9 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial

Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

By: Sarah Bidgood

Russia recently published a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia's official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination.

Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia's threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble.

One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions."

The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons.

These parallels suggest that an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear command, control and communications systems could be of interest to both Washington and Moscow. A treaty along these lines would help to shore up crisis stability while rebuilding trust and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. It could also become a multilateral approach involving the five nuclear weapon states, which have been meeting regularly to discuss risk reduction and other topics. This would represent one of the few concrete outcomes of these discussions, which have been met with cautious enthusiasm but have so far failed to bear much fruit.

Another example of mutual U.S.-Russia threats appears in section 12E of the Russian document. Here, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture” are described as risks that nuclear deterrence is meant to neutralize. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons seems to remain a focus of U.S. nuclear policy, too, and the 2018 NPR commits to strengthening institutions that support “verifiable, durable progress on non-proliferation.” This ongoing shared interest is an argument for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, especially as it relates to strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.

There is a long history of engagement between the two largest nuclear weapon states on nonproliferation, even at times of major discord in their relationship. Successful outcomes of this cooperation include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 50 years ago to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Despite decades of joint work toward this shared goal, the rift between Washington and Moscow has now brought most bilateral efforts in this area to a halt. As some in Iran, Turkey and Germany contemplate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it's time for the U.S. and Russia to shore up the credibility of the regime they built.

Other sections of Russia's document offer additional glimpses into Moscow's perceived threats, although not all find ready analogs in U.S. declaratory policy. Many relate instead to the possibility that an adversary will carry out a conventional attack on Russia. Sections 12 and 14, for instance, reference the risks posed by adversary deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons. They also mention the deployment of missile defense systems in space; military buildups by would-be adversaries of general-purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in territories neighboring Russia; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapons states, among others.

There is little here that would surprise most Russia-watchers, but if the U.S. is serious about pursuing “next generation” arms control, it is useful to have a list of potential topics for discussion that go beyond ballistic missile defense. This list might also prove helpful in negotiating asymmetric treaties or in identifying confidence-building measures that cross domains.

Overall, this short document does provide greater clarity with respect to Russia's deterrence strategy, but it is ambiguous on many points as well. Olga Oliker, the International Crisis Group's program director for Europe and Central Asia, noted, for instance, it does not settle the debate over whether Russia has an “escalate-to-deescalate” policy, and it is (unsurprisingly) vague about the precise circumstances under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons.

Still, despite leaving some questions unanswered, the document offers a valuable window into Russia's strengths and vulnerabilities as they appear from Moscow. While likely not the intended signal this document was meant to send, it nevertheless points to possible opportunities for engagement when other good alternatives are hard to see.

https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/08/russias-new-nuclear-policy-could-be-a-path-to-arms-control-treaties/

Sur le même sujet

  • US Army exports multinational combat training center to Philippines

    21 mai 2024 | International, Terrestre

    US Army exports multinational combat training center to Philippines

    The Army is taking a full-scale exportable Joint Pacific Multinational Training Center west of the International Date Line for the first time.

  • Dassault Aviation et Babcock France remportent l’appel d’offre du projet Mentor - Aerobuzz

    19 mai 2021 | International, Aérospatial

    Dassault Aviation et Babcock France remportent l’appel d’offre du projet Mentor - Aerobuzz

    Actualité et information aéronautique

  • Small-satellites and Downstream Digital Transformation Accelerate Space Industry Evolution

    15 août 2019 | International, Aérospatial

    Small-satellites and Downstream Digital Transformation Accelerate Space Industry Evolution

    Global launch demand and cumulative launch opportunities of $102.52 billion from 2019-2030 will augment growth prospects, finds Frost & Sullivan LONDON, Aug. 14, 2019 /CNW/ -- New market entrants, platforms, services and business models are disrupting the global space industry. To serve an evolving market, value chain players are developing flexible, affordable, dedicated, competitive and complementary solutions for end customers to sustain significant growth opportunities. Frost & Sullivan forecasts the total revenue opportunities for the global satellite manufacturing market to soar past $366.06 billion with global launch demand for 12,766 satellites and cumulative launch opportunities of $102.52 billion for the period 2019 to 2030. "The space industry is rapidly evolving. Not only are satellite platforms becoming more agile and robust with the execution of software-based satellites, electric propulsion systems and spot beam offerings, but competition in the launch services market is lowering prices and new entrants with mega-constellation-based business models are poised to disrupt the connectivity and earth observation market," said Arun Kumar Sampathkumar, Industry Manager, Space at Frost & Sullivan. Currently, there is a clear gap between satellite launch demand and the supply of launch services with an average launch wait period of six months to two years for satellite operators. However, more than 40 global new participants are developing launch vehicles to bridge this gap. "In the small-satellite launch segment, the major unmet needs include on-demand launch, independent mission from the primary launch payload, and launch cost," noted Sampathkumar. "Due to the existing gap between supply and launch, the launch service market is price inelastic. However, with the entry of new vehicles and reusable capabilities, launch supply is likely to increase and will lead the market towards price sensitivity." Downstream data pressures have meant that communication satellites represent the fastest growing market segment, increasing demand for the manufacture of high-throughput and constellation communication satellites. Sampathkumar sees multiple incumbents and new participants looking to install their high-capacity communication satellites in Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) orbits. This will result in both new installation and recurring replacement mission demand for manufacturing communication satellites. Growth opportunities participants should tap into for future successes include: The manufacturing sector utilising COTS technologies, additive manufacturing, Industrial IoT (IIoT), and serial production with systems and satellite platform standardisation. The launch services sector focussing on infrastructure-as-a-service for dedicated launch service providers and vehicle reusability to reduce launch costs. Ground station services players developing a global network of ground stations that utilise automated aggregator platforms as well as standarise mission control processes and systems. Earth observation participants developing affordable standard platforms for value-added service providers. Satellite communication players focussing on network standardisation and integration, including terrestrial and capacities in LEO, MEO, and GEO. 'Consumerisation' of Space has taken a leap forward with end users demanding seamless connectivity, actionable geospatial intelligence, and advanced sensing capabilities to drive new business propositions and solutions. Disruptions impacting the ecosystem are driven by technology, manufacturing processes and business models from traditional players like SES, SpaceX and Airbus, and new space participants like RocketLab, EarthNow, OneWeb and SpireGlobal. Frost & Sullivan latest analysis, Global Space Industry Outlook, 2019 and Beyond explores key questions such as what drives the market? What are the critical shifts to watch? Which best practices are important to note? Who are the emerging players? The space industry within the scope of this study is segmented into satellite manufacturing, launch services, ground stations and satellite networks, and downstream applications including satellite communication, earth observation, navigation, scientific missions, and technology demonstration. Global Space Industry Outlook, 2019 and Beyond is the latest addition to Frost & Sullivan's Space research and analysis available through the Frost & Sullivan Leadership Council, which helps organisations identify a continuous flow of growth opportunities to succeed in an unpredictable future. https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/small-satellites-and-downstream-digital-transformation-accelerate-space-industry-evolution-802341560.html

Toutes les nouvelles