Operational pause of CT-114 Tutor fleet lifted

On the same subject

• 

  November 5, 2019 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  A new Defence Procurement Agency – Would it solve anything?

  By Brian Mersereau Defence Watch Guest Writer During the recent federal election, the issue of considering a new Defence Procurement Agency or DPA surfaced again. The Liberals made such an organization part of their defence platform this time around as part of their plan to improve military procurement. While positive outcomes could result from a new organizational structure, simply installing one will not in and of itself create an efficient procurement model. It most certainly will not address in any substantive manner why taxpayers pay far too much to acquire the defence capabilities Canada needs to protect our sovereign interests in a world that has become increasingly unstable in recent years. It appears that, in many cases, Canada pays more per unit of capability to satisfy its defence needs than most of its allies. Unfortunately, though quite logically, this phenomenon has effectively shrunk the size of our armed forces as the number of platforms we can afford to acquire continues to dwindle due to high costs. While this approach can create short-term jobs, they are ultimately unsustainable since there is no international market for our higher-priced solutions. This is not the direction in which Canada should be headed. Before Canada decides to move ahead with a new procurement agency, it should assemble a “smart persons” panel or forum to thoroughly review the existing system and establish the mandate and objectives of whatever type of organization results from said review. Such a review group must be composed of people from the public and private sector with significant experience, not skewed with staff whose procurement experience primarily consists of exposure to the Canadian “way”. During this review, the panel must examine various issues which are currently perceived to be an impediment to the efficiency of Canada's procurement system. Based on my own years of experience on both the buy and sell sides of the procurement equation, the following areas merit some serious thought: Organizational Structure The fewer individuals, departments and oversight committees with their fingers in the “procurement pie”, the quicker and more coherently things will get done. Even at today's interest rates, time really is money for all involved in the process. Adding more time to a schedule for another management review quite often has a negative impact. While I understand governance and oversight committees have their place, their overinvolvement can produce negative outcomes if mandates are not absolutely clear and if individuals on these committees have limited experience with respect to the issue at hand. Risk Canada's ongoing method for defence procurement is that it will not assume any risk on their side of a contract. If Canada insists the private sector must accept all risk, the private sector will so oblige – but at a significant price and to the detriment of schedules and timelines. As contract prices necessarily increase, so do governments costs to manage the contract. In reality, the most efficient procurement solution for Canada would see some elements of risk managed by the buyer, rather than entirely borne by the seller. More consideration needs to go into balanced risk-sharing formulas. Process Canada has an extremely hands-on procurement process for major systems during the competitive phase, as well as during the implementation of the contract. Even in this digital age, Canada hamstrings its own progress with the sheer degree of detail and bureaucracy it requires; unbelievably, freight trucks are still required to deliver proposals. It seems as though, on occasion, the buyer thinks it knows more about designing and engineering the defence systems Canada needs than the actual designers and engineers for whom it is a primary occupation. Requirements of little or no consequence are painstakingly spelled out in the greatest of detail. Such an approach has a tremendous impact on the amount of time consumed by both the buyer and seller, again driving up costs and extending schedules. Less “hand holding” by the customer must be seriously considered. Sole Source In the procurement world, “sole source” is often viewed as a dirty phrase. Frequently, Canada attempts to run competitions in scenarios where the chances of achieving any meaningful savings or benefits related to competition are low at best. This takes years and drives costs higher at no measurable gain for the buyer. The parameters of when and under what circumstances Canada should move directly to a sole source should be thoroughly reviewed. Significant resources are being wasted managing nearly meaningless processes. Skills Canada's internal skill set for managing large, complex defence procurements does not appear to be adequate. As a result, it turns more and more often to the expertise of external third parties in order to keep up with large private sector firms at the negotiation table from a knowledge and experience standpoint. While there will always be a need for some third-party expertise, project managing many external suppliers in the negotiation phase – each of whom have their own agendas – only further complicates the already convoluted procurement process. Canada would be much better off with an enhanced internal core staff. If Canada takes the time to review the appropriateness of some form of DPA model, it must cast the net wider and review other critical aspects of the procurement process – or else any organizational changes will inevitably succumb to the systematic inertia of the overall process. A failure to do so means Canada will continue struggling mightily to stand-up the level of defence and security necessary to secure its citizens in an increasingly turbulent world. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/a-new-defence-procurement-agency-would-it-solve-anything

• 

  August 9, 2019 | Local, Aerospace

  Canadian, U.S. military leaders agree on framework to retool Norad

  By Murray Brewster Military leaders from the U.S. and Canada have come to an agreement on the nuts and bolts retooling of Norad, CBC News has learned. It is a milestone that could end up pitting the next government in Ottawa against both the Trump administration and perhaps even northern Indigenous communities at home. Now over six decades old, the bi-national air and maritime defence command — and its associated airfields, radar stations and satellite network — has been in need of a major overhaul in the face of emerging threats, such as North Korean ballistic missiles and rapidly advancing cruise missile technology. Word of the understanding comes as two Canadian CF-18s and two American F-22 Raptors intercepted two Russian Tu-95 Bear bombers, which pressed close to North American airspace, on Thursday. The agreement of "what's in and what's out" of the new North American Aerospace Defence Command was struck a few months ago, said a defence source in Ottawa, who was granted anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. Separately, the Canadian general who is the deputy commander of Norad confirmed the two countries are on the same page when it comes to the new framework needed to defend the continent, but cautioned there is still a lot of work and negotiation ahead over capabilities and what is affordable. "We have established the operational requirements," Lt.-Gen. Christopher Coates in an interview with CBC News. A bi-national panel is examining the specifications and make recommendations to both the Pentagon and the Department of National Defence in Ottawa. Eventually, Coates said, each government will have to "determine whether or not those capabilities will be provided — or some other option" will be pursued. And that is where things could potentially get messy, according to defence experts. James Fergusson, of the University of Manitoba, one of the pre-eminent researchers on Norad, said the price tag will be substantial. Replacing the North Warning System chain of radar stations, alone, could cost as much as $11 billion, he said. The Liberal government has made much of saying its defence plans are fully costed, but it deliberately did not include the calculation for Norad modernization in its policy. There will have to be some negotiation with Washington, even though the cost sharing formula (60-40 split between the U.S. and Canada) has long been established. Steve Saideman, a professor of international affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, said he can't see any Canadian government being anxious to open negotiations with the Trump administration, regardless of how long standing the arrangements might be. U.S. President Donald Trump has long complained American allies do not pay their fair share of costs for the NATO alliance, and Saideman said it is not beyond the realm of possibility that government-to-government technical negotiations over Norad could devolve. Fergusson disagreed. If they argue over money, he said, it will likely involve environmental cleanup costs related to the existing, remote north warning radar stations. When Norad abandoned its first chain of early warning sites — known as the DEW line — in 1993, the cleanup took 21 years and Canada was stuck with the $575 million bill. More problematic, as far as Fergusson is concerned, is whether Norad's proposed new capabilities will affect northern indigenous communities, which — unlike the past — will rightfully expect to be consulted and have a say over what the military does with the land. "When they [the Canadian and U.S. military] go up there in Northern Canada, now, they can't simply ignore the Indigenous people," said Fergusson, "And that's a political issue." https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/norad-canada-us-military-1.5240855

• 

  October 16, 2023 | Local, Land

  French firms to triple 155mm ammo production, boost weapons output

  French defense firms have reportedly boosted production of self-propelled guns, artillery shells, fighter jets and anti-air missiles.