May 11, 2020 | International, Naval

The US Navy’s modernization rush must not harm mine countermeasures

By: Rep. Rob Wittman

As the world continues to grapple with the COVID-19 pandemic, we are reminded that even in a time of unprecedented technological growth and development, simple and primitive threats have the ability to radically alter our way of life. In spite of astonishing medical advancements, some threats, unfortunately, remain timeless.

Many people have drawn comparisons between the current coronvirus pandemic and the Spanish flu pandemic of 1918. The Spanish flu was caused by an H1N1 virus that was first identified in the United States in military personnel in the spring of 1918. It would eventually infect one-third of the global population, killing approximately 675,000 people in the United States and an estimated 50 million people worldwide. All of this was happening in the midst of the “war to end all wars” — World War I.

While the homeland was battling the flu pandemic, the U.S. Navy was battling the U-boat threat in the Atlantic.

In World War I, German submarines sank almost 5,000 ships, most of them merchant vessels. To help counter the U-boat threat, the United States and the United Kingdom embarked on an unprecedented and ambitious project: the construction of the North Sea Mine Barrage — a 230-mile-long underwater barrier of sea mines stretching from Aberdeen, Scotland, to Ekersund, Norway. The effort was a marvel of modern manufacturing, producing 1,000 sea mines every day. Over five months, the allies eventually laid over 70,000 sea mines, helping to contain the U-boat threat and protect allied shipping.

As a second wave of the flu pandemic raged across the globe, World War I finally came to an end in November 1918. The American and British navies now had the task of cleaning up 70,000 live sea mines in the unforgiving North Sea. These primitive mines were anchored to the bottom of the sea, and the U.S. and U.K. had the advantage of knowing precisely where they were located because they had laid them. Despite those advantages, it took 82 ships and over 4,000 men — 10 times the assets that were required to lay the mines — to clean up the North Sea Mine Barrage.

After almost a year of mine-clearing efforts, the operation was declared complete. Navy studies would later reveal that only approximately 40 percent of the American mines had actually been cleared, and mines continued to wash ashore for years after the end of the war.

Fast forward a century and sea mines have proliferated around the world. Since the end World War II, sea mines have damaged or sunk four times as many U.S. Navy ships as any other method of attack.

U.S. adversaries have paid attention. Russia was a pioneer in mine warfare and is estimated to have as many as 250,000 sea mines in its inventory. China is not far behind, with an inventory of around 100,000, including some of the world's most advanced mines. China has hundreds of mine-capable ships and aircraft, and could deploy thousands of mines a day during a conflict.

To counter the mine threat, the U.S. Navy relies on 11 wooden-hulled Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships, 31 MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters and a handful of explosive ordnance disposal platoons. The Navy wants to retire both the Avengers and Sea Dragons by 2025, while efforts to field any replacement capability have continued to falter.

While the U.S. Navy has focused its research and funding on countering emerging threats such as advanced radars and hypersonic missiles, a time-tested threat waits patiently in the waters around the globe; and if we ignore the lessons of history, a centuries-old technology could lead to our defeat. Mine warfare, like public health, is an area that rarely attracts attention or significant investment until a crisis emerges. We should not wait until American lives are in peril before we take action.

We need to change course immediately. First, the Navy must maintain its existing mine countermeasures forces until a credible replacement is fielded. Second, the Navy must make a significant investment to recapitalize the mine countermeasures force both in time and quantity to deliver a credible force.

Unfortunately, the Navy has spent billions of dollars and wasted precious years pursuing a mine countermeasure module program that, even if it worked as advertised, would have neither the capability nor the capacity to effectively counter an enemy mine threat anticipated in our National Defense Strategy.

