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July 14, 2020 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

COMMENTARY: Canada should follow Australia’s example in defence, foreign policy

By Matthew Fisher Special to Global News

Posted July 13, 2020 7:00 am

Updated July 13, 2020 11:32 am

Those who follow developments in the Indo-Pacific often claim that Australia has a far more robust security posture there than Canada because of geographic necessity.

The argument is that Australia must be especially vigilant because China is closer to it than Canada is to China. That perception may partially explain why Australia spends nearly twice as much per capita on defence as Canada does with little public discussion Down Under, let alone complaint.

But here's the thing. It depends where you start measuring from, of course, but the idea that Australia is physically closer to China is hokum. By the most obvious measure, Vancouver is 435 kilometres closer to Beijing (actual distance 8,508 km) than Beijing is to Sydney (8,943 km). By another measure, Sydney is only 1,000 km closer to Shanghai than Vancouver is.

Mind you, it must also be said that Australia is far more reliant than Canada on trade moving through the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Canada has many more shipping lanes to choose from.

Despite their similarly resource-oriented export economies, extreme climates and thin populations, there are startling differences in how Canada and Australia have tackled the security challenges of this century.

The standard line from Ottawa these days is that the Canadian government cannot possibly consider any other issue at the moment because the government's entire focus is on coronavirus. Yet faced with the same lethal disease and the horrendous economic fallout and deficits that it's triggered, Australia has found time to address alarming security concerns in the western Pacific.

Pushing the COVID-19 calamity aside for a moment, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison declared last week that because it was “a more dangerous world,” his country intended to increase defence spending by as much as 40 per cent, or a whopping $255 billion over the next decade. The money will pay for submarines, greatly improved cyber capabilities, and the establishment of military partnerships with smaller nations in the western Pacific, which are constantly bullied by China.

The Canadian government has often seemed paralyzed by the COVID-19 crisis and China's kidnappings of the Two Michaels and has been slow to react to the rapidly changing security environment. This includes not yet banning Huawei's G5 cellular network, as Australia has done. Nor has Ottawa indicated anything about the future of defence spending in an era when Canada's national debt has now ballooned to more than $1 trillion.

Faced with similar public health and economic challenges as Canada, Australian diplomats, generals and admirals have recently increased military and trade ties with India and are completing a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Japan that affords troops from the two countries legal protections and presupposes that they will collaborate more closely with each other in the future. Canberra also inked a deal with Tokyo last week to collaborate on war-fighting in the space domain and closer military ties.

Despite complaints of “gross interference” in China's internal affairs by Beijing's foreign ministry, Australia has also agreed to let about 14,000 visitors from Hong Kong extend their visas by five years and will offer an accelerated path for Chinese students to obtain Australian citizenship.

Perhaps most alarming from Beijing's point-of-view, the Quad intelligence group, which includes Australia, Japan, India and the U.S., could be about to add a military dimension. Navies from all four countries are expected to take part in joint naval exercises soon in the Indian Ocean.

Even before announcing a huge increase, defence spending was already at 1.9 per cent of Australia's GDP. The defence budget in Canada has remained static near 1 per cent for years, despite a pledge to NATO six years ago by former Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper, and repeated several times since by current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, that defence spending would soar to 2 per cent.

As it is, the Australian Defence Force spends about $15 billion a year more on defence than Canada does. That money buys a lot of kit and capability. The ADF has two new fleets of frontline fighter jets, the Super Hornet and the F-35, has attack helicopters and new maritime surveillance aircraft, is building a dozen French-designed attack submarines, and already has two huge, new assault ships and other new warships.

The Canadian Armed Forces are a very poor second to Australia with 40-year old CF-18 fighter jets and surveillance aircraft, 30-year old submarines that seldom put to sea and no assault ships or attack helicopters.

Aside from the red herring of geographic proximity, there are other factors that account for the stark differences in how Australia and Canada regard defence spending and the threat posed by an ascendant China. Many Canadians believe that the U.S. will protect them so do not see why should they pay more for their own defence.

Australia also has a longstanding all-party consensus that national security is a top priority. The two main political parties in Canada regard procurement as football to be kicked around. Neither of them has a declared foreign policy.

