October 21, 2021 | International, Aerospace
May 5, 2020 | International, Aerospace
A Smart Approach To Retaining Most Of The A-10s
The Air Force leaders who sought to retire the A-10 in 2014 did not want to cut the aircraft, but they had no other choice due to the Budget Control Act of 2011. While that era has passed, the same dynamics are still at play— a service that is under-resourced, overtasked, compelled to retire aircraft to free up resources to modernize the remaining inventory of mostly geriatric aircraft.
In American politics people like to talk about third-rail issues, those that kill you when you touch them. For the Air Force, retiring the much-loved and much-misunderstood A-10 Warthog has been a third-rail issue. Army folks, generally not known for their knowledge of aircraft capabilities, LOVE the A-10, largely because it is something Army troops can see results from and it's really loud and looks aggressive, a combination ground pounders appreciate. Key members of Congress have loved the A-10 because it's based in their districts (the late Sen. John McCain) or because their spouse flew the airplane (former Sen. Kelly Ayotte.) OK, and a few really do believe the A-10 should be kept because it is the best close-air-support aircraft. In the 2021 budget, the Air Force is taking a new approach, trying to blend extending the life of most of the A-10 fleet while retiring some. The head of the Mitchell Institute, Dave Deptula, presents a detailed argument in favor of the new approach. Will the Air Force touch the rail or? Read on? The Editor.
Some were surprised to see the Air Force again trying in the latest budget request to retire 44 A-10s from, bringing the total force of 281 Warthogs down to 237.
Any discussion regarding the status of the A-10—or any other capability in the Air Force's inventory—needs to start with the fact that the Air Force is seriously underfunded. Between 1989 and 2001, the Air Force absorbed the largest cuts of all the services as a percentage of the overall defense budget. Between 2008 and 2011, the Air Force received its lowest share of the defense budget going all the way back to the Eisenhower Administration. On top of those slim budgets, the service does not even receive all that is allocated to it in its total budget. Roughly 20 percent is removed from its control as a budget pass-through to the Intelligence Community. In 2020, that equaled $39 billion—enough to buy 400 F-35As.
The chronic deficiencies in Air Force funding were the motivating force behind service leaders releasing “The Air Force We Need,” a plan that calls for growing the number of operational squadrons from 312 today to the 386 required to execute the national defense strategy. While that assessment has yet to be met with funding from the administration or Congress it provides a realistic way to view risk; the difference between what the Air Force needs and what it currently possesses.
Because of this disparity, the Air Force is continuously forced to trade existing force structure to pay for modern weapons. It does not matter that the Air Force fields the oldest and smallest aircraft force in its history, or that nearly every mission area is coded “high demand, low density.” The Air Force leaders who sought to retire the A-10 in 2014 did not actually want to cut the aircraft, but they had no other choice due to the Budget Control Act of 2011. While that era has passed, the same dynamics are still at play— a service that is under-resourced, overtasked, compelled to retire aircraft to free up resources to modernize the remaining inventory of mostly geriatric aircraft.
With that background, it is important to understand the Air Force's plan to cover the panoply of mission requirements that it faces. Defense leaders today are anticipating a broad array of future threats ranging from non-state actors like the Islamic State and Boko Haram on the low end, North Korea and Iran in the middle, and China and Russia as peer adversaries on the top of the spectrum. The overlapping concurrency of these challenges makes for a difficult balancing act given the chronic underfunding of the Air Force and the fact that dealing with each threat demands a different set of tools.
This is precisely why the Air Force wants to retain the bulk of the A-10 inventory. They are planning on doing it in a smart way to achieve two primary goals. First, to assure sufficient capacity to ensure that when combatant commanders need the aircraft the Air Force has enough aircraft so that one squadron can be continuously deployed for combat operations. Second, to assure sufficient capability, leaders are investing in re-winging all the remaining A-10 airframes, funding avionics improvements, and other critical upgrades. Taking these steps will ensure the A-10 can continue to fly and fight into the 2030s. The reason for this is simple: when it comes to effectively and efficiently dealing with certain missions in the low- to medium-threat environment, few aircraft can net better results than the A-10. These aircraft are incredibly precise, efficient to operate, can haul a tremendous load of munitions, and their ability to integrate with other aircraft as well as ground forces is legendary.
However, when defense leaders consider operations at the higher end of the threat spectrum, the reality is that A-10 cannot survive. In such environments, commanders select appropriate capabilities rather than risking airmen or mission success. Close air support is a mission—not an aircraft—and it can be executed by many aircraft other than the A-10, particularly in higher threat scenarios. This is why A-10s were not employed over Syria. It would have put them at risk against sophisticated Russian air defenses and combat aircraft. Commanders prudently decided to harness F-22s, F-15Es, F/A-18s, F-16s, and others to secure desired objectives because these aircraft could better defend themselves against those threats.
Such sophisticated defenses require continued investment in aircraft like the F-35 and B-21. These are the sorts of aircraft—empowered with fifth generation attributes like stealth, advanced sensors, and computing power—that will be far better equipped to handle mission demands against potential adversaries equipped with the most advanced weapons coming out of China or Russia.
Preparing for the future demands adjusting the Air Force's existing aircraft inventory in response to budget realities. Dialing up investment in fifth-generation aircraft is an essential requirement, especially given that too few B-2s and F-22s were procured in the past. The types of combat scenarios that defined the post-9/11 world occurred in permissive airspace at the low end of the threat spectrum. America's interests demand a much more far reaching set of options able to operate and survive in high threat environments. That is why investments in A-10 modernization and newer designs like the F-35, B-21, and next generation air dominance aircraft are so important.