Whether it's a pandemic or a proliferated naval threat, our citizens expect the United States to respond effectively, and we must make the necessary investments to counter the threats to our nation and our Navy.

https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/08/the-us-navys-modernization-rush-must-not-harm-mine-countermeasures/

On the same subject

April 9, 2018 | International, Aerospace

Avions de chasse. Les Européens adorent acheter américain. Pourquoi ?
(B2) Quand on regarde l'équipement des Européens, en avions de chasse ou de combat, on remarque une constante. Les pays européens préfèrent acheter américain qu'européen. Mais à y regarder de près, on voit aussi que ceux qui proclament haut et fort qu'ils sont tenants de l'Europe de la défense ne sont pas toujours ceux que l'on croit. Ce papier a fait l'objet d'une chronique dans l'excellente émission ‘La Faute à l'Europe‘, de FranceTvInfo, animée par mes confrères Yann Antony-Noguès, Kattalin Landaburu, Jean Quatremer et préparée par Hughes Beaudouin. Combien de pays ne volent pas avec du matériel américain ? Cela se compte sur les doigts d'une main et un doigt. Seuls six pays ne volent pas américains (en bleu et en vert sur la carte) : France, Allemagne, Suède, Rép. Tchèque, Autriche, Hongrie. Parmi ces pays, il faut distinguer la Suède (Gripen) et la France (Rafale) qui s'équipent uniquement en national (en vert sur la carte), et l'Allemagne qui vole avec du matériel européen (Eurofigther) certes mais fabriqué sur son sol. Tandis que l'Autriche, la Hongrie et la Tchéquie volent avec du matériel acheté chez un de leurs voisins. Le premier en Eurofighter, les deux autres en matériel suédois. Certains pays pratiquent-ils un équipement mixte ? Oui. Le panachage est un procédé typique de plusieurs pays (en jaune sur la carte). C'est le cas de tous les pays du Sud de l'Europe — l'Ejército del aire espagnole, l'Aeronautica italienne, l'Hellenic Air Force —, qui ont jusqu'ici pris grand soin d'avoir au moins deux modèles dans leur flotte aérienne : l'un de fabrication UE, l'autre de fabrication US. A une exception notable près : le Portugal. C'est aussi le cas... du Royaume-Uni. ... le Royaume-Uni aussi ? Qui l'eut cru ! Ce pays très attaché au lien transatlantique prend bien soin d'équilibrer ses achats entre le made in USA et le made in Europa. Une tradition de la Royal Air Force. Les Britanniques — à la différence des Français — préfèrent fabriquer en multinational que fabriquer en solo. Cela a été le cas du Tornado (un avion fabriqué avec l'Allemagne et l'Italie) puis de l'Eurofighter (renommé Typhoon outre-Manche). Hors de l'aviation de chasse, c'est aussi le cas de l'Airbus A400M. Un pragmatisme qui a un fondement très industriel. Une partie de ces avions (européens) sont fabriqués dans les usines britanniques. Y-a-t-il des tendances géopolitiques dans l'équipement exclusif made in USA ? Clairement. Les pays qui ont une frontière avec la Russie s'équipent exclusivement en matériel américain (en orange sur la carte), en général avec du F-16 (fabriqués par General Dynamics, aujourd'hui repris par Lockheed Martin). Il ne s'agit pas alors seulement de performances de l'appareil mais aussi d'avoir une ‘assurance-vie' américaine... et de bénéficier à moindre prix d'une flotte d'appareils. Ceux-ci étant souvent amortis ou d'occasions. ... et d'autres raisons plus idéologiques ? Les pays du nord de l'Europe (Norvège, Danemark, Pays-Bas, Belgique) sont aussi équipés en matériel américain. Il s'agit là d'une solidarité euro-atlantique plutôt que d'une solidarité européenne. Assez atypique par rapport à ses voisins, le Portugal a également acheté du matériel américain, pour des raisons idéologiques (et des raisons politiques très personnelles). Hors de l'Union européenne, même la neutre Suisse vole US : avec des F/A 18 Hornet fabriqués par Boeing (1). Décidément, en matière d'équipement d'avions de chasse... ceux qui se prétendent très Européens ne sont pas toujours ceux que l'on croit. Dans ce panorama, comment se situent les Français ? La France est totalement isolée. Son aviation de chasse est équipée uniquement de matériel national (2). Mais, à la différence de la Suède, autre producteur national, et du précédent du Mirage, Dassault n'a pas réussi à exporter son Rafale (avion pourtant excellent) dans d'autres pays en Europe. Certes, deux pays figurent aujourd'hui dans la lunette de tir de Paris : la Belgique et la Suisse. Cela nécessitera cependant un sacré effort pour convaincre ces deux pays, francophones, de s'équiper ‘français'. Dans le futur, le Rafale pourrait être ainsi le dernier avion à être produit en ‘national'. L'avion du futur (habité ou non = drone) devra l'être