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August 15, 2023 | International, Security

Australia and Japan deepen defence ties - APDR

Australia and Japan are strengthening our defence ties with the Japan-Australia Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) coming into effect.

https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/australia-and-japan-deepen-defence-ties/

On the same subject

  • Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

    June 9, 2020 | International, Aerospace

    Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

    By: Sarah Bidgood Russia recently published a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia's official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination. Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia's threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble. One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions." The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons. These parallels suggest that an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear command, control and communications systems could be of interest to both Washington and Moscow. A treaty along these lines would help to shore up crisis stability while rebuilding trust and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. It could also become a multilateral approach involving the five nuclear weapon states, which have been meeting regularly to discuss risk reduction and other topics. This would represent one of the few concrete outcomes of these discussions, which have been met with cautious enthusiasm but have so far failed to bear much fruit. Another example of mutual U.S.-Russia threats appears in section 12E of the Russian document. Here, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture” are described as risks that nuclear deterrence is meant to neutralize. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons seems to remain a focus of U.S. nuclear policy, too, and the 2018 NPR commits to strengthening institutions that support “verifiable, durable progress on non-proliferation.” This ongoing shared interest is an argument for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, especially as it relates to strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. There is a long history of engagement between the two largest nuclear weapon states on nonproliferation, even at times of major discord in their relationship. Successful outcomes of this cooperation include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 50 years ago to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite decades of joint work toward this shared goal, the rift between Washington and Moscow has now brought most bilateral efforts in this area to a halt. As some in Iran, Turkey and Germany contemplate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it's time for the U.S. and Russia to shore up the credibility of the regime they built. Other sections of Russia's document offer additional glimpses into Moscow's perceived threats, although not all find ready analogs in U.S. declaratory policy. Many relate instead to the possibility that an adversary will carry out a conventional attack on Russia. Sections 12 and 14, for instance, reference the risks posed by adversary deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons. They also mention the deployment of missile defense systems in space; military buildups by would-be adversaries of general-purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in territories neighboring Russia; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapons states, among others. There is little here that would surprise most Russia-watchers, but if the U.S. is serious about pursuing “next generation” arms control, it is useful to have a list of potential topics for discussion that go beyond ballistic missile defense. This list might also prove helpful in negotiating asymmetric treaties or in identifying confidence-building measures that cross domains. Overall, this short document does provide greater clarity with respect to Russia's deterrence strategy, but it is ambiguous on many points as well. Olga Oliker, the International Crisis Group's program director for Europe and Central Asia, noted, for instance, it does not settle the debate over whether Russia has an “escalate-to-deescalate” policy, and it is (unsurprisingly) vague about the precise circumstances under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons. Still, despite leaving some questions unanswered, the document offers a valuable window into Russia's strengths and vulnerabilities as they appear from Moscow. While likely not the intended signal this document was meant to send, it nevertheless points to possible opportunities for engagement when other good alternatives are hard to see. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/08/russias-new-nuclear-policy-could-be-a-path-to-arms-control-treaties/

  • CACI Secures $880 Million Task Order to Provide Information Technology and Engineering Services for U.S. Army's Personnel and Force Management Systems

    June 18, 2019 | International, Other Defence

    CACI Secures $880 Million Task Order to Provide Information Technology and Engineering Services for U.S. Army's Personnel and Force Management Systems