A cultural contrast is that Canadians have bought into a peacekeeping myth that has never really been true and is certainly not true today, while largely ignoring the wars its troops fought with great distinction in. Australians remain far more focused on recalling what their troops did in the Boer War, the two World Wars and Korea.

As well as finally working on some joint defence procurement projects, Canada and Australia should collaborate with each other and other western nations to prevent China from playing them off against each other in trade. For example, Canadian farmers recently grabbed Australia's share of the barley market after China banned Australian barley in response to Canberra's demand for an independent investigation into what Beijing knew and when about COVID-19. The Australians did the same in reverse when Canadian canola was banned by China.

Australia has moved to protect what it regards as its national interests by calling out China on human rights and spending much more on defence with little apparent fear as to how China might retaliate. Ottawa has not yet articulated what its interests are and acts as if it is scared at how China might respond if it takes a tougher stance.

What must be acknowledged in Ottawa is that the coronavirus has not caused China to abandon or even pause for a moment in pursuit of its goal of shaping a new world order not only in the western Pacific but wherever it can.

Australia is seriously upping its game in response. Canada remains silent.

Matthew Fisher is an international affairs columnist and foreign correspondent who has worked abroad for 35 years. You can follow him on Twitter at @mfisheroverseas

https://globalnews.ca/news/7161890/commentary-canada-should-follow-australias-example-in-defence-foreign-policy/

On the same subject

  • Canada’s defence industry positioning for life beyond COVID

    May 19, 2020 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    Canada’s defence industry positioning for life beyond COVID

    Posted on May 15, 2020 by Chris Thatcher In an appearance before the Commons finance committee on May 12, Parliamentary Budget Officer Yves Giroux suggested the federal deficit could vastly exceed the $252 billion he projected in mid-April as the government continues to unveil relief measures to help Canadians and businesses withstand the economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Most admit it is to too early to tell what that will mean for future military procurement and the government's 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE), but think tanks and defence analysts are nonetheless forecasting turbulence ahead. “Over the past generation, recessions and the fiscal consolidation that has followed them have had a seriously negative impact on DND's (Department of National Defence) budget,” wrote Eugene Lang, an adjunct professor with the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University and Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, in a recent policy paper for CGAI. “The future for SSE and its associated funding does not look bright. National defence probably has a year or two before the crunch hits.” Christyn Cianfarani is more cautious, but the president and chief executive officer of the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries (CADSI) admits the “rumblings are there that we are naturally concerned. Anybody who knows their history will tell you that when federal governments have been in these deficit spending situations — and this is the largest since the Second World War — they typically will be looking for strategies to reduce that deficit in the long term and DND unfortunately is a target.” But pulling government funding from a sector that has weathered the COVID-19 storm reasonably well might be “counterintuitive,” she suggested. The sector “right now is one of the few that is able to contribute to the economy under this persistent pandemic environment ... If there are multiple waves of [the virus], defence will be one sector that actually can shoulder the ups and downs and return to remote operations if we get to that stage again.” “Pure play” defence companies with few or no ties to commercial aerospace and the travel industry have managed the risks well, she said. Most have so far avoided the workforce layoffs and temporary downsizing experienced in other sectors, though manufacturing has slowed to meet provincial health regulations. Some, in fact, have been hiring. “Aside from some localized instances of companies facing real challenges, I would say the overall health [of the sector] is not too bad,” she said. Following what she called a “choppy” roll out of COVID-19 related policies that cut across federal and