After Washington’s refueling woes, US Navy eyes new plans for carriers

On the same subject

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  September 25, 2023 | International, Aerospace

  Space Force, partners to craft global supply chain strategy

  The event will give stakeholders a chance to share their perspectives on global supply chain challenges and opportunities to address them.

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  April 26, 2019 | International, Aerospace

  Government watchdog finds more problems with F-35’s spare parts pipeline

  By: Valerie Insinna WASHINGTON — Only about half of the F-35s worldwide were ready to flyduring an eight-month period in 2018, with the wait for spare parts keeping jets on the ground nearly 30 percent of the time, according to a new report by the Government Accountability Office. Over the past several years, the Defense Department has sought to improve mission capable rates by making improvements to the way it and F-35 contractor Lockheed Martin order, stockpile and repair spare parts. However, GAO's findings imply that the situation may have gotten worse. The GAO's report, released April 25, investigated how spare parts shortages impacted F-35 availability and mission capable rates in 2018, with most data gathered between a May and November sustainment contract period. “In 2017, we reported that DOD was experiencing sustainment challenges that were reducing warfighter readiness, including delays of 6 years in standing up repair capabilities for F-35 parts at its depots and significant spare parts shortages that were preventing the F-35 fleet from flying about 20 percent of the time,” GAO said in the report. “According to prime contractor data, from May through November 2018, F-35 aircraft across the fleet were unable to fly 29.7 percent of the time due to spare parts shortages,” it said. “Specifically, the F-35 supply chain does not have enough spare parts available to keep aircraft flying enough of the time necessary to meet warfighter requirements.” That lack of improvement may make it more difficult for the U.S. Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps to hit an 80 percent mission capable rate by the end of fiscal year 2019, as mandated by then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis last fall. The military services stopped providing mission capable rates for aircraft last year, citing operational sensitivities. However, the data put forth by the GAO indicates that progress stagnated in the lead up to Mattis' order. From May to November 2018, mission capable rates — which measure how many planes possessed by a squadron can perform at least one of its missions — hovered around 50 percent for all versions of the F-35. But when GAO assessed how many planes were fully mission capable — meaning that they were ready to fulfill all of their mission sets — all variants were far from meeting the 60 percent target. Only 2 percent of F-35C carrier takeoff and landing versions hit the fully mission capable mark, with the F-35Bs slightly better at 16 percent and the F-35A at 34 percent. The GAO is skeptical that the services will be able to hit the 80 percent mission capable rate goal this year, and it is even more critical of the Defense Department's plans to fund spares in future years. The department intends to buy “only enough parts to enable about 80 percent of its aircraft to be mission-capable based on the availability of parts.” However, that planning construct will likely only yield a 70 percent mission capable rate at best, the GAO said, because it only accounts for the aircraft on the flight line and not jets that are in the depot for longer term maintenance. No silver bullet for parts shortage issues Like all complicated problems, there is no single solution for the F-35 spare parts shortage, which is driven by a number of factors. GAO indicated that the Defense Department still has “a limited capacity” to repair broken parts, creating a backlog of 4,300 parts still needing to be addressed. Between September and November, it took more than six months to fix parts that should have been repaired in a window of two to three months. The F-35's much-maligned Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) was designed to be able to track parts and automate the process of generating and expediting work orders, however, GAO notes that the system still requires manual workarounds from users in order to accomplish tasks. Supply and maintenance personnel cited challenges such as “missing or corrupted electronic spare parts data,” limited automation and problems caused by ALIS's subsystems not communicating with each other properly, it said. As the F-35 is still a relatively new platform, it has taken time for the program to assess which parts have been failing more often than previously estimated — but that is an area where the Defense Department is making progress, the GAO stated. “DOD has identified specific parts shortages that are causing the greatest aircraft capability degradation, and it is developing short-term and long-term mitigation strategies to increase the quantity and reliability of these parts,” the report said. One such component is a coating used on the F-35's canopy to help it maintain its stealth characteristics, which has been found to peel off at an unexpected rate, creating a heightened demand for canopies. “To address these challenges, the program is looking for additional manufacturing sources for the canopy and is considering design changes,” the GAO stated. But — somewhat paradoxically — the F-35 has been flying for a long enough time that there is significant parts differences between the first jets that rolled off the production line to the most recently manufactured planes. The GAO found “at least 39 different part combinations across the fleet” on top of variations in software. “According to the program office, DOD spent more than $15 billion to purchase F-35 aircraft from the earliest lots of production, specifically lots 2 through 5 ... but it faces challenges in providing enough spare parts for these aircraft,” the report stated. One problem — the cannibalization of F-35 aircraft for parts — is partially user-inflicted. “From May through November 2018, F-35 squadrons cannibalized (that is, took) parts from other aircraft at rates that were more than six times greater than the services' objective,” the GAO stated. “These high rates of cannibalization mask even greater parts shortages, because personnel at F-35 squadrons are pulling parts off of other aircraft that are already unable to fly instead of waiting for new parts to be delivered through the supply chain.” During an interview this February, Lt. Col. Toby Walker, deputy commander of the 33rd Maintenance Group, told Defense News that F-35 maintainers at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., had stopped pulling parts off a cannibalized F-35 and had seen some improvements to mission capable rates as a result. “We're not continually moving parts from one aircraft to another. We're relying on the program to provide our parts,” he said. “It was a very strategic plan to do that to increase aircraft availability by not sitting an aircraft down.” In a statement, Lockheed Martin said that it had taken key steps to improve parts availability, such as transitioning some suppliers to performance based logistics contracts that incentivize companies to meet certain targets, as well as “master repair agreements” that will allow other suppliers to make longer term investments in their production capability. “These actions are beginning to deliver results and we're forecasting additional improvement. Newer production aircraft are averaging greater than 60 percent mission capable rates, with some operational squadrons consistently at 70 percent,” the company said. “From a cost perspective, Lockheed Martin has reduced its portion of cost per aircraft per year by 15 percent since 2015. Our goal is to further reduce costs to $25,000 cost per flight hour by 2025, which is comparable to legacy aircraft while providing a generational leap in capability.” https://www.defensenews.com/air/2019/04/25/government-watchdog-finds-more-problems-with-f-35s-spare-parts-pipeline

