October 2, 2024 | International, Land
January 30, 2020 | International, Aerospace
By Lt. Col. Johnny Duray
When an MQ-1 Predator fired an AGM-114 Hellfire missile in the opening stage of Operation Enduring Freedom over Afghanistan, the world discovered a new form of power projection: kinetic force delivered from unmanned, remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). That proof of concept drove exponential growth in RPA usage, with combat air patrols (CAPs) swelling from just four in 2004 to 65 simultaneous, worldwide CAPs every day in 2014.
Yet there is still more work to be done to fully realize the power of RPA technology. As the new US national defense strategy focuses on an era of great power competition, RPAs will provide valuable capabilities and capacity to address the persistent threat posed by violent extremist organizations. In doing so, RPAs will also allow other portions of America's air arsenal to focus on near-peer competitor challenges.
Achieving this goal requires a new vector for the use of RPAs, as illustrated in the vignettes that follow. Though details have been obscured for operational sensitivity, the narratives and lessons remain largely intact.
The Camp Strike. Graphic: Mike Tsukamoto and Dash Parham/staff
View or download this infographic
In one recent RPA mission, intelligence sources helped the US military discover a remote jihadi training facility. Plans called for eliminating the radicals with airpower.
Leaders initially sought bomber aircraft for the strike, which required scheduling and positioning refueling aircraft, obtaining overflight clearances, and coordinating for personnel recovery—all time- and resource-intensive factors that didn't apply to the RPAs already providing persistent ISR overhead, as explained in RAND publication Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and US Security.
When bombers proved unavailable, a four-ship formation of fighter aircraft was requested. This option necessitated an even more robust support structure, as the fighters needed to forward deploy closer in theater. This also required a massive undertaking involving the movement of support personnel and equipment, despite the fact that multiple armed MQ-9 aircraft were already conducting daily surveillance and intelligence missions in the vicinity of the camp.
Two environmental factors introduced further complexity into this mission. First, the camp was embedded deep inside a canyon with a valley floor only 15 feet wide. Any air-launched weapons would need to be precisely aimed to strike the narrow space between the canyon walls. Second, the jihadis were broken up into two distinct groups, two to three miles apart. A first-run attack would require delivery of simultaneous effects. Re-attacks on survivors would need to be conducted expeditiously.
Once the bomber and fighter options proved unavailable, leaders finally selected four MQ-9 Reapers to execute the mission. Reaper One, Reaper Two, and Reaper Three were flown by squadrons in the same location, while Reaper Four was flown by a squadron at a separate location. The first three Reaper crews planned, briefed, and executed as a formation, or flight, bringing the geographically separated Reaper Four into the planning as much as possible before execution.
The four Reapers were equipped with two 500-pound GBU-12 laser-guided bombs and 16 air-to-ground Hellfire missiles. Reaper One teamed with Reaper Four to make a run on the first target group, dropping the 500-pound bombs. Once established inbound, Reaper One passed an estimated “bombs-on-target” time to Reaper Two and Reaper Three, which targeted the second group of terrorists-in-training with four Hellfire missiles in order to achieve simultaneous effects.
The synchronicity was near perfect. Weapons impacts from the bombs on the first group and the Hellfires on the second group were within a second of each other. The four MQ-9s hit two separate target sets with six munitions on four different aimpoints with a time on target calculation formulated as the mission progressed, based on outside clearance authority.
Reaper Two and Reaper Three teamed up to immediately re-attack the survivors. Prior planning, internal communication, and near-real-time data sharing enabled an unprecedented display of efficiency. RPA pilots physically located together can speak into each other's headsets without delay on an intercom channel, for example. Reaper Three rifled off all four of its Hellfires on three separate re-attacks in under seven minutes. In one instance, Reaper Three fired a Hellfire on a group of terrorists without ever having even seen it, since Reaper Two had tracked the group and provided final weapons guidance for Reaper Three's missile. Reaper One and Reaper Four were left to conduct re-attacks as solo aircraft, since they lacked the prerequisites for the seamless integration enjoyed by Reapers Two and Three. As such, they were only able to employ three of their available eight Hellfires in the first 16 minutes following the initial strike.
The final attack was conducted two hours later when Reaper Three found a group of eight enemy combatants hiding in a small ravine. Out of munitions, Reaper Three talked the crew of Reaper Four on to the group. The terrain only allowed a window of approximately 20 seconds for an MQ-9 to provide final guidance onto the target before becoming masked by rocks. Reaper Four shot a Hellfire into the ravine, target unseen, while Reaper Three came in from the opposite direction, crested the terrain, and timed the aircraft's positioning so that final guidance was placed on the enemy group in the last 10 seconds of the missile's flight. By the conclusion of the mission, some 85 percent of the combatants were killed with the other 15 percent wounded.
Some of the lessons from this operation:
The 15-Second Window. Graphic: Mike Tsukamoto and Dash Parham/staff
As part of global counterterrorism operations, US and coalition forces tracked a senior terrorist leader several years ago. After extensive study, a concept of operations (CONOPS) developed to facilitate a strike on this individual within an incredibly tight window—the time it took for him to ride his motorcycle to his home, after departing from a main road but before entering a courtyard near his residence. This strike window lasted only about 15 seconds.
