May 11, 2020 | International, Naval
By: Rep. Rob Wittman
As the world continues to grapple with the COVID-19 pandemic, we are reminded that even in a time of unprecedented technological growth and development, simple and primitive threats have the ability to radically alter our way of life. In spite of astonishing medical advancements, some threats, unfortunately, remain timeless.
Many people have drawn comparisons between the current coronvirus pandemic and the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918. The Spanish flu was caused by an H1N1 virus that was first identified in the United States in military personnel in the spring of 1918. It would eventually infect one-third of the global population, killing approximately 675,000 people in the United States and an estimated 50 million people worldwide. All of this was happening in the midst of the “war to end all wars” — World War I.
While the homeland was battling the flu pandemic, the U.S. Navy was battling the U-boat threat in the Atlantic.
In World War I, German submarines sank almost 5,000 ships, most of them merchant vessels. To help counter the U-boat threat, the United States and the United Kingdom embarked on an unprecedented and ambitious project: the construction of the North Sea Mine Barrage — a 230-mile-long underwater barrier of sea mines stretching from Aberdeen, Scotland, to Ekersund, Norway. The effort was a marvel of modern manufacturing, producing 1,000 sea mines every day. Over five months, the allies eventually laid over 70,000 sea mines, helping to contain the U-boat threat and protect allied shipping.
As a second wave of the flu pandemic raged across the globe, World War I finally came to an end in November 1918. The American and British navies now had the task of cleaning up 70,000 live sea mines in the unforgiving North Sea. These primitive mines were anchored to the bottom of the sea, and the U.S. and U.K. had the advantage of knowing precisely where they were located because they had laid them. Despite those advantages, it took 82 ships and over 4,000 men — 10 times the assets that were required to lay the mines — to clean up the North Sea Mine Barrage.
After almost a year of mine-clearing efforts, the operation was declared complete. Navy studies would later reveal that only approximately 40 percent of the American mines had actually been cleared, and mines continued to wash ashore for years after the end of the war.
Fast forward a century and sea mines have proliferated around the world. Since the end World War II, sea mines have damaged or sunk four times as many U.S. Navy ships as any other method of attack.
U.S. adversaries have paid attention. Russia was a pioneer in mine warfare and is estimated to have as many as 250,000 sea mines in its inventory. China is not far behind, with an inventory of around 100,000, including some of the world's most advanced mines. China has hundreds of mine-capable ships and aircraft, and could deploy thousands of mines a day during a conflict.
To counter the mine threat, the U.S. Navy relies on 11 wooden-hulled Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships, 31 MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters and a handful of explosive ordnance disposal platoons. The Navy wants to retire both the Avengers and Sea Dragons by 2025, while efforts to field any replacement capability have continued to falter.
While the U.S. Navy has focused its research and funding on countering emerging threats such as advanced radars and hypersonic missiles, a time-tested threat waits patiently in the waters around the globe; and if we ignore the lessons of history, a centuries-old technology could lead to our defeat. Mine warfare, like public health, is an area that rarely attracts attention or significant investment until a crisis emerges. We should not wait until American lives are in peril before we take action.
We need to change course immediately. First, the Navy must maintain its existing mine countermeasures forces until a credible replacement is fielded. Second, the Navy must make a significant investment to recapitalize the mine countermeasures force both in time and quantity to deliver a credible force.
Unfortunately, the Navy has spent billions of dollars and wasted precious years pursuing a mine countermeasure module program that, even if it worked as advertised, would have neither the capability nor the capacity to effectively counter an enemy mine threat anticipated in our National Defense Strategy.
Whether it's a pandemic or a proliferated naval threat, our citizens expect the United States to respond effectively, and we must make the necessary investments to counter the threats to our nation and our Navy.
November 19, 2024 | International, Aerospace
Trump touted his administration's renegotiation of the Air Force One contract with Boeing as an example of how he could cut defense costs.
