NGEN-R: What is the Navy thinking?

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  August 24, 2020 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR

  Pentagon’s acquisition chief wants microelectronics production to return to the US

  Andrew Eversden WASHINGTON — The microelectronics industry is at an “inflection point, and the U.S. government must implement policies to entice companies to do more manufacturing within American shores, the Defense Department's chief weapons buyer said Thursday. Ellen Lord, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment, said on a webinar that her office is taking a look at how to entice companies to bring microelectronic production and testing work back to the United States, where the Defense Department can more easily verify the security and reliability of the hardware. Microelectronics are the cornerstone to advancing emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing and 5G wireless networks, as well as critical components of weapons systems. But the Pentagon is concerned that the current market — where the majority of production and testing takes place outside the United States — allows for adversaries such as China to introduce backdoors that will harm U.S. national security. “We can no longer identify the pedigree of our microelectronics,” Lord said at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Electronics Resurgence Initiative summit. “Therefore we can no longer ensure that backdoors, malicious code or data exfiltration commands aren't embedded in our code. While we develop the ability to identify the technical path to ensure all components, circuits and systems are clean regardless of their manufacturing location, we need to find a path to domestic sources to provide a secure and resilient supply of legacy, state-of-the-present and state-of-the-art microelectronics.” The United States is one of three countries with advanced microelectronics manufacturing capabilities. Increasingly, American microelectronics manufacturers have moved microchip fabrication plants abroad, according to a 2016 report from the Congressional Research Service. To pull the microelectronics manufacturing back within U.S. shores, Lord proposed creating public-private partnerships. “The U.S. government can provide a demand signal and can also infuse some capital to overcome some of the activation energy, if you will, to get the whole process rolling — of manufacturing, packaging, testing here in the states,” Lord said. “And then we partner with other industrial sectors to sustain that.” Lord listed several reasons why companies had gone abroad, such as environmental regulations, local and state taxes, and economic pressures such as a wages. https://www.c4isrnet.com/newsletters/daily-brief/2020/08/20/pentagons-acquisition-chief-wants-microelectronics-production-to-return-to-the-us/

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  January 29, 2020 | International, Land