provincial jurisdictions, defence companies have adapted. Some have retooled shop floors and supply chains to manufacture critically needed personal protective equipment (PPE). Others with government contracts have continued operations where possible, albeit at reduced levels to match restrictions at government facilities. Maintenance on some platforms such as submarines has halted. The federal government has been “very conscious of trying to keep the contracts moving and executing,” said Cianfarani. “For example, if you are in the Canadian shipbuilding program, you are still pushing forward. If you are part of that supply chain, that hasn't seen any tangible change in the expectations.” Furthermore, many smaller defence firms specialize in software development and cyber security, both of which remain in demand as governments and companies try to protect expanded networks that now include thousands of employees working from home. The greatest concern for members has been liquidity, she said. CADSI encouraged the Business Development Bank of Canada and Export Development Canada to set aside their traditional risk aversion to the defence sector as they work with private sector lenders to support access to capital. The Business Credit Availability Program includes loans of up to $60 million and guarantees of up to $80 million. “We are quite proud of making a big intervention on that,” she said. “It was supposed to be open for all businesses and, irrespective of ... whether you characterize certain businesses as higher risk than others, it is an incentive program at the federal level.” An essential service At the outset of the COVID-19 economic slowdown, CADSI was a vocal advocate for defence as an essential service and greater harmonization of federal and provincial policies, including the rules that allow embedded contractors to access Canadian Armed Forces facilities. As provincial governments now begin easing restrictions and take the first tentative steps to open their economies, the association is calling for guidance and common standards, especially for the use of protective masks, gloves and other clothing. Of particular concern are the rules for employees of companies that embed on Wings and Bases to provide training, platform maintenance, healthcare and other services. “Who has to wear protective health equipment in a DND facility and is it the same [federal standard] across different provincial jurisdictions?” said Cianfarani. “If Ontario decides you have to stand two metres apart and Nova Scotia doesn't have the same policy,” it will create confusion. “If you need a particular face mask to go onto a DND base to perform maintenance on their aircraft, what does that look like? If it is so specialized, can you help us procure it? Or, if it is not so specialized, can you give us a specification so we can ensure that we do have it when we get spooled up to work?” Likewise, what PPE do companies need to provide when DND and other government employees visit their facilities? DND has released some information on “what they are starting to classify as health equipment versus PPE,” she said. “If companies have that information, they won't get to a DND facility and be surprised by a piece of PPE they need or a standard of working they need to accommodate.” Made in Canada The economic repercussions of the pandemic likely won't be felt in the defence sector for some time. Cianfarani noted that some companies have found opportunity in the crisis and will increase investments in automation, big data and other elements of Industry 4.0 as they position for the future. “This is probably an acceleration of something that has been going on slowly in the background for quite sometime,” she observed. But the pandemic has opened the door to a renewed discussion about a national defence industrial strategy, an issue CADSI has been flagging for over a decade. Buying made-in-Canada defence and security platforms and systems is more expensive, but the past months have demonstrated that protectionism is “alive and well.” President Donald Trump in early April asked U.S.-based 3M to stop supply N95 masks to Canada. “The crisis has certainly given us and the government, and Canadians in general, a renewed interest in the concept of having sovereign capability,” she said. Shifting to a procurement culture that accepts the risks and costs of Canadian-built equipment won't happen quickly or easily — it took about seven years to study and adopt recommendations for Canadian key industrial capabilities, she noted — “but I really do think if there is any opportunity, it is probably now, because the shock is still very prevalent in everyone's mind.” https://www.skiesmag.com/news/canada-defence-industry-covid