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  July 9, 2020 | International, Naval

  US Navy shakes up the carrier Ford program after latest setback

  By: David B. Larter WASHINGTON –The officer overseeing the deployment of the carrier Gerald R. Ford was fired Wednesday, the latest jolt to the trouble program that has been operating under a microscope as technical problems with nearly two dozen new technologies bundled into the lead ship have piled up. Capt. Ron Rutan was removed by Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition James Geurts last Wednesday in connection with his “performance over time” in the role as program manager for the ship. “Based on the recommendation of PEO Aircraft Carriers [Rear Adm. James Downey] due to performance over time, ASN RDA Geurts reassigned CVN 78 (PMS 378) Program Manager Capt. Ron Rutan to Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) staff, and selected Capt. Brian Metcalf, previously LPD 17 program manager and Executive Assistant to COMNAVSEA, as his relief, effective 1 July,” according to a statement from Naval Sea Systems Command spokesman Rory O'Connor The Navy said the change was made to get “fresh eyes” on the effort to get the new aircraft carrier through its post-delivery test and trial period, which will go on through the rest of this year before the ship heads into full-ship shock trials, where live explosives are set off next the ship to see how it handles battle damage. “While there is no perfect time for leadership transitions, it is prudent to bring in renewed energy now to lead the CVN 78 team through the challenges ahead,” the statement reads. “Capt. Metcalf's proven program management acumen and extensive waterfront experience will be a tremendous asset to the CVN 78 team in the months ahead.” News of Rutan's removal was first reported by USNI News. The Ford has had a witches' brew of technical problems and accompanying delays and setbacks since construction of the ship began in 2005. Much of the trouble is the result of trying to pack too much new stuff in a single new hull, and Rutan's firing shows the problems are still vexatious, said Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and analyst with the Telemus Group. “Obviously the problems on the Ford are still beyond the managers' ability to control them,” Hendrix said . “And while this may be a blow to Capt. Rutan's career, it sounds like they just needed to move on to someone who will take a different approach and brought a different perspective. It may be more about getting to the next guy as it is removing the current guy. “Look, I don't think it's possible to overstate the complexity of the Ford program.” The ship, conceived in an era when the Defense Department was looking to make giant steps forward in military technology while it had no direct peer competitors, packed at least 23 new technologies into the lead ship. Those included a complete redesign of the systems used to arm, launch and recover the ship's aircraft. All those systems have, in their turn, caused delays in getting the Navy's most expensive-ever warship to the fleet, which was originally to have deployed in 2018, but now will likely not deploy until 2023. The Ford cost the Navy roughly $13.3 billion, according to the latest Congressional Research Service report. Trials and tribulations The latest hiccup came in the form of a fault in the power supply system to the electromagnetic aircraft launch system, which is replacing the old steam catapult system on the Nimitz-class carriers. The fault curtailed flight operations on the ship for several days while the crew and contractors tried to identify the issue. Prior to the latest EMALS issue, the Advanced Weapons Elevators – which are designed to reduce the time it takes to get bombs armed and to the flight deck for mounting on aircraft – became the center of a firestorm and contributed to former Secretary of the Navy Richard Spencer's firing last year. In January 2019, Spencer announced he'd told the President that if the weapons elevators aren't functioning by mid-summer, then he should fire him. But within months Spencer had to admit that the weapons elevators would not be finished until the end of 2021 or maybe 2022, which he blamed on Huntington Ingalls Industries for not communicating adequately. Making the Ford deployment ready was a focus of former acting Navy Secretary Thomas Modly, who likened the ship to an albatross around the Navy's neck. “The Ford is something the president cares a lot about, it's something he talks a lot about, and I think his concerns are justified,” Modly said. “It's very, very expensive, and it needs to work. “And there is a trail of tears that explains why we are where we are, but right now we need to fix that ship and make sure it works. There is nothing worse than having a ship like that, our most expensive asset, being out there as a metaphor for why the Navy can't do anything right.” https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/07/07/the-us-navy-shakes-up-the-carrier-ford-program-after-latest-setback/