  Artillery Seeks Robot Ammo Haulers

  Six companies got $150,000 Field Artillery Autonomous Resupply contracts to study everything from exoskeletons that strengthen human ammo handlers to robots that might replace them. UPDATED to clarify contract details WASHINGTON: After 100 years of hauling 100-pound howitzer shells by hand, Army gunners are about to get some high-tech help. Last week, representatives from six small and mid-size tech companies trudged through the mud with soldiers at Fort Bliss, Tex., so they could watch close-up as troops moved 155 mm shells from pallets to their M109 Paladins. The six firms are under 12-week, $150,000 contracts to refine their ideas to augment or replace human muscle at every stage of the loading process, part of the Field Artillery Autonomous Resupply (FAAR) initiative run by Austin-based Army Futures Command. “For every projectile that goes down range, that projectile is picked up no less than five different times by a soldier and moved manually – and each one of those projectiles is 100 pounds,” Maj. Chris Isch told the Army's in-house news service. “We are looking for ways to automate that as much as possible.” Robotic logistics, from self-driving supply trucks to AI predicting engine breakdowns, lacks the ominous glamour of so-called killer robots. But the sheer complexity of identifying friend or foe amidst the chaos of combat, and deep-rooted Pentagon policy on human control of lethal force, mean that autonomous weapons will take much longer to develop than autonomous supply and support systems, some of which are already in field-tests. That said, Field Artillery Autonomous Resupply would definitely mark the Army more deadly. Artillery historically kills more troops than any other branch, and after years of letting Russia pull ahead in range and volume of fire, the Army is urgently upgrading its guns. The service's No. 1 modernization priority is what it calls Long-Range Precision Fires, and while hypersonics and post-INF Treaty missiles have dominated the headlines, the LRPF portfolio also includes conventional howitzers. The Army had already begun upgrading the hull and automotive systems of its venerable M109 armored howitzer vehicle under its Paladin Integrated Management (PIM) program. Now it's looking to upgrade the gun and turret under what's called Extended Range Cannon Artillery. A New Beast To Feed Between a longer barrel, precision guidance and new rocket-boosted shells, ERCA has already doubled the Paladin's range, from 30 km (19 miles) to 62 km (39 miles) in test-shots at Yuma Proving Ground. The goal is to double it again, to over 120 km (75 miles). ERCA also plans to add an autoloader mechanism to feed the gun, instead of humans manhandling shells into the breech. That should increase the rate of fire from four shells a minute to 10. Assuming standard high-explosive rounds, that means the ERCA gun can go through 950 pounds of ammo in 60 seconds and a ton in just over two minutes. How do you feed such a beast? Currently, ammo is shipped in crates and pallets to (relatively) safe supply dumps in the rear, where troops load the individual shells into a purpose-built armored vehicle for transport to the front. That M992 ammo hauler has an extendable conveyer belt to transfer shells directly into the howitzer vehicle, but the belt doesn't always work that well in the field. Besides, the ammo hauler holds 95 rounds of high explosive and propellant, which would blow up horrifically if hit, so a standard tactic is to park the ammo transport under cover, well away from the guns, and have soldiers schlep the shells. The Army's multidisciplinary Cross Functional Team for Long-Range Precision Fires, already working on multiple missiles at once, couldn't develop the ERCA gun and a new loading system at the same time, an officer explained at an AUSA robotics conference last fall. So the team turned to a sister organization within Army Futures Command, the Army Applications Lab, whose in-house Army Capabilities Accelerator reaches out beyond traditional defense contractors to universities, startups, and smaller firms, especially ones which have little experience working with the military. Five Functions, Six Firms, 12 Weeks The Applications Lab came up with the Field Artillery Autonomous Resupply concept and sought proposals to revolutionize every step of the process. An online solicitation lists