Feds should stand up for Canadian aerospace and defence industries with CMMA procurement

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  May 9, 2019 | International, Aerospace, Naval

  The US military’s logistical train is slowly snaking toward China

  By: Kyle Rempfer A failed Venezuela coup, Iranian missiles and Russian hybrid warfare make for interesting side stories, but the center of military policy is increasingly gravitating toward U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, according to U.S. government officials. If anything, the challenge is how to quicken the pace because the logistical tail of warfare takes time to put in place and because the Pacific theater is one of the most difficult environments for moving supplies. “If there's a challenge, it's moving enough focus and enough direction from everything else we're doing towards the Pacific," said Joel Szabat, the assistant secretary for international affairs within the Department of Transportation. Szabat, whose department deals with U.S. military logistics in wartime, said the center of gravity has shifted so much toward the Asia-Pacific region that even a major crisis on par with 9/11 won't derail the change. “I don't see, in the near term at least, things that would have us pull back,” Szabat said. But he warned that new lines of effort must be implemented if that shift is to be sustainable during a war with the region's biggest player — China. The baggage train challenge The Department of Transportation is the coordinating arm for civilian airlift and sealift capacity in peacetime and wartime. But the sealift fleet is old and in need of recapitalization. The size of the fleet is also too small to support the long logistical train required in a Pacific-based conflict, and the ships that do exist are poorly positioned across the operating area and would lack armed escorts in the event of a conflict, according to Szabat. “For small or moderate-scale warfare exercises, it's adequate," Szabat said. “For the maximum deployment that our military is built for ... it is not adequate to move and sustain. We don't have the mariners. We don't have the U.S. flagged Merchant Marine that we need for that purpose.” The Marine Corps represents a large component of the military force that would need to be delivered in the event of a war. “There are 40,000 Marines at any one time that are moving around the world, and 23,000 of those are west of the international date line, so they're in the Pacific,” said Gayle Von Eckartsberg, policy director at Headquarters Marine Corps' Pacific Division. “And then you have your Marines in Hawaii, and that brings that number to over 30,000. And the rest are distributed across other places in the world.” "The Marine Corps' natural environment is the Asia-Pacific region, and I think we're uniquely capable of operating effectively [there],” she added. The Corps is posturing to act as the inside force of the region, as it practices littoral operations in contested environments and expeditionary base operations from deep in the Pacific. “We're today engaged in aggressive war gaming, training and exercises to test out and refine these concepts,” Von Eckartsberg said. “We're going to hug the enemy and we're going to be there first, operate at this level below armed conflict.” But there remains an “enduring gap in lift capability," Von Eckartsberg acknowledged. No armed escorts The Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration is responsible for managing much of the Navy's sealift capability that would be responsible for delivering Marines, soldiers, sailors, airmen and their equipment into a war. If there was a conflict with China, Szabat said, there is a high degree of confidence that the Navy, with the use of pre-positioned vessels, will be able to move the initial salvo of personnel and equipment quickly into the area of operations. “But sustaining a battle means getting supplies and getting the remainder of your forces from [the continental United States] to wherever the battle is,” Szabat said, adding that the fleet for this isn't currently in place. After the initial war push, 90 percent of logistics would move via civilian vessels and aircraft, according to Szabat. Those civilian assets will need armed escorts at sea, but the Navy has no dedicated escort vessels for the Merchant Marine fleet, he added. “I used to serve in the European theater. That was a challenge. But crossing the Pacific is four times as difficult in terms of logistics and supplies," Szabat said. “We are not able to move our logistics according to war plans unless we have cooperation from our allies.” That presents a unique challenge altogether. The biggest change to U.S. policy in the region has been an increased reliance on allies to accomplish missions and long-term goals, and one would assume that the goal is for them to pick up some of the logistical burden. “But by statute, and national security presidential directive, we are supposed to be able to provide sealift with U.S. ships and U.S. mariners without relying on allies," Szabat said. "We can't do that unless we have the escorts.” However, allies and partnerships still play an important role. China's growth is followed closely by that of U.S. ally India. U.S. Pacific Command understands the power dynamics between India and China, which is part of why it renamed itself U.S. Indo-Pacific Command last year, according to Deputy Assistant Secretary Walter Douglas, who leads the U.S. State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. “Bringing the countries of South Asia in is absolutely crucial to what we do,” he said. “India is very much a partner in everything that we do and is central in the Indo-Pacific as we move forward." Allies, while unable to provide sealift under current war plans, remain crucial to U.S. efforts to counter China. The U.S. is helping train naval forces for countries like Vietnam; promising to defend the territorial integrity of countries like Japan and the Philippines; performing freedom of navigation patrols through contested waterways; and courting new allies like the small Pacific island nations in Oceania. “I expect that to continue," Douglas said. "I never want to promise resources until they're delivered, but I think the indications are pretty good that we're going to be doing more.” https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/05/08/the-us-militarys-logistical-train-is-slowly-snaking-toward-china