    ARLINGTON, Va.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--CACI International Inc (NYSE: CACI) announced today it has secured an $880 million task order to provide information technology and engineering services to the U.S. Army's Product Lead Reserve Component Automation System-Force Management System (PL RCAS - FMS). The Information Technology Enterprise Management Systems Solution (ITEMSS) task order, made under the U.S. General Services Administration's Alliant 2 contract vehicle, represents continuing work for CACI and expansion to support the Army's vision for Global Force Information Management. The government will rely upon CACI's Agile Solution Factory (ASF), already one of the largest and most modern Agile frameworks used by the federal government, to more quickly develop software for the Army's personnel and force management systems. Since 2013, the ASF has consistently delivered increased productivity, reduced costs, higher quality, and more secure software to its customers. On the previous RCAS contract, the ASF increased software development productivity by 60% and reduced implementation costs by more than 50%, software quality averaged 99% defect free, and time-to-market was reduced by 70%. Ken Asbury, CACI's President and Chief Executive Officer, said, “CACI's Agile Solution Factory has set the standard for continuous software development on an enterprise scale through its iterative and transparent approach. Under the ITEMSS contract, CACI's ASF will help the Army implement multiple personnel and force management systems, including RCAS and FMS, two of the most efficient large-scale personnel and force management systems in the world.” Under the seven-year ITEMSS task order, CACI will provide a broad range of information technology and engineering services, including hardware and software design, sustainment and modification, and network, cybersecurity, distance learning program, and military construction services to support the Army's dynamic force management, mobilization and readiness missions. CACI provides information solutions and services in support of national security missions and government transformation for Intelligence, Defense, and Federal Civilian customers. A Fortune World's Most Admired Company, CACI is a member of the Fortune 1000 Largest Companies, the Russell 2000 Index, and the S&P MidCap 400 Index. CACI's sustained commitment to ethics and integrity defines its corporate culture and drives its success. With approximately 22,000 employees worldwide, CACI provides dynamic career opportunities for military veterans and industry professionals to support the nation's most critical missions. Join us! www.caci.com. There are statements made herein which do not address historical facts, and therefore could be interpreted to be forward-looking statements as that term is defined in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such statements are subject to factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from anticipated results. The factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated include, but are not limited to, the risk factors set forth in CACI's Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2018, and other such filings that CACI makes with the Securities and Exchange Commission from time to time. Any forward-looking statements should not be unduly relied upon and only speak as of the date hereof. CACI-Contract Award https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190618005167/en

  • Army selects eight counter-drone systems for the joint force

    June 30, 2020 | International, Aerospace

    Army selects eight counter-drone systems for the joint force

    Nathan Strout Following an Army-led assessment, the Defense Department will be narrowing the number of different counter-small unmanned aircraft system solutions deployed by the joint force from about 40 to eight. In November, the defense secretary delegated the Army to lead an effort to reduce redundancy in the development and fielding of various C-sUAS solutions by the services. The Army subsequently set up the Joint C-sUAS Office to conduct that assessment, and over the last few months the office has worked to narrow down the dozens of counter-drone systems fielded by the services. “Our goal is to align existing and future Counter-UAS technology solutions to best address operational needs while applying resources more efficiently,” Maj. Gen. Sean Gainey, the JCO's first director, said during a media call June 26, one day after the assessment results were announced. “This is really why the organization was stood up — to eliminate the redundancy that was being fielded.” That assessment, which Defense Department leadership have approved, looked at approximately 40 systems, about 30 of which were primarily used for the C-sUAS mission, said the director. The assessment concluded that the joint force should move forward with fielding just eight different systems — a variety of fixed, mounted and dismounted solutions. “So essentially moving forward, we will focus our investments,” Gainey said. “The services have each been assigned sponsor of each one of those systems, so as we move this forward as a joint approach, it will coordinate the future upgrades to these systems and the contracting of these systems across the joint force.” C-sUAS systems that were not included in the final selection will be replaced by the approved systems, although JCO could not provide a timeline for how quickly this will take place, how much it will cost or how many units will need to be replaced across the services. Gainley noted that the services are currently conducting an analysis of how many systems will need to be replaced. Of the eight approved solutions, three are fixed, one is mounted and three are dismounted. The approved C-sUAS systems are as follows: 1) Fixed/Semi-Fixed Systems Fixed Site-Low, Slow, Small Unmanned Aircraft System Integrated Defeat System (FS-LIDS), sponsored by the Army Negation of Improvised Non-State Joint Aerial-Threats (NINJA), sponsored by the Air Force Counter-Remote Control Model Aircraft Integrated Air Defense Network (CORIAN), sponsored by the Navy 2) Mounted/Mobile System Light-Mobile Air Defense Integrated System (L-MADIS), sponsored by the Marine Corps 3) Dismounted/Handheld Systems Bal Chatri, sponsored by Special Operations Command Dronebuster, no sponsor, commercial off-the-shelf capability Smart Shooter, no sponsor, commercial off-the-shelf capability 4) Command and Control Forward Area Air Defense Command and Control (FAAD-C2), sponsored by the Army (includes FAAD-C2 interoperable systems like the Air Force's Air Defense System Integrator (ADSI) and the Marine Corps' Multi-Environmental Domain Unmanned Systems Application Command and Control (MEDUSA C2)) https://www.c4isrnet.com/unmanned/2020/06/26/army-selects-eight-counter-drone-systems-for-the-joint-force/

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