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April 8, 2022 | Local, C4ISR, Security

AÉRO MONTRÉAL EST À LA RECHERCHE D'UN(E) GESTIONNAIRE DE PROJETS, CYBERSÉCURITÉ

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  • $1 billion and counting: Inside Canada's troubled efforts to build new warships

    February 25, 2020 | Local, Naval

    $1 billion and counting: Inside Canada's troubled efforts to build new warships

    Federal government tables figures showing what it's spent on the projects to date Murray Brewster The federal government has spent slightly more than $1.01 billion over the last seven years on design and preparatory contracts for the navy's new frigates and supply ships — and the projects still haven't bought anything that floats. The figures, tabled recently in Parliament, represent the first comprehensive snapshot of what has been spent thus far on the frequently-delayed project to build replacement warships. It's an enormous amount of money for two programs that have been operating for more than a decade with little to show for their efforts to date. It will be years before the Canadian Surface Combatant project — which aims to replace the navy's frontline frigates with 15 state-of-the-art vessels — and the Joint Support Ship program for two replenishment vessels actually deliver warships. The numbers and details for each advance contract were produced in the House of Commons in response to written questions from the Conservative opposition. The money was divided almost evenly between the federal government's two go-to shipyards: Irving Shipbuilding in Halifax, the prime contractor for the new frigates, and Seaspan of Vancouver, the builder of the supply ships. The breakdown raises critical questions about at least one of the programs, said a defence analyst, but it also shines a light on promises made by both Liberal and Conservative governments to keep spending under control for both of these projects — which could end up costing more than $64 billion. "I think there should be a level of concern [among the public] about whether or not what's being delivered in practice is what was advertised at the outset," said Dave Perry, a procurement expert and vice president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. A design still in flux Most of his concerns revolve around the new support ships, which the Liberal government says are in the process of being built now. The written responses, tabled in Parliament, note that the projected cost for the two supply ships — $3.4 billion — remains under review "as the design effort finalizes." Perry said he was astonished to learn that, "seven years and half-a-billion dollars into design work on an off-the-shelf design," the navy doesn't have the support ships, even though "the middle third of the ship is built" — and officials now say "the design effort isn't finished." Usually, he said, ships are designed before they're built. The head of the Department of National Defence's materiel branch said most of the preparatory contracts were needed to re-establish a Canadian shipbuilding industry that had been allowed to wither. 'A lot of patience' "I think we have to look at the totality of everything that's being accomplished under" the national shipbuilding strategy, said Troy Crosby, assistant deputy minister of materiel at DND. "Over that period of time, and with these expenditures, we've built a shipbuilding capability on two coasts, not just through National Defence but also through the coast guard, offshore fisheries science vessels. I understand it has taken a lot of patience, I suppose, and probably some uncertainty, but we're really getting to the point now where we can see delivering these capabilities to the navy." The largest cash outlays involve what's known as definition contracts, which went individually to both shipyards and were in excess of $330 million each. They're meant to cover the supervision of the projects and — more importantly — to help convert pre-existing warship designs purchased by the federal government to Canadian standards. The choices on each project were made at different times by different governments, but ministers serving both Liberal and Conservative governments decided that going with proven, off-the-shelf designs would be faster and less expensive than building from scratch. Now, after all the delays, it's still not clear that choosing off-the-shelf designs has saved any money. "I would be completely speculating on what it would cost to invest to develop the kind of expertise and capacity inside the government, inside National Defence and everybody involved, to be able to do something like that in-house," said Crosby. "The approach we've taken at this point, by basing both the Joint Support Ship and the Canadian Surface Combatant on pre-existing designs, allows us to retire a lot of risk in the way forward." When Crosby talks about "retiring risk," he's talking about the potential for further delays and cost overruns. Among the contracts, Irving Shipbuilding was given $136 million to support the drawing up of the design tender for the new frigates and to pay for the shipbuilding advice Irving was giving the federal government throughout the bidding process. Years ago, the federal government had enough in-house expertise to dispense with private sector guidance — but almost all of that expertise was lost over the past two decades as successive federal governments cut the defence and public works branches that would have done that work. The last time Canada built major warships was in the 1990s, when the current fleet of 12 patrol frigates was inaugurated. The federal government has chosen to base its new warships on the BAE Systems Type-26 design, which has been selected by the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy. The hull and propulsion system on the new frigates will be "largely unchanged" from the British design, but the combat system will be different and uniquely Canadian, said Crosby. The project is still on track to start cutting steel for the new combat ships in 2023. Crosby said he would not speculate on when the navy will take delivery of the first one. Delivery of the joint support ships is expected to be staggered, with the first one due in 2024. There will be a two-year gap between ships, said Crosby, as the navy and the yard work through any technical issues arising with the first ship. If that timeline holds, the first support ship will arrive two decades after it was first proposed and announced by the Liberal government of former prime minister Paul Martin. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/frigates-joint-supply-ships-navy-procurement-canada-1.5474312

