Spanish air chief calls for Madrid to meet NATO's 2 percent defense spending goal

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  June 8, 2020 | International, C4ISR, Security

  GAO Chides DoD For Absence Of Cybersecurity Requirements

  Overall, costs of major DoD acquisition programs have grown by 54 percent over their lifetimes and schedule delays average two years, GAO's annual report finds. By THERESA HITCHENS WASHINGTON: Five years after the Pentagon demanded every weapon system include the requirement that it be able to fight through Russian and Chinese cyber attacks expected on future battlefields, DoD “does not often include cybersecurity” in key performance parameters (KPP) for major programs, says GAO in its annual defense acquisition review. Of the three services, the Air Force is the worst at fulfilling two of the three best cybersecurity practices, the report says. The congressional watchdog found “inconsistent implementation of leading software practices and cybersecurity measures” among high-dollar “major defense acquisition programs” (MDAPs) — 85 programs worth $1.80 trillion at the end of 2019. “This included longer-than-expected delivery times for software and delays completing cybersecurity assessments— outcomes disruptive to DOD's efforts to keep pace with warfighters' needs for enhanced, software-dependent capabilities and protect weapon systems from increasingly sophisticated cybersecurity threats,” GAO said in the June 3 report. Cybersecurity KPPs Left Out The GAO report explains that KPP “are considered the most critical requirements by the sponsor military organization, while key system attributes (KSA) and other performance attributes are considered essential for an effective military capability.” In 2015, DOD modified its main requirements policy—the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual (JCIDS) rules on “survivability” requirements to include the ability to operate in a “degraded cyber environment.” Yet, GAO found that, at the end of 2019, 25 of the 42 major acquisition programs reviewed regarding cybersecurity practices failed to include cybersecurity as a parameter in their KPPs; “even more programs reported that their KSAs did not address cybersecurity.” GAO has targeted cybersecurity, software development and DoD-wide information technology (IT) improvement programs in its recent annual reviews because DoD weapon systems “are more networked than ever before — a change that while providing benefits for the warfighter also “has come at a cost” because “more weapon components can now be attacked using cybersecurity capabilities,” GAO explains. “Further, networks can be used as a pathway to attack other systems.” The watchdog has found consistently that failing to bake in cybersecurity requirements to system design and development ends up costing more money and time when program offices struggle to re-engineer systems once they hit production. This is a problem that affects most types of software development; and similarly trying to upgrade or replace software to improve cybersecurity often proves impossible. The 2019 report thus “looked at DOD's progress with developing: (1) strategies that help ensure that programs are planning for and documenting cybersecurity risk management efforts (cybersecurity strategies), (2) evaluations that allow testers to identify systems' weaknesses that are susceptible to cybersecurity attacks and that could potentially jeopardize mission execution (cybersecurity vulnerability evaluations), and (3) assessments that evaluate the ability of a unit equipped with a system to support assigned missions (cybersecurity assessments).” Most of the 38 MDAPs reviewed reported creation of cybersecurity strategies. However, of the 19 major programs that require cybersecurity vulnerability evaluations — under regulations set by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Ellen Lord — 11 have not completed them or failed to do so on time. Another three said they didn't have a schedule yet for doing so; and one — an unnamed Air Force program — told GAO it actually didn't know if it had undertaken the required evaluation. Indeed, the Air Force had the worst record on the evaluations, with none of its six programs having completed the evaluation processes. Of the 42 programs, 14 told GAO they had not finished their cybersecurity assessments. GAO also “found variation among the military departments in the rates they had completed these assessments. Specifically, among the three military departments, the Army reported the best rate for programs conducting cybersecurity assessments, while the Air Force had the lowest rate.” IT and Software Problems Plague Programs “Over the years, weapon acquisition program officials, through their responses to our questionnaires, have consistently acknowledged software development as a risk item in their efforts to develop and field capabilities to the warfighter, and this year is no different,” GAO reported somewhat wryly. GAO found that more than a quarter of the 42 MDAPs reviewed reported cost growth from software changes but admitted that “details are limited” in DoD reporting. Part of that uncertainty might be due to the fact that GAO found a number of major programs are transitioning to commercial approaches to software development, such as “agile development” that involves introducing incremental improvements over time. However, GAO found, “deliveries often lag behind industry standards.” Indeed, Air Force acquisition czar Will Roper told a webinar yesterday sponsored by Dcode, a tech innovation hub connecting commercial industry to government agencies, that while the Air Force can't go back and re-do old programs, “every new contract we do has to include DevSecOps.” “We are all in,” he added, “it's going to change the world.” DevSecOps stands for “development, security and operations,” and is a framework and tools for “designing in” software and cybersecurity. Roper long has been a key champion within DoD for moving to commercial practices and has repeatedly said he wants the Air Force to become a “software company.” GAO said that officials from 26 of the MDAPs regarding software development reported that software concerns had created risks at some point during their program's history. The biggest problem faced was — you guessed it — changes necessitated to ensure cybersecurity. The second biggest program was that the software development simply was “more difficult than expected.” Hardware design changes also played a big role in creating software problems, requiring subsequent changes in software configurations. Interestingly, while often bemoaned as a cause for program delays, requirements changes came in at the low of end of the reported issues troubling software development. Of the 15 major DoD IT programs reviewed, worth $15.1 million, 10 had delays in their original baseline schedules. But on the bright side, 11 showed decreased life cycle cost estimates. Further, all 15 have cybersecurity strategies as required by DoD regulations, and most reported having undertaken in 2019 at least one operational cybersecurity test. That said, “less than half reported conducting developmental cybersecurity testing,” GAO found. And according to DoD's own “Cybersecurity Testing and Evaluation Guidebook,” GAO scolds, “not conducting developmental cybersecurity testing puts programs at an increased risk of cost and schedule growth and poor program performance. Cost and Schedule Growth Stabilizes As it does every year, GAO also reviewed all 85 MDAPs for cost and schedule growth, and on that front the news is good: GAO found that the programs DoD Overview “have generally stabilized non-quantity related — (i.e. meaning not related to buy more stuff) — cost growth and schedule growth.” “Between 2018 and 2019, total acquisition cost estimates for DoD's 85 current MDAPs grew by a combined $64 billion (a 4 percent increase), growth that was driven by decisions to increase planned quantities of some weapon systems,” GAO found. “For example, DoD more than doubled in the past year the total number of missiles it plans to acquire through the Air Force's Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile program.” And some programs actually lowered their year-average costs. GAO found that 55 MDAPs (more than half) “had lower average procurement unit costs since last year. Examples of programs with lower unit costs include the Navy's Joint Precision Approach and Landing System (16 percent decrease) and the Air Force's F-22 Increment 3.2B Modernization (15 percent decrease).” “Also between 2018 and 2019, capability delivery schedules for MDAPs increased, on average, by just over 1 month (a 1 percent increase),” GAO said. However, the report cautioned that cost/schedule performance looks “less encouraging as measured against their original approved program baselines.” The report found that the major acquisition programs “have accumulated over $628 billion (or 54%) in total cost growth since program start, most of which is unrelated to the increase in quantities purchased. Additionally, over the same time period, time required to deliver initial capabilities has increased by 30%, resulting in an average delay of more than two years. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/06/major-dod-acquisition-programs-flounder-on-cybersecurity-gao

