Le Pentagone accorde une modification de contrat de 7,8 milliards de dollars pour les F-35 à Lockheed Martin | Zonebourse

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  October 25, 2019 | International, Naval

  Florence Parly, ministre des Armées, lance la fabrication d’une série de nouvelles frégates à Lorient

  L'événement s'est déroulé en présence du délégué général pour l'armement, Joël Barre, du chef d'état-major de la marine nationale, l'amiral Christophe Prazuck, de son homologue grec, le vice-amiral Nikolaos Tsounis , et de Hervé Guillou, PDG de Naval Group. Les FDI sont des navires de combat de la classe 4 500 tonnes avec un équipage de 125 marins. Aptes à intervenir dans tous les domaines de la lutte en haute mer, elles intègrent de nombreuses innovations, parmi lesquelles le premier radar à panneaux fixes entièrement numérique au monde. Le programme FDI a été lancé en 2017. La loi de programmation militaire 2019-2025 prévoit que les deux premières FDI seront livrées à la Marine nationale d'ici à 2025. Cinq FDI seront en service au sein de la Marinenationale en 2030. Sur proposition de l'amiral Prazuck, la ministre des Armées a décidé que l'une d'entre elles portera le nom de l'amiral Louzeau, décédé récemment. Le programme FDI participe au renouvellement et au renforcement de la flotte de surface de la Marine nationale, conformément aux conclusions de la revue stratégique de 2017 qui prévoit 15 frégates de premier rang en 2030 : 8 frégates multi-missions (FREMM), 2 frégates de défense aérienne (FDA Horizon) et 5 frégates de défense et d'intervention (FDI). La première FDI a été commandée en avril 2017 par la Direction générale de l'armement (DGA) à l'industriel Naval Group associé à Thales et MBDA. Sa livraison à la Marine nationale est prévue fin 2023. Complémentaires des FREMM, les FDI sont des navires de combat d'un déplacement de la classe 4 500 tonnes, polyvalents, endurants, embarquant un équipage de 125 marins. Les FDI intègrent dès leur conception un concentré d'innovations : Elles peuvent intervenir dans tous les domaines de la lutte en haute mer: antinavire, antiaérien, anti-sous-marin. Aptes au contrôle de vastes espaces aéro-maritimes, elles sont aussi capables de se défendre contre les menaces asymétriques et de projeter un détachement des forces spéciales. Pour évoluer dans un monde de plus en plus digital, les FDI disposent nativement d'une protection contre la menace cyber et de deux centres numériques (Data Centers) qui regroupent les capacités de calculs de tous les senseurs et armements du bord. Parmi les équipements de nouvelle génération installés à bord on trouve un radar à quatre panneaux fixes permettant une veille permanente sur 360 degrés, fixés sur une m'ture unique, et des lanceurs capables de tirer plusieurs types de missiles antiaériens en fonction de la menace. Ce sont également les premières frégates à pouvoir embarquer simultanément un hélicoptère et un drone de la classe 700 kg. Conçues pour être évolutives, les FDI évolueront en standards de manière à s'adapter à l'évolution de la menace. Depuis la notification du marché par la DGA au printemps 2017, chaque jalon technique a été franchi dans les temps que ce soit pour la conception du navire ou pour le développement des innovations embarquées, gr'ce à un travail collaboratif en plateau réunissant la DGA, l'industrie et la Marine. *L'amiral Pierre Alexis Ronarc'h, connu pour avoir été à la tête de la « brigade Ronarc'h », brigade de fusiliers marins ayant participé à la défense héroïque de Dixmude en 1914, commandant supérieur de la Marine pour la zone des armées du Nord de 1916 à 1918, un des pères de la lutte anti-sous-marine, puis chef d'état-major de la Marine entre 1919 et 1920. https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dga/actualite/florence-parly-ministre-des-armees-lance-la-fabrication-d-une-serie-de-nouvelles-fregates-a-lorient

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  April 29, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security, Other Defence

  Here’s how much global military spending rose in 2018

  By: Aaron Mehta WASHINGTON — Overall military expenditures rose 2.6 percent between 2017 and 2018, to hit a total of $1.82 trillion dollars, according to new research from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The total from 2018 is 5.4 percent higher than 2009, and represents a 76 percent increase over 1998, a 20-year period. Sixty percent of global military spending came from five countries: The United States ($649 billion), China ($250 billion), Saudi Arabia ($67.6 billion), India ($66.5 billion) and France ($63.8 billion). Russia ($61.4 billion) and the United Kingdom ($50 billion) were the other two countries to spend $50 billion or more on defense. However, there are ups and downs among the biggest spenders. While the U.S. (4.6 percent, the first overall growth since 2010), China (5 percent) and India (3.1 percent) increased their respective military spending year over year, Saudi Arabia cut its spending by 6.5 percent, France by 1.4 percent and Russia by 3.5 percent. And overall defense spending per gross domestic product fell to 2.1 percent in 2018, representing $239 per global citizen, a 0.1 percent decrease over one year and a 0.5 percent decrease over 10 years. Notably, Russia ranked outside the top five for the first time since 2006. China, meanwhile, increased its military spending for the 24th consecutive year, and its spending is almost 10 times higher than it was in 1994; however, researchers warn that Chinese growth may slow in the coming year. “The annual rate of growth of China's military spending has slowed steadily since it reached a post-2009 high of 9.3 percent in 2013. The growth of 5.0 percent in 2018 was the lowest annual increase since 1995,” the authors note. “China has followed a policy of linking growth in military spending with economic growth. With its economic growth slowing in 2018 to the lowest level in 28 years, slower rates of growth in the coming years can be expected if China continues to follow this policy.” SIPRI, which is widely considered to be the authority on military expenditures and exports, having gathered such data for decades. Other key developments, as noted by the researchers: Military spending in South America rose by 3.1 percent in 2018. This was mainly due to the increase in Brazilian spending (by 5.1 percent), the second increase in as many years. Military expenditure in Africa fell by 8.4 percent in 2018, the fourth consecutive annual decrease since the peak in spending in 2014. There were major decreases in spending by Algeria (–6.1 percent), Angola (–18 percent) and Sudan (–49 percent). Military spending by states in the Middle East, for which data is available, fell by 1.9 percent in 2018. Total military expenditure by all 29 NATO members was $963 billion in 2018, which accounted for 53 percent of world spending. Military spending in Turkey increased by 24 percent in 2018 to $19 billion, the highest annual percentage increase among the world's top 15 military spenders. Six of the 10 countries with the highest military burden (military spending as a proportion of GDP) in the world in 2018 are in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia (8.8 percent of GDP), Oman (8.2 percent), Kuwait (5.1 percent), Lebanon (5 percent), Jordan (4.7 percent) and Israel (4.3 percent). https://www.defensenews.com/global/2019/04/28/heres-how-much-global-military-spending-rose-in-2018

