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July 14, 2020 | Local, Aerospace

Canada’s Secret Cold War Submarine Drone Is Still Relevant Today

Extra-large autonomous submarines may revolutionize intelligence gathering and espionage under the sea. One of these ground breaking projects is the U.S. Navy's Boeing Orca extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicle (XLUUV). It is much larger than any other underwater drone currently in the water. But there is a historical precursor that, despite its epic Cold War story, is not widely known. And its mission, to lay covert sensor networks in the arctic, may be as relevant today as it was then.

During the Cold War, NATO believed that Russian submarines were using the ice cap in the Canadian Arctic as cover to covertly move between the Atlantic and Pacific. So the U.S. and Canada placed a special sonar network there, deep under the ice. Canadian engineers had to build the world's largest autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), Theseus, to lay a cable where ships could not reach.

The project started in the 1980s, at a time when Russian submarines were getting much quieter. To listen for them, a joint U.S. and Canadian sonar array was to be placed several hundred miles north of the remote Canadian base at CFS Alert. The array was codenamed Spinnaker, in honor of the bar where scientists made many of the unclassified decisions in the project. This was similar to the now-famous SOSUS (Sound Surveillance System), but used classified technology to match its operational circumstances. In fact it must have been much more advanced than the original SOSUS.

Connecting the sonar array to the base would require laying a fiber-optic cable for hundreds of miles under permanent ice cap. The solution was to build the world's largest autonomous underwater vehicle. The uncrewed submarine would swim from an ice hole nearer to the base all the way to the Spinnaker array. As it went the cable would unreel out of the back. Thus ‘Theseus' got its name from the mythical hero of Ancient Greece who trailed thread behind him when he ventured into the labyrinth to fight the Minotaur.

When we think of advanced Canadian military projects which were ahead of their time, the Avro Canada CF-105 Arrow springs to mind. That delta-winged Mach-2 fighter flew in the 1950s and was cutting edge technology at the time, one of the all-time great aircraft. But it was cancelled abruptly in 1959 before it could enter service. The Theseus AUV is up there with the Avro Arrow, but less well recognized. And unlike the Arrow, it was used operationally, in one of the boldest projects started during the Cold War.

The project had many secret aspects. Years later much of what we know about the project comes from Bruce Butler, one of the core team involved. Bulter has written a book, Into the Labyrinth (on Amazon), and recently talked to the Underwater Technology Podcast about the project.

Theseus was 35 feet long and about 4 feet across. In AUV terms this is large, even today. In modern naval terminology it would be categorized as a large-displacement uncrewed underwater vehicle (LDUUV).

The Spinnaker sonar system was placed on the sea floor right on the edge of the arctic shelf. It was about 84 degrees north, up in the top right-hand corner of Canada, near to Greenland. Such an advanced project took years to realize, so it was not until spring 1996 when Theseus could go to work laying the cable. The whole operation was pushing the boundaries of uncrewed underwater vehicles at the time. Despite some close calls along the way, Theseus was able to navigate to the Spinnaker, letting out the vital thread as it went.

Many details of the project and technology involved are still classified. And we may never know whether Spinnaker ever picked up any Russian submarines. By the time it had been laid the Russian Navy was in steep decline following the end of the Cold War.

But with a resurgent Russian Navy today, the relevance of systems like Spinnaker may be greater than ever. And one of the roles which large submarine drones like the Orca might do is lay cables on the sea floor, unseen from above. Historical precedents like Theseaus can help us understand the way that these might be employed, and the challenges that they will face.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/07/12/canada-secret-cold-war-drone-submarine-is-still-relevant-today/#121a2da51e96

On the same subject

  • Update and new name for the Joint Unmanned Surveillance Target Acquisition System (JUSTAS) project

    November 16, 2017 | Local, Aerospace

    Update and new name for the Joint Unmanned Surveillance Target Acquisition System (JUSTAS) project

