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  November 11, 2020 | International, Aerospace

  Gotta go fast: How America’s Space Development Agency is shaking up acquisitions

  Nathan Strout WASHINGTON — In March 2019, the Pentagon established a new organization to buy space systems: The Space Development Agency. But this led to some confusion. After all, the U.S. Air Force's Space and Missile Systems Center already bought the bulk of the military's satellites and space systems, and the Space Rapid Capabilities Office acted as a supplement to drive faster programs. The imminent establishment of the U.S. Space Force brought further questions: Why set up a new space acquisitions organization when the military was on the verge of reorganizing its main space acquisitions service? Some suggested that the nascent agency wouldn't survive the year. Over the intervening 18 months, the Space Development Agency, or SDA, has embarked on a whirlwind tour to not only explain what it's building, but how it offers something different than legacy organizations. To the first point: SDA was set up to build the National Defense Space Architecture, a new proliferated constellation primarily in low Earth orbit that will be made up of hundreds of satellites. That's a radical departure from traditional military space. To date, the biggest military constellation in operation is GPS, with about 30 satellites ― give or take a satellite or two ― on orbit at any one time. With the new architecture, SDA wants to put into orbit about 1,000 satellites by 2026. “It's got this novel approach compared to, you know, kind of the legacy approach. They've got these very unique core values. So they do things quickly. They're a very lean organization. They move out fast. They're responsive to the needs of the war fighter,” said Mark Lewis, the Pentagon's acting deputy undersecretary of defense for research and engineering. Over the last 18 months, the agency has designed the National Defense Space Architecture, or NDSA; issued its first request for proposals; and awarded its first contracts. Here's what onlookers have seen in how the agency works differently: Gotta go fast The area where SDA has most distinguished itself is speed, according to some observers. “A lot of the reason the SDA was stood up is that there is a general recognition that the speed of the threat is increasing tremendously,” said Eric Brown, director of mission strategy for military space at Lockheed Martin, one of the companies providing satellites for the NDSA. “Everyone is acknowledging that in order to stay ahead and maintain our high ground from a space superiority standpoint, we're going to have to operate at a different speed.” At an industry day in summer 2019, SDA Director Derek Tournear laid out the agency's plan. In 2022, just three years after SDA was established, it would launch its first satellites ― a little more than 20. Most military constellations consist of less than a dozen satellites, and it can take five to 10 years from conception until the first satellite arrives at the launch pad. SDA's plans didn't stop there. The agency planned to launch increasingly large numbers of satellites into orbit in two-year tranches, culminating in a constellation of about 1,000 satellites in 2026. With this spiral development approach, the agency is looking to put mature technology on orbit now, and then provide upgraded capabilities as more tranches go online. In other words: In less time than it traditionally took the Air Force to design and launch one satellite, SDA wanted to launch 1,000. In the resulting 18 months, the agency has set a goal of launching its first satellites two years from now. “I certainly have to applaud SDA. In every case over the past year and a half, when they have set a date they have met that date,” Brown said. “They really kept to a very tight schedule, which is certainly impressive, especially for an agency that's only just standing up.” SDA issued its first request for proposals on May 1, seeking 20 satellites for its transport layer. Later that month, it issued another solicitation for eight wide-field-of-view satellites for its missile-tracking layer. “They've done things that we've never seen before,” said Bill Gattle, the chief executive of L3Harris Technologies' space systems business. “They were able to release a request for proposal very quickly, and it was actually a pretty good request for proposal.” Gattle said SDA was unusually clear in laying out what it wanted and that the agency had one priority: speed. SDA wanted vendors who could stick to their aggressive schedule and deliver satellites in two years' time. “They only gave industry 30 days to respond (for each request for proposal),” Gattle said. “That is unprecedented speed ― we normally get 45, 60 days.” Moreover, while it typically takes months to get feedback from the customer, SDA responded within three weeks, offered the proposers notes, and required updated submissions back within two weeks, recalled Gattle. “And then they awarded about two to three weeks later. That compressed timeline was stunning.” In August, the agency awarded Lockheed Martin and York Space Systems $188 million and $94 million respectively to each build 10 of those