Canadian CH-147F Chinook crashed while executing turn shortly after clearing tree line: DND - Skies Mag

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  November 25, 2019 | Local, Aerospace

  CAE upgrades trainers at 15 Wing Moose Jaw

  Ahead of the Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (I/ITSEC), the world's largest military training and simulation event to be held next week in Orlando, Fla., CAE announced it has completed major upgrades to the CT-156 Harvard (T-6) and CT-155 Hawk flight training devices (FTDs) used as part of the NATO Flying Training in Canada (NFTC) program at 15 Wing Moose Jaw, Sask. The upgrades were done on three CT-156 Harvard FTDs and one CT-155 Hawk FTD that are used extensively for ground-based training elements of the NFTC pilot training syllabus. CAE replaced computing hardware on the simulators, added new visual display systems, updated the instructor operator stations, and upgraded the image generators to the latest CAE Medallion series. CAE will now begin upgrading the CT-155 Hawk FTD located at 4 Wing Cold Lake, Alta., which is used as part of phase IV fighter lead-in training under the NFTC program. “The ground-based training system and use of simulators has become increasingly important for military pilot training,” said France Hébert, vice-president and general manager, CAE Canada. “With the upgraded flight training devices used for NATO Flying Training in Canada, we will now be able to deliver ground-based training that is more immersive and realistic, which in turn contributes to the more effective and efficient delivery of live flying training.” The effectiveness of the upgraded CT-156 Harvard and CT-155 Hawk FTDs is already benefiting student pilots. The new visual systems provide more realism in the synthetic environment and have enabled training tasks such as formation flying and tactical scenarios to be rehearsed in the simulators, thus enhancing the efficiency of performing these tasks during live flying training. As the prime contractor for the NFTC program, CAE operates the NFTC base facilities, delivers the ground-school classroom and simulator training, and supports the live flying training on a fleet of Beechcraft T-6 (CT-156 Harvard) and BAE Systems Hawk (CT-155 Hawk) aircraft. CAE operates the NFTC program out of 15 Wing Moose Jaw and 4 Wing Cold Lake, and the program is designed and delivered in cooperation with the Government of Canada to support pilot training for the Royal Canadian Air Force and allied militaries. The NFTC program combines basic, advanced, and lead-in fighter training as part of the comprehensive military pilot training program. https://www.skiesmag.com/press-releases/cae-upgrades-trainers-at-15-wing-moose-jaw

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  November 19, 2019 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  Military Procurement: What the New Cabinet Can Learn From Australia

  By Lee Harding The Liberal government announced its new cabinet on Nov. 20—the very same day the Canadian Global Affairs Institute hosted its annual event on the topic of military procurement. Given that an overhaul in that area is sorely needed, Canada can learn a lot from Australia, Ian Mack wrote in a recent report for the institute. Mack is uniquely qualified to make that assessment, having worked with both governments in their process of awarding contracts for military sea vessels. While he believes both countries had an acceptable result, his report, titled “Another Way to Buy Frigates,” suggests the Canadian approach adds work, balloons costs, and delays success. The re-elected Trudeau government should take note. The Liberals proposed significant changes to Canada's defence procurement system during the election campaign, but it will be a tall order to change this process. The land down under is isolated in a less secure part of the globe, without a nearby superpower like the United States to watch its back. So if Australia is far more diligent about defence than Canada, it might be due to necessity. The last time Canada had a proper and comprehensive white paper on defence was 1994. Australia has had three in the 21st century. Australia's effectiveness goes from the top down, something Canada knows nothing of. As Mack explains, “Canada, uniquely among its allies, has multiple government departments and central agencies significantly involved in the minutiae of its major military procurement projects.” These include Defence; Treasury Board; Finance; Public Services and Procurement; Justice; Innovation, Science and Economic Development—and even more. Meanwhile in Australia, the minister of defence is responsible for all aspects of navy shipbuilding. This includes setting operational and technical requirements, securing funds, developing a plan to benefit domestic industries, and satisfying the legal aspects of procurement. Each country had a project management office of roughly the same size, but Canada's was, frankly, less competent. Australia's office had many knowledgeable contractors working alongside the Department of Defence, whereas Canada's team had many from the public service and armed forces with “little or no applicable experience or knowledge,” according to Mack. “In Canada, significant effort was expended on regular reporting to layers of senior governance,” he says in the report. But it was paperwork and process for its own sake, and impractical in its effect. “Despite the onerous reporting demands, only a few key decisions were rendered and rarely in a timely manner. The opposite was the case in Australia.” In seemingly every aspect of development, Canada made things rigid, complicated, and fragmented, while Australia made them flexible, cohesive, and collaborative. Canada made stand-alone contracts for each sequence of the process. Australia worked with contractors to establish “end-to-end accountability.” Canada's initial request for proposal included hundreds of technical requirements that bidders had to prove. Australia had few mandatory requirements, but worked alongside bidders to explore their respective proposed solutions. In Canada, the intellectual property, liabilities, and insurance requirements were debated at length and only decided hours before the request for proposal was made. Hundreds of criteria got a numerical score, and the sum of all scores won the bid. Canada was “preoccupied” about a public appearance of fairness and avoiding lawsuits. (Nevertheless, the controversy over former Vice-Admiral Mark Norman and complaints from Irving Shipbuilding over the bid for a navy supply vessel shows it failed at this.) Shipbuilders bidding in Australia were confident of a fair system without any of those things. The department did not announce its evaluation criteria, nor was the evaluation report the only factor. Instead, the department stated its objectives and worked collaboratively with three potential bidders in their respective approaches. In Mack's words, this left “the competition to be more about assessing apples, oranges, and bananas” than about tallying up numerical scores. Mack says he could not make the Canadian system work like Australia's because the procurement, request for proposals, and resulting contracts were done outside of the Department of National Defence. At the time, he was “simply unaware of the intricacies of the Australian approach” because he hadn't yet been exposed to it. Regardless, he had already surmised that Canadian bureaucrats “did not want changes to their tried and true ways of doing business” and clung to “adherence to prescriptive and traditional methodologies.” https://www.theepochtimes.com/military-procurement-what-the-new-cabinet-can-learn-from-australia_3150065.html

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  February 25, 2020 | Local, Naval

  $1 billion and counting: Inside Canada's troubled efforts to build new warships

  Federal government tables figures showing what it's spent on the projects to date Murray Brewster The federal government has spent slightly more than $1.01 billion over the last seven years on design and preparatory contracts for the navy's new frigates and supply ships — and the projects still haven't bought anything that floats. The figures, tabled recently in Parliament, represent the first comprehensive snapshot of what has been spent thus far on the frequently-delayed project to build replacement warships. It's an enormous amount of money for two programs that have been operating for more than a decade with little to show for their efforts to date. It will be years before the Canadian Surface Combatant project — which aims to replace the navy's frontline frigates with 15 state-of-the-art vessels — and the Joint Support Ship program for two replenishment vessels actually deliver warships. The numbers and details for each advance contract were produced in the House of Commons in response to written questions from the Conservative opposition. The money was divided almost evenly between the federal government's two go-to shipyards: Irving Shipbuilding in Halifax, the prime contractor for the new frigates, and Seaspan of Vancouver, the builder of the supply ships. The breakdown raises critical questions about at least one of the programs, said a defence analyst, but it also shines a light on promises made by both Liberal and Conservative governments to keep spending under control for both of these projects — which could end up costing more than $64 billion. "I think there should be a level of concern [among the public] about whether or not what's being delivered in practice is what was advertised at the outset," said Dave Perry, a procurement expert and vice president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. A design still in flux Most of his concerns revolve around the new support ships, which the Liberal government says are in the process of being built now. The written responses, tabled in Parliament, note that the projected cost for the two supply ships — $3.4 billion — remains under review "as the design effort finalizes." Perry said he was astonished to learn that, "seven years and half-a-billion dollars into design work on an off-the-shelf design," the navy doesn't have the support ships, even though "the middle third of the ship is built" — and officials now say "the design effort isn't finished." Usually, he said, ships are designed before they're built. The head of the Department of National Defence's materiel branch said most of the preparatory contracts were needed to re-establish a Canadian shipbuilding industry that had been allowed to wither. 'A lot of patience' "I think we have to look at the totality of everything that's being accomplished under" the national shipbuilding strategy, said Troy Crosby, assistant deputy minister of materiel at DND. "Over that period of time, and with these expenditures, we've built a shipbuilding capability on two coasts, not just through National Defence but also through the coast guard, offshore fisheries science vessels. I understand it has taken a lot of patience, I suppose, and probably some uncertainty, but we're really getting to the point now where we can see delivering these capabilities to the navy." The largest cash outlays involve what's known as definition contracts, which went individually to both shipyards and were in excess of $330 million each. They're meant to cover the supervision of the projects and — more importantly — to help convert pre-existing warship designs purchased by the federal government to Canadian standards. The choices on each project were made at different times by different governments, but ministers serving both Liberal and Conservative governments decided that going with proven, off-the-shelf designs would be faster and less expensive than building from scratch. Now, after all the delays, it's still not clear that choosing off-the-shelf designs has saved any money. "I would be completely speculating on what it would cost to invest to develop the kind of expertise and capacity inside the government, inside National Defence and everybody involved, to be able to do something like that in-house," said Crosby. "The approach we've taken at this point, by basing both the Joint Support Ship and the Canadian Surface Combatant on pre-existing designs, allows us to retire a lot of risk in the way forward." When Crosby talks about "retiring risk," he's talking about the potential for further delays and cost overruns. Among the contracts, Irving Shipbuilding was given $136 million to support the drawing up of the design tender for the new frigates and to pay for the shipbuilding advice Irving was giving the federal government throughout the bidding process. Years ago, the federal government had enough in-house expertise to dispense with private sector guidance — but almost all of that expertise was lost over the past two decades as successive federal governments cut the defence and public works branches that would have done that work. The last time Canada built major warships was in the 1990s, when the current fleet of 12 patrol frigates was inaugurated. The federal government has chosen to base its new warships on the BAE Systems Type-26 design, which has been selected by the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy. The hull and propulsion system on the new frigates will be "largely unchanged" from the British design, but the combat system will be different and uniquely Canadian, said Crosby. The project is still on track to start cutting steel for the new combat ships in 2023. Crosby said he would not speculate on when the navy will take delivery of the first one. Delivery of the joint support ships is expected to be staggered, with the first one due in 2024. There will be a two-year gap between ships, said Crosby, as the navy and the yard work through any technical issues arising with the first ship. If that timeline holds, the first support ship will arrive two decades after it was first proposed and announced by the Liberal government of former prime minister Paul Martin. https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/frigates-joint-supply-ships-navy-procurement-canada-1.5474312