June 9, 2020 | International, Aerospace
By: Sarah Bidgood
Russia recently published a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia's official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination.
Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia's threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble.
One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions."
The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons.
These parallels suggest that an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear command, control and communications systems could be of interest to both Washington and Moscow. A treaty along these lines would help to shore up crisis stability while rebuilding trust and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. It could also become a multilateral approach involving the five nuclear weapon states, which have been meeting regularly to discuss risk reduction and other topics. This would represent one of the few concrete outcomes of these discussions, which have been met with cautious enthusiasm but have so far failed to bear much fruit.
Another example of mutual U.S.-Russia threats appears in section 12E of the Russian document. Here, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture” are described as risks that nuclear deterrence is meant to neutralize. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons seems to remain a focus of U.S. nuclear policy, too, and the 2018 NPR commits to strengthening institutions that support “verifiable, durable progress on non-proliferation.” This ongoing shared interest is an argument for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, especially as it relates to strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
There is a long history of engagement between the two largest nuclear weapon states on nonproliferation, even at times of major discord in their relationship. Successful outcomes of this cooperation include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 50 years ago to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Despite decades of joint work toward this shared goal, the rift between Washington and Moscow has now brought most bilateral efforts in this area to a halt. As some in Iran, Turkey and Germany contemplate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it's time for the U.S. and Russia to shore up the credibility of the regime they built.
Other sections of Russia's document offer additional glimpses into Moscow's perceived threats, although not all find ready analogs in U.S. declaratory policy. Many relate instead to the possibility that an adversary will carry out a conventional attack on Russia. Sections 12 and 14, for instance, reference the risks posed by adversary deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons. They also mention the deployment of missile defense systems in space; military buildups by would-be adversaries of general-purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in territories neighboring Russia; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapons states, among others.
There is little here that would surprise most Russia-watchers, but if the U.S. is serious about pursuing “next generation” arms control, it is useful to have a list of potential topics for discussion that go beyond ballistic missile defense. This list might also prove helpful in negotiating asymmetric treaties or in identifying confidence-building measures that cross domains.
Overall, this short document does provide greater clarity with respect to Russia's deterrence strategy, but it is ambiguous on many points as well. Olga Oliker, the International Crisis Group's program director for Europe and Central Asia, noted, for instance, it does not settle the debate over whether Russia has an “escalate-to-deescalate” policy, and it is (unsurprisingly) vague about the precise circumstances under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons.
Still, despite leaving some questions unanswered, the document offers a valuable window into Russia's strengths and vulnerabilities as they appear from Moscow. While likely not the intended signal this document was meant to send, it nevertheless points to possible opportunities for engagement when other good alternatives are hard to see.
September 12, 2024 | International, C4ISR, Security
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January 10, 2020 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR
DAVID PUGLIESE, OTTAWA CITIZEN Updated: January 10, 2020 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau said Thursday that Canada has intelligence indicating a Ukrainian passenger jet that crashed outside Tehran was shot down by an Iranian-surface-to-air missile. Trudeau declined to get into details about where that information came from but U.S. missile defence satellites likely played a key role in providing some of that intelligence data. Ukrainian International Airlines Flight 752 was destroyed Wednesday shortly after it took off from Tehran. All 176 people on board died, including 63 Canadians. “We have intelligence from multiple sources, including our allies and our own intelligence,” Trudeau said at a news conference Thursday. “The evidence indicates that the plane was shot down by an Iranian surface-to-air missile.” U.S. officials were already stating the same conclusion earlier in the day. The U.S. has a constellation of missile warning satellites that are equipped with various sensors that use, among other capabilities, infrared technologies to detect the launch of a rocket. Many of the details about how the system works and transfers information are secret. But the Space Based Infrared System or SBIRS consists of four main satellites, each costing more than $2 billion. The first was launched in 2011 and the latest put in orbit in 2018. The U.S. military also has the capability to intercept communications between Iranian commanders and