  • An In-Service Support Opportunity

    May 5, 2020 | Local, Naval

    An In-Service Support Opportunity

    POLICY PERSPECTIVE by Ian Mack CGAI Fellow May 2020 DOWNLOAD PDF Introduction In the autumn of 2019, the federal government announced on www.buyandsell.gc.ca the creation of a discussion group to address in-service support for the Canadian Surface Combatants (CSCs). The objective of Canada's procurement is 15 warships and the project is in the early stages of modifying the design of the U.K.'s global combat ship (GCS), with the first Canadian ship delivery anticipated after 2025. It must be assumed that this discussion group formation is the first stage of industry consultation. The City-class Type 26 frigate design has been in development for over a decade and the first of eight U.K. Type 26 warships is now in production. BAE Systems won the contract for the design and construction work in the U.K. This design has been available for export under the moniker global combat ship, and both Canada and Australia have selected it – the latter intending to build nine Hunter-class frigates. While neither the Australian nor Canadian designs have been completed, the combat systems will apparently be quite different across the three nations. However, it is unlikely that the major platform design will change dramatically. If this assumption is correct, it could mean that the major equipment of the platforms of some 32 hulls would likely be substantially the same. And from an in-service support point of view, this clearly creates an opportunity for international co-operation wherever it makes sense. TOP OF PAGE Conventional Wisdom – International Programs There are indications that three-nation government-to-government meetings have taken place to exchange views on creating a user group during the acquisition activity. It would make sense to also explore a related arrangement for in-service support. Clearly, with the potential to support 32 equipment sets across the marine platforms, there are many opportunities for economies of scale which could reduce the costs for all three nations – for common design modifications, for spares through bulk buys, for depot-level maintenance with many more units, for common training of potentially two to four times individual nations' throughput/requirements and the like. Such synergies could be worth hundreds of millions of dollars in savings over the extended lives of these warships. But international programs are not always easy to establish and implement, for many reasons. Nations are very different. They place different priorities on defence matters so the simple co-ordination required to achieve timely agreements can be difficult. Governments also change and a falling-out between two nations can lead to reversals. Nations lose some of their autonomy in decision-making when they join such programs, which can be a major deterrent. And governments have approaches to contracting which are very different, so negotiations on behalf of multiple governments can become bogged down in disagreements as to what approaches nations will support. In a perfect world, Canadian and Australian officials might have included an option during the design selection competitions so that such international in-service support programs could have been enabled by adopting a number of mandatory attributes. Unfortunately, the variability in schedules driving Canada's and Australia's frigate programs, as well as the built-in challenges of running competitions, conspired against any detailed discussion of “what ifs”. Work share (or industrial benefits) is important – to the domestic industries and thus to governments that always care about high-value jobs of the sort one finds in defence-related work. Without doubt, companies in all three countries are already seeing dollar signs and/or may already have won certain rights during the competitions for selection. Hence, Australia and Canada would be unlikely to sign up if all the work is being done, say, in Europe because the bar to agree to collaborate for other reasons could be so high as to be a non-starter. And there could be a number of other challenging commercial issues related to such things as intellectual property that could affect the shape of work-share agreements. There are also many tactical issues. The three time zones are not conducive to ongoing dialogue; one should never underestimate the challenges of working across large distances. As simple as international meeting arrangements should be, one of the partners will not be able to make it at the 11th hour more often than one expects – much less the travel budget involved and/or the cost of personnel liaison/exchange programs between the countries. Canada's Treasury Board is frequently much more involved in expensive and long-term international contracts, routinely requiring the tedious achievement of annual approvals. Nations and organizations have different laws/regulations and standards respectively which must be synchronized upfront and as changes occur. And so it goes. One can conclude that, aside from international information exchange forums, complex business arrangements involving both governments and industries in international programs detrimentally impact a nation's autonomy in decision-making and often offer fewer economic benefits. They are not for the faint of heart. TOP OF PAGE Conventional Wisdom – The Opportunity If one were to consider an international three-party in-service support (ISS) program for common platform major equipment/systems which would leverage BAE Systems as the common ISS agent, wouldn't there be potentially significant benefits to Canada? On the face of it, one must assume that the answer is “maybe” and this is worth exploring. In reviewing this option from a Canadian perspective, it would be appropriate to assess the ISS outcomes against the four sustainment pillars as now mandated for inclusion in the business cases driving Department of National Defence (DND) ISS procurement decisions: performance (operational readiness), value for money (price at or below the market rate), flexibility (adaptable and scalable to accommodate change in operational tempo and available budgets) and economic benefits (jobs and economic growth for Canadian companies). As mentioned earlier, international programs often render economic benefits much more elusive. However, in terms of