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  April 29, 2020 | International, Naval

  Navy Acquisition Boosts Ship Contract Awards Under COVID-19

  “I think there are ways we can come out of this much more resilient, but you know it's hard to change bureaucracy and institutional ways of doing business [to] make sure that this disruption doesn't go to waste,” says Navy acquisition chief James Geurts. By PAUL MCLEARY WASHINGTON: Navy leaders and defense industry execs are worried about the effect the COVID-19 pandemic is having on their supply chains, potentially interrupting critical repair and refit availabilities that could have knock-on effects on deployment schedules. The Navy's acquisition chief James Geurts told reporters recently that so far, industry is “holding pretty good on near-term milestones,” but he's worried about long-term effects on ship repair and the industry's ability to keep pace. However, the pandemic seems to be having some beneficial effects. “Part of my goal for our team is not to recover necessarily to where we were,” before COVID-19, but to change some fundamentals of how the Navy's business gets done, he said. With most of the Navy acquisition force teleworking, “we're basically 32 percent ahead on contract awards,” of where they planned to be at this point in the year. “And so, that means there are processes that are working much more efficiently now than they were before, so I want to capture those,” he said. The Navy and shipbuilders are trying to do the same thing in the shipyards where “maybe different techniques will allow us to gain some efficiency while also creating some resiliency,” that will help weather any future disruptions and setbacks. The big shipbuilders like Huntington Ingalls and Bath Iron Works are staggering shifts and allowing liberal leave and teleworking without suffering much disruption so far, company officials have said. Geurts said the lessons they're learning could lead to the conclusion that, “we cannot operate the way we used to operate, which had a lot of fragility and brittleness as we're seeing right now. It's got to drive to the way we need to operate in the future, which has to have resiliency for whatever disruption that might come up. That's what we're really trying to watch closely and think two or three phases ahead, and not just get caught up in managing today's crisis.” Even before COVID-19 tore through the global economy, the Navy was looking at ways to save money on repairing ships. Last month the service backtracked on plans for a classwide service-life extension project for its Arleigh Burke-class destroyers that would have added a decade to their 35-year service lives. Not keeping the Burkes longer, and saving on their life-extension upgrades, would free up money for the Navy to buy more unmanned systems and other smaller ships to fit into plans Defense Secretary Mark Esper is making with Navy leadership for a smaller, faster, more stealthy fleet. To that end, the service has been working on changing how it awards ship maintenance contracts, and is working to “bundle” multiple ship repair contracts together to give industry a more predictable work schedule, allowing them to plan long-term. “Ultimately, getting them bundles is the key to us being successful delivering these [ships] on time,” the commander of Naval Sea Systems Vice Adm. Thomas Moore said last month at the annual McAleese and Associates Defense Programs Conference. Awarding several ship contracts at once will allow the shipbuilder to stockpile parts and arrange work schedules in a more efficient and rational manner, as opposed to the one-off, last-minute contracts the Navy has traditionally awarded for ship repair. “Industry is rational. That's what I tell everybody — you may not like every decision they make, but the decisions most always are very, very rational,” Moore said. In the end, “we've got to manage our way through delay and disruption, but really focus on steepening the recovery and reinvention phase to get into the place we need to be,” Geurts said. “I think there are ways we can come out of this much more resilient, but you know it's hard to change bureaucracy and institutional ways of doing business [to] make sure that this disruption doesn't go to waste.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/navy-acquisition-boosts-ship-contract-awards-under-covid-19

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  September 26, 2024 | International, Land

  Finland to purchase more Patria 6x6 armoured vehicles

  The procurement agreement included an additional purchase option for 70 vehicles, of which the Defence Forces previously redeemed 41 at the turn of the year 2023–2024 and now an additional...

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  May 5, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  A Smart Approach To Retaining Most Of The A-10s