satellites. In October, the agency announced two more contracts: SpaceX and L3Harris would receive $149 million and $193 million respectively to each build four wide-field-of-view satellites for the NDSA's missile-tracking layer. Neither York Space Systems nor SpaceX responded to requests from C4ISRNET to discuss the contracts. “It demonstrates SDA [is] doing what it was created to do, which is to quickly obligate funds, move really quickly and execute toward the mission,” Lewis said, referring to the contracts. “It shows one of the values of SDA as kind of an independent organization in delivering this tranche 0,” he added. “It's not clear that a larger, more bureaucratic organization culture could have moved as quickly as SDA did.” Bringing in the new kids Program officials sometimes talk a big game about bringing in nontraditional vendors, yet end up awarding to the same small group of contractor giants over and over again. But with its first batch of four contracts, the agency has already brought in some surprising names. York Space Systems, which will be building 10 transport layer satellites, has never built a major satellite for the Air Force or Space Force. The small satellite manufacturer has done some experimental work with the military, but this seems to be the company's first major contract win with the Pentagon. SpaceX may be the most recognized company in the world when it comes to space, but to date the firm's efforts have been limited to launch services and satellite-enabled commercial broadband. SpaceX has scrappily fought over the last decade to win more national security launches, and earlier this year it was named one of two companies providing heavy launches for the Space Force over a five-year period. Additionally, the company's Starlink constellation has helped popularize the proliferated constellation concept on which SDA is built, and the services have begun experimenting with Starlink to enable beyond-line-of-sight communications. Still, this will be the first time SpaceX has built a satellite for the military. Neither York Space Systems nor SpaceX responded to requests for comment. L3Harris Technologies may not be a newcomer when it comes to supplying technology to the military, but many were likely surprised to see the company selected to build the missile-tracking satellites that will be key to the Pentagon's efforts to defeat hypersonic weapons. L3Harris has not built a missile warning satellite for the U.S. military before; its forays into infrared sensors was limited to weather satellites until now. “We were known pretty much as a weather company in this area, infrared,” Gattle admitted. “This is the culmination for us of a pretty big pivot in our company.” A couple of years ago, L3Harris decided to apply its weather-sensing infrared technology to missile tracking, with a focus on the types of satellites the military was signaling it wanted: affordable and quick to produce. In October, that bet seems to have initially paid off with SDA. “The industry people, including us, are all repositioning our companies to address basically the message that space has to be a war-fighting domain, space has to be more affordable, space has to have easier access, where you can get there faster,” Gattle said. “I think for a lot of us in the industry, we view this as probably the biggest transformation we've seen since the Apollo days.” Of course, Lockheed Martin stands out in the group as a defense giant — one of the companies that's always in the discussion when selecting a military satellite manufacturer — and naysayers may point to the firm's inclusion as proof that SDA isn't reinventing the wheel. The company itself is quick to acknowledge its role in the status quo, but Brown credited the contract win to Lockheed's ability to be disruptive and quickly refocus its energy. “We've demonstrated — and have been told from SDA — we've demonstrated that we've built upon Lockheed Martin's history of being disruptive,” Brown said. “We've had some success in the past and people have stopped associating us in some way with disruption, but this was a place where we really wanted to demonstrate something very differently from what you would see in some of our existing programs of record.” A key example of the company's pivot from exquisite space systems to proliferated constellations is Pony Express, Lockheed's experimental on-orbit mesh network. Developed in nine months, Pony Express was privately funded by the company to test new space-based computing capabilities that could enable on-orbit artificial intelligence, data analytics, cloud networking and advanced satellite communications. In other words, it was testing some of the very capabilities with which SDA wants to enable its own on-orbit mesh network. “We saw the requirements coming for transport layer — frankly, it's the capability that the U.S. government has needed for some time,” Brown said. “Pony Express really marked a little bit of a graduation, being able to show the community and show the world the kind of capabilities that Lockheed Martin had been investing in and developing for some time.” Lockheed brought forward some of the technologies developed for Pony Express to the transport layer. In addition, Brown claimed, the