avec un autre pays (Royaume-Uni ou/et Allemagne). Une raison davantage économique que politique. La France ne peut plus suivre en solo. Quel est l'avantage comparatif du matériel américain ? On ne peut pas vraiment en vouloir à un pays de choisir un modèle éprouvé, compétent, suffisant pour les besoins nationaux et qui procure un rapport qualité / prix très convenable, voire largement supérieur au prix d'un avion européen. Le F-16 a été produit en grand nombre : environ 4500 exemplaires. Ce qui permet des économies d'échelle. La moitié a été achetée par l'US Air Force, la moitié à l'export. Pour un avion Eurofighter, Rafale ou JAS 39 neuf, vous pouvez vous payer environ quatre F-16 d'occasion. Outre les raisons politiques, acheter US est-il efficace ? Oui. Il faut le reconnaitre. L'avantage d'acheter US, c'est appartenir à un club mondial. Le club des pays équipés du F-16 se réunit d'ailleurs régulièrement pour échanger ou demander des modifications. Et quand on interroge des pilotes équipés de ce type d'avions, la liste des avantages est longue. On « bénéficie de l'expérience des autres » m'expliquait ainsi un officier. « Il y a une mise à jour constante des avions». Le « F-16 d'aujourd'hui ne ressemble ainsi plus du tout au F-16 acheté à l'époque ». En déplacement ou en opération, autre atout, il est toujours possible de trouver un voisin qui a une pièce de rechange ou un mécano capable de vous donner un coup de main. Très appréciable. Et, puis, il ne faut pas le nier. L'aura de l'Amérique joue. Le plaisir de côtoyer de près les pilotes américains, d'aller s'entraîner en Arizona que dans la plaine du Pô ou au-dessus de l'Auvergne La tendance pourrait-elle s'inverser ? Pour l'instant, aucun signe ne le montre. Les derniers pays qui viennent de s'équiper (Roumanie, Croatie, Slovaquie) l'ont fait avec du F-16. Et les Bulgares devraient suivre ce chemin. Les Autrichiens ont remis en cause leur équipement avec l'Eurofighter d'Airbus. L'accusation américaine du protectionnisme européen est-elle valable ? Non. C'est un pur mensonge... ou alors cela se révèle d'une incompétence notoire. L'arrivée de l'avion américain de nouvelle génération F-35 (fabriqué par Lockheed Martin) dans la flotte de plusieurs États va siphonner tous les budgets pour de longues années. Il est assez coûteux, son prix réel toujours très incertain. Mais, surtout, l'équipement en avion de chasse est un investissement lourd. Le renouvellement n'intervient que tous les 20 ans (au mieux si achat d'occasion) à 40 ans (si achat en neuf). Autant dire que les acquisitions prévues aujourd'hui vont plomber l'industrie européenne jusqu'à 2060 ! Les Américains sont-ils seuls en cause ? Non. Accuser les Américains d'être trop puissants, c'est surtout mettre le doigt sur un problème typiquement européen : la dispersion. L'industrie aéronautique européenne est éclatée entre trois constructeurs (Airbus, Dassault, Saab). Ce qui l'empêche d'avoir un modèle unique (quitte à ce qu'il soit décliné en plusieurs versions) et donc des économies d'échelle. Quand il s'agit de choisir un nouvel avion, les petits egos nationaux, tout comme les différences de portée stratégique, empêchent de s'unir. Pourquoi ne pas s'équiper comme certains le font avec des modèles fabriqués dans différents pays ? Ce type d'équipement mixte est réservé à des pays qui disposent de certains moyens et d'une certaine flotte. Car il coûte cher. La tendance, aujourd'hui, est plutôt désormais de s'équiper avec un seul modèle ou au moins avec un seul fabricant. Il faut le reconnaître aussi : l'utilité opérationnelle d'un avion (ses qualités requises) diffèrent grandement selon les pays. La plupart des pays (de la Finlande au Portugal, en passant par l'Allemagne ou la Belgique) ont surtout besoin d'une surveillance de leur sol, et éventuellement d'une participation à la police du ciel internationale (en opération multinationale ou sous couvert de l'OTAN). Alors que la France ou la Grande-Bretagne entendent garder une capacité d'intervention offensive. (Nicolas Gros-Verheyde) (1) Après avoir annulé un premier appel d'offres (suite à une votation populaire hostile), la Suisse a mis en concurrence, pour le renouvellement de sa flotte, cinq avions : le Gripen suédois, l'Eurofighter européen, le Rafale français, le F-18 Super Hornet et le F-35 américains. (2) Un mono-équipement qui ne concerne que l'aviation avec pilote (dite ‘habitée'). Pour les avions sans pilote (drones), la France est obligée de recourir à des matériels américains, faute d'avoir développé à temps ce type de matériel. https://www.bruxelles2.eu/2018/04/08/quand-ils-volent-les-europeens-adorent-acheter-americain-pourquoi/
September 20, 2021 | International, Land

