April 16, 2020 | International, Naval
By: David B. Larter
WASHINGTON — A struggling Philadelphia shipyard got a new lease on life April 8 with the announcement that it had been selected to build up to five training ships for the Maritime Administration destined for use by civilian mariners attending state maritime academies.
The contract, issued by Alaska-based company TOTE Services, tapped Philly Shipyard to build the first two national security multimission vessels, or NSMV, for a total of $630 million, according to the trade publication Marine Log.
The ships, which will feature the latest navigation and bridge technologies, will be able to accommodate up to 600 cadets but will also be available for use by the federal government for disaster relief operations. The ships come with a roll-on/roll-off ramp and a crane that can be used for moving equipment and containers.
The NSMVs will be 525 feet long and about 90 feet wide, or just a little smaller than a Ticonderoga-class cruiser, according to a Maritime Administration fact sheet.
MARAD Administrator Mark Buzby said the contract is a win for American shipbuilding jobs.
“Investing in maritime education creates more American jobs,” Buzby, a former Navy flag officer, said in a statement. "By the selection of Philly Shipyard, Inc., as the construction shipyard for the NSMV, this effort is not only bolstering the U.S. Merchant Marine, but the U.S. economy and vital transportation infrastructure as well.”
Philly Shipyard primarily makes Jones Act ships, or vessels that exist only because the Jones Act mandates that goods shipped between U.S. ports must be sent on U.S.-flagged ships built and crewed by Americans. The rule is designed to preserve the domestic shipbuilding industry as a national security asset. Without it there would essentially be no domestic commercial shipbuilding industry.
“Philly Shipyard only received one order per year during the last two years and was in danger of closing during 2020 unless it received additional work,” said Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute who recently led a study of the domestic shipbuilding industry.
“Philly is important not just because it is a significant employer in the Philadelphia area, but also because it is one of the shipyards the government depends on to build smaller auxiliary and non-combatant ships such as Coast Guard cutters, NOAA research ships, and Navy unmanned surface vessels, survey ships, and towing and salvage vessels.”
The vessels could also prove useful in the Navy's quest to identify a flexible hull that can meet a number of missions as it seeks to replace its aging logistics fleet, said Sal Mercogliano, a maritime historian at Campbell University.
“I think those vessels serve as a potential hull form for maybe a hospital ship, maybe a command ship, an aviation logistics ship, a sub tender: There's potential there,” Mercogliano said.
The Navy planned to develop and field two variants of a Common Hull Auxiliary Multi-Mission Platform, one for sealift purposes and one for other auxiliary ship missions such as submarine tending, hospital ships, and command-and-control platforms. But late last year, the White House blanched at a cost estimate of upward of $1.3 billion for the submarine tender variant of the CHAMP platform, planned for acquisition in 2024.
For moving lots of tanks and howitzers across long distances, the NSMV isn't well-suited. But for many of the other missions the Navy needs to recapitalize, including its hospital ships, it could prove useful.
“I don't think they'd be good for a roll-on/roll-off — it's not designed for a large mission bay,” Mercogliano said. “But I think for the hospital ship, a command ship, there's a lot of utility there.”
March 15, 2023 | International, Aerospace, C4ISR
The national industry champions for advanced defence electronics representing Japan, the UK and Italy have announced the signing of a collaboration agreement, the next formal step towards a permanent industrial...
May 5, 2020 | International, Aerospace
The Air Force leaders who sought to retire the A-10 in 2014 did not want to cut the aircraft, but they had no other choice due to the Budget Control Act of 2011. While that era has passed, the same dynamics are still at play— a service that is under-resourced, overtasked, compelled to retire aircraft to free up resources to modernize the remaining inventory of mostly geriatric aircraft. By DAVID DEPTULA In American politics people like to talk about third-rail issues, those that kill you when you touch them. For the Air Force, retiring the much-loved and much-misunderstood A-10 Warthog has been a third-rail issue. Army folks, generally not known for their knowledge of aircraft capabilities, LOVE the A-10, largely because it is something Army troops can see results from and it's really loud and looks aggressive, a combination ground pounders appreciate. Key members of Congress have loved the A-10 because it's based in their districts (the late Sen. John McCain) or because their spouse flew the airplane (former Sen. Kelly Ayotte.) OK, and a few really do believe the A-10 should be kept because it is the best close-air-support aircraft. In the 2021 budget, the Air Force is taking a new approach, trying to blend extending the life of most of the A-10 fleet while retiring some. The head of the Mitchell Institute, Dave Deptula, presents a detailed argument in favor of the new approach. Will the Air Force touch the rail or? Read on? The Editor. Some were surprised to see the Air Force again trying in the latest budget request to retire 44 A-10s from, bringing the total force of 281 Warthogs down to 237. Any discussion regarding the status of the A-10—or any other capability in the Air Force's inventory—needs to start with the fact that the Air Force is seriously underfunded. Between 1989 and 2001, the Air Force absorbed the largest cuts of all the services as a percentage of the overall defense budget. Between 2008 and 2011, the Air Force received its lowest share of the defense budget going all the way back to the Eisenhower Administration. On top of those slim budgets, the service does not even receive all that is allocated to it in its total budget. Roughly 20 percent is removed from its control as a budget pass-through to the Intelligence Community. In 2020, that equaled $39 billion—enough to buy 400 F-35As. The chronic deficiencies in Air Force funding were the motivating force behind service leaders releasing “The Air Force We Need,” a plan that calls for growing the number of operational squadrons from 312 today to the 386 required to execute the national defense strategy. While that assessment has yet to be met with funding from the administration or Congress it provides a realistic way to view risk; the difference between what the Air Force needs and what it currently possesses. Because of this disparity, the Air Force is