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  August 21, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval

  The Navy's Fighter Shortage Is Finally, Slowly Improving

  By Kyle Mizokami The U.S. Navy's horrible fighter availability rate is gradually improving thanks to increased funding for fighter maintenance. At one point in 2017, just one in three F/A-18 Super Hornet fighters was available, a number that's increased to nearly half of all fighters. The problem is in large part due to past budget shortfalls and delayed introduction of the F-35 fighter jet. The U.S. Navy has 546 F/A-18E and F/A-18F Super Hornet fighters, larger, beefier, slightly stealthier versions of the original F/A-18 Hornet. Aircraft readiness rates, or the percentage of aircraft ready for deployment, should typically be north of seventy five percent, depending on type of aircraft, the complexity of the aircraft systems, and the age of the fleet. In 2017, the Navy's Super Hornet fleet hovered around 30 percent readiness, a shockingly low number the service blamed on minimal maintenance budgets and non-stop operations. The Navy struggled to place flight-capable aircraft with squadrons deploying on aircraft carriers. On the outside things looked fairly normal, as carriers went to sea with flight decks filled with Super Hornets. Behind the scenes however non-deployed squadrons suffered, acting as spare parts donors for deployment-bound ships. This cascading effect had negative implications for stateside squadrons and pilot training. According to DefenseNews, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer cited increased maintenance budgets over the past two years as a major part of the turnaround, allowing the service to fund repairs and spare parts. The service also streamlined maintenance processes, avoiding duplication and increasing efficiency. The maintenance crisis was caused by several problems. The high demand for strike fighters, particularly for combat operations against the Islamic State, increased the amount of wear and tear on the Super Hornet fleet. Super Hornets also act as aerial refueling tankers, increasing flight hours and wear and tear on the platform. Meanwhile the Navy struggled to operate within the budget mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act that trimmed federal spending. Making matters worse, so-called "continuing resolutions" passed during times of budget bickering to keep government going were an inefficient means of spending money and played havoc with the Pentagon's budget. Another problem that indirectly cause the crisis: a delay in the introduction of the U.S. Navy's version of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35C. The F-35C, meant to replace older F/A-18C Hornet fighters, is now at least three years behind schedule. As the chart above illustrates, the Navy originally expected the F-35C to be initial operations capable—when the first Navy squadron is at least partially combat-capable—in late 2015. That date has gradually slipped to late 2018 or early 2019. On the outside things looked fairly normal, as carriers went to sea with flight decks filled with Super Hornets. Behind the scenes however non-deployed squadrons suffered, acting as spare parts donors for deployment-bound ships. This cascading effect had negative implications for stateside squadrons and pilot training. According to DefenseNews, Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer cited increased maintenance budgets over the past two years as a major part of the turnaround, allowing the service to fund repairs and spare parts. The service also streamlined maintenance processes, avoiding duplication and increasing efficiency. The maintenance crisis was caused by several problems. The high demand for strike fighters, particularly for combat operations against the Islamic State, increased the amount of wear and tear on the Super Hornet fleet. Super Hornets also act as aerial refueling tankers, increasing flight hours and wear and tear on the platform. Meanwhile the Navy struggled to operate within the budget mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act that trimmed federal spending. Making matters worse, so-called "continuing resolutions" passed during times of budget bickering to keep government going were an inefficient means of spending money and played havoc with the Pentagon's budget. Another problem that indirectly cause the crisis: a delay in the introduction of the U.S. Navy's version of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35C. The F-35C, meant to replace older F/A-18C Hornet fighters, is now at least three years behind schedule. As the chart above illustrates, the Navy originally expected the F-35C to be initial operations capable—when the first Navy squadron is at least partially combat-capable—in late 2015. That date has gradually slipped to late 2018 or early 2019. As a result of this delay, the Navy was forced to extend the lives of five squadrons of older -C model Hornets while it waited for the F-35C. That work added to the burden of Navy maintenance units already working to keep Super Hornets flying. In addition to the Navy's maintenance work, Boeing is set to take 40 to 50 Super Hornets a year and upgrade them to the new Block III configuration. DefenseNews says this will also bring the jets in the worst shape back to flying condition. In the long term F-35C production should ease the burden on the Super Hornet community, as the fifth generation fighter will eventually equip half of the strike fighter squadrons deployed on U.S. Navy carriers. The executive branch's 2019 defense budget also plans for an additional 110 Super Hornets over five years. Finally, the Navy plans to acquire a small fleet of MQ-25 Stingray unmanned aerial refueling aircraft to take over tanking duties from the overworked strike fighters. Full article: https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a22778556/us-navy-fighter-shortage-progress