performance, flexibility and value for money, there is no doubt that the potential exists to see maximum return on investment. In the case under review, BAE Systems is reported to be the second largest Western defence contractor and therefore should be able to wield the clout that comes with it when dealing with major equipment system manufacturers (OEMs). And of course, the supplemental impact must also be understood and catered to – BAE Systems can choose to be difficult in any business arrangement without significantly affecting its bottom line. With respect to contractual response to major equipment and systems performance (which contributes to technical readiness), a client with a large work share is more likely to get attention for initiatives to maintain and improve performance than will smaller clients. This would be important in this case because the three navies operate in significantly different environments around the world with the concomitant variations in some performance requirements. As well an OEMs' failure to address the concerns of three allied navies could result in being blacklisted by BAE Systems when procuring equipment/systems for new ship designs, while timely and effective contractual response could lead to future opportunities. Low performance achievement could also deliver a much more significant blow to an OEM's reputation if more than one navy is impacted detrimentally – witness the Boeing scenario with the 737 Max. This can be important, as select foreign OEMs have essentially ignored Canada before when Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) equipment has suffered performance shortfalls. From a performance perspective, an international ISS program with BAE Systems at the centre could be a plus. In terms of providing adaptability and scalability, the presence of a number of clients can allow reductions in the demand for various services by one client (e.g., facing a budget downturn) to be picked up by another on an interim basis. Alternatively, the need for a surge in support by one navy (e.g., facing major unforeseen operations) may be easier to address by diverting some degree of effort from other clients. Only in the case where all clients are experiencing a similar variation in demand will such flexibility be jeopardized; but such a challenge can equally accrue whether in an international support program or not. Therefore, on balance, there can be greater flexibility in traditional circumstances for an international program, but there are limits. Value for money should be a strong argument for an international collaboration, if only because of economies of scale when considering, in this case, a fleet of 32 ship sets instead of eight, nine or 15 – and that is as-fitted, with spares increasing the overall numbers of common units of equipment. As an ISS client agent with much more maintenance, repair work and spares demand for an OEM, there would be greater interest in keeping multiple navies happy with the prices paid and the requirement over time to see support costs reduced. International programs frequently benefit by pooling spare units and ownership by OEMs, such that the number required (and hence the costs) are lower and risks to availability can be somewhat mitigated. Instead of each nation addressing emerging technical issues separately, sharing the costs should make it cheaper for all. So too are there potential benefits for OEM infrastructure, as top-notch physical plant and software assurance against cyber-attack are much more affordable to all concerned. Hence, the conventional wisdom is that such an international in-service support program should offer a better return on investment in terms of greater performance at lower costs, as well as the possibility for greater scalability to adapt to variations in demand for services. But as mentioned earlier, this comes typically with the potential for fewer economic benefits for Canada – clearly an important consideration. TOP OF PAGE Unique Considerations of the Case at Hand In exploring a possible international program for the U.K., Australia and Canada to leverage their selection of the same basic platform design and designer (BAE Systems), it is useful to accept the conventional wisdom but explore additional factors that should be weighed in a sustainment business case. What follows is a potpourri of additional considerations worthy of study. It is useful to address what could be included in the term “in-service support”. Based on common equipments and systems, it could include design agent services, maintenance, spares, training and documentation within an integrated data environment, to name the most important few. Nations could also select from among these options for hybrid arrangements. Near the top of the list for CSC is the fact that it is under the umbrella of the National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS). The strategy specifically prevents the NSS shipyards from providing a single day of in-service support once they are delivered to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) unless such shipyards win those rights through a competitive procurement process. This is unique – a departure from past approaches in Canadian government shipbuilding – and quite frankly considered to be imprudent. In the very early days of a new class of complex ships, the prime contractor (often the build shipyard and/or designer) usually provides as a minimum a number of years of ISS. The shipbuilder typically has the best expert knowledge that exists for the initial years of services, along with the relationships and a degree of leverage with the major equipment/systems' OEMs. Normally, an in-service support bridging contract is awarded concurrent with the ship construction contract. Often, the prime contractor is then awarded a long-term ISS contract. There is a story as to why ship maintenance support for vessels delivered under NSS departed from the norm (there is always a story), and confirmation should be obtained as soon as possible that the earlier decision is reversible, to allow the business case to include all options. Related to the former paragraph, Canada has relatively recently awarded a contract to Thales for support services for the Arctic offshore patrol ships and the joint support ships. Although these ships have yet to be turned over to the RCN, one would expect that even at this early stage many