  The Air Force leaders who sought to retire the A-10 in 2014 did not want to cut the aircraft, but they had no other choice due to the Budget Control Act of 2011. While that era has passed, the same dynamics are still at play— a service that is under-resourced, overtasked, compelled to retire aircraft to free up resources to modernize the remaining inventory of mostly geriatric aircraft. By DAVID DEPTULA In American politics people like to talk about third-rail issues, those that kill you when you touch them. For the Air Force, retiring the much-loved and much-misunderstood A-10 Warthog has been a third-rail issue. Army folks, generally not known for their knowledge of aircraft capabilities, LOVE the A-10, largely because it is something Army troops can see results from and it's really loud and looks aggressive, a combination ground pounders appreciate. Key members of Congress have loved the A-10 because it's based in their districts (the late Sen. John McCain) or because their spouse flew the airplane (former Sen. Kelly Ayotte.) OK, and a few really do believe the A-10 should be kept because it is the best close-air-support aircraft. In the 2021 budget, the Air Force is taking a new approach, trying to blend extending the life of most of the A-10 fleet while retiring some. The head of the Mitchell Institute, Dave Deptula, presents a detailed argument in favor of the new approach. Will the Air Force touch the rail or? Read on? The Editor. Some were surprised to see the Air Force again trying in the latest budget request to retire 44 A-10s from, bringing the total force of 281 Warthogs down to 237. Any discussion regarding the status of the A-10—or any other capability in the Air Force's inventory—needs to start with the fact that the Air Force is seriously underfunded. Between 1989 and 2001, the Air Force absorbed the largest cuts of all the services as a percentage of the overall defense budget. Between 2008 and 2011, the Air Force received its lowest share of the defense budget going all the way back to the Eisenhower Administration. On top of those slim budgets, the service does not even receive all that is allocated to it in its total budget. Roughly 20 percent is removed from its control as a budget pass-through to the Intelligence Community. In 2020, that equaled $39 billion—enough to buy 400 F-35As. The chronic deficiencies in Air Force funding were the motivating force behind service leaders releasing “The Air Force We Need,” a plan that calls for growing the number of operational squadrons from 312 today to the 386 required to execute the national defense strategy. While that assessment has yet to be met with funding from the administration or Congress it provides a realistic way to view risk; the difference between what the Air Force needs and what it currently possesses. Because of this disparity, the Air Force is continuously forced to trade existing force structure to pay for modern weapons. It does not matter that the Air Force fields the oldest and smallest aircraft force in its history, or that nearly every mission area is coded “high demand, low density.” The Air Force leaders who sought to retire the A-10 in 2014 did not actually want to cut the aircraft, but they had no other choice due to the Budget Control Act of 2011. While that era has passed, the same dynamics are still at play— a service that is under-resourced, overtasked, compelled to retire aircraft to free up resources to modernize the remaining inventory of mostly geriatric aircraft. With that background, it is important to understand the Air Force's plan to cover the panoply of mission requirements that it faces. Defense leaders today are anticipating a broad array of future threats ranging from non-state actors like the Islamic State and Boko Haram on the low end, North Korea and Iran in the middle, and China and Russia as peer adversaries on the top of the spectrum. The overlapping concurrency of these challenges makes for a difficult balancing act given the chronic underfunding of the Air Force and the fact that dealing with each threat demands a different set of tools. This is precisely why the Air Force wants to retain the bulk of the A-10 inventory. They are planning on doing it in a smart way to achieve two primary goals. First, to assure sufficient capacity to ensure that when combatant commanders need the aircraft the Air Force has enough aircraft so that one squadron can be continuously deployed for combat operations. Second, to assure sufficient capability, leaders are investing in re-winging all the remaining A-10 airframes, funding avionics improvements, and other critical upgrades. Taking these steps will ensure the A-10 can continue to fly and fight into the 2030s. The reason for this is simple: when it comes to effectively and efficiently dealing with certain missions in the low- to medium-threat environment, few aircraft can net better results than the A-10. These aircraft are incredibly precise, efficient to operate, can haul a tremendous load of munitions, and their ability to integrate with other aircraft as well as ground forces is legendary. However, when defense leaders consider operations at the higher end of the threat spectrum, the reality is that A-10 cannot survive. In such environments, commanders select appropriate capabilities rather than risking airmen or mission success. Close air support is a mission—not an aircraft—and it can be executed by many aircraft other than the A-10, particularly in higher threat scenarios. This is why A-10s were not employed over Syria. It would have put them at risk against sophisticated Russian air defenses and combat aircraft. Commanders prudently decided to harness F-22s, F-15Es, F/A-18s, F-16s, and others to secure desired objectives because these aircraft could better defend themselves against those threats. Such sophisticated defenses require continued investment in aircraft like the F-35 and B-21. These are the sorts of aircraft—empowered with fifth generation attributes like stealth, advanced sensors, and computing power—that will be far better equipped to handle mission demands against potential adversaries equipped with the most advanced weapons coming out of China or Russia. Preparing for the future demands adjusting the Air Force's existing aircraft inventory in response to budget realities. Dialing up investment in fifth-generation aircraft is an essential requirement, especially given that too few B-2s and F-22s were procured in the past. The types of combat scenarios that defined the post-9/11 world occurred in permissive airspace at the low end of the threat spectrum. America's interests demand a much more far reaching set of options able to operate and survive in high threat environments. That is why investments in A-10 modernization and newer designs like the F-35, B-21, and next generation air dominance aircraft are so important. However, capacity still matters. The Air Force needs to be properly resourced so it does not have to gut the very numbers that will prove essential in future engagements. No matter the theater in which a fight may erupt, the type of combat action, or the scale of the operation, the need for numbers of airframes is a constant—the same cannot be said for surface forces. It is well past time for leaders in the Department of Defense, the White House and on Capitol Hill to start properly scaling Air Force resources to align for the actual mission demand required by our National Defense Strategy. David Deptula, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is a retired Air Force lieutenant general with over 3,000 flying hours. He planned the Desert Storm air campaign, orchestrated air operations over Iraq and Afghanistan and is now dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/a-smart-approach-to-retaining-most-of-the-a-10s