company's proposal included plans for a diversity of subcontracts in building its satellites, helping to expand the industrial base for SDA's future tranches, which will include a massive increase in the sheer number of satellites purchased. “We made a conscious choice not to take a heavily vertical approach because we don't think that that sort of vertical play that you might see from some other companies would have really benefited the SDA,” Brown said. Learning from industry Tournear has his own example of how his agency is unique, and it showcases how SDA wants to act like a commercial entity. Just as the agency awarded the two contracts for its first tracking layer satellites, it also canceled a contract for an experiment meant to reduce risk on those satellites. “We canceled that experiment because what we do at SDA is we continually look at measuring the return on investment to get the best capability for the taxpayer dollar, and we view that as the investment going forward,” Tournear said. “The tracking phenomenology experiment was started before tranche 0, with the idea that it would do two things. One, it would burn down risk for tranche 0 WFoV [wide field of view],” he added. “And number two, it would give us OPIR [overhead persistent infrared] bands that were multiple bands.” As the agency began receiving proposals, it became clear that some of the proposers were already including multiple bands on their OPIR solutions. In other words, SDA didn't need to develop its own solution for that capability — instead, industry could provide it. Still, the experiment would offer valuable risk reduction, giving the tracking layer a greater chance of succeeding. SDA decided to calculate whether it was worth continuing the experiment. “We had to look at the cost going forward to carry the tracking phenomenology experiment, subtract from that the risk leans that it would burn down in the WFoV experiment, and calculate, in essence, our net present value going forward,” Tournear explained. “So in that respect, canceling that program saved us a total net present value of $20 million.” One contributing factor was the knowledge that the experiment was only going to deliver data nine months prior to the satellites being delivered. That was not a lot of time to factor lessons learned into the final product. Additionally, the agency didn't have enough money allotted to buy all eight missile-tracking satellites. But by canceling the contract, SDA could apply the $20 million to buying more of them. “In order to ensure we get the best capability to the war fighter, the return is higher to invest that money toward getting more of the WFoV sensors up on tranche 0,” Tournear said. “That is a calculus that you don't often hear being made by the government on these programs. But it does show that we are trying to respond in a rapid manner to get these capabilities fielded as quickly as possible, and we're going to do trades to make sure that we push forward with getting those capabilities fielded." Tournear declined to say how many satellites the $20 million from the experiment bought, only noting that it enabled the agency to get the eight total satellites it wanted for tranche 0. “They're making good decisions. The ability to stop things that aren't working — I think that's really important. The ability to start things quickly — that's also really important,” said Lewis. https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/11/09/gotta-go-fast-how-americas-space-development-agency-is-shaking-up-acquisitions/

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  December 14, 2018 | International, Aerospace, Naval, Land, C4ISR, Security

  NATO defense investment official talks European security and artificial intelligence

  By: Sebastian Sprenger BERLIN — As the European Union positions itself to become a defense force in its own right, some in Washington have wondered if such moves would weaken NATO as the dominant trans-Atlantic security pact. Alliance leaders, including Camille Grand, who serves as NATO's assistant secretary general for defense investment, have defended EU efforts, arguing something good will come out of it if both organizations manage to cooperate. Grand sat down with Defense News Europe Editor Sebastian Sprenger during the NATO-Industry Forum in Berlin in November to discuss the state of play between the EU and NATO, defense spending by allies, and new technologies on the horizon. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has said the alliance can benefit from the European Union's newfound interest in all things defense. How so? It can be fruitful for both organizations as long as we work well together. Of course it is good news to see the European Union as a more active player in the field of defense, provided that we operate in an environment where we avoid competing guidance to the member states and the allies, especially those who are members of both organizations, and provided that the EU effort strengthens trans-Atlantic security by enabling the European allies to acquire capabilities earlier or faster or in a more efficient way. Outlook 2019: World leaders and analysts speak on the state of global security and the defense industry We have a number of areas of