Lockheed construit sa relation avec l’industrie belge

On the same subject

• 

  January 27, 2024 | International, Naval

  ‘Back to the ‘80s’ as French navy prepares for new threats

  The French navy includes two or three days of drills under “back to the ‘80s” conditions whenever it deploys its carrier strike group.

• 

  January 28, 2021 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Opinion: Are Flat Pentagon Budgets The New Up Or The New Down?

  Byron Callan January 26, 2021 The Biden administration probably will not unveil an outyear spending plan for the Defense Department until the late spring of 2021 at the earliest, and more likely it will come out with the fiscal 2023 budget submission in February 2022. The administration should, however, be commenting on some of the bigger changes as different reviews and assessments are completed before that budget plan is released. Consensus now is that Pentagon spending will be flat at least in the first term of the Biden administration, though analysts are not clear on what this means. Will the Pentagon's budget be unchanged from the level that was appropriated for fiscal 2021? Will it be flat in inflation-adjusted terms, which means it would rise at 2% annually in current dollars? Or will the budget be flat in current dollars, which would entail a roughly 2% annual decline in Pentagon purchasing power, assuming inflation is 2%? Each would have different outcomes for the spending that would flow to contractors. Defense optimists could argue that flat budgets historically have not lasted too long. There were periods in which budgets were flat over 2-4 years annually in the late 1950s, early 1960s and mid-1990s. Flat periods, however, were succeeded by growth—usually because of a crisis or a new military contingency. No one has a working crystal ball that will show what is ahead for the 2020s. There are reasons to believe, however, that the 2020s are different. Although interest rates are at historic lows, the ratio of U.S. debt to GDP is at levels seen during World War II. There is pent-up demand for non-defense discretionary spending—notably for infrastructure, and an aging U.S. population will likely demand more health care and other “social” spending. “Endless wars” in the Middle East may temper Americans' willingness to engage in new overseas missions, unless a major provocation occurs that is akin to the 9/11 attacks. The flat budget period could last longer than the post-World War II era suggests. Is “flat” good for contractors? That depends. Markets started to digest that U.S. defense spending was flattening in 2020. The largest U.S. defense contractors underperformed the S&P 500 in 2020 and are doing so again in the first days of 2021. The initial market verdict is that flat is not good. The assessment might be true, but it is going to depend on two factors: how the Pentagon reallocates resources in a flat budget environment and how contractors change their strategies and portfolios. A flat top-line defense budget could be positive if the Pentagon can successfully cut military personnel and operations and maintenance (O&M) spending. Both are tall tasks. Winding down operations in Afghanistan and the Middle East is not going to free up significant troop numbers, and in any event, both are apt to exert gravitational pulls from which the U.S. cannot easily break free. Global security risks are not going to allow the sort of force structure cuts that occurred at the end of the Cold War and the Korean and Vietnam wars. Readiness and training also will remain a priority in this environment. Spending on military personnel and O&M that keeps pace with inflation may place even more pressure on investment. If those accounts grow at 1-2% annually, in a flat top-line period, that will put even more pressure on investment. Still, while there has been no indication so far, it is conceivable that the Biden administration will propose reductions in force structure and will attack O&M costs with more vigor. It will take 1-2 years at least to realize those savings, but they could be applied to modernize a smaller military. For a number of years, the Pentagon attempted to retire older “legacy” weapon systems in order to fund new investment, but Congress has stymied efforts to muster out older Navy cruisers, aircraft carrier refueling systems and aircraft such as the A-10. The Defense Department could renew this line of attack, but it may be reminded of the old adage that repeating the same thing over and over and expecting a different outcome is the definition of insanity. The Pentagon will have to change its approach here by offering more incentives to states and districts that could be affected by the elimination of squadrons or units, and it has to be more forceful in confronting contractors whose net interests are harmed by such moves. A final thought is how contractors' strategies might change. In 2020 and so far in 2021, outperformance was evidenced by small-to-midsize contractors that appeared better aligned with Pentagon investment priorities in artificial intelligence, autonomy, supply chain resilience and low-cost weapons. The largest contractors may be able to unlock value in a flat top-line environment if they can spin off segments that are stagnant or declining. Sprawling program portfolios are apt to perform more in line with market growth rates, and that is not a recipe for superior performance. https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/budget-policy-operations/opinion-are-flat-pentagon-budgets-new-or-new-down

• 

  July 8, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Turkey Is Deploying Lots Of Air Defense Systems In Syria And Libya

