February 18, 2022 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security
April 24, 2020 | International, Aerospace
America’s bomber force is facing a crisis
By: Maj. Gen. Larry Stutzriem (ret.) and Douglas Birkey
The nation faces a bomber crisis, and it is time to openly acknowledge the scale and scope of the problem.
Tasked with deterrence and, if necessary, striking targets around the globe, Air Force crews operating these aircraft afford the nation's security leaders unique options best embodied in the phrase: anytime, anyplace. Despite the criticality of this mission, the Air Force currently operates the smallest, oldest fleet of bombers since its 1947 founding. No other service or ally has this capability, which places an imperative on this finite force. The service's recent announcement that it will be ending its continuous bomber presence in Guam further amplifies the precarious state of bombers. It is a stark warning to senior leaders in the Pentagon, in the executive branch and on Capitol Hill that the Air Force is “out of Schlitz” when it comes to the critical missions they perform.
Bombers are unique instruments of power. They can strike targets with large volumes of kinetic firepower without requiring access to foreign bases and without projecting the vulnerability associated with regionally based land or sea forces. The striking power of a single bomber is immense. In fact, B-1Bs flying missions against ISIS in the opening days of Operation Inherent Resolve were able to carry more munitions than that delivered by an entire carrier air wing.
Stealth bombers can penetrate enemy air defenses, depriving mobile targets of sanctuary. They can also carry large bunker-buster munitions required to eliminate deeply buried and hardened facilities. Bomber aircraft are also cheaper to operate on a per-mission basis when compared to alternate options, like ships, large packages of smaller strike aircraft or standoff missiles.
The erosion of the bomber force is no secret. At the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force possessed 400 bombers arrayed to fight the Soviet Union. Today, it has just 157, with a plan to cut a further 17 in the fiscal 2021 budget submission. Air Force efforts to modernize the bomber force a decade ago were thwarted within the Department of Defense by an excessive near-term focus on counterinsurgency operations. Bombers are requested by combatant commands on a continual basis given the concurrent threats posed by peer adversaries, mid-tier nations like Iran and North Korea, and hostile nonstate actors.
The Air Force knows this mission area is stretched too thin, and that is precisely why in 2018 leaders called for an additional five bomber squadrons in “The Air Force We Need” force structure assessment.
Well-understood risk exists with operating a high-demand, low-density inventory for too long. The B-1B force, which makes up over one-third of America's bomber capacity, offers a highly cautionary tale in this regard. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the service retired 26 of these aircraft to free up modernization funds, which subsequently were snatched away from the bomber mission area for other uses. For the next two decades, the Air Force flew the B-1B in a nearly continuous string of intense combat deployments. Sustainment funding was under-resourced, which further wore down the B-1B force. Last summer, B-1B readiness rates plummeted below 10 percent — effectively putting them out of commission.
As Air Force Global Strike Command Commander Gen. Tim Ray explained: “We overextended the B-1Bs.” It was a toxic formula of too much mission demand and too few airplanes. Air Force leaders continually signaled concern, but their calls for help went unanswered.
The normal solution to this sort of a challenge would be straight-forward: Go buy more airplanes. However, operational B-21s will not be in production until the latter 2020s. The Air Force is asking to retire 17 B-1s to free up resources to nurse the remaining aircraft along as a stopgap measure.
COVID-19 emergency spending and corresponding downward pressure on future defense spending are only going to aggravate the complexity of this juggling act with mission demand, available force structure and readiness. Whether world events will align with these circumstances is yet to be seen.
It was in this context that the Air Force decided to end its continuous bomber presence on Guam. Launched in 2004 to deter adversaries like China and North Korea and to reassure regional allies, the mission has been a tremendous success. It clearly communicated U.S. readiness to act decisively when U.S. and allied interests were challenged. Ending continuous bomber presence in the Pacific now sends the opposite message, just as the region grows more dangerous. This is a decision with significant risk, yet it is an outcome compelled by past choices resulting in a bomber force on the edge.
The path forward begins with admitting the nation has a bomber shortfall. Retiring more aircraft exacerbates the problem. Nor is this just an Air Force problem. Bombers are national assets essential to our security strategy and must be prioritized accordingly. If other services have excess funds to invest in ideas like a 1,000-mile-range cannon when thousands of strike aircraft, various munitions and remotely piloted aircraft can fill the exact same mission requirements, it is time for a roles and missions review to direct funding toward the most effective, efficient options. Bombers would compete well in such an assessment. Ultimately, the solution demands doubling down on the B-21 program.