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  April 29, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  The Flying Car Of the Future Looks to Flying Cars of the Past

  The Air Force is close to testing an experimental vertical takeoff prototype under its new program. The first contract in the U.S. Air Force's bid to acquire flying cars has gone to a company whose design harks back to a pioneer in the field. California-based Sabrewing Aircraft Company received a $3.25 million Phase II Small Business Innovative Research earlier this month to test its Rhaegal-B, a four-rotor craft that the company says can carry up to 5,400 pounds up to 200 knots some 1,000 nautical miles. With its four electric rotors, two on either side of the aircraft, the 60-foot Rhaegal-B somewhat resembles the M400X Skycar from Paul Moller. Moller is, in many ways, the Nikola Tesla of the flying car field. In the early 2000s, the Moller International Skycar became the first non-helicopter vertical takeoff and landing aircraft to actually get off the ground. The four motors would lift the car up and then swivel to propel it forward, like a V-22 Osprey. Even though the design worked, it never made it into showrooms. “For the engine, the most critical element is power,” Moller told The Futurist magazine in 2008. “Once you reduce the diameter of the propulsion system [making the propellor smaller] you go from a helicopter to a fan system. So you're moving less air, and the less air you move, the more power it takes to generate a certain kind of thrust. If I took a helicopter and made it one-half the diameter, I would have to immediately add 60% more power. I halve the diameter again, I have to add 60% more power, again. The M400 Skycar has over 1,000 horsepower.” Given the high cost to power it, the M400 Skycar was impractical for most locations outside of the Middle East, where oil sheiks would use them to traverse wide distances, Moller said at the time. Sabrewing CEO Ed De Reyes, who once worked for Moller, said his former boss was restricted by the engines of his time. The best-suited for the purpose were Wankel rotor engines, and internal combustion engines, which offered high speeds but limited torque. The electric motors that have arrived in recent years are far more promising: smaller, lighter, yet capable of producing more torque than an internal combustion engine. The Rhaegal-B design is highly but not fully autonomous, De Reyes said. A controller will command it from a ground station, but with the sort of low-effort, push-button interface you would encounter on a Northrop Grumman Global Hawk, rather than the more hands-on piloting needed for General Atomics MQ-9 Reapers. Something else that's come a long way since the early 2000s is the ability to detect and avoid objects in mid-air. Ssense-and-avoidance systems are a major stepping stone to more widespread use of drones in U.S. civilian airspace. A lot of drone manufacturers are hoping for the FAA's blessing for their versions. The Rhaegal-B combines radar and nine other sensors to give the aircraft a picture of the environment around it. It can take evasive action without any human control. (In fact, humans can't override it to accidentally steer the vehicle into something else.) If communication is cut off, it can continue to its destination with no additional imput from the ground operator. The appeal for the Air Force has to do with versatility and even detectability. During a webcast on Monday, Air Force Col. Pete White, with Air Force Warfighting Integrating Capability, said that traditional helicopters are noisy compared new vertical-lift aircraft. Thanks, in part, to the new electric motors. “Within feet of an enemy, they can't hear you,” He said that new, nimble electric air vehicles that could take off and land without a runway could help the military “maneuver around the battlefield at a pace that would be impossible today” The Air Force says it wants flying cars to evacuate wounded soldiers from the battlefield, among other missions. That means that they could be operating under fire. De Reyes says the military version of the aircraft has a Kevlar coating to protect it from small ballistics and can operate even when one of the motors is damaged. Air Force officials have also said that they are looking to fund and support U.S. flying-car companies, lest they migrate to China or accept lots of foreign investment. De Reyes says he's often approached by Chinese investors looking to gain a foothold in his company and other entrepreneurs in this space are as well. Sabrewing will test the Rhaegal-B at the Air Force's Edwards Air Force Base, hoping to meet safety requirements that will clear it for more military work and perhaps even commercial use. A June flight demonstration with its prototype has been postponed due to travel restrictions https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/04/flying-car-future-looks-flying-cars-past/164995