  In recent months, Turkey has deployed an array of air defense missile systems in Syria and Libya to deter and defend against air and drone attacks mounted by its rivals in these war zones. On February 27, airstrikes killed 34 Turkish soldiers deployed in Syria's northwest province of Idlib during clashes with pro-regime forces. It was the largest single loss of Turkish troops in a single incident in years. Turkey responded ferociously, launching Operation Spring Shield. It used its formidable armed drones to devastate Syrian ground forces and armor. Turkish Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon jet fighters shot down three Syrian warplanes with long-range AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles without having to leave Turkish airspace. A Russian-brokered ceasefire ended the clashes in early March. However, Turkey quickly realized the importance of air defenses in the volatile region. It had already requested the U.S. deploy MIM-104 Patriot missiles on its southern border shortly after launching Operation Spring Shield. Aside from its controversial purchase of S-400 air defenses from Russia, which it hasn't activated yet, Turkey's air defenses are mostly short- and medium-range and relatively antiquated. The U.S. did not deploy any Patriots in Turkey this year. The only NATO country to deploy a Patriot battery in Turkey this year is Spain. Ankara has since deployed its own MIM-23 air defense missiles in Idlib. However, that system is much older and much less effective than the PAC-3 Patriot. The Turkish press also cited an official in early March saying that Turkey would deploy its domestically-built Hisar low-altitude air defense missiles to Idlib. However, it's unclear if any of these missiles were actually fielded. It's also been claimed that Turkey even deployed old Soviet-era S-200 air defense systems, acquired from Ukraine, in northern Idlib. This claim is unverified and also highly unlikely. The Turkish military is also becoming more deeply involved in the civil war in Libya where it's supporting the U.N.-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), based in the capital Tripoli that controls the west, against General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA), based in Benghazi that controls the east. In Libya, Turkey has deployed a formidable array of air defense missiles in the country's west and has also made significant headway in establishing an “air defense bubble” around Tripoli. As The Washington Institute for Near East Policy observed: “The combination of medium-range U.S.-made MIM-23 Hawk missile systems, Hisar short-range SAMs, and Korkut antiaircraft guns created a layered defense over critical infrastructure and reduced the threat to GNA drone ground stations and launch operations.” “This protection, combined with an increase in Turkish operators and equipment, allowed Libyan government forces to increase the number and effectiveness of their drone operations,” the report added. While formidable, Turkish air defenses in western Libya have their limitations. Turkish military analyst Metin Gurcan, recently pointed out that “medium- and high-altitude air defense is vital for air dominance in the Sirte-al-Jufra axis, but this remains a problem for Turkey, though low-altitude air defense has been secured through the deployment of the Hisar air defense systems in Libya.” Gurcan went on to note that Turkey's far more advanced high-altitude S-400s haven't been activated and the prospect of transferring those sophisticated missiles – which could establish a game-changing Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) zone over wherever they are deployed – to Libya “is out of question.” Turkey also deployed two MIM-23 Hawk batteries at al-Watiya airbase. They did not seem to have hindered an airstrike on July 3 carried out by unidentified warplanes, although they may not yet have been fully set up when that strike occurred. The jets that attacked al-Watiya – which was captured from the LNA by a Turkish-backed GNA offensive in May that broke the LNA siege on Tripoli and enabled the GNA to go on the offensive – likely belonged to a foreign air force supporting the LNA. One Turkish official said the jets were Dassault Mirage fighters. If true, then they were most likely Mirage 2000 jets belonging to the United Arab Emirates, a key backer of Haftar. The Arab Weekly, on the other hand, cited informed sources who claim the aircraft were Dassault Rafale jets, not Mirages. This would limit the attackers to either Egypt or France, both of which possess those multirole fighter jets and both of which support the LNA. The LNA wants to prevent Turkey from establishing a base in al-Watiya and further solidify its growing presence in the country by creating more air defense bubbles across the west. Turkey wants to help the GNA push on its offensive and capture the strategically-important city of Sirte and the al-Jufra region, including the eponymous airbase where Russia delivered MiG-29 and Su-24 warplanes in May. What happens next in Libya is anyone's guess. Turkey is likely to retain its presence and increase the number of its air defense missiles in Libya, especially if the GNA advances further eastward in the coming weeks. https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2020/07/07/turkey-is-deploying-lots-of-air-defense-systems-in-syria-and-libya/#727c5aae5555