June 12, 2024 | International, Land
KNDS is actively working to demonstrate the maturity of ASCALON® 140mm gun and its ammunition
https://www.epicos.com/article/841562/knds-rests-ascalonr-gun-are-going-further
March 3, 2021 | International, Naval
ARLINGTON, Va. — The U.S. Navy has awarded Austal USA a contract to build the 15th Spear-head-class expeditionary fast transport (EPF). The Naval Sea Systems Command awarded Austal a $235 million “undefinitized” contract action modification on Feb. 26, 2021, for the detailed...
February 3, 2020 | International, Aerospace
By: Richard Matlock Over the past five years, missile threats have evolved far more rapidly than conventional wisdom had predicted. Best known is North Korea's accelerated development and testing of sophisticated, road-mobile ballistic missiles. But the U.S. National Defense Strategy requires renewed focus on greater powers. China has adopted an anti-access strategy consisting of new offensive missiles, operational tactics and fortifications in the South China Sea. Russia, too, has developed highly maneuverable hypersonic missiles specifically designed to defeat today's defenses. Grappling with these sobering realities demands change. The 2019 Missile Defense Review called for a comprehensive approach to countering regional missiles of all kinds and from whatever source, as well as the increasingly complex intercontinental ballistic missiles from rogue states. But programs and budgets have not yet aligned with the policy. The upcoming defense budget submission presents an important opportunity to address these new and complex challenges. The Missile Defense Agency's current top three goals are sustaining the existing force, increasing capacity and capability, and addressing more advanced threats. The first two are necessary but insufficient. The third goal must be elevated to adapt U.S. missile defense efforts to the geopolitical and technological realities of our time. For the last decade, less than 2 percent of MDA's annual funding has been dedicated to developing advanced technology, during which time our adversaries have begun outpacing us. As President Donald Trump said last January, we “cannot simply build more of the same, or make incremental improvements.” Adapting our missile defense architecture will require rebalance, discipline and difficult choices. Realigning resources to develop advanced technologies and operational concepts means investing less in single-purpose systems incapable against the broader threat. It also requires we accept and manage new kinds of risk. Indeed, meeting the advanced threat may, in the short term, require accepting some strategic risk with North Korea. The beginning of this rebalance requires more distributed, elevated and survivable sensors capable of tracking advanced threats. The most important component here is a proliferated, globally persistent space layer in low-Earth orbit consisting of both passive and active sensors. MDA may be the missile defense-centric organization best suited to developing and integrating this capability into the architecture, but there is considerable opportunity for partnering with others to move out smartly, as recently urged by Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Hyten. Partnerships with the Space Development Agency and the Air Force can be supplemented by collaborative efforts with commercial space companies. We need not do this all at once. Space assets could be fielded in phases, with numbers, capability (sensors, interceptors, lasers), missions, and orbits evolving over time. MDA demonstrated a similar paradigm with the Delta experiments, Miniature Sensor Technology Integration series and the Near Field Infrared Experiment in the past. Meanwhile, other sensors could alleviate the cost of building new, billion-dollar radar on islands in the Pacific Ocean — efforts which continue to suffer delay. Adding infrared tracking sensors to high-altitude drones, for instance, has already been demonstrated experimentally in the Indo-Pacific theater with modified Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles. These need not be dedicated assets. Sensor pod kits could be stored in theater to be deployed aboard Reapers or other platforms during heightened tensions. We must revisit boost-phase defenses and directed energy. In 2010, the Airborne Laser program demonstrated that lasers could destroy missiles in the boost phase, but deploying toxic chemical lasers aboard large commercial aircraft was fiscally and operationally untenable. Fortunately, considerable operational promise exists with recently developed solid-state lasers (the cost of which is around $2 of electricity per shot). We must move these systems out of the laboratory and build and test operational prototypes. Near-term actions to better manage risk against the rogue-state ballistic missile threat must not overtake the pursuit of these larger goals. Although the Pentagon is currently considering a 10-year, $12 billion program for a next-generation interceptor, nearer-term, cheaper options are available. Replacing each existing kill vehicle on the Ground-Based Interceptors with several smaller kill vehicles would multiply each interceptor's effectiveness dramatically. The U.S. has been developing this technology since 2006, including a “hover” flight test in 2009. Affordable solutions like this must be found. Missile defense cannot do it all. Denying, degrading and destroying enemy missile systems prior to launch must be part of the mix. But left-of-launch activities can be expensive and difficult, and reliance on a cyber magic wand carries risk, too. We need to broaden our approach to attack all parts of our adversary's kill chain. The National Defense Strategy urges that we contend with the world as it is, not as we might wish it to be — or as it previously was. To meet the threats of today and tomorrow, we must radically transform our U.S. missile defenses. It falls to the 2021 budget to do so. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/01/31/the-drive-to-advance-missile-defense-is-there-but-there-must-be-funding/