    From the Royal Canadian Air Force The Royal Canadian Air Force's Joint Unmanned Surveillance and Target Acquisition System (JUSTAS) project was established to procure an unmanned aircraft system (UAS) for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). The project is currently in the options analysis phase. This fall, the project's name was changed to Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) project. This change is consistent with recent changes in the lexicon and classification systems of our allies, and is a more accurate reflection of how the systems are operated. As outlined in Strong, Secure, Engaged, released in June 2017, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) have become integral to modern military operations. Remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) such as the RCAF's CU-170 Heron and other unmanned aircraft have been deployed on Canadian military operations in the past and offer several advantages including the ability to remain airborne significantly longer than current strategic surveillance platforms. The use of remotely piloted aircraft also reduces the risk to CAF personnel operating the aircraft from a distance and within a lower threat environment, and will also aid in identifying potential threats to CAF personnel in area of operations. Remotely piloted aircraft will be equipped with a variety of payloads and sensors to detect items of interest in all-weather operations including into Canada's Arctic, and will be able to assist in a range of missions from persistent surveillance to supporting search and rescue, to combat operations. The RPAS project anticipates that remotely piloted aircraft can in fact be employed in all eight core missions outlined in Strong, Secure, Engaged, both domestically and overseas. Directly, the RPAS project supports initiatives 91 and 92, which state the government will also “invest in a range of remotely piloted systems” and “conduct research and development of remotely piloted land, sea and aerial capabilities.” The RPAS project Although the name has changed, the RPAS project's aim remains to provide an integrated persistent long-range, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance capability. The project will operate as part of a system-of-systems network and will be capable of providing near-real time information to tactical, operational and strategic commanders to support both domestic and deployed operations, and when required, provide a precision strike capability to support operations. The project will complement existing capabilities within the CAF, such as the CP-140 Aurora long range patrol aircraft. The RPAS project is not a platform replacement. Project phases The RPAS project is currently in the options analysis phase: Options analysis allows departmental senior management to make informed decision on the best way to implement a project, attempting to achieve the capability identified in a manner that is acceptable to the Government. During this phase, options are formulated, cost and benefits assessed, and a business case for the options developed. The definition phase of a project marks the transition from determining what should be done to deal with a lack of a capability, to determining how the preferred option will be implemented. A project is planned during this phase. Activities include carrying out a detailed review of the project requirements and risk assessment as well as costing and planning for the implementation phase and a preferred procurement strategy selected. Projects in the implementation phase have received the approvals required to enter into contracts and commit to the expending funds and resources for the project to proceed to completion. Initial operational capability, when the ability to employ the capability is first attained, is planned for the 2025-2026 fiscal year, based on direction contained in Strong, Secure, Engaged. Project costs Costs are being evaluated as part of the options analysis phase and will be further refined during the definition phase. The estimated cost will depend on the approved procurement strategy, infrastructure and the type of platform(s) chosen. Costs will include associated sensors, ground elements and infrastructure. Number of aircraft No decision has been made concerning the number of aircraft. The number of RPASs will be sufficient to meet three simultaneous lines of tasking and may be affected by the procurement strategy, infrastructure, and specific platform(s) chosen. Economic benefits The Industrial and Technological Benefits Policy, including the Value Proposition will apply to this procurement, requiring that the prime contractor on this project invest 100 percent of the contract value back into Canada's economy. The Value Proposition is the economic commitment that bidders make to Canada up front at bid time, which is a scored and weighted factor in winner selection. This becomes a contractual commitment for the winning bidder. Value Proposition requirements are tailored to each procurement to allow the government to steer investments and take advantage of the unique economic opportunities offered by each project. RPAS uses Domestically, the RPAS will provide a strengthened ability for surveillance of the maritime and northern approaches to Canada and support to search and rescue operations. The RPAS will allow the CAF to assist other government departments in support of special security events, such as international summits, aid to the civil authorities – such as response to forest fires or floods – and Assistance to Law Enforcement Agencies operations. Overseas, the RPAS will be capable of detecting, recognizing, identifying, and tracking targets of interest in complex environments and integrate with the systems required to process and fuse the collected information into actionable intelligence. RPAS precision strike capability Strong, Secure, Engaged indicates that the RPAS will have a precision strike capability – it will be capable of being armed. The ability to target and execute precision strikes ensures that if a threat is detected that it can also be addressed at that time. As with any use of weapons systems, the CAF will operate in accordance with domestic and international laws. Operations will be conducted in strict accordance with all the controls, procedures, and rules of engagement that govern the use of force or any other weapon. All of these systems would be remotely piloted by CAF personnel who would be directly involved in the decision making process to execute a strike. However, the RPA(s) will be armed only if necessary for the assigned task(s). Operating environments The RPAS will be able to operate worldwide, in all weather conditions, at any time of day with the range and endurance to cover all of Canada's airspace from any suitable operating location. The system will also need to be able to operate in low-to-medium threat environments, within joint environments with other government departments, and as part of a coalition with our allies. The Royal Canadian Air Force ensures the sovereignty of Canada through its ability to respond rapidly to any threat. The investment in the RPAS project, as outlined in Strong, Secure, Engaged, enhances the RCAF's capability to continue to provide agile, integrated air power with the necessary reach to fulfill any requirement asked by the Government of Canada. Interested suppliers should direct question related to this project to the Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) contracting authority. Article: http://www.rcaf-arc.forces.gc.ca/en/news-template-standard.page?doc=update-and-new-name-for-the-joint-unmanned-surveillance-target-acquisition-system-justas-project/j9u7rzyf