June 26, 2018 | International, Aerospace
JOHN A. TIRPAK The secret B-21 bomber will progress to a major milestone—critical design review—by the end of this year, Air Force Rapid Capabilities Office director Randall Walden said Monday. Walden also revealed that the B-21 is merely one of 28 programs being managed by the RCO, which he noted is funded at about $30 billion over the five-year future year defense plan. Walden, speaking at an AFA Mitchell Institute event in Arlington, Va., said the B-21 has already passed its preliminary design review, and noted that the release of drawings for the bomber is progressing well. As for critical design review, "we haven't done it, but we're on our way," and he predicted it would happen by the end of December. Major design work on the bomber is taking place at Northrop Grumman's Melbourne, Fla., facility. He acknowledged that subscale models of the aircraft have been tested in wind tunnels, but said no full-size version has yet been fabricated. "Component testing" is moving along at an "appropriate" speed, he said. "We're looking forward to ... an 'on-time' start of production," Walden said. Walden has spoken publicly about the RCO in a number of venues, but was more forthcoming than usual about the organization and its products at the Mitchell event. Of the 28 projects in the RCO's portfolio, 13 are "ACAT 1," he noted, meaning they are major defense acquisition programs, which usually means a major platform, like an aircraft, missile, or command and control system. While Walden would only identify the B-21 and X-37 orbital vehicle among those that the RCO is working on, he said the majority of the rest could best be characterized as "family of systems" projects. Interestingly, Walden said the RCO has not been called on to undertake any hypersonics programs. The Air Force is pursuing hypersonics projects with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), and the other services are conducting independent research in the field. Walden said the RCO has about 220 people, who are headquartered at JB Anacostia-Bolling, in Washington, D.C. Among them are experts from the line Air Force who are "embedded" with programs to offer operator advice on design and development. Four bomber pilots are attached to the RCO to advise on the B-21's development, he noted. The B-21 program manager—who Walden did not name—has had experience with management of the F-22 and F-35 programs, he said. The B-21 program has long been scheduled to produce a "usable asset" in the 2024 timeframe, according to comments offered by Air Force officials for the last three years. Rep. Rob Wittman (R-Va.), chair of the House Armed Services Seapower and Projection Forces panel, revealed in March that problems had arisen with airflow to the B-21's engines, and Walden said Monday that these had been resolved. "Complex weapon systems, especially engine integrations, ... you've got to get throat sizes done right, prior to anything being built" he said, referring to the serpentine tunnels by which air reaches the B-21's engines, which are buried in the fuselage. The RCO obtained "insight from actual lab testing" and found the optimal solution, he said. The RCO has been asked to help with the set-up of a dedicated "Space RCO" at the Space and Missile Systems Center at Los Angeles AFB, Calif., and Walden said he has recommended veterans of his own shop to run it, especially those who have worked on space systems, and they have been hired, he said. Walden resisted allowing his own people to be hired away for the new organization, he said. Walden was asked whether the RCO is working on a successor platform to the X-37, and although he did not reply directly, he did say that it is "no different from any other system, ... it starts to get old," and there begin to emerge problems with vanishing vendors and parts obsolescence. However, he forecast no "big change" in that program in the near future. The X-37 tends to fly two-year missions, and various agencies that use the data collected from it are very happy with its activities, he said. Walden told Air Force Magazine he is not experiencing trouble obtaining the workforce he requires, but he said he's aware that major vendors are experiencing difficulties hiring all the engineering and especially software talent needed to execute the Air Force's array of high-tech projects. He also reported that the RCO's experience with protests—wherein a contractor not selected for a program complains that the judging was not fair—is no worse, and probably somewhat better, than that experienced by the Air Force in its "white world," or non-secret programs. Commenting on the "culture" of the RCO, Walden said it is largely based on the Lockheed "Skunk Works" model of small teams with tightly defined objectives and a vastly shortened reporting chain. Where the RCO saves time and money is usually in the area of "deciding to do" something and not going into endless coordination efforts. The RCO can save two to three years on a project simply by having the authority to make decisions, Walden said, avoiding "the tyranny of consensus." It reports to an executive committee comprised of the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the service's acquisition executive, and the Pentagon's acquisition chief. It's not possible to rush the development of, say, an aircraft, he said, noting that basic design must be gotten right or problems are inevitable later on. It takes about three years at a minimum to develop a design, he said. Asked whether the RCO can provide a model to the overall acquisition system, Walden said it can be applied to a degree, but there is the risk that the organization could get too big. "There is a knee in the curve. I can't tell you" what it is, he said, but at a certain size, an RCO-like acquisition agency would no longer be able to do things rapidly. The value of something of constrained size, like the RCO, is to "make a decision, get on contract," Walden said. The mainstream acquisition system takes "an inordinate amount of time" on those two steps. An analysis of alternatives can take up to three years and "sometimes no one makes a decision," Walden said. Walden insisted the RCO is fully observant of the 5000-series of acquisition regulations, but makes a careful review of them on all its efforts and works to "avoid" the ones that don't really affect its programs. He also said the organization turns away many people who want to be involved in overseeing or getting briefed on RCO activities unless they are required under regulations. Even so, he said the RCO has a good relationship with Congress because it tries to be transparent with members, and even when it runs into problems, people on Capitol Hill "want to help." He added that the Pentagon's "risk-averse" acquisition process took many years to get that way and reversing that mindset to one of risk-taking and experimentation will not happen quickly. http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2018/June%202018/B-21-Bomber-Critical-Design-Review-by-End-of-Year.aspx
March 26, 2020 | International, Aerospace
By: The Associated Press WICHITA, Kan. — Aircraft parts maker Spirit AeroSystems announced Tuesday that it is temporarily halting work for Boeing that is performed in Wichita, Kansas, and two Oklahoma facilities amid an outbreak of the new coronavirus. The move came after Boeing announced Monday that it was suspending operations at its Seattle, Washington, area facilities. At least 110 people have died from COVID-19 in Washington state, mostly in the Seattle area. Boeing employs about 70,000 people in the region. The company said 32 employees have tested positive for the virus, including 25 in the greater Seattle area. At Spirit, military, non-Boeing work and other programs will continue. In Oklahoma, the suspension affects facilities in Tulsa and McAlester. Spirit will continue to support 787 work for Boeing's Charleston, South Carolina, facility. Spirit did not say how many employees would be affected, but the suspension begins Wednesday and will last until April 8. Employees will continue to be paid during the two-week period. Deep cleaning of work spaces and facilities also is planned. https://www.defensenews.com/industry/2020/03/24/spirit-aerosystems-temporarily-suspends-boeing-work-in-some-facilities