There comes a point where you cannot do more with less. Given the importance of bombers to the nation, rebuilding the bomber force is not an option — it is an imperative.
Retired U.S. Air Force Maj. Gen. Larry Stutzriem served as a fighter pilot and held various command positions. He concluded his service as the director of plans, policy and strategy at North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command. He is currently the director of studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, where Douglas Birkey is the executive director. Birkey researches issues relating to the future of aerospace and national security, and he previously served as the Air Force Association's director of government relations.
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/04/23/americas-bomber-force-is-facing-a-crisis/
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June 10, 2022 | International, Aerospace
Avions de chasse chinois : Trudeau parle de « provocation », Pékin se défend
Pékin accuse plutôt l'aviation militaire canadienne de mener des « opérations hostiles » dans le Pacifique.
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March 13, 2020 | International, Aerospace
Could a commercial drone replace the MQ-9 Reaper? The Air Force is considering it.
By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — The Air Force is looking for a replacement to the stalwart MQ-9 Reaper and intends to explore options ranging from commercial drones built by emerging tech firms to high-end unmanned aircraft, the service's top acquisition official said Tuesday. Will Roper, the Air Force's assistant secretary for acquisition, technology and logistics, said the service is working on a study that will inform the fiscal 2022 budget and lay out a path for replacing the MQ-9 Reaper made by General Atomics. "The Reaper has been a great platform for us. Four million flight hours, just undeniable overmatch in a low-end uncontested fight, and it is certainly saving lives,” Roper told lawmakers at a House Armed Services Committee hearing. “But as we look to the high end fight, we just can't take them into the battlefield. They are easily shot down.” The MQ-9 Reaper and its precursor, the MQ-1 Predator, have been the Air Force's workhorse drones in the Middle East over the past two decades, providing both real-time video surveillance and the ability to strike targets. But looking forward, the Reaper is ill-suited to a war with Russia and China while at the same time seen by the Air Force as requiring too much money and manpower to sustain for continued operations in low-threat environments. There likely won't be a single, one-size fits all solution for replacing the MQ-9, Roper said. The Air Force may need drones that “are more high-end, military-unique” systems, and “they'll likely be expensive,” he acknowledged. There may also be room for unmanned attritable aircraft, which are reusable but are cheap enough that they can be shot down in battle without incurring massive financial losses. For lower-end missions, the Air Force sees promise in the emerging unmanned systems market, where new entrants have begun creating long-loiter drones for applications in agriculture, communications and the oil and gas sector. “A lot of companies are targeting that market, not thinking about defense because we've been buying Reapers forever,” Roper said, who added that by buying from promising commercial drone makers, Air Force may be able to influence those companies to keep their supply chains out of China and to incorporate military-specific features — potentially even weapons. “I think if we do the program right on the commercial side, we might be able to bring a new entrant into defense without making them a defense prime,” he said, adding that funding from the Air Force could help a commercial company move from making prototypes to building up a stable production line that could further be grown to manufacture drones on a more massive scale. “Working with the Defense Department, you don't need the kind of production capacity that the globe does. So, we're a pretty good first stop,” he said. However, the Air Force may face an uphill battle in getting Congress to support a plan to replace the Reaper. The service in its FY21 budget request has asked for 24 more MQ-9s before ending the programs of record — a move that would curtail the program from 363 to 337 Reapers. The early shutdown of the line would have major financial implications for General Atomics, said Chris Pehrson, the company's vice president of strategic development, in a February interview with Air Force Magazine. “We're actually going out about 22 months ahead of delivery and procuring the long-lead item parts, ... whether it's [satellite communication] equipment or engines ... to negotiate the best prices and get the best deals for the government,” Pehrson said. “Having the rug pulled out from under your feet at the last minute kind of disrupts all your supply chain investments that you're making.” Top generals in the Middle East and Africa have also raised concerns about the demands for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and privately helped stave off retirements of the MQ-9 by the Air Force in FY21. In its unfunded wish list, U.S. Central Command included additional contractor-flown MQ-9 hours as its number one priority, at a cost of $238 million. https://www.defensenews.com/air/2020/03/12/could-a-commercial-drone-replace-the-mq-9-reaper-the-air-force-is-considering-it/