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  November 13, 2019 | International, Aerospace

  Can a new Franco-German export agreement clear the air for Europe’s future fighter?

  By: Sebastian Sprenger COLOGNE, Germany — French and German officials celebrated the signing of a new defense export agreement last month as a watershed moment, but political and industrial mistrust remains a wild card for the Future Combat Air System program — an envisioned sixth-generation fighter jet. The export pact, which entered into force in late October with the formal exchange of government notes, is meant to streamline a contentious process that has clouded bilateral defense cooperation for some time. Namely, the agreement dictates that joint government programs, like FCAS fighter jet, be free from interference by partner nations when it comes to eventual exports. The clause is mainly aimed at Germany, where politicians and lawmakers tend to scrutinize weapons deliveries to countries with known or suspected human rights abuses more heavily than their French colleagues. The situation has grown more tense since the October 2018 death of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who Western officials believe was murdered by order of Saudi Arabia. Germany has since frozen all exports to the kingdom, prompting an outcry from France, where companies had to stall deliveries of equipment to Saudi Arabia in all cases where even a small number of components originated from Germany. The new agreement ensures “nobody can throw a wrench” into the other's export planning, says Matthias Wachter, chief defense analyst at the Federation of German Industries lobbying group. Having such a guarantee in writing is good news for FCAS and its ground-focused sister project, the Franco-German future main battle tank known as the Main Ground Combat System, he added. The language of the export pact is reminiscent of the 1971 Schmidt-Debré agreement, named for the German and French defense ministers at the time and panned in the left-leaning Spiegel magazine as an “embarrassing pact” when reporters found out about the then-secret understanding a year later. Fast-forward almost 50 years, and defense cooperation remains a thorny subject between the two countries destined to spearhead Europe's envisioned military autonomy in the coming decades. And there are also long-standing cultural differences that linger. There is a perception among some German lawmakers, for example, that cooperation with Paris inevitably means ceding power to French influence to the point that Germany plays only second fiddle, according to Wachter. That sentiment has led appropriators to craft a package deal for FCAS that would release funding for the next phase — building subcomponent demonstrators — only when there are assurances that Germany's tank makers, namely Rheinmetall, play a prominent role in the Main Ground Combat System effort. With armored vehicles traditionally being a strong suit for German industry, some here have privately complained about the 50-50 division of responsibility. “It's an emotional issue here in Germany,” Wachter said. Once the money begins to flow for an additional set of contracts early next year, there is a litany of questions yet to be sorted out. The fate of intellectual property rights, for example, remains unsorted, according to the analyst. In addition, as of late October, there was no agreement on Spain's industrial work share. Spain is something of a junior partner in the FCAS project, though officials in Madrid have said they expect equal treatment as a full member of the trinational project team. The Spanish government in the summer designated defense electronics company Indra as the national lead for the fighter program. The move angered Airbus, where officials were hoping to give their Spanish subsidiary a role that would satisfy Madrid's demands for industrial participation. Another potential point of contention has to do with military requirements for the future fighter. Perhaps the most prominent issue is that French officials want a carrier-capable jet, which Germany does not need. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/11/11/can-a-new-franco-german-export-agreement-clear-the-air-for-europes-future-fighter/