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  April 30, 2024 | International, Security

  Millions of Malicious 'Imageless' Containers Planted on Docker Hub Over 5 Years

  Millions of malicious "imageless" containers have been planted on Docker Hub over the past 5 years in multiple cybercriminal campaigns.

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  May 3, 2019 | International, Naval

  The U.S. Navy Is Unbalanced. It's Time to Fix It.

  by John S. Van Oudenaren From a shortage of ships to munitions and carrier-based fighters which lack range, the U.S. Navy is ill-equipped to contend with a new era of great-power conflict. In the decades after the Cold War, the U.S. Navy absorbed sustained budget cuts resulting in large force reductions. The total size of the fleet dwindled from nearly 600 active ships in 1987 to around 285 today. During this period, naval planners focused their substantial, yet shrinking, budgetary resources on large, costly, high-end platforms such as aircraft carriers at the expense of smaller surface warfare combatants such as frigates. This approach perhaps suited the range of global expeditionary missions that the navy was called upon to support in the 1990s (e.g. Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo), a time when the United States faced no proximate military competitors. However, its lack of platforms currently leaves the sea service in a parlous state as it faces intensifying major power competition from China and Russia. At a recent Center for the National Interest event, two leading authorities on naval strategy, operations and force structure, explained how the navy can take steps to create a more balanced force that will adequately prepare the fleet for a new era of great power naval competition. According to Milan Vego, Professor of Operations at the U.S. Naval War College, “lack of understanding of naval theory” makes it difficult for the navy to develop “sound doctrine”, and as a result, to determine force requirements. For example, Vego notes that the navy has an ingrained offensive mindset, which contributes to neglect of the defensive elements of naval combat such as mine warfare and protecting maritime trade. At the strategic level, this conditions a preoccupation with sea control (offensive), as opposed to sea denial (defensive). However, per Vego, it is not inconceivable, especially as capable competitors emerge, that the U.S. Navy might be put on the defensive and forced to shift its focus from sea control to sea denial. For example, if “Russia and China combined in the Western Pacific,” the U.S. Navy would probably be on the defensive, a position it has not occupied since the early days (1941–1942) of the Pacific War against Japan. The challenge is that the navy faces different, conceivable scenarios that could require it to implement sea control or sea denial strategies. This makes planning difficult, because, per Vego, “in thinking about what kind of ships you have, what number of ships you have is all based on whether you are going to conduct sea control or sea denial; what focus will be on protection of shipping versus attack on shipping.” Furthermore, the efficacy of naval strategic planning is hampered by “a lack of joint approach to warfare at sea” said Vego, citing a need for working with “the other services to help the navy carry out its missions.” A repeated issue raised by both panelists is the imbalance in naval force structure between large, highly capable surface combatants, and smaller, cheaper platforms. This is the result of a series of budgetary and planning choices made in the two decades following the Cold War's end. During this period, the “navy was satisfied to ride its Cold War inventory of ships and weapons down, always believing that it could turn the spigot back on in a crisis. It also believed that if it had limited dollars, it should strategically spend them on high-capability ships rather than maintaining the previous Cold War balance of small numbers of high-capability ships and a larger capacity of less capable ships” observed Jerry Hendrix, a retired U.S. Navy Captain and vice president with the Telemus Group, a national-security consultancy. With regards to surface warfare combatants, this approach fostered an emphasis on cruisers and destroyers, while frigates were eliminated entirely from the fleet. The drastic reduction in ship numbers is only part of the navy's current problem. According to Hendrix, the navy employs many of the same missiles (with the same ranges and lethality, albeit with improved targeting technology) that it has used for over three