five key functions: Robotic ammo handling and transport for the supply depot to move shells from crates & pallets to the ammo vehicle, or even carry it directly to the gun; Small unmanned ground vehicles or even drones to drive or fly a few shells at a time – at least 150 pounds payload, i.e. one shell plus packaging — from the ammo vehicle to a gun at least a kilometer away; Automated ammo handling for inside the M109 howitzer itself, not only auto-loading the shell into the breech, but also setting charges, adjusting propellant loads for range, and more; Exoskeletons, both powered and passive, to help soldiers handle 100-plus-pound objects without fatigue – the main limiting factor on sustained fire – or injury; and Command & Control systems to coordinate munitions delivery when GPS and radio are being jammed, including self-directing robot swarms. The response was vigorous: 83 submissions from 43 states and multiple foreign countries, which the Army weeded down to the six firms that went out to Fort Bliss last week. Each got a $150,000 contract to spend 12 weeks gathering feedback and refining their designs, with a final brief to the Army in Austin on April 1st. (UPDATE: Technically, the six firms are all subcontractors to Alion Science and Technology, which is administering the program for the Army). The Army will then decide which, if any, should advance further towards actual production. The six companies in the current phase? Actuate (formerly Aegis) develops computer vision software that analyzes surveillance feeds in real time to detect intruders and firearms. They're based in New York City, hardly the usual breeding ground for defense contractors. Apptronik builds exoskeletons and “human-centered robotics” designed to work with people. It's a four-year-old spin-off of the University of Texas at Austin. The Army picked Austin to be Futures Command's home town precisely because it's a hub of high-tech innovation with few existing ties to the military. Carnegie Robotics in Pittsburg is a decade-old spin-off of Carnegie Mellon University's National Robotics Engineering Center. CMU has a strong relationship with the Army and is now host to the Army AI Task Force. Neya Systems, also in the Pittsburgh area, develops aerial drones and off-road robots. It's a division of employee-owned defense contractor Applied Research Associates. Hivemapper is a Silicon Valley firm that turns surveillance video – including from drones – into digital maps, automatically updated by change-detection algorithms, for both the private sector and the Pentagon. Pratt & Miller Engineering, based in Detroit and South Carolina, and most famous for its work on race cars, whose seven-ton EMAV robot just won a field-testing contract for the Army's experimental Robotic Combat Vehicle – Light. Now, the RCV is still experimental, and Pratt & Miller's win hardly guarantees a production contract, it makes sense for them to offer a variant of the same robot for the artillery resupply program. It would definitely be simpler and cheaper for Army logisticians to use the same robotic chassis for both armed vehicles and ammo haulers. UPDATE “It's about creating direct, candid engagement between commercial solvers and Army problem owners to open the aperture on the realm of the possible,” said Porter Orr, production innovation lead at the Army Applications Lab, in a statement to Breaking Defense. “The capability presentations ...on April 1st...will be used to help shape thinking and inform future requirements, at a minimum.” “While it's possible that a single, ‘perfect' piece of hardware could come from the FAAR cohort, that's not the marker of success,” Orr continued. “Rather, it's about giving Army stakeholders better access and insight into commercial solutions with a low, upfront investment, while also creating channels that make it easier for non-traditionals to work with the Army. The FAAR cohort is the first to launch as part of this new model, but the intention is that it will not be the last.” Corrected 10pm to remove references to the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) process: While the Field Artillery Autonomous Resupply (FAAR) initiative is also exploring the use of the SBIR process, the contracts discussed in this article were awarded under a different vehicle. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/01/artillery-seeks-robot-ammo-haulers