Soldiers Could Shoot 'Rambo'-Style With Elbit Systems' Smart Assault Rifle Tech
If an assault rifle augmentation system from Elbit Systems works as advertised, special operations troops or dismounted infantry could gain the ability to shoot around corners or fire from the hip with no loss of accuracy.
July 3, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR

Trump Warns NATO Allies to Spend More on Defense, or Else
By Julie Hirschfeld Davis WASHINGTON — President Trump has written sharply worded letters to the leaders of several NATO allies — including Germany, Belgium, Norway and Canada — taking them to task for spending too little on their own defense and warning that the United States is losing patience with what he said was their failure to meet security obligations shared by the alliance. The letters, sent in June, are the latest sign of acrimony between Mr. Trump and American allies as he heads to a NATO summit meeting next week in Brussels that will be a closely watched test of the president's commitment to the alliance. Mr. Trump has repeatedly questioned its value and has claimed that its members are taking advantage of the United States. Mr. Trump's criticism raised the prospect of another confrontation involving the president and American allies after a blowup by Mr. Trump at the Group of 7 gathering last month in Quebec, and increased concerns that far from projecting solidarity in the face of threats from Russia, the meeting will highlight divisions within the alliance. Such a result could play into the hands of President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, who is to meet with Mr. Trump in Helsinki, Finland, after the NATO meeting, and whose primary goal is sowing divisions within the alliance. In his letters, the president hinted that after more than a year of public and private complaints that allies have not done enough to share the burden of collective defense, he may be considering a response, including adjusting the United States' military presence around the world. “As we discussed during your visit in April, there is growing frustration in the United States that some allies have not stepped up as promised,” Mr. Trump wrote to Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany in a particularly pointed letter, according to someone who saw it and shared excerpts with The New York Times. “The United States continues to devote more resources to the defense of Europe when the Continent's economy, including Germany's, are doing well and security challenges abound. This is no longer sustainable for us.” “Growing frustration,” Mr. Trump wrote, “is not confined to our executive branch. The United States Congress is concerned, as well.” The president's complaint is that many NATO allies are not living up to the commitment they made at their Wales summit meeting in 2014 to spend 2 percent of their gross domestic product on national defense. American presidents have long complained about the lack of burden-sharing by NATO member countries, but Mr. Trump has taken that criticism much further, claiming that some of the United States' closest allies are essentially deadbeats who have failed to pay debts to the organization, a fundamental misunderstanding of how it functions. The Trump administration has already reportedly been analyzing a large-scale withdrawal of American forces from Germany, after Mr. Trump expressed surprise that 35,000 active-duty troops are stationed there and complained that NATO countries were not contributing enough to the alliance. In the letter, Mr. Trump told Ms. Merkel that Germany also deserves blame for the failure of other NATO countries to spend enough: “Continued German underspending on defense undermines the security of the alliance and provides validation for other allies that also do not plan to meet their military spending commitments, because others see you as a role model.” In language that is echoed in his letters to the leaders of other countries — including Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada, Prime Minister Erna Solberg of Norway and Prime Minister Charles Michel of Belgium — Mr. Trump said he understands the “domestic political pressure” brought to bear by opponents of boosting military expenditures, noting that he has expended “considerable political capital to increase our own military spending.” “It will, however, become increasingly difficult to justify to American citizens why some countries do not share NATO's collective security burden while American soldiers continue to sacrifice their lives overseas or come home gravely wounded,” Mr. Trump wrote to Ms. Merkel. Mr. Michel reacted tartly