Major defence contractor lobbying feds on procurement opportunities

On the same subject

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  March 24, 2020 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Canadian military will no longer release info about numbers of personnel affected by COVID-19

  “This is information we don't want opposing forces to have as we're relatively a small force,” a spokesman said Friday. DAVID PUGLIESE, OTTAWA CITIZEN The Canadian Forces won't be releasing information on the numbers of military personnel who have tested positive for the novel coronavirus because of security reasons. The military had previously confirmed three cases, including one involving a reservist who had been on a personal trip to Spain. The Canadian Forces had also stated that no personnel on overseas operations had tested positive for COVID-19. But going forward, the Canadian military will no longer be confirming any other cases publicly because of operational security, Department of National Defence spokesman Dan Le Bouthillier said Friday. “This is information we don't want opposing forces to have as we're relatively a small force,” he added. Chief of the Defence Staff Gen. Jon Vance has warned that the “integrity” of some military units could be threatened by personnel contracting coronavirus. The Canadian Forces could be eventually called upon by the federal government to provide support if the pandemic worsens. The U.S. military has confirmed that more than 50 of its personnel have tested positive for COVID-19. The Canadian Forces has also ordered approximately 2000 COVID-19 test kits for military clinics across the country, Le Bouthillier said. The kits are expected in the next week. “The needs of deployed units for COVID-19 testing will be considered in the distribution plan,” he added. “In the interim, we are working in collaboration with our partners, through a combination of integral, allied and host nation supports, to ensure deployed CAF members are provided with the best available health care.” COVID-19 has also caused the cancellation of Exercise Maple Resolve, the army's main training event for the year, as well as a naval exercise off the coast of Africa. HMCS Glace Bay and HMCS Shawinigan, which were to take part in that naval training, are now returning to Halifax. The ships are expected to arrive in mid-April. Troops from Canadian Forces Base Petawawa who were supposed to take part in Exercise Maple Resolve will now be training in smaller groups, Le Bouthillier said. “We will mitigate this lost training opportunity through the aggressive pursuit of smaller training events and professional development,” he noted. “We will return to our normal managed readiness cycle when conditions permit.” “The current situation with COVID-19 is unprecedented and prudence demands we adopt a posture that allows us to best support civilian authorities should the need arise while safe-guarding the well-being of our personnel and the broader Canadian public,” Le Bouthillier stated. Maple Resolve was scheduled to take place from May 11 to 24 at Wainwright Alta. It normally involves approximately 5000 personnel and 1450 pieces of major equipment. The exercise gives participating personnel the opportunity to train with a wide variety of weapons, simulation technology, armoured fighting vehicles, and aircraft in order to hone their skills in a realistic setting, short of an actual operation. Another exercise that was to have taken place before Maple Resolve has also been cancelled. That training event, scheduled to run from April 5 to May 5, would have involved around 2,000 troops. Military personnel from the U.S., United Kingdom, France and Brazil had been scheduled to take part in Maple Resolve. Many other nations are also cancelling military exercises because of COVID-19. In addition, the Canadian Forces is also limiting public access to its recruiting centres across the country. The military is continuing to recruit but has asked new applicants to begin their recruiting process using its website. “For those applicants currently going through the recruitment process, please note that all face-to-face interactions will be restricted and by appointment only,” the Canadian Forces added in a social media post. “If contacted for an appointment, please note that we are implementing additional protective protocols including increased questions specific to individual circumstances in order to ensure the continued health of our recruiting teams.” https://ottawacitizen.com/news/national/defence-watch/canadian-military-will-no-longer-release-info-about-numbers-of-personnel-affected-by-covid-19

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  November 19, 2019 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Military Procurement: What the New Cabinet Can Learn From Australia

  By Lee Harding The Liberal government announced its new cabinet on Nov. 20—the very same day the Canadian Global Affairs Institute hosted its annual event on the topic of military procurement. Given that an overhaul in that area is sorely needed, Canada can learn a lot from Australia, Ian Mack wrote in a recent report for the institute. Mack is uniquely qualified to make that assessment, having worked with both governments in their process of awarding contracts for military sea vessels. While he believes both countries had an acceptable result, his report, titled “Another Way to Buy Frigates,” suggests the Canadian approach adds work, balloons costs, and delays success. The re-elected Trudeau government should take note. The Liberals proposed significant changes to Canada's defence procurement system during the election campaign, but it will be a tall order to change this process. The land down under is isolated in a less secure part of the globe, without a nearby superpower like the United States to watch its back. So if Australia is far more diligent about defence than Canada, it might be due to necessity. The last time Canada had a proper and comprehensive white paper on defence was 1994. Australia has had three in the 21st century. Australia's effectiveness goes from the top down, something Canada knows nothing of. As Mack explains, “Canada, uniquely among its allies, has multiple government departments and central agencies significantly involved in the minutiae of its major military procurement projects.” These include Defence; Treasury Board; Finance; Public Services and Procurement; Justice; Innovation, Science and Economic Development—and even more. Meanwhile in Australia, the minister of defence is responsible for all aspects of navy shipbuilding. This includes setting operational and technical requirements, securing funds, developing a plan to benefit domestic industries, and satisfying the legal aspects of procurement. Each country had a project management office of roughly the same size, but Canada's was, frankly, less competent. Australia's office had many knowledgeable contractors working alongside the Department of Defence, whereas Canada's team had many from the public service and armed forces with “little or no applicable experience or knowledge,” according to Mack. “In Canada, significant effort was expended on regular reporting to layers of senior governance,” he says in the report. But it was paperwork and process for its own sake, and impractical in its effect. “Despite the onerous reporting demands, only a few key decisions were rendered and rarely in a timely manner. The opposite was the case in Australia.” In seemingly every aspect of development, Canada made things rigid, complicated, and fragmented, while Australia made them flexible, cohesive, and collaborative. Canada made stand-alone contracts for each sequence of the process. Australia worked with contractors to establish “end-to-end accountability.” Canada's initial request for proposal included hundreds of technical requirements that bidders had to prove. Australia had few mandatory requirements, but worked alongside bidders to explore their respective proposed solutions. In Canada, the intellectual property, liabilities, and insurance requirements were debated at length and only decided hours before the request for proposal was made. Hundreds of criteria got a numerical score, and the sum of all scores won the bid. Canada was “preoccupied” about a public appearance of fairness and avoiding lawsuits. (Nevertheless, the controversy over former Vice-Admiral Mark Norman and complaints from Irving Shipbuilding over the bid for a navy supply vessel shows it failed at this.) Shipbuilders bidding in Australia were confident of a fair system without any of those things. The department did not announce its evaluation criteria, nor was the evaluation report the only factor. Instead, the department stated its objectives and worked collaboratively with three potential bidders in their respective approaches. In Mack's words, this left “the competition to be more about assessing apples, oranges, and bananas” than about tallying up numerical scores. Mack says he could not make the Canadian system work like Australia's because the procurement, request for proposals, and resulting contracts were done outside of the Department of National Defence. At the time, he was “simply unaware of the intricacies of the Australian approach” because he hadn't yet been exposed to it. Regardless, he had already surmised that Canadian bureaucrats “did not want changes to their tried and true ways of doing business” and clung to “adherence to prescriptive and traditional methodologies.” https://www.theepochtimes.com/military-procurement-what-the-new-cabinet-can-learn-from-australia_3150065.html

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  December 3, 2023 | Local, Aerospace

  South Korea launches first spy satellite after North Korea does same

  Since last year, North Korea has conducted about 100 ballistic missile tests, part of efforts to modernize weapons targeting South Korea and the U.S.