22 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

Will COVID-19 Kill The Liberal World Order?

By JAMES KITFIELDon May 22, 2020 at 4:01 AM

For a brief moment it seemed that the worst global pandemic in a century might lead to increased comity between the United States, China and Russia after years of geopolitical eye-gauging. As the virus spread there were early signs of a pause in the escalating cycle of military brinksmanship, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns and trade wars that has badly shaken the rules-based international order in this era of great power competition.

Beijing seemed to initially embrace a spirit of cooperation when it donated protective gear and testing equipment to hard hit countries in Europe. President Trump for months was uncharacteristically effusive in his praise of Chinese President Xi Jinping's efforts to combat the virus. Russian President Vladimir Putin got into the soft power act in early April when he dispatched an An-124 military transport to New York filled with donated masks and ventilators. (Of course, you can also argue it was a highly effective information operation designed to undermine U.S. standing in the world.)

That moment was short lived.

“Unfortunately, this crisis is likely to unfold in three consecutive waves, with a public health crisis followed by an economic crisis, quite possibly followed by a security crisis,” said David Kilcullen, author of the recent book “The Dragons and Snakes: How the Rest Learned to Fight the West,” and a former special adviser to Gen. David Petraeus in Iraq, and the U.S. Secretary of State. The United States is already experiencing high levels of domestic unrest at a time of paralyzing partisan rancor, he noted, and the discord will certainly increase as the presidential election nears in November. Adding to that combustible mixture is likely to be a second wave of the virus expected to hit in the fall, and foreign actors like Russian and China determined to use disinformation to stoke domestic divisions during the election.

“Given the likelihood of internal instability and anti-government anger here and around the world, there will be a huge incentive for leaders who personalize politics like Trump, [Russian President Vladimir] Putin and [Chinese President] Xi Jinping to look for external scapegoats for their domestic troubles, which has already started to happen,” said Kilcullen. “This crisis also comes at a point when the international system that we've known since the end of World War II was already rotting and weaker than it appears. It may only take one big shock to bring that whole structure down, and, if we're not very careful, the pandemic could be that shock. So this is the most dangerous geopolitical dynamic I have seen in my entire career.”

As it became clear the Chinese Communist Party covered up the initial outbreak of the novel coronavirus in Wuhan, wasting precious time and allowing it to blossom into a global pandemic, Beijing launched a campaign of intimidation and economic threats to mute international criticism. Borrowing a page from Russian disinformation operations, Beijing posited the conspiracy theory that the virus originated with the U.S. military. Both China and Russia pushed alarmist narratives about the pandemic on social media to sow division and panic inside the United States. Much of the protective equipment Beijing “donated” to the West carried a price tag and turned out to be defective.

In his own campaign of blame shifting and heated rhetoric, President Donald Trump accused China of being responsible for an attack on the United States that “is worse that Pearl Harbor,” and “worse than the World Trade Center” that fell in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Chinese incompetence in dealing with the virus, Trump tweeted this week, is responsible for “mass Worldwide killing!”

Trump darkly hinted in mid-April that he had information that a virology lab in Wuhan played an important role in the virus' creation, even though the U.S. Intelligence Community consensus was that the virology lab in Wuhan had nothing to do the virus' creation or origins.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo insisted there is “enormous evidence” the coronavirus originated in that lab. “We greatly underestimated the degree to which Beijing is ideologically and politically hostile to free nations,” Pompeo told reporters this week, after sending a rare, high-level message of congratulations to recently reelected Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen, who has rejected the “one country, two systems” construct that has kept the peace between China and Taiwan for nearly half a century.

As the Trump administration weighs retribution against China, it has continued to ratchet up the rhetoric and provocations, angering and worrying allies by cutting critical funding to the World Health Organization (WHO) in the midst of the pandemic, and boycotting a virtual meeting of G-20 nations that attempted to coordinate an international response to the crisis, leaving a leadership gap that China was happy to help fill.

Meanwhile, populist leaders and autocratic regimes around the world are using the threat of the pandemic to assume extraordinary powers and crack down on their political opposition in what the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Counterterrorism and Human Rights called an “an epidemic of authoritarianism,” according to the The New York Times.

Shaky World Order

Even before the pandemic the post-WW II international order that the United States constructed and led for more than half a century was on shaky ground. The global institutions, alliances and rules governing international relations has been challenged by assertive autocratic regimes like China and Russia, and eroded from within by inward-looking nationalist-populists movements spreading throughout the Western democracies.

The liberal international order has also been largely abandoned by its leader as Donald Trump's administration retreats further into “America First” isolationism. The Trump doctrine in international affairs actively seeks to undermine the institutions of global order, whether it's the World Health and Trade Organizations, the UN, the European Union or NATO. The administration has rejected or abolished all manner of multilateral agreements and treaties designed to peacefully constrain international rivalries, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, the Paris Climate Agreement, the Iran nuclear deal, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, and quite possibly next year the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).

A Dark History

History is rife with cautionary examples of natural disasters or economic crises conflating with geopolitical tensions, with cataclysmic results. The catastrophic 1918 Spanish flu pandemic, which killed more than 20 million victims worldwide, was accelerated and spread by troop movements during World War I. With many Americans disillusioned by the war and loss, the United States turned insular and isolationist during the 1920s, rejecting the League of Nations, dramatically curtailing immigration and erecting steep tariff barriers to trade. Much of the rest of the world followed suit.

The U.S. stock market crash of 1929 was compounded the next year by one of the worst droughts in history. When the Japanese invaded China two years later, and Adolf Hitler became German chancellor soon after, there was no League of Nations nor stabilizing trading systems to contain the war fever that swept the globe and became World War II.

“When you think back to 1918 and the Spanish flu, it's worth remembering that more people died in the second wave than the first, and the Great Depression and the 1930s taught us that bad economic conditions can be transformative,” said Joseph Nye, a professor emeritus and former Dean of the Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, speaking recently on a videoconference organized by The National Interest. “The point is, in the current pandemic we're likely only in Act 1 of a multi-act play.”

Combustible