December 17, 2018 | International, Aerospace
By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — A next-generation air superiority jet for the U.S. Air Force, known by the service as Penetrating Counter Air, could cost about $300 million in 2018 dollars per plane, the Congressional Budget Office states in a new study. At that price, PCA would be more than three times that of the average F-35A jet, which is set at about $94 million to capture both the expense of early production lots and the decline in cost as the production rate increases, according the report, which predicts the cost of replacing the Air Force's aircraft inventory from now until 2050. This sum, while not an official cost estimate from the Pentagon, represents the first time a government entity has weighed in on the potential price tag for PCA. The CBO estimates the Air Force will need 414 PCA aircraft to replace existing F-15C/Ds and F-22s, the Air Force's current fighters geared toward air-to-air combat. It also surmises that the first aircraft will enter service in 2030, based on the service's stated desire to begin fielding PCA around that time frame. The reason for the whopping price tag? Part of it comes down to the cost of new technology. “The PCA aircraft would probably have a greater range and payload, as well as improved stealth and sensor capabilities, than today's F-22; those characteristics would help it operate in the presence of the high-end air defenses that DoD believes China, Russia, and other potential adversaries may have in the future,” the CBO states. The other reason comes down to history. The Air Force doesn't have a great track record when it comes to producing stealth aircraft at the low costs initially envisioned by leadership. Both the B-2 and F-22 programs were truncated in part due to the high price per plane — which in turn contributed to the production rate never accelerating to the point where unit costs begin to decrease. The early years of the F-35 program were also marred by a series of cost overruns that eventually prompted the Pentagon to restructure it. “Containing costs for the PCA aircraft may be similarly difficult,” the report states. The Air Force has said little about PCA since the release of the Air Superiority 2030 flight plan in 2016, which stated a need for a new fighter jet that would be networked into a family of systems of other air, space, cyber and electronic warfare technologies. “The replacement may not be a single platform,” Gen. Dave Goldfein, the Air Force's chief of staff, told Defense News earlier this year. “It may be two or three different kinds of capabilities and systems. And so as we look at air superiority in the future, ensuring that we're advancing to stay ahead of the adversary, we're looking at all those options.” Although Air Force leadership won't say exactly what it's doing to develop PCA or when a new jet may be coming online, it's clearly making investments. In the fiscal 2019 budget, the service requested $504 million for “next-generation air dominance,” its portfolio of future fighter technologies and weapons. The Air Force expects to ramp up funding to $1.4 billion in FY20, hitting a high in FY22 with a projected $3.1 billion in spending. According to the CBO's analysis, Air Force procurement of new aircraft could peak at about $26 billion in 2033, as the service buys both the F-35 and PCA. Those two fighters, together with the B-21 bomber, are set to be the largest drivers of cost as procurement reaches its height in the mid-2030s. “Although the Air Force could probably modify both retirement plans and replacement schedules to smooth out the 2033 peak, the average annual costs of procuring new aircraft would still be higher than in the recent past: $15 billion in the 2020s, $23 billion in the 2030s, and $15 billion in the 2040s,” the report states. Dealing with an upcoming bow wave CBO's estimates included 35 platforms that will be replacing legacy systems, with six programs making up more than 85 percent of the projected procurement costs cited throughout the report: the F-35, PCA, the KC-46A, the B-21, the C-130J cargo plane as well as the yet-unannounced C-17 replacement. The report envisions a future where the Air Force is allowed to retire all of its legacy fighter and attack aircraft — the A-10, the F-15, the F-16 and even the F-22 — in favor of three aircraft: the F-35, PCA and a light attack aircraft configured to take on low-threat missions. The Air Force has yet to decide whether to buy a light-attack aircraft or how extensive its purchase may be, although the service is expected to put out a request for proposals by the end of the month. “Funding for new fighter aircraft makes up about half of the total projected costs of procuring new aircraft,” the CBO states, with the F-35 set to be the most expensive program through the 2020s until PCA takes its place in the early 2030s. The Air Force could decrease costs in a couple of ways, although all of them come with significant drawbacks. For one, it could extend the lives of its legacy fighter and attack aircraft, and delay programs like PCA. However, the CBO notes that “obtaining replacement parts can be both difficult and expensive, and a refurbished fleet may not provide as many available and mission-capable aircraft as a new fleet.” If the service wants to increase the availability of its inventory without paying the high price associated with developing a new stealth fighter, it could retire its legacy F-15s and F-16s and buy new ones. That option is probably more expensive, but would result in aircraft that are more reliable. The Air Force could also defer the PCA program while allowing some of its legacy aircraft to be retired, the CBO posits. However, Air Force leadership contend that the service is already too small, with Secretary Heather Wilson arguing that the number of operational squadrons needs to increase from 312 to 386 — a goal that necessitates buying more aircraft. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/12/14/budget-watchdogs-warn-of-expensive-price-tag-for-next-air-force-fighter/