Pentagon seeks to classify future year defense spending plans

On the same subject

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  September 12, 2019 | International, Aerospace

  L'Italie embarque à bord du Tempest

  Helen Chachaty A trois, on y va. L'Italie a officiellement rejoint le programme d'aviation de combat du futur, mené par le Royaume-Uni. Un secret de polichinelle qui a pris la forme de la signature de deux accords distincts, le premier impliquant les autorités politiques, le second établissant les bases pour la coopération industrielle à venir entre les deux pays. Les documents ratifiés cette semaine prévoient aussi bien un partenariat renforcé sur les plateformes actuelles, Eurofighter et F-35, qu'un développement conjoint du prochain aéronef de combat, au sein du programme Tempest. La déclaration d'intention signée entre le chef du Defence Equipment & Support (l'équivalent britannique de la DGA), Sir Simon Bollom, et le Lieutenant général Nicolò Falsaperna, vice-secrétaire général à la Défense italien, couvre cinq aspects de coopération : un rapprochement des deux gouvernements sur les capacités futures de l'Eurofighter ; la définition conjointe des besoins militaires concernant le Tempest, le développement d'une feuille de route pour l'aviation de combat, avec le transfert de technologies de l'Eurofighter au Tempest ; la mise en place d'un cadre de coopération industrielle ; le lancement d'études pour de nouvelles voies de « travail collaboratif ». Cette annonce politique a été suivie le lendemain par la signature d'un accord de coopération entre les principaux industriels britanniques et italiens, à l'occasion du salon DSEI, qui se tient jusqu'au 13 septembre à Londres. Il s'agira de « travailler ensemble pour définir un concept innovant et un modèle de partenariat qui inclura le partage de connaissances, la conception et le développement de technologies en vue d'un développement conjoint des systèmes de combat aérien futurs », selon le communiqué officiel. Côté britannique, on retrouve BAE Systems, Leonardo UK, Rolls Royce et MBDA UK, tandis que la partie italienne va impliquer Leonardo - évidemment - Elettronica, Avio Aero et la MBDA Italy. L'Italie devient ainsi le troisième acteur impliqué dans le programme de développement du système de combat aérien du futur lancé et dirigé par le Royaume-Uni, le deuxième au sein du programme Tempest. La Suède s'est pour sa part contentée de signer un accord de coopération pour l'aviation de combat de nouvelle génération lors du salon aéronautique de Farnborough, sans toutefois rejoindre le programme Tempest en lui-même. Selon Jane's, la décision formelle est attendue pour la fin de l'année 2020. Le paysage européen de l'aviation de combat du futur se répartit à présent comme suit : France, Allemagne et Espagne coopèrent sur le SCAF, tandis que le Royaume-Uni, l'Italie - et peut-être la Suède - s'engagent sur le Tempest, chacun avec ses industriels dédiés. Certains, tels que MBDA ou encore Safran (qui figurent tous deux dans la liste « team Tempest »), tirent cependant leur épingle du jeu, en étant impliqués dans les deux programmes. https://www.journal-aviation.com/actualites/43040-l-italie-embarque-a-bord-du-tempest

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  February 4, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Lord Says F-35s Safe Despite Fastener Problem

