2D. The E-2D crew could instruct the operators of an MQ-4C to steer their drone toward the enemy ship's location. Once the MQ-4C pinpoints the ship, the E-2D could then pass the targeting data back to the F-35C as well as to other allied vessels and planes, all of which could fire missiles. Imagine this whole process happening in minutes. “It is about deploying an extended trusted sensor network, which can be tapped through various waveforms, and then being able to shape how the decision-making arc can best deliver the desired combat effect,” Laird wrote. The Navy hopes to deploy the first MQ-25s as early as 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2020/05/22/the-us-navys-new-drone-could-team-up-with-stealth-fighters/#9bc4fd875e2e

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  24 avril 2018 | International, Aérospatial, C4ISR

  High-cost satellites remain vulnerable to low-cost threats

  By: Daniel Cebul WASHINGTON ― Despite advances in satellite technology, many of the U.S. military's most expensive and necessary assets remain vulnerable to jamming from inexpensive tools, according to a new report from the CSIS Aerospace Security Project. “The technology needed to jam many types of satellite signals is commercially available and relatively inexpensive,” the report reads. Other electronic threats such as spoofing, which attempts to trick receivers into believing manipulated data from an attacker is real, also offer low cost options to adversaries who hope to interfere with satellite connectivity. These kinds of attacks can disrupt communications or position, navigation and timing techniques. The report, released April 12 and titled “Space Threat Assessment 2018,” notes that while United States near-peer adversaries have made strides in more advanced kinetic weapons, such as direct ascent anti-satellite weapons, jamming technology also is seen as critical. For example, “China has made the development and deployment of satellite jamming systems a high priority,” according to the authors, Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson and Thomas Roberts. Another near-peer, Russia, has displayed jamming and spoofing capabilities in the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Syria in the last several years. The report said the use of Russian technology in these conflicts “demonstrate[s] that Russia retains advanced electronic attack capabilities, despite some analysts' claims that Russia's ability to jam and spoof satellites has declined since 1991.” But the threat from jamming and spoofing attacks goes beyond near-peers. Iran and North Korea, so-called rogue states, also have demonstrated the capability and willingness to interfere with satellite communications and GPS signals, according to the report. And the ability to jam and spoof signals is likely to spread. The report notes once a jammer or spoofer is developed, “it is relatively inexpensive to produce and deploy in large numbers and can be proliferated to other state and non-state actors.” But the United States is not sitting by idly. The Air Force's Advanced Energy High Frequency satellites, reserved for secure communication, “incorporate a high degree of protection against jamming, spoofing, and other forms of electronic attack,” according to the report. The U.S. is also preparing troops to operate in GPS-denied environments. In January, the Defense Department jammed GPS-signals in western states so pilots could train in environments that will likely come to characterize combat in the age of electronic warfare. https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/space-symposium/2018/04/16/high-cost-satellites-remain-vulnerable-to-low-cost-threats/

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  9 mars 2021 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  Intel joins DARPA in search of encryption 'holy grail' | ZDNet

  Chip giant will participate in DARPA's DPRIVE program that aims to develop an accelerator for fully homomorphic encryption.