  • RCAF hints at capabilities that may guide future fighter acquisition

    April 26, 2018 | Local, Aerospace

    RCAF hints at capabilities that may guide future fighter acquisition

    Chris Thatcher The Canadian government is still a year away from issuing a request for proposals for its next fighter jet, but the general leading the future fighter capability project has indicated what capabilities may drive the Royal Canadian Air Force's (RCAF's) eventual statement of requirements. In a presentation to the Aerospace Innovation Forum in Montreal last week, MGen Alain Pelletier, chief of the Fighter Capability Program, emphasized the importance of a platform with the flexibility to adapt to changing threats over a period of at least 30 years. Setting the future fleet of 88 jets in the context of NATO and NORAD missions, he emphasized the challenge of anticipating, adapting and acting in a threat environment where potential adversaries are investing heavily in longer-range “anti-access/area denial” capabilities, surface-to-air missile systems, exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrum, and cyber weapons. Pelletier, a CF-188 Hornet pilot with two tours in the Balkans, noted the “operational disadvantage” Canadian pilots currently face from anti-aircraft and surface-to-air threats. In recent NATO air policing missions over Romania and Lithuania, “we fly to a potential threat area knowing that our location and number is known by the adversaries while the intent and willingness...to employ their weapon systems remains unknown,” he said. This was especially true during the CF-188 deployment on Operation Impact over Iraq and Syria. Though the theatre was considered a semi-permissive environment, “had the Syrian government intent changed regarding the use of their airspace, only effective self-protection systems and exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrums could have protected our fighters against a 20 second engagement by a surface-to-air missile,” he observed. The current NATO environment features a range of advanced surface-to-air systems that “are mobile, digitized, passive, and carry missiles with a cruise speed capability and a classified range in excess of 300 kilometres,” he said. A sortie might begin in a permissive environment but end in a contested one, so the “capabilities of the aircraft at the beginning of the mission [will] define if the future fighter will have an operational advantage.” The NORAD picture is equally challenging. Russian activity in the North has increased in the past several years, Pelletier noted, “with Russian bombers potentially armed with low observable cruise missiles being escorted by fighters...like the advanced [Sukhoi] Su-35 and eventually the Su-57 [first seen] in the Syrian theatre of operations.” “Exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrum allows Russian platforms to know where Canadian NORAD fighters are,” limiting Canadian options to respond, he added. “The bottom line remains that the defence of Canada and North America requires a future fighter that can adapt and act decisively.” Consequently, a critical requirement of the next fighter jet will be interoperability with NORAD and NATO partners. In particular, Pelletier underscored the importance of being able to share intelligence among 2 Eyes and 5 Eyes partners collected by their respective national assets. The 2 Eyes partnership of Canada and the United States, and the 5 Eyes group of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the U.S., has been essential to understanding and operating in conflict zones. He also emphasized that operations are heavily dependent on the systematic collection, coordination, fusion, production and dissemination of defence intelligence. “In a fighter aircraft, all systems employ or exploit this information for the use of mission data files, threat libraries, all of which allow the pilots to effectively conduct their mission. Commonality and a growth path are required to ensure the seamless fusion of all systems through the life of the fleet to 2060 and beyond.” NATO and NORAD systems and intelligence interoperability requirements are not new, but the RCAF's demand for 2 Eyes/5 Eyes compatibility could present a barrier for countries and manufacturers that are not part of those closed groups. Several times during his presentation, Pelletier also repeated the need for an aircraft and mission and weapons systems that could be “continuously” upgraded well into the 2060s. Given the innovation forum's focus on disruptive technologies, Pelletier noted the opportunities and threats posed by autonomous systems operating in an integrated and networked fashion, swarming unmanned systems, advanced exploitation of the electro-magnetic spectrum, hypersonic speed, directed energy, quantum technology, and artificial intelligence. All may eventually be part of the next fighter, but he cautioned industry that any advantage would only happen if the technology could be rapidly implemented and integrated and supported by government policy and rules of engagement. https://www.skiesmag.com/news/rcaf-hints-capabilities-may-guide-future-fighter-acquisition/

  • Defence contractor lobbying on arms export rules

    November 17, 2024 | Local, Land

    Defence contractor lobbying on arms export rules

    Rheinmetall Canada Inc. was registered this past week by Elizabeth Seip, a consultant with Hill & Knowlton.

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