cooperation between the EU and NATO, including in the field of capability development. Could things be better? Yes, probably, for example in terms of interaction between both organizations and fostering transparency, access to relevant documents, and so forth. Ultimately, I think the issue is whether the European effort can be a good contribution to a broader burden-sharing effort. But I think we also have to keep in mind that the effort in the field of defense remains primarily with nations. There is still a sizable trans-Atlantic imbalance as it pertains to the size of the defense-industrial base. Is that detrimental in the long run? The situation is relatively well-known. The defense market in North America, and especially in the United States, is larger than in Europe. There is an imbalance in defense spending; that's the whole point about the defense investment pledge, to partially correct that and having European members invest more in defense. Beyond that, the consolidation of defense industries took place in the United States earlier. In Europe it is still a process that is underway. There are still many companies competing for all sorts of markets. We have a fragmented demand and a fragmented supply, if you will. The issue is not to end up with a single company in Europe or in the U.S.; I think competition is healthy. The issue is: Can we tackle the issue of fragmentation in a European market? As seen from NATO, we don't really do industrial policy, per se. That's really a European Commission perspective. If it enables Europeans to be more efficient in delivering the capabilities we all need in the alliance, that can be good news. What do you expect to come out of industry consolidation in Europe? First of all, I think it has to be a business-driven process, primarily. It's not for organizations such as the EU or NATO to decide. I think what is true is that we see repeatedly cases of where there are a very large number of types of equipment in the same category available. There are a number of medium and small players in Europe that are part of the defense equation, and the defense industry is something where states look carefully at preserving some national capacity. The issue is: Should that organization evolve over time into a slightly more consolidated market? For me, the key criteria is to promote opportunities for multinational cooperations, which is something that we do both at NATO and the EU. It's very important that allies who are EU member states, when they are in a position to do so, decide to go for multinational solutions — with or without a single industrial champion. The European NATO members have pledge to spend more on defense. How does that manifest itself from where you sit? First of all, they are indeed spending more on defense. The increase in defense spending for this year is expected to be more than 5 percent for Europe and Canada. It's a complete overturn from the previous 25 years. We are now in the fourth year in a row of increasing defense spending. This is starting to make a real difference. In the last couple of years, Europe and Canada have spent €36 billion (U.S. $27 billion) more on defense than they had done previously. This starts being real money. It enables us to do three things: First of all, to fill some of the very serious gaps that we have — whether in ammunition or spare parts, for example. Secondly, to reinvest in building up capabilities for identified shortfalls, for example air-to-air refueling, anti-submarine warfare, all sorts of domains. Thirdly, to invest in defense for innovation. For example, take a deeper look at disruptive technologies, 21st century technologies. From where I sit, I can see two things. First of all, the NATO defense-planning targets have been apportioned by all allies. It's the first time in history that all allies have agreed to deliver what they are being asked. Secondly, all allies have agreed to keep increasing their defense spending. We might see nuances in terms of when they intend to reach 2 percent of GDP, which has partly to do with the politics in each country. But I think the political commitment is very strong and was strengthened by the Brussels summit in many ways. There is more money coming, and that creates more opportunities not only for new capabilities but also more cooperation. I think altogether, we have a dynamic that is very positive. Ultimately it makes a difference. People were always pointing at the fact that the Russian Federation had tripled its defense budget over the previous decade. Without trying to match that in any shape or form into an arms race, we also have seen now that reinvesting massively in defense, as the Russian Federation has done, has given Moscow more ability to act in the Middle East, to modernize its conventional and nuclear forces, and so on and so forth. The notion that investing in defense doesn't make a difference is wrong. What are the top three of four areas that need more investment for NATO? One that we are focusing on is the joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance domain. This is something where modern warfare requires us to have an edge. Then also I would emphasize mobility, both tactical and strategic. All of our missions require