last week to the letter, telling reporters at a European Union summit meeting in Brussels that he was “not very impressed” by it, according to a report by Deutsche Welle. Mr. Trump has long complained about the alliance and routinely grouses that the United States is treated shabbily by multilateral organizations of which it is a member, be it the World Trade Organization or the North Atlantic alliance. But in Europe, the letters to NATO allies have been greeted with some degree of alarm because of their suggestion that Mr. Trump is prepared to impose consequences on the allies — as he has done in an escalating tariff fight with European trading partners — if they do not do what he is asking. “Trump still seems to think that NATO is like a club that you owe dues to, or some sort of protection racket where the U.S. is doing all the work protecting all these deadbeat Europeans while they're sitting around on vacation, and now he is suggesting there are consequences,” said Derek Chollet, a former Defense Department official who is the executive vice president for security and defense policy at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. “Europeans have been watching Donald Trump begin to implement his rhetoric on trade in ways that are very combative,” he said, “and they're starting to contemplate whether he would do this regarding security issues, as well.” Mr. Trump's letter to Mr. Trudeau was reported last month by iPolitics in Canada, and the existence of others was reported last week by Foreign Policy. It was not clear precisely how many Mr. Trump wrote, and the White House would not comment on presidential correspondence. But two diplomatic sources said they believed at least a dozen were sent, including to Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. A White House official, speaking on the condition of anonymity because the official was not authorized to discuss the matter, said that Mr. Trump is committed to the NATO alliance and expects allies to shoulder “their fair share of our common defense burden, and to do more in areas that most affect them.” John R. Bolton, Mr. Trump's national security adviser, said Sunday that it was NATO members who refused to spend more on defense — not the president — who were responsible for undercutting the alliance. “The president wants a strong NATO,” Mr. Bolton said in an interview on CBS's “Face the Nation.” “If you think Russia's a threat, ask yourself this question: Why is Germany spending less than 1.2 percent of its G.N.P.? When people talk about undermining the NATO alliance, you should look at those who are carrying out steps that make NATO less effective militarily.” But for diplomats hoping fervently to avoid another high-profile summit meeting collapse with Mr. Trump as the instigator, the letters were concerning. “Europeans, like many folks in our Defense Department, think that there are many good things that could come out of this summit if only they can keep it from going off the rails,” Mr. Chollet said. “They are hoping to survive without irreparable damage, and so the fact that you have all these storm clouds surrounding NATO and Trump is really worrisome.” Mr. Trump's disparagement of Europe and the alliance has become almost routine, leaving some veteran diplomats aghast. Last week, Jim Melville, the United States ambassador to Estonia, told friends and colleagues that he would resign at the end of this month after more than 30 years in the Foreign Service, in part because of the president's language. “For the President to say the E.U. was ‘set up to take advantage of the United States, to attack our piggy bank,' or that ‘NATO is as bad as NAFTA' is not only factually wrong, but proves to me that it's time to go,” Mr. Melville wrote in a Facebook post. He was referring to remarks about Europe that the president made during a rally last week in Fargo, N.D., and comments about NATO that he is reported to have made privately during the Group of 7 gathering. Still, the president is not alone in demanding more robust military spending by NATO allies. Jim Mattis, the secretary of defense, wrote to Gavin Williamson, the British defense minister, last month saying he was “concerned” that the United Kingdom's military strength was “at risk of erosion” if it did not increase spending, and warned that France could eclipse Britain as the United States' “partner of choice” if it did not invest more. A United States official confirmed the contents of Mr. Mattis's letter, first reported by The Sun. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/world/europe/trump-nato.html

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