lessons have been learned which should be taken into account when conducting the business case, such as whether the knowledge was/is available to support first-day-under-power with the RCN. BAE Systems is at the heart of the potential international program. From the internet alone, one observes that, among other classes of Royal Navy (RN) ships, BAE Systems manages design, equipment maintenance and ship modifications for the RN's Type 45 destroyers. It therefore would be important to ask the RN how well their approach is working and to explore the details of the existing contract, infrastructure arrangements, innovations introduced and performance to date. This would be a bellwether to the likelihood that the RN would be at least interested in an international support program for their Type 26 frigates in terms of capability and customer-focused cultural flexibility at BAE Systems. And if they have misgivings and/or if Australia is not interested, the international program option may be eliminated from the business case. One would expect that all three nations would support the generation of their own business cases and compare conclusions before making decisions. Earlier, I offered the assumption that the platform systems are likely to employ the same major equipment systems, but that the combat systems are unlikely to be common. But to overstate the obvious, warships are not like layer cakes – they do not have separate top and bottom halves. The three naval variants being procured are exceptionally integrated and complex super-systems. Therefore, in-service support must address both sets of major equipment/systems – platform and combat systems. BAE Systems is the overall combat systems integrator for the Type 26 frigates destined for the RN and an obvious choice to deliver in-service support. Lockheed Martin Canada is the equivalent for the CSC. And BAE Systems Australia is partnered with Lockheed Martin Australia and Saab Australia to deliver the combat system integration for the Hunter-class frigates. Therefore, an international – almost-whole-of-ship – ISS solution might even offer significant economic benefits to all three nations. This could create challenges based on the proverbial “too many eggs in one basket”, and certain safeguards would be required. It is worthwhile to note an anomaly in Canada's case regarding the construction of these warships. BAE Systems is responsible for building all of the ships in question in the U.K. and Australia, but Irving Shipbuilding is responsible under NSS to construct the CSCs. One should never underestimate the shipbuilder's knowledge when dealing with a complex seagoing vessel, and a sole platform-related focus on BAE Systems alone would, in the Canadian case, be a deficit in any international program. Irving Shipbuilding's contribution should therefore be considered in the business case for Canada. Should the business case be strong, there is an argument that a directed contract to an Irving-BAE partnership for in-country platform in-service support would make sense and be in the public's interest. As mentioned earlier, although this was prohibited under the original terms of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, it could be waived in this instance for those warships that will be the backbone of Canada's maritime defence for 30 years. It would provide significant economic benefits as well. There is clearly the significant potential of operational value to such an arrangement, in addition to strong performance supporting day-to-day readiness. The three nations are on three different continents, and all three navies pursue global deployments. The availability of full ISS in or within the reach of Canada, the U.K. and Australia provides significant benefits to all three navies over their 30-year lives when breakdowns occur far from home port. The business case should take into account the fact that the U.K. may export the global combat ship design more broadly in the world. If an international consortium delivering in-service support were in place, it could become an important selling feature for potential buyers of the GCS. This undoubtedly could enhance value for money, flexibility and performance for the three plank owner nations. And from a Canadian perspective, as the nation with the largest stake in the game at 15 warships, we should be able to significantly influence the contractual arrangements with current and future parties to the international program. A typical and expensive part of the life cycle of warships is midlife conversions. Combat systems in particular require modernization to employ new technologies designed to address new threats. These are extremely complex endeavours. Once again, the degree of value for money through life could be even greater, depending on the degree of commonality of the equipment upgrade options selected. And the very fact that Canada would see opportunities worth considering as fully developed options would in itself offer potential cost benefits that would otherwise be unlikely to occur. As part of the business case analysis, it would be useful to study the commercial marine industry examples of international in-service support. Large ship operators and OEMs are very experienced in working across national and client boundaries to deliver economical services. Any business case should capture the pros and cons more broadly in the commercial business sector as well. There could be a benefit as part of an international program in terms of the people required. As the proverb goes, many hands make light work. Since the launch of what was then termed the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, Canada's marine HR challenges within government have become more pronounced. An international program could lighten the load while expanding the experience base for involved government and naval personnel in tackling the demands of supporting as complex a platform as the CSC. It would be important to understand the challenges surrounding the governance in the broadest sense. Though not at all unique, governance would likely need to be structured to address three separate functions – the integrated supplier-client engagement, the clients' government-to-government activity and industry-to-industry supplier co-ordination. While not uncommon when contracting for goods and services for complex systems, the international aspects, length of the arrangement and the ever-increasing volatility in the marketplace are noteworthy. With such complexity and the constantly changing stakeholders involved over 30 years, the mechanisms for a strong and appropriate relationship alignment would be critical to long-term success. When dealing with a high degree of complexity in an international program such as this, the business case needs to assess the likelihood that the collaboration can be created and maintained in terms of the critical enabling relationships. In the factors highlighted here and as with any business case, the importance of comparing the international program solution with what seems to be the more recent and typical Canadian in-service solution resulting from a competitive procurement cannot be underestimated. Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships and Joint Support Ships In-Service Support (AJISS) is the latest Canadian example and must be carefully analyzed even at this early stage to determine the prognosis for achieving the desired outcomes. Again, engagement with allies to assess their experience with single-nation support scenarios would be important in establishing the right comparators to enable coherent business case recommendations. It would be prudent to consider the long view as part of the business case – including such things as the likelihood that nations would retire their warships at different times or even opt out of the international ISS program long before end-of life. While much can change, an early appreciation and understanding of various scenarios and the related risks would be important. As a final point, such complicated business case assessments are never easy. After assembling the assumption set and the criteria analysis, and after negotiating “les grandes lignes” of a contractual agreement, it would be important to avoid the common pitfall of allowing one or two pros or cons to dominate the decision-making. Too often, the complexity that defies the “kiss principle” leads to rejection of otherwise optimum solutions. But at the end of the day, one must accept that it will be a judgment call. TOP OF PAGE Concluding Material Under the five-year-old Defence Procurement Strategy, Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) is responsible for leading the industry engagement that launches defence procurement processes. More recently, the ISS procurement strategies have been based on the results of the sustainment initiative business case led by DND. At virtually every opportunity over the past decade, I have emphasized the importance of managing expectations. In every discussion with industry, it behooves those leading the CSC in-service support exploration activity to include the possibility of an international program solution. To eliminate that option without study would be both shortsighted and inexcusable. Also, failing to repeatedly ensure that all stakeholders are aware of the potential for such an outcome would lack transparency and be disingenuous. When the RCN's readiness to deliver operational capability is at stake, along with billions of Canadian taxpayers' dollars for CSC in-service support over 30 years, it matters. And an international in-service support program for the new frigates of Canada, the U.K. and Australia is an important option worth considering. TOP OF PAGE About the Author After a 38 year career with the Royal Canadian Navy, Ian Mack (Rear-Admiral Retired) served for a decade (2007-2017) as the Director-General in the Department of National Defence responsible for the conception, shaping and support of the launch and subsequent implementation of the National Shipbuilding Strategy, and for guiding the DND project managers for the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships, the Joint Support Ships and the Canadian Surface Combatants. He also had responsibility for four vehicle projects for the Canadian Army until 2015. Since leaving the government, he has offered his shipbuilding and project management perspectives internationally. Ian is a longstanding Fellow of the International Centre for Complex Project Management. He also is allied with Strategic Relationships Solutions Inc. He is married to Alex, and has three grown children. With few accommodations for impaired mobility, he remains active. Upon retirement, he founded a small business, Xi Complexity Consulting Inc. in Ottawa Canada. TOP OF PAGE Canadian Global Affairs Institute The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada's international relations in all its forms including (in partnership with the University of Calgary's School of Public Policy), trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to inform Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada's population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States), social development, or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests. The Institute was created to bridge the gap between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically Canadians have tended to look abroad out of a search for markets because Canada depends heavily on foreign trade. In the modern post-Cold War world, however, global security and stability have become the bedrocks of global commerce and the free movement of people, goods and ideas across international boundaries. Canada has striven to open the world since the 1930s and was a driving factor behind the adoption of the main structures which underpin globalization such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and emerging free trade networks connecting dozens of international economies. The Canadian Global Affairs Institute recognizes Canada's contribution to a globalized world and aims to inform Canadians about Canada's role in that process and the connection between globalization and security. In all its activities the Institute is a charitable, non-partisan, non-advocacy organization that provides a platform for a variety of viewpoints. It is supported financially by the contributions of individuals, foundations, and corporations. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Institute publications and programs are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Institute staff, fellows, directors, advisors or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to, or collaborate with, the Institute. https://www.cgai.ca/an_in_service_support_opportunity