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  May 3, 2019 | International, Naval

  The U.S. Navy Is Unbalanced. It's Time to Fix It.

  by John S. Van Oudenaren From a shortage of ships to munitions and carrier-based fighters which lack range, the U.S. Navy is ill-equipped to contend with a new era of great-power conflict. In the decades after the Cold War, the U.S. Navy absorbed sustained budget cuts resulting in large force reductions. The total size of the fleet dwindled from nearly 600 active ships in 1987 to around 285 today. During this period, naval planners focused their substantial, yet shrinking, budgetary resources on large, costly, high-end platforms such as aircraft carriers at the expense of smaller surface warfare combatants such as frigates. This approach perhaps suited the range of global expeditionary missions that the navy was called upon to support in the 1990s (e.g. Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo), a time when the United States faced no proximate military competitors. However, its lack of platforms currently leaves the sea service in a parlous state as it faces intensifying major power competition from China and Russia. At a recent Center for the National Interest event, two leading authorities on naval strategy, operations and force structure, explained how the navy can take steps to create a more balanced force that will adequately prepare the fleet for a new era of great power naval competition. According to Milan Vego, Professor of Operations at the U.S. Naval War College, “lack of understanding of naval theory” makes it difficult for the navy to develop “sound doctrine”, and as a result, to determine force requirements. For example, Vego notes that the navy has an ingrained offensive mindset, which contributes to neglect of the defensive elements of naval combat such as mine warfare and protecting maritime trade. At the strategic level, this conditions a preoccupation with sea control (offensive), as opposed to sea denial (defensive). However, per Vego, it is not inconceivable, especially as capable competitors emerge, that the U.S. Navy might be put on the defensive and forced to shift its focus from sea control to sea denial. For example, if “Russia and China combined in the Western Pacific,” the U.S. Navy would probably be on the defensive, a position it has not occupied since the early days (1941–1942) of the Pacific War against Japan. The challenge is that the navy faces different, conceivable scenarios that could require it to implement sea control or sea denial strategies. This makes planning difficult, because, per Vego, “in thinking about what kind of ships you have, what number of ships you have is all based on whether you are going to conduct sea control or sea denial; what focus will be on protection of shipping versus attack on shipping.” Furthermore, the efficacy of naval strategic planning is hampered by “a lack of joint approach to warfare at sea” said Vego, citing a need for working with “the other services to help the navy carry out its missions.” A repeated issue raised by both panelists is the imbalance in naval force structure between large, highly capable surface combatants, and smaller, cheaper platforms. This is the result of a series of budgetary and planning choices made in the two decades following the Cold War's end. During this period, the “navy was satisfied to ride its Cold War inventory of ships and weapons down, always believing that it could turn the spigot back on in a crisis. It also believed that if it had limited dollars, it should strategically spend them on high-capability ships rather than maintaining the previous Cold War balance of small numbers of high-capability ships and a larger capacity of less capable ships” observed Jerry Hendrix, a retired U.S. Navy Captain and vice president with the Telemus Group, a national-security consultancy. With regards to surface warfare combatants, this approach fostered an emphasis on cruisers and destroyers, while frigates were eliminated entirely from the fleet. The drastic reduction in ship numbers is only part of the navy's current problem. According to Hendrix, the navy employs many of the same missiles (with the same ranges and lethality, albeit with improved targeting technology) that it has used for over three decades. Furthermore, Hendrix lamented that the retirement of longer-range carrier wing aircraft such as the F-14 Tomcat and S-3 Viking, has, since 1988, slashed the “average unrefueled range of the air wing . . . from 900 miles to just under 500 nautical miles.” The static range of the navy's standoff munitions and reduced carrier wing range is particularly detrimental in the current strategic context. China and Russia have, notes Hendrix, “invested in a new generation of anti-access, air-denial weapons that have sought to push the U.S. and its allies farther from their shores, establishing sea-control from land, and redefining territorial sovereignty over the seas.” This combined with the limited ability of U.S. munitions and aircraft to strike targets in potential adversaries' homelands, means that in the event of a naval conflict with China or Russia, the United States will face tremendous difficulty projecting conventional firepower ashore into the enemy's homeland. As a result, the navy could be forced to fight a bloody battle at sea in order to get within range of its enemies (the closest historical analogy would be World War II in the Pacific where the United States fought ferociously to acquire territory from which its long-range bombers could strike the Japanese homeland). China and Russia have been so successful at creating anti-access, area denial bubbles that it has forced the U.S. Navy to alter how it thinks about the nature of sea warfare. According to Hendrix, naval strategic thought has shifted from focusing on “power projection and sea control to an ephemeral concept called ‘distributed lethality,' which roughly equates to a long campaign of attrition at sea rather than short power projection campaigns that had characterized modern strategic planning.” A major issue in re-orienting the force around distributed lethality, which calls for dispersing combat firepower across a host of platforms, is the shortage of ships in the navy. As Vego observes, the current “battle force is unbalanced” lacking “less capable, less costly platforms.” Hendrix too, calls for a “series of investments” that re-establish a “high-low mix in our day-to-day force with an emphasis on the new frigate to [undertake the role] to preserve the peace presence, and submarines to provide penetrating, high-end power projection.” The current unbalanced force structure could put the navy at a disadvantage in a conflict with China or Russia. “The need for smaller ships is always shown in any major conflict. That does not change. If you have to protect maritime trade for example, you need smaller ships, you need frigates and corvettes,” said Vego. Unfortunately, he observed, due to the potentially, short, intense, contracted nature of modern naval warfare, the United States will probably lack the luxury, which it enjoyed in World War II, of having time to retool its industrial base to build up an armada of smaller combatants. In addition to building frigates again (Hendrix calls for upping the current U.S. inventory from zero to between fifty to seventy hulls) and scaling up submarine production, the navy should be investing in “unmanned aerial, surface, and subsurface platforms” that can enhance the range and accuracy of naval weaponry. Finally, the navy requires a new generation of weapons that have “increased range, speed and lethality” and to ensure that surface warfare ships are capable of mounting these platforms. In recent years, increasing the fleet to 355 ships has become something of a totemic target for American navalists, who argue that the failure to make the right investments will result in the diminution, or even, elimination, of American naval preeminence. While 355 ships is no panacea, a move in that direction stemming from an increase both in ship numbers, and from restoring a more balanced mix between high and lower end surface combatants across the fleet, would certainly constitute a move in the right direction. As leading proponents of American sea power, such as former Virginia congressman Randy Forbes, have emphasizedrepeatedly, the purpose of naval preeminence is not ultimately to wage war, but to ensure the free flow of trade and commerce, safeguard the rule of law across the maritime commons, and most critically, to preserve peace through strength. John S. Van Oudenaren is assistant director at the Center for the National Interest. Previously, he was a program officer at the Asia Society Policy Institute and a research assistant at the U.S. National Defense University. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-navy-unbalanced-its-time-fix-it-55447