However, capacity still matters. The Air Force needs to be properly resourced so it does not have to gut the very numbers that will prove essential in future engagements. No matter the theater in which a fight may erupt, the type of combat action, or the scale of the operation, the need for numbers of airframes is a constant—the same cannot be said for surface forces. It is well past time for leaders in the Department of Defense, the White House and on Capitol Hill to start properly scaling Air Force resources to align for the actual mission demand required by our National Defense Strategy.
David Deptula, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is a retired Air Force lieutenant general with over 3,000 flying hours. He planned the Desert Storm air campaign, orchestrated air operations over Iraq and Afghanistan and is now dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.
https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/a-smart-approach-to-retaining-most-of-the-a-10s
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USAF Launches Effort To Speed Up Commercial EVTOL Market
Graham Warwick The U.S. Air Force has detailed its plans to accelerate the emerging advanced air mobility market, and potentially become an early adopter of electric vertical-takeoff-and-landing (eVTOL) vehicles, but is making clear it does not intend to set requirements or fund development. Instead, the service wants to help developers along the way to commercial certification and volume production by providing testing resources and possibly enabling a near-term government public-use market for their vehicles in advance of FAA certification. The Air Force's Agility Prime program office published its “innovative capabilities opening” (ICO) on Feb. 25, establishing a contracting framework for prototyping projects designed to show whether, as their developers claim, eVTOL vehicles can revolutionize mobility, particularly logistics. Under the ICO framework, which will remain open until Feb. 28, 2025, the service plans to release a series of solicitations for different “areas of interest” (AOI). The first of these—AOI #1, or the “Air Race to Certification”—was also released on Feb. 25. Other AOIs could range from autonomy to manufacturing. Under AOI #1, the Air Force office plans to issue contracts to produce test reports that will substantiate company claims for their eVTOL vehicles. Based on a test report, the service could proceed to the next step, potentially an early procurement, says Col. Nathan Diller, Agility Prime integrated product team lead. “They can leverage that test report to get military certification that would allow near-term government use cases that would accelerate commercial certification, potentially providing revenue and data that accelerates the broader adoption of the technology,” he says. The Air Force has not established explicit requirements for an eVTOL. Instead, it has launched studies into potential missions in which commercial vehicles—both passenger-carrying and larger unmanned aircraft—could be used. These could include distributed logistics, medevac, firefighting, search-and-rescue, disaster relief and facility security. The Air Force is aiming for an initial operating capability (IOC) in fiscal 2023 with a “handful-plus” of vehicles in a squadron. “We have begun a series of studies to look at the business case associated with these different missions, and we have started looking at some basic constructs for what these units [operating the aircraft] might look like,” Diller says. “They may be very different units to what we are doing now.” To qualify under the first AOI, companies must have flown their vehicles by Dec. 17, 2020. Diller says some eVTOL developers are ready to submit test reports and move on to the next step, while others will take longer. “That gives us a year to see which companies are ready, but we feel we are in a position to award contracts quickly.” Agility Prime was provided with $10 million in funding in fiscal 2019 and $25 million in 2020. This is not money requested in the Air Force's fiscal 2021 budget, but Diller says there is a “strong desire and intent to fund” the program in fiscal 2022 and future years to get to an IOC in fiscal 2023. The AOI calls for vehicles that can carry three to eight people, with a range greater than 200 mi., speed faster than 100 mph and endurance of more than 60 min. As well as passenger-carrying eVTOLs, Diller says Agility Prime is looking at unmanned cargo aircraft heavier than 1,320 lb. because the other services are focusing below that weight. The Agility Prime ICO is structured to encourage participation by smaller companies and nontraditional defense contractors, but not exclude traditional Pentagon suppliers that are innovating, he says. Bidders are required to cover at least a third of the cost of the prototype project themselves. The objective of Agility Prime is to “catalyze the commercial market by bringing our military market to bear,” Air Force acquisition chief Will Roper said at a roundtable on Feb. 21. “It's equally important to make sure that commercial market catalyzes first in the U.S.,” he added. “That's equally as important as providing the capability to the warfighter. What we don't want to happen is what happened with the small drone migration to China,” he said. “It was a commercial technology, the Pentagon didn't take a proactive stance on it, and now most of that supply chain has moved to China.” U.S. government agencies have banned the use of Chinese-made drones, citing security concerns. “If we had realized that commercial trend and shown that the Pentagon is willing to pay a higher price for a trusted supply-chain drone, we probably could have kept part of the market here and not had to go through the security issues we have now,” he said. “Agility Prime is saying we are not going to let that happen again,” Roper said. Diller says the Air Force is not imposing military requirements on eVTOL developers because it wants to benefit from the low acquisition and operating costs and potentially high production volumes that could come out of the commercial market. “Since we are not putting research and development money in this, we are going to fall into accordance with what the industry partners want to do,” he says. “Our intent is that any testing they do with us will be something that takes them along the path to commercial certification and is not diverting them.” If the Air Force were to set requirements and fund development, “we would feel we are putting at risk a very large market that would allow us to eventually capitalize on that affordable quantity based on potential mass production at an automobile rate,” he says. https://aviationweek.com/shows-events/air-warfare-symposium/usaf-launches-effort-speed-commercial-evtol-market