  • Hacker Community to Take on DARPA Hardware Defenses at DEF CON 2019

    August 5, 2019 | Local, Security

    Hacker Community to Take on DARPA Hardware Defenses at DEF CON 2019

    This month, DARPA will bring a demonstration version of a secure voting ballot box equipped with hardware defenses in development on the System Security Integrated Through Hardware and Firmware (SSITH) program to the DEF CON 2019 Voting Machine Hacking Village (Voting Village). The SSITH program is developing methodologies and design tools that enable the use of hardware advances to protect systems against software exploitation of hardware vulnerabilities. To evaluate progress on the program, DARPA is incorporating the secure processors researchers are developing into a secure voting ballot box and turning the system loose for public assessment by thousands of hackers and DEF CON community members. Many of today's hardware defenses cover very specific instances or vulnerabilities, leaving much open to attack or compromise. Instead of tackling individual instances, SSITH researchers are building defenses that address classes of vulnerabilities. In particular, SSITH is tackling seven vulnerabilities classes identified by the NIST Common Weakness Enumeration Specification (CWE), which span exploitation of permissions and privilege in the system architectures, memory errors, information leakage, and code injection. “There are a whole set of cyber vulnerabilities that happen in electronic systems that are at their core due to hardware vulnerabilities – or vulnerabilities that hardware could block,” said Dr. Linton Salmon, the program manager leading SSITH. “Current efforts to provide electronic security largely rely on robust software development and integration, utilizing an endless cycle of developing and deploying patches to the software firewall without addressing the underlying hardware vulnerability. The basic concept around SSITH is to make hardware a more significant participant in cybersecurity, rather than relegating system security only to software.” Under the SSITH program, researchers are exploring a number of different design approaches that go well beyond patching. These include using metadata tagging to detect unauthorized system access; employing formal methods to reason about integrated circuit systems and guarantee the accuracy of security characteristics; and combining hardware performance counters (HPCs) with machine learning to detect attacks and establish protective fences within the hardware. One team from the University of Michigan is developing a novel security approach that changes the unspecified semantics of a system every 50 milliseconds. Currently, attackers continuously probe a system to locate these undefined sections and, over time, are able to create a system map to identify possible hacks. By changing the construct every 50 milliseconds, attackers do not have enough time to find those weaknesses or develop an accurate representation of the system as a whole. To evaluate the hardware security concepts in development on the SSITH program, DARPA – working with Galois – is pursuing a voting system evaluation effort to provide a demonstration system that facilitates open challenges. The program elected to use a voting system as its demonstration platform to provide researchers with an accessible application that can be evaluated in an open forum. Further, the topic of election system security has become an increasingly critical area of concern for the hacker and security community, as well as the United States more broadly. “DARPA focuses on creating technologies to enhance national defense, and election system security falls within that remit. Eroding trust in the election process is a threat to the very fabric of our democracy,” noted Salmon. While protecting democracy is a critical national defense issue, SSITH is not trying to solve all issues with election system security nor is it working to provide a specific solution to use during elections. “We expect the voting booth demonstrator to provide tools, concepts, and ideas that the election enterprise can use to increase security, however, our true aim is to improve security for all electronic systems. This includes election equipment, but also defense systems, commercial devices, and beyond,” said Salmon. During DEF CON 2019, the SSITH voting system demonstrator will consist of a set of RISC-V processors that the research teams will modify to include their SSITH security features. These processors will be mounted on field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) and incorporated into a secure ballot box. Hackers will have access to the system via an Ethernet port as well as a USB port, through which they can load software or other attacks to challenge the SSITH hardware. Since SSITH's research is still in the early stages, only two prototype versions of the 15 processors in development will be available for evaluation. “At this year's Voting Village, hackers may find issues with the processors and quite frankly we would consider that a success. We want to be transparent about the technologies we are creating and find any problems in these venues before the technology is placed in another venue where a compromise could be more dangerous,” said Salmon. Following DEF CON 2019, the voting system evaluation effort will go on a university roadshow where additional cybersecurity experts will have an opportunity to further analyze and hack the technology. In 2020, DARPA plans to return to DEF CON with an entire voting system, which will incorporate fixes to the issues discovered during the previous year's evaluation efforts. The 2020 demonstrator will use the STAR-Vote system architecture, which is a documented, open source architecture that includes a system of microprocessors for the voting booth, ballot box, and other components. It also includes a verifiable paper ballot, providing both digital and physical representations of the votes cast within the booth. “While the 2020 demonstrator will provide a better representation of the full attack surface, the exercise will not result in a deployable voting system. To aid in the advancement of secure election equipment as well as electronic systems more broadly, the hardware design approaches and techniques developed during the SSITH program will be made available to the community as open-source items,” concluded Salmon. https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2019-08-01

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