anti-aircraft missile batteries which would have provided the Pentagon insight into what might have transpired around the time the Ukrainian passenger jet crashed. Canada also has its own communications intelligence gathering capabilities which are considered top notch. The Canadian government didn't release any information on what type of surface-to-air missile could have been involved. But photos that are said to have been taken near the crash site have been circulating on social media. IHS Markit, which includes the Jane's military publications, reported that the photographs appeared to show the guidance portion of a Russian-built Tor SA-15 short-range, surface-to-air missile. Russia sold 29 Tor systems to Iran in 2007. The system is designed for destroying aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles. It can hit targets up to 12 kilometres away. U.S. government officials also told CBS News that American surveillance systems detected that shortly before the Ukrainian airline crash, Iranian anti-aircraft radars were activated. U.S. surveillance satellites then detected two heat signatures, believed to be the launch of two SA-15 missiles, according to CBS. Another heat signature detected shortly after was believed to be the Ukrainian passenger jet exploding. But why would the Iranians allegedly shoot down an aircraft full of its own citizens? Human error or bad intelligence could be to blame. The crash took place just hours after Iran launched ballistic missiles against American bases in Iraq in retaliation for the U.S. assassination of a top Iranian general in Bagdad. Iran's anti-aircraft missile crews would have been on high alert for any U.S. military response. “This may well have been unintentional,” Trudeau said of the alleged missile launch. U.S. President Donald Trump, like Trudeau, has also suggested the crash could have been the result of a mistake. “It was flying in a pretty rough neighborhood,” the president said of the Ukraine Airlines passenger jet. “Someone could have made a mistake on the other side.” Iran, however, denies that the aircraft was shot down by one of its missiles. Iranian Gen. Abolfazl Shekarchi dismissed such allegations as “psychological warfare” being spread by foreign-based Iranian opposition groups. Ali Abedzadeh of Iran's Civil Aviation Organization also dismissed such claims. “Scientifically, it is impossible that a missile hit the Ukrainian plane and such rumors are illogical,” he stated. He noted that several domestic and foreign flights were flying at the same altitude of 8,000 feet as the Ukrainian passenger jet at the time of the incident. But shortly before the crash, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration announced an emergency flight restriction for U.S. airlines flying over areas of Iraq and Iran. The FAA warned of the “potential for miscalculation or misidentification” of civilian planes because of increased military tensions in those areas. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/u-s-satellites-intercepts-of-iranian-communications-could-support-claims-missile-destroyed-passenger-jet
December 3, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
NAVY General Dynamics Electric Boat Corp. (GDEB), Groton, Connecticut, is awarded a $22,209,893,409 fixed-price-incentive, multi-year modification to previously-awarded contract N00024-17-C-2100 for construction of nine Virginia-class submarines, eight with Virginia Payload Module (VPM), from fiscal 2019 to fiscal 2023. The contract modification includes spare material and an option for one additional submarine with VPM. If the option is exercised, the cumulative value of this contract will increase to $24,097,439,556. The awarded amounts include previously-announced material awards (including long-lead-time material and economic ordering quantity material) totaling $3,197,633,908. This contract modification is for the construction of the fifth block of Virginia-class submarines by GDEB and major subcontractor Huntington Ingalls Industries' Newport News Shipbuilding division, inclusive of design support and all efforts necessary to test and deliver each submarine. GDEB will continue to subcontract with Huntington Ingalls Industries' Newport News Shipbuilding division. Work will be performed in Newport News, Virginia (25%); Quonset Point, Rhode Island (21%); Groton, Connecticut (20%); Sunnyvale, California (8%); Norfolk, Virginia (1%); Bethlehem, Pennsylvania (1%); and Annapolis, Maryland (1%), with other efforts performed at various places throughout the U.S. below one percent (22%), and other places outside of U.S. below one percent (1%). Work is expected to be completed by August 2029. If the option is exercised, work is expected to be completed by February 2030. Fiscal 2017 and 2019 shipbuilding and conversion, Navy (SCN) funding in the amount of $3,155,793,018 will be obligated at time of award and will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year - funding: fiscal 2019 SCN (95%); fiscal 2017 SCN (5%). The Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, District of Columbia, is the contracting activity. Kellogg Brown and Root Services Inc., Houston, Texas, is awarded a $14,070,093 for modification of the second option under an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contract for base operations support services at Naval Support Activity (NSA) Kingdom of Bahrain. After award of this option, the total cumulative contract value will be $44,363,284. The work to be performed provides for, but is not limited to, all management, supervision, tools, materials, supplies, labor and transportation services necessary to perform security operations, galley services, unaccompanied housing, facility management, emergency service requests, urgent service, routing service, facilities investment, custodial, pest control service, integrated solid waste, grounds maintenance, utility management, wastewater, operate reverse