16 septembre 2022 | International, Aérospatial
US Air Force to provide industry with test model for JADC2 development
The guidance is an outgrowth of work conducted by a cross-functional team formed by the Air Force and Space Force.
9 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial
By: Sarah Bidgood
Russia recently published a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia's official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination.
Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia's threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble.
One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions."
The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons.
These parallels suggest that an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear command, control and communications systems could be of interest to both Washington and Moscow. A treaty along these lines would help to shore up crisis stability while rebuilding trust and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. It could also become a multilateral approach involving the five nuclear weapon states, which have been meeting regularly to discuss risk reduction and other topics. This would represent one of the few concrete outcomes of these discussions, which have been met with cautious enthusiasm but have so far failed to bear much fruit.
Another example of mutual U.S.-Russia threats appears in section 12E of the Russian document. Here, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture” are described as risks that nuclear deterrence is meant to neutralize. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons seems to remain a focus of U.S. nuclear policy, too, and the 2018 NPR commits to strengthening institutions that support “verifiable, durable progress on non-proliferation.” This ongoing shared interest is an argument for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, especially as it relates to strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.
There is a long history of engagement between the two largest nuclear weapon states on nonproliferation, even at times of major discord in their relationship. Successful outcomes of this cooperation include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 50 years ago to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.
Despite decades of joint work toward this shared goal, the rift between Washington and Moscow has now brought most bilateral efforts in this area to a halt. As some in Iran, Turkey and Germany contemplate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it's time for the U.S. and Russia to shore up the credibility of the regime they built.
Other sections of Russia's document offer additional glimpses into Moscow's perceived threats, although not all find ready analogs in U.S. declaratory policy. Many relate instead to the possibility that an adversary will carry out a conventional attack on Russia. Sections 12 and 14, for instance, reference the risks posed by adversary deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons. They also mention the deployment of missile defense systems in space; military buildups by would-be adversaries of general-purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in territories neighboring Russia; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapons states, among others.
There is little here that would surprise most Russia-watchers, but if the U.S. is serious about pursuing “next generation” arms control, it is useful to have a list of potential topics for discussion that go beyond ballistic missile defense. This list might also prove helpful in negotiating asymmetric treaties or in identifying confidence-building measures that cross domains.
Overall, this short document does provide greater clarity with respect to Russia's deterrence strategy, but it is ambiguous on many points as well. Olga Oliker, the International Crisis Group's program director for Europe and Central Asia, noted, for instance, it does not settle the debate over whether Russia has an “escalate-to-deescalate” policy, and it is (unsurprisingly) vague about the precise circumstances under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons.
Still, despite leaving some questions unanswered, the document offers a valuable window into Russia's strengths and vulnerabilities as they appear from Moscow. While likely not the intended signal this document was meant to send, it nevertheless points to possible opportunities for engagement when other good alternatives are hard to see.
16 septembre 2022 | International, Aérospatial
The guidance is an outgrowth of work conducted by a cross-functional team formed by the Air Force and Space Force.
1 août 2023 | International, Aérospatial, Sécurité
14 janvier 2020 | International, C4ISR
MOORESTOWN, N.J., January 14, 2020 – Through partnerships with the U.S. Government, Spain, Japan, and Canada, Lockheed Martin's (NYSE: LMT) solid state radar (SSR) technology will provide front-line defense to nations around the world with cutting-edge air and missile defense capabilities. These nations are part of a growing SSR family of 24 platforms, ushering in the next generation of maritime and ground-based advanced radar technology. The basis of SSR is the Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR), which the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) selected Lockheed Martin to develop in 2015 with an on-track delivery set for 2020. In 2019 Lockheed Martin's SSR for Aegis Ashore Japan was designated by the United States Government as AN/SPY-7(V)1. What is SSR Technology? SPY-7's core technology is derived from the LRDR program, which has been declared Technical Readiness Level 7 by the U.S. Government. The technology consists of a scalable and modular gallium nitride (GaN) based “subarray” radar building block, providing advanced performance and increased efficiency and reliability to pace ever-evolving threats. As part of its investment into the advancement of SSR, Lockheed Martin built a Solid State Radar Integration Site to conduct detailed testing to prove the maturity of the system and reduce fielding risk. Scaled versions of the LRDR site will be utilized for future radar programs including Aegis Ashore Japan, Canadian Surface Combatant and MDA's Homeland Defense Radar in Hawaii. Solid state offers powerful capabilities to detect, track and engage sophisticated air and missile threats, including the very complicated task of discriminating – or picking out – and countering lethal objects present in enemy ballistic missiles. The Lockheed Martin SSR uses state-of-the art hardware and an innovative software-defined radar architecture to meet current requirements while providing extensibility features to pace evolving threats for decades to come. Its unique maintain-while-operate capability provides very high operational availability and enables continuous 24-hour/7-day week operation. Solid state radar is a multi-mission system providing a wide range of capabilities, from passive situational awareness to integrated air and missile defense solutions. The combined capability and mission flexibility of Lockheed Martin's SSR has gained the attention of new and current users of the Aegis Weapon System, the world's premier air and missile defense combat suite. Meeting the World's Most Demanding Missions While LRDR is the first program to utilize Lockheed Martin's new SSR building blocks, over the past three years Lockheed Martin has consistently been selected in open competitions to equip an additional 24 platforms in four nations. SPY-7 provides several times the performance of traditional SPY-1 radars and the ability to engage multiple targets simultaneously with the latest proven interceptors. Spain's Ministry of Defense stated its preference for Lockheed Martin's technology for its five F-110 class frigates in 2017 and awarded the ship construction order to Navantia in 2019. These ships will host the first-ever S-band variants of the SPY-7 radar for the Spanish Navy. Production will be a collaboration between Lockheed Martin and Spanish company, Indra. When the frigates deploy in 2026 our SPY-7 variant will be integrated as part of the Aegis Weapon System. The frigates will also incorporate the International Aegis Fire Control Loop (IAFCL) integrated with SCOMBA, the national combat system developed by Navantia. Canada's Department of National Defence also selected Lockheed Martin as the naval radar provider for its 15 Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) ships. Lockheed Martin's IAFCL is integrated with Canada's combat management system, CMS 330, developed by Lockheed Martin Canada for the Royal Canadian Navy's HALIFAX Class ships. The program will make Canada the owner of the world's second largest Aegis fleet, and our SPY-7 radar variant will enable CSC to conduct highly advanced maritime missions for decades to come. Mature, Cost-Effective Systems Ready Now Including LRDR, the 24 Lockheed Martin SSR platforms selected to date represent a total of 91 antennas of varying sizes, collectively composed of over 15,000 subarrays. On LRDR alone, Lockheed Martin has produced an equivalent of eight Aegis shipsets to-date. The U.S. Government's LRDR has a planned service life for decades to come and will be supported and maintained throughout that period. This ensures the U.S. and its allies will have a large and stable base of cost-effective logistics and support for many years in the future. About Lockheed Martin Headquartered in Bethesda, Maryland, Lockheed Martin is a global security and aerospace company that employs approximately 105,000 people worldwide and is principally engaged in the research, design, development, manufacture, integration and sustainment of advanced technology systems, products and services. https://news.lockheedmartin.com/2020-01-14-Four-Nations-to-Be-Protected-with-Lockheed-Martins-Next-Generation-Radar