This broke down into two problems: First, successfully positioning a shooting aircraft within a 15-second engagement window within seven seconds of the target departing the main road, and second, planning around a fork in the main road that afforded the target two options. Route A was simple—there were no further intersections before the target left the main road and entered the engagement window. Route B was more nuanced, with one additional intersection before the target left the main road. The shooting aircraft would need to maneuver to get into position before the target hit the additional intersection. If the target was held up for even a few seconds, it could throw off timing and negate all previous planning.
Three MQ-9s were allocated for the strike. Reaper One took the lead and began timing calculations to maneuver into position. Reaper Two followed the target motorcycle as it traveled toward the engagement site. Data sharing allowed Reaper One to position itself within the 15 second window at precisely the time the motorcycle turned off the main road and came into the field of view (FOV). Reaper Three stared at the additional intersection along Route B. Reaper One was able to view Reaper Three's feed to determine the possibility of the target getting held up at that intersection should he travel along Route B.
As events unfolded, the target chose to continue down Route B. Updates on the target's distance and speed from Reaper Two and the intersection traffic from Reaper Three enabled Reaper One to successfully maneuver the aircraft into the 15-second window, fire, and eliminate the target with no collateral damage.
The success of this strike was made possible by a flight-focused operations approach, paired with an intensive training program, and truly decentralized execution. It also introduced three new areas to reflect on.
The Attempted Rescue. Graphic: Mike Tsukamoto and Dash Parham/staff
On one calm, moonless night a few years ago, a small group of US special operations forces parachuted from a transport aircraft on a hostage rescue mission. Overhead, three MQ-9s and a U-28 manned ISR aircraft provided support to the SOF team from insertion, through the rescue operation, and the exfiltration. The three MQ-9s were co-located and operated out of the same RPA operations center, where a small staff stood up to support the three flying crews.
As the SOF team worked its way toward the hostage's reported location, it became apparent to the RPA operations center director that key real-time intelligence was taking too long to get to the ground forces via the joint operations center (JOC)—the main mission hub. The MQ-9 elements overhead had direct radio contact with ground forces and, more importantly, instant access to the intelligence as well. After a quick discussion about transferring responsibility from JOC leadership to the MQ-9 pilots, the time frame for essential intelligence processing to ground forces went from a minute to under five seconds. A U-28 aircrew member was prepositioned inside the ROC to provide subject-matter expertise on the ISR aircraft, as well as techniques, tactics, and procedures to the MQ-9 crews and ROC staff.
Unfortunately, as the team arrived at the location, it discovered that the hostage had been moved from the village just prior to the raid. However, the event offered a real-world opportunity to explore several underutilized capabilities that RPAs and the operations center could apply to future missions.
These three vignettes provide substantial food for thought about how RPAs expand the flexibility and capability of air component commanders. This leads to four critical implications that policy makers, DOD leaders, and Air Force officials should consider:
In current combat operations, the Air Force's MQ-9 is as different from its Operation Enduring Freedom-era 2001 MQ-1 forbearer as an F-16 is from a P-51. However, this transformation has collided with cultural differences rooted in traditional notions of force employment—both in the air and on the ground. This has led to sub-optimal utilization and investment considerations.
Today, fighters and bombers are no longer the only option for mass strike, and RPAs are no longer just airborne sniper rifles. RPAs can effectively conduct CAS, particularly with small ground team elements like SOF units. These two considerations alone should cause US military leaders to rethink American force posture for the fight against violent extremist organizations.
Remotely piloted aircraft operations are ripe for exploitation with centralized execution, yet “mission-type tactics”—where operational outcomes are emphasized more than any specific means of achieving them—are a central tenet to maximizing RPA potential. Continued investment in the RPA community is crucial to building on the momentum these assets are gathering in operations around the world. This will require harnessing information-sharing through open system architectures.
The United States' continued prosecution of low-intensity conflicts around the world, and the need to prepare for potential near-peer military confrontations, both benefit from an agile, decentralized, and well-connected RPA force whose lethality is intelligently incorporated into joint force operational planning. Military leaders with a commanding grasp on RPA capabilities and a willingness to think beyond traditional aircraft mission sets, will be best positioned to take full advantage of every capability RPA can bring to bear in future combat.
Air Force Lt. Col. John D. Duray is a senior pilot with more than 3,200 flight hours in the MQ-9 and U-28 and extensive experience in combat and combat support missions. He has supported Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, Inherent Resolve, and Freedom's Sentinel, and deployed to four different areas of responsibility. The opinions and assessments expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not reflect those of the Department of Defense or the US Air Force. This article is adapted from a forum paper published by the Mitchell Instititue for Aerospace Studies.
https://www.airforcemag.com/article/remotely-piloted-aircraft-implications-for-future-warfare/
October 2, 2024 | International, Land
March 30, 2021 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
Essential news and analysis on the defense aerospace business. Your trusted source for new and ongoing programs and requirements in military aircraft (manned and unmanned), engines, avionics, weapons and associated systems, including ground-based air defense.