decades. Furthermore, Hendrix lamented that the retirement of longer-range carrier wing aircraft such as the F-14 Tomcat and S-3 Viking, has, since 1988, slashed the “average unrefueled range of the air wing . . . from 900 miles to just under 500 nautical miles.” The static range of the navy's standoff munitions and reduced carrier wing range is particularly detrimental in the current strategic context. China and Russia have, notes Hendrix, “invested in a new generation of anti-access, air-denial weapons that have sought to push the U.S. and its allies farther from their shores, establishing sea-control from land, and redefining territorial sovereignty over the seas.” This combined with the limited ability of U.S. munitions and aircraft to strike targets in potential adversaries' homelands, means that in the event of a naval conflict with China or Russia, the United States will face tremendous difficulty projecting conventional firepower ashore into the enemy's homeland. As a result, the navy could be forced to fight a bloody battle at sea in order to get within range of its enemies (the closest historical analogy would be World War II in the Pacific where the United States fought ferociously to acquire territory from which its long-range bombers could strike the Japanese homeland). China and Russia have been so successful at creating anti-access, area denial bubbles that it has forced the U.S. Navy to alter how it thinks about the nature of sea warfare. According to Hendrix, naval strategic thought has shifted from focusing on “power projection and sea control to an ephemeral concept called ‘distributed lethality,' which roughly equates to a long campaign of attrition at sea rather than short power projection campaigns that had characterized modern strategic planning.” A major issue in re-orienting the force around distributed lethality, which calls for dispersing combat firepower across a host of platforms, is the shortage of ships in the navy. As Vego observes, the current “battle force is unbalanced” lacking “less capable, less costly platforms.” Hendrix too, calls for a “series of investments” that re-establish a “high-low mix in our day-to-day force with an emphasis on the new frigate to [undertake the role] to preserve the peace presence, and submarines to provide penetrating, high-end power projection.” The current unbalanced force structure could put the navy at a disadvantage in a conflict with China or Russia. “The need for smaller ships is always shown in any major conflict. That does not change. If you have to protect maritime trade for example, you need smaller ships, you need frigates and corvettes,” said Vego. Unfortunately, he observed, due to the potentially, short, intense, contracted nature of modern naval warfare, the United States will probably lack the luxury, which it enjoyed in World War II, of having time to retool its industrial base to build up an armada of smaller combatants. In addition to building frigates again (Hendrix calls for upping the current U.S. inventory from zero to between fifty to seventy hulls) and scaling up submarine production, the navy should be investing in “unmanned aerial, surface, and subsurface platforms” that can enhance the range and accuracy of naval weaponry. Finally, the navy requires a new generation of weapons that have “increased range, speed and lethality” and to ensure that surface warfare ships are capable of mounting these platforms. In recent years, increasing the fleet to 355 ships has become something of a totemic target for American navalists, who argue that the failure to make the right investments will result in the diminution, or even, elimination, of American naval preeminence. While 355 ships is no panacea, a move in that direction stemming from an increase both in ship numbers, and from restoring a more balanced mix between high and lower end surface combatants across the fleet, would certainly constitute a move in the right direction. As leading proponents of American sea power, such as former Virginia congressman Randy Forbes, have emphasizedrepeatedly, the purpose of naval preeminence is not ultimately to wage war, but to ensure the free flow of trade and commerce, safeguard the rule of law across the maritime commons, and most critically, to preserve peace through strength. John S. Van Oudenaren is assistant director at the Center for the National Interest. Previously, he was a program officer at the Asia Society Policy Institute and a research assistant at the U.S. National Defense University. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-navy-unbalanced-its-time-fix-it-55447