  By John A. Tirpak The F-35 fleet is safe to fly, despite an unknown number of under-strength fasteners being used to build critical areas of the jet, Pentagon acquisition and sustainment chief Ellen Lord said Jan. 31. Lockheed Martin workers mixed up titanium and Inconel bolts during manufacture of the F-35, and the Defense Contract Management Agency told Air Force Magazine neither the company nor the Joint Program Office knew how many aircraft were affected, or how far back the problem started. It said the whole fleet of 400-plus F-35s could potentially be affected. The titanium fasteners are lighter than the Inconel parts, and also have less shear strength. Lockheed is to present its 70-day root cause analysis of the “quality escape” to the government in February. At a press conference to discuss cyber security rules for Pentagon contractors, Lord said she had “looked at samples of that issue”—meaning the mixed-up fasteners—and said “right now we have assessed that there is no structural compromise of the aircraft.” She said the root cause analysis continues. “The JPO is working closely with Lockheed; we will continue to asses if there are any issues, but we have confidence in the integrity of the aircraft at this point.” Deliveries of the F-35 were halted briefly in November when the issue was discovered. A Lockheed spokeswoman said barrels of the two fasteners, which are visually similar and differ only in a number stamped into them, were mixed up at the company's Ft. Worth, Texas, factory, as well as the Final Assembly and Check-Out facility in Italy, though not at the FACO in Japan. Titanium fasteners were installed in places where the Inconel parts were specified, and vice versa. An inspection of some number of aircraft—it did not disclose how many—led the company to conclude the problem is not widespread, and there is no plan in the works to conduct fleetwide inspections. Each F-35 has some 50,000 fasteners, of which about 1.7 percent are supposed to be made of Inconel. The F-35C Navy version requires 3.5 percent Inconel fasteners because of the greater size and loads on that airplane. Lord said she's looking for “continuous improvement” in F-35 production, and reported seeing “incredible strides” in its quality over the last two-and-a-half years. However, “I think this is a journey that we will be on for the entire life of the F-35.” She expects Lockheed will continue to improve, “month over month, quarter over quarter, and year over year.” https://www.airforcemag.com/lord-says-f-35s-safe-despite-fastener-problem

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  June 9, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

  By: Sarah Bidgood Russia recently published a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia's official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination. Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia's threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble. One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions." The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons. These parallels suggest that an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear command, control and communications systems could be of interest to both Washington and Moscow. A treaty along these lines would help to shore up crisis stability while rebuilding trust and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. It could also become a multilateral approach involving the five nuclear weapon states, which have been meeting regularly to discuss risk reduction and other topics. This would represent one of the few concrete outcomes of these discussions, which have been met with cautious enthusiasm but have so far failed to bear much fruit. Another example of mutual U.S.-Russia threats appears in section 12E of the Russian document. Here, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture” are described as risks that nuclear deterrence is meant to neutralize. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons seems to remain a focus of U.S. nuclear policy, too, and the 2018 NPR commits to strengthening institutions that support “verifiable, durable progress on non-proliferation.” This ongoing shared interest is an argument for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, especially as it relates to strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. There is a long history of engagement between the two largest nuclear weapon states on nonproliferation, even at times of major discord in their relationship. Successful outcomes of this cooperation include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 50 years ago to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite decades of joint work toward this shared goal, the rift between Washington and Moscow has now brought most bilateral efforts in this area to a halt. As some in Iran, Turkey and Germany contemplate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it's time for the U.S. and Russia to shore up the credibility of the regime they built. Other sections of Russia's document offer additional glimpses into Moscow's perceived threats, although not all find ready analogs in U.S. declaratory policy. Many relate instead to the possibility that an adversary will carry out a conventional attack on Russia. Sections 12 and 14, for instance, reference the risks posed by adversary deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons. They also mention the deployment of missile defense systems in space; military buildups by would-be adversaries of general-purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in territories neighboring Russia; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapons states, among others. There is little here that would surprise most Russia-watchers, but if the U.S. is serious about pursuing “next generation” arms control, it is useful to have a list of potential topics for discussion that go beyond ballistic missile defense. This list might also prove helpful in negotiating asymmetric treaties or in identifying confidence-building measures that cross domains. Overall, this short document does provide greater clarity with respect to Russia's deterrence strategy, but it is ambiguous on many points as well. Olga Oliker, the International Crisis Group's program director for Europe and Central Asia, noted, for instance, it does not settle the debate over whether Russia has an “escalate-to-deescalate” policy, and it is (unsurprisingly) vague about the precise circumstances under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons. Still, despite leaving some questions unanswered, the document offers a valuable window into Russia's strengths and vulnerabilities as they appear from Moscow. While likely not the intended signal this document was meant to send, it nevertheless points to possible opportunities for engagement when other good alternatives are hard to see. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/08/russias-new-nuclear-policy-could-be-a-path-to-arms-control-treaties/