June 12, 2020 | International, Aerospace
June 10, 2020 - AeroVironment, Inc. (NASDAQ: AVAV), a global leader in unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), today announced its receipt of two firm-fixed-price orders totaling $9,804,448 from the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA). The orders, received on March 5, 2020 and April 16, 2020, encompass the procurement of Raven® and Puma™3 AE tactical UAS and spares. Delivery for the first order is anticipated by August 2020 and the second order by October 2020. This press release features multimedia. View the full release here: https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200610005372/en/ The orders are part of a three-year base contract received from NSPA in January 2020. The contract includes an option for two additional years of logistics support for Raven, Wasp® and Puma tactical UAS. The total potential value of the multi-year contract is $80 million, encompassing the procurement and sustainment of AeroVironment tactical unmanned aircraft systems employed by the defense forces of several NATO countries. “AeroVironment's tactical unmanned aircraft systems, such as Raven and Puma, have helped transform the way U.S. and allied forces plan, train, equip and operate,” said Rick Pedigo, vice president of sales and business development at AeroVironment. “Both systems benefit from continuous technology improvements and pack significant capabilities into portable, man-packable platforms that provide operators with rapid and effective force protection.” AeroVironment's Raven system is designed for rapid deployment and high mobility for operations requiring low-altitude intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. With a wingspan of 4.5 feet (1.4 meters) and weighing just 4.2 pounds (1.9 kilograms), the hand-launched Raven provides situational awareness, day or night, with an operational range of 6.2 miles (10 kilometers). The Raven's Mantis i23 EO/IR gimbaled payload delivers real-time video or infrared imagery to ground control and remote viewing stations. The AeroVironment Puma 3 AE is a fully man-portable unmanned aircraft system designed for land and maritime operations. The hand-launched Puma 3 AE has a wingspan of 9.2 feet (2.8 meters), weighs 15 pounds (6.8 kilograms) and can operate for up to 2.5 hours at a range of up to 12.4 miles (20 kilometers) with a standard antenna, and up to 37.2 miles (60 kilometers) with AeroVironment's Long-Range Tracking Antenna (LRTA). Capable of landing in water or on land, the all-environment Puma, with its Mantis i45 EO/IR sensor suite, empowers the operator with extended flight time and a level of imaging capability never before available in the tactical UAS class. AeroVironment's family of tactical UAS use a common ground control station and software, allowing for improved interoperability and decreased training and logistics costs for NATO forces. To learn more, visit www.avinc.com. About AeroVironment Tactical UAS The RQ-20A/B Puma™, Puma™ LE, RQ-11B Raven®, RQ-12A Wasp®, together with the VAPOR® Helicopter comprise AeroVironment's family of tactical unmanned aircraft systems. This family of systems provides increased capability to the warfighter that gives ground commanders the option of selecting the appropriate aircraft based on the type of mission to be performed. This increased capability has the potential to provide significant force protection and force multiplication benefits to small tactical units and security personnel. AeroVironment provides logistics services worldwide to ensure a consistently high level of operational readiness. AeroVironment has delivered thousands of new and replacement tactical unmanned air vehicles to customers within the United States and to more than 45 allied governments. About AeroVironment, Inc. AeroVironment (NASDAQ: AVAV) provides customers with more actionable intelligence so they can proceed with certainty. Based in California, AeroVironment is a global leader in unmanned aircraft systems and tactical missile systems, and serves defense, government, and commercial customers. For more information visit www.avinc.com. About NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) The NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA) brings together in a single organization, acquisition, logistic, medical and infrastructural capabilities, operational and systems support and services to the NATO nations, NATO Military Authorities and partner nations. As NATO's primary enabler, the Agency's mission is to provide effective and cost-efficient multinational solutions to its stakeholders. NSPA is a customer-funded agency, operating on a "no profit - no loss" basis. It is headquartered in the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, with main operational centers in France, Hungary and Italy. For more information visit www.nspa.nato.int Safe Harbor Statement Certain statements in this press release may constitute "forward-looking statements" as that term is defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. These statements are made on the basis of current expectations, forecasts and assumptions that involve risks and uncertainties, including, but not limited to, economic, competitive, governmental and technological factors outside of our control, that may cause our business, strategy or actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied. Factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from the forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, our ability to perform under existing contracts and obtain additional contracts; changes in the regulatory environment; the activities of competitors; failure of the markets in which we operate to grow; failure to expand into new markets; failure to develop new products or integrate new technology with current products; and general economic and business conditions in the United States and elsewhere in the world. For a further list and description of such risks and uncertainties, see the reports we file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. We do not intend, and undertake no obligation, to update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. For additional media and information, please follow us at: Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/aerovironmentinc/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/aerovironment LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/aerovironment YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/user/AeroVironmentInc Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/aerovironmentinc/ View source version on businesswire.com: https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200610005372/en/