the alliance to be very mobile and be able to forward-deploy quite quickly. I would also cite integrated air and missile defense as a domain of focus. And lastly, the maritime domain, especially anti-submarine warfare. But those are only examples. We are in the process of designing NATO for the 21st century, which needs to be more agile and regain a degree of robustness that we didn't necessarily anticipate 10 years ago when we were working on the assumption that the primary objective of NATO would be to have light, deployable forces to go out of area. I could have mentioned cyber, of course, as a priority. I didn't mention it because while it is obviously a major, major domain for building our capabilities on, it is probably not as cash-intensive as others. The Germans seems to be perpetually moving toward 2 percent of GDP on defense, as opposed to saying when they will reach it. Is that enough? Is the GDP-percentage metric suitable for defense contributions? First of all, Germany has turned a corner on defense spending. I would note that Germany has a commitment to move to 1.5 percent, which is significant. Is this enough? Probably not. And Germany should meet its political commitment like other allies and aim towards moving as quickly as possible to the 2 percent objective. Having said this, 2 percent is a figure that is quite reasonable. The Cold War figure for Germany was more in the 3 percent realm. The notion that 2 percent would be a massive and disruptive number doesn't seem to me quite convincing. The second argument that I sometimes hear in the wealthy European countries is that 2 percent when you're rich is much more difficult to achieve. I could exactly reverse that argument, saying 2 percent when you're poor is much more difficult to achieve because then you're competing with much more immediate, existential needs in terms of infrastructure, education and so on. From that perspective, the good news with the 2 percent concept is that the burden is the same for everyone. Of course, with Germany being the largest economy in Europe, a lot of effort tends to be indeed with Germany. Germany already has demonstrated a willingness to move significantly in this direction, and there are high expectations that it will continue down that route and meet the target. I honestly think it's both doable and manageable. But then, of course, that doesn't happen overnight. Are NATO and the EU on the same page when it comes to modernizing the members' combat aircraft fleets, especially in Europe? I wouldn't say there is a NATO-EU competition or disagreement over that because, first of all, NATO doesn't take sides in terms of choosing equipment. NATO identified the need to modernize and keep an effective air force. And then each ally can decided which way they want to go. Some of them, quite a number now, have decided to go for the F-35 solution. On the other hand, other allies have either recently acquired planes that are quite modern — whether it's the Eurofighter or the Rafale — or are projecting to build together — as the French and the Germans [are] — the next generation of aircraft. Britain is also contemplating its own. From a NATO perspective, I think it's fair to say that we recognize every ally's right to pursue what they think is the best approach to address a capability challenge. The European Union is pursuing a slightly different perspective because the EU does have a dimension in terms of industrial policy and research policy where they can see benefits in supporting technological development in Europe. The United States, Russia and China are spending significant amounts of money on artificial intelligence research and development. Where does NATO as a whole stand on investments in this area? We have to look very seriously, as NATO allies, at the latest generation of disruptive technologies. And artificial intelligence is one of them. There is a major challenge coming from other major powers, starting with China. The United States is already well into it, Europe is starting to do that. I would nevertheless put AI in the broader context of new and disruptive technologies because I think it's one of them. And AI can also probably bring a lot to our intelligence efforts. But I would put it in the broader context of all sorts of technology revolutions underway. And maybe sometimes we over-focus on AI only, as if it was the single game changer. Nobody has fully assessed how much it's going to change the way we do military operations. Is AI going to be a tool to assist in decisions, or is AI going to allow for more autonomous systems to operate? On this, we've been working very, very hard, including with Allied Command Transformation. https://www.defensenews.com/outlook/2018/12/10/nato-defense-investment-official-talks-european-security-and-artificial-intelligence

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  October 17, 2023 | International, Naval

  Lockheed Martin's Next Generation Interceptor Program Advances Through Major Design Milestone

  Huntsville, Ala., October 16, 2023 /PRNewswire/ -- Lockheed Martin's (NYSE: LMT) Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) program executed its digital All Up Round (AUR) Preliminary Design Review (PDR), in partnership with...