osmosis water treatment system, chiller and transportation at NSA Kingdom of Bahrain. Work will be performed in NSA Kingdom of Bahrain. This option period is from December 2019 to November 2020. No funds will be obligated at time of award. Fiscal 2020 operation and maintenance (Navy) contract funds for $4,159,063 for non-recurring work will be obligated on individual task orders issued during the option period. Naval Facilities Engineering Command Europe Africa Central, Naples, Italy, is the contracting activity (N62470-17-D-4007). L-3 Technologies Inc., Salt Lake City, Utah, is awarded a $9,999,144 firm-fixed-price modification (P00012) to a previously-awarded firm-fixed-price, cost-plus-fixed-fee contract (N00019-18-C-1030) to procure eight Common Data Link Hawklink AN/SRQ-4 systems for the MH-60R aircraft. Work will be performed in Salt Lake City, Utah, and is expected to be completed in December 2022. Fiscal 2020 other procurement (Navy) funds in the amount of $9,999,144 will be obligated at time of award, none of which will expire at the end of the fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Maryland, is the contracting activity. AIR FORCE Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Control, Orlando, Florida, has been awarded a $988,832,126 definitization modification (PZ0010) to previously-awarded contract FA8681-18-C-0021 for Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon critical design review, test and production readiness support. The contract modification will definitize the contract terms, specifications and price. Work will be performed at Orlando, Florida, and is expected to be completed Dec. 31, 2022. The total cumulative face value of the contract is $988,832,126. Fiscal 2020 research, development, test and evaluation funds are being obligated in the amount of $23,000,000 at the time of award. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, is the contracting activity. GTA Containers Inc., South Bend, Indiana, has been awarded a $9,404,953 delivery order (FA8534-20-F-0003) against previously-awarded contract FA8533-16-D-0001 for collapsible fuel tank production. Work will be performed at South Bend, Indiana, and is expected to be completed by Jan. 31, 2022. The total cumulative face value of the contract is $24,507,563. Fiscal 2019 other procurement funds in the amount of $9,404,953 are being obligated at the time of award. The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, is the contracting activity. ARMY Fisher Sand and Gravel Co., Dickinson, North Dakota, was awarded a $399,962,000 firm-fixed-price contract to design-build border infrastructure along the southern perimeter of the Cabeza Prieta National Wildlife Refuge in Yuma County, Arizona. Five bids were solicited with three bids received. Work will be performed in Yuma, Arizona, with an estimated completion date of Dec. 30, 2020. Fiscal 2018 military construction, defense-wide funds in the amount of $268,072,900 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Portland District, Portland, Oregon, is the contracting activity (W912PL-20-C-0004). InSap Services Inc.,* Marlton, New Jersey, was awarded a $41,636,459 modification (BA02 44) to contract W91QUZ-11-D-0017 to provide personnel with technical experience to sustain the Army's Logistics Modernization Program. Work will be performed at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, with an estimated completion date of Dec. 31, 2020. Fiscal 2020 other procurement, Army funds in the amount of $7,961,225 were obligated at the time of the award. U.S. Army Contracting Command, Rock Island, Illinois, is the contracting activity. DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY Unisys Corp., Reston, Virginia, was awarded a single award indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity firm-fixed-price contract for Unisys Operating System 2200 capacity services. The place of performance will be at current Defense Information Systems Agency data centers. The contract ceiling is $80,457,160. The solicitation was issued as an other-than-full-and-open-competition action pursuant to the authority of 10 U.S. Code §2304(c)(1) and Federal Acquisition Regulation 6.302-1, with only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements. Proposals were solicited via the Federal Business Opportunities website (www.fbo.gov), now known as beta.SAM.gov website (www.beta.sam.gov). Only one proposal was received. The period of performance (PoP) consists of a one-year base period and two one-year options. The PoP for the base year is Dec. 1, 2019, through Nov. 30, 2020, and the option years follow consecutively through Nov. 30, 2022. The Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, is the contracting activity (HC1084-20-D-0002). (Awarded Dec. 1, 2019) DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY AvKare Inc., Pulaski, Tennessee, has been awarded a maximum $11,727,127 firm-fixed-price requirements contract for potassium chloride tablets. This was a competitive acquisition with one response received. This is a one-year base contract with four one-year option periods. Locations of performance are Tennessee and Minnesota with a Dec. 1, 2020, performance completion date. Using customers are Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs, Indian Health Services and Federal Bureau of Prisons. Type of appropriation is fiscal 2020 through 2021 defense working capital funds. The contracting activity is the Defense Logistics Agency Troop Support, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (SPE2D2-20-D-0081). UPDATE: ADS Inc.,* Virginia Beach, Virginia (SPE8EH-20-D-0001), has been added as an awardee to the multiple award contract for fire and emergency services equipment, issued against solicitation SPE8EH-16-R-0001, and announced March 21, 2019. *Small Business https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Contracts/Contract/Article/2030017/source/GovDelivery/