continuously forced to trade existing force structure to pay for modern weapons. It does not matter that the Air Force fields the oldest and smallest aircraft force in its history, or that nearly every mission area is coded “high demand, low density.” The Air Force leaders who sought to retire the A-10 in 2014 did not actually want to cut the aircraft, but they had no other choice due to the Budget Control Act of 2011. While that era has passed, the same dynamics are still at play— a service that is under-resourced, overtasked, compelled to retire aircraft to free up resources to modernize the remaining inventory of mostly geriatric aircraft. With that background, it is important to understand the Air Force's plan to cover the panoply of mission requirements that it faces. Defense leaders today are anticipating a broad array of future threats ranging from non-state actors like the Islamic State and Boko Haram on the low end, North Korea and Iran in the middle, and China and Russia as peer adversaries on the top of the spectrum. The overlapping concurrency of these challenges makes for a difficult balancing act given the chronic underfunding of the Air Force and the fact that dealing with each threat demands a different set of tools. This is precisely why the Air Force wants to retain the bulk of the A-10 inventory. They are planning on doing it in a smart way to achieve two primary goals. First, to assure sufficient capacity to ensure that when combatant commanders need the aircraft the Air Force has enough aircraft so that one squadron can be continuously deployed for combat operations. Second, to assure sufficient capability, leaders are investing in re-winging all the remaining A-10 airframes, funding avionics improvements, and other critical upgrades. Taking these steps will ensure the A-10 can continue to fly and fight into the 2030s. The reason for this is simple: when it comes to effectively and efficiently dealing with certain missions in the low- to medium-threat environment, few aircraft can net better results than the A-10. These aircraft are incredibly precise, efficient to operate, can haul a tremendous load of munitions, and their ability to integrate with other aircraft as well as ground forces is legendary. However, when defense leaders consider operations at the higher end of the threat spectrum, the reality is that A-10 cannot survive. In such environments, commanders select appropriate capabilities rather than risking airmen or mission success. Close air support is a mission—not an aircraft—and it can be executed by many aircraft other than the A-10, particularly in higher threat scenarios. This is why A-10s were not employed over Syria. It would have put them at risk against sophisticated Russian air defenses and combat aircraft. Commanders prudently decided to harness F-22s, F-15Es, F/A-18s, F-16s, and others to secure desired objectives because these aircraft could better defend themselves against those threats. Such sophisticated defenses require continued investment in aircraft like the F-35 and B-21. These are the sorts of aircraft—empowered with fifth generation attributes like stealth, advanced sensors, and computing power—that will be far better equipped to handle mission demands against potential adversaries equipped with the most advanced weapons coming out of China or Russia. Preparing for the future demands adjusting the Air Force's existing aircraft inventory in response to budget realities. Dialing up investment in fifth-generation aircraft is an essential requirement, especially given that too few B-2s and F-22s were procured in the past. The types of combat scenarios that defined the post-9/11 world occurred in permissive airspace at the low end of the threat spectrum. America's interests demand a much more far reaching set of options able to operate and survive in high threat environments. That is why investments in A-10 modernization and newer designs like the F-35, B-21, and next generation air dominance aircraft are so important. However, capacity still matters. The Air Force needs to be properly resourced so it does not have to gut the very numbers that will prove essential in future engagements. No matter the theater in which a fight may erupt, the type of combat action, or the scale of the operation, the need for numbers of airframes is a constant—the same cannot be said for surface forces. It is well past time for leaders in the Department of Defense, the White House and on Capitol Hill to start properly scaling Air Force resources to align for the actual mission demand required by our National Defense Strategy. David Deptula, a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, is a retired Air Force lieutenant general with over 3,000 flying hours. He planned the Desert Storm air campaign, orchestrated air operations over Iraq and Afghanistan and is now dean of the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/a-smart-approach-to-retaining-most-of-the-a-10s
January 22, 2020 | International, Aerospace
Aviation Week Network forecasts that over the next ten years, 18,631 new, western-developed engines will be delivered for new military aircraft or as part of re-engining processes. In the same period 11,669 engines will be retired from service. Note: Engines produced by industrial partnerships such as Eurojet are tracked separately from their partner companies. General Electric will deliver 27.7% of total global deliveries of engines. Out of General Electric's total deliveries, 3,560 will be variants of their T700 series of engines, found on most U.S. military helicopters, including the Sikorsky S-70/H-60. The T700 family alone will account for 19.1% of the total deliveries of engines for military aircraft. In a distant second is Pratt & Whitney, which will deliver 12.7% of total global deliveries. Of those deliveries, 70.9%, will be variants of the F135 engine that powers Lockheed Martin's F-35. Following Pratt & Whitney is Rolls-Royce, which will deliver just 7% engines under their own name but contribute heavily to numerous industrial partnerships. A full 25% of engines are tied to competitions or requirements for which an engine manufacturer has not yet been selected, leaving ample growth opportunity for all manufacturers. General Electric also will see the most engine retirements of any manufacturer between 2020 to 2029, with 36.8% of global retirements. The T700 engine family once again makes up the bulk of General Electric's activity, with 24.4% retirements. Rolls-Royce will have more than twice as many engine retirements as deliveries with 23.4% of all global retirements in the next decade. The retirement of T56 (501) engines, mainly on older-model Lockheed Martin C-130s, is the single-largest driver of retirements for Rolls-Royce. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/z/top-military-engine-manufacturers-deliveriesretirements-2020-2029