  • NORAD modernization to dominate agenda of Canada-U.S. defence relations, experts say

    February 8, 2021 | Local, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

    NORAD modernization to dominate agenda of Canada-U.S. defence relations, experts say

    Levon Sevunts, Radio Canada International The modernization of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) will dominate the agenda of Canada-U.S. defence relations as the Biden administration gears up to repair relations with old allies and face emerging threats from resurgent Russia and ascending China, Canadian defence experts say. The continued modernization of the binational command created in 1957 was on the agenda of the first phone call between President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Justin Trudeau last month, and during the first calls of Canadiand and U.S. defence ministers, said Andrea Charron, head of the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at the University of Manitoba. “This is at the highest levels. When the U.S. is concerned about the homeland defence and they feel vulnerable, it's something that Canada has to take very-very seriously and I think that is what's happening,” Charron told Eye on the Arctic. Canadian defence expert Nancy Teeple said she expects the Biden administration to ask Canada to contribute more to continental defence. “It opens up the question of whether Canada will participate in missile defence, it's going to push Canada towards that new fighter capability,” said Teeple, who teaches at the Royal Military College of Canada and is Postdoctoral Fellow at the North American Defence and Security Network (NAADSN). The need for NORAD modernization is driven by changes in the strategic and the global geopolitical environment, Charron said. “Where as before the primary threat during the Cold War was one peer competitor, who wasn't using greyzone tactics, or at least not to the same extent as now, we now have two peer competitors to the U.S. – China and Russia – and they are using greyzone tactics, and they're developing more sophisticated weapons like hypersonic glide vehicle weapons,” Charron said. A new generation of threats The urgency of the NORAD modernization and the paths towards that goal were outlined last fall in a paper written for the Wilson Center's Canada Institute by the former U.S. NORAD commander, retired Gen. Terrence O'Shaughnessy, and U.S. Air Force Brig.-Gen. Peter Fesler, the current deputy director of operations at the U.S. air defence headquarters. In the paper, titled Hardening the Shield: A Credible Deterrent & Capable Defense for North America, O'Shaughnessy and Fesler argue that “with innovations in long range missiles and foreign missile defense systems as well as a changing Arctic landscape, threats to U.S. national security are closer and less deterred than ever from attacking the U.S. Homeland.” O'Shaughnessy and Fesler argue that both China and Russia have developed capabilities to target North America with a new generation of long-range and high-precision conventional weapons. They say that while the U.S. has invested billions of dollars into building ballistic missile defences to protect against strikes by rogue nations such as North Korea, Washington and Ottawa have neglected investments and upgrades of the continental defensive systems “designed to defend against the range of threats presented by peer competitors.” Moreover, the various systems in place in many cases simply can't automatically share information, they say. “The radars used by NORAD to warn of Russian or Chinese ballistic missile attack, for example, are not integrated with those used by Northern Command to engage missiles launched by North Korea,” O'Shaughnessy and Fesler write. “Even if the ballistic missile defense architecture were to detect a launch from China, it would not directly share that information with NORAD's missile warning systems. “The watch standers in the consolidated NORAD and Northern Command headquarters are forced to verbally pass information displayed on independent systems.” Putting up a SHIELD O'Shaughnessy and Fesler call for a “more holistic modernization effort” for NORAD. Northern Command and NORAD have collectively developed a modernization strategy for defence referred to as the Strategic Homeland Integrated Ecosystem for Layered Defence, or SHIELD, they write. “SHIELD is not a system, or even a system of systems, it is an ecosystem,” O'Shaughnessy and Fesler write. “It is a fundamentally new approach to defending North America.” SHIELD takes advantage of the data provided by traditional and non-traditional sources to provide a layered ability to detect any threat approaching the continent, from the seafloor to on orbit, in what NORAD and Northern Command refer to as “all domain awareness,” they write. “It pools this data and fuses it into a common operational picture. Then, using the latest advances in machine learning and data analysis, it scans the data for patterns that are not visible to human eyes, helping decision-makers understand adversary potential courses of action before they are executed.” ‘It's many things and they are already happening' Experts say figuring out Canada's role in this new “ecosystem” will be tricky politically and likely to come at a steep financial cost just as both Ottawa and Washington are deep in the red because of the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic. “It's everything from, for example, the runways at Inuvik being extended because right now only the CF-18 Hornets can land there and we need to make it longer,” Charron said. “It's things like better communication in the Arctic because there seems to be the potential for more activity there.” Or it could be something like coming up with a new Combined Forces Air Component Commander to change the command and control structure and allow the NORAD commander to think more strategically rather than to be bogged down by the day-to-day tasks, Charron said. In addition, upgrades to NORAD capabilities also have to be guided by the need for information dominance, Charron said. “So it's many things and they are already happening,” Charron said. “For example there is a new program called Pathfinder, which is helping feeds from the North Warning System through artificial intelligence to glean more information that the North Warning System is actually picking up but current algorithms and analysts aren't able to see.” Teeple said Canada can also benefit from Washington's interest in developing continental defence, including the Arctic by developing infrastructure that has dual military-civilian use. “This provides incredible benefits if Canada can collaborate,” Teeple said. “And those benefits would be obviously involving collaboration, involving input from Northern Indigenous communities and developing systems that can enhance things like communications and other types of infrastructure in the North that would enhance their quality of life.” Canadian policy-makers should also think about some of the niche areas where Canada can contribute to the NORAD modernization and the continental defence, Teeple said. “So enhancing its sensor capabilities for early warning, obviously that involves the upgrading of the North Warning System,” Teeple said. Other roles for Canada could include non-kinetic disruptive capabilities, such as cyber capabilities, Teeple said. This could give Canada a more offensive role in the new SHIELD ecosystem that would be more palatable politically than hosting ballistic missile interceptors on its territory, she added. https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2021/02/05/norad-modernization-to-dominate-agenda-of-canada-u-s-defence-relations-experts-say/

  • This new tool lets brigades ‘see’ their electronic warfare footprint

    December 12, 2024 | Local, Land

    This new tool lets brigades ‘see’ their electronic warfare footprint

    A handful of operational U.S. Army brigades now have a tool to “see” how they and enemy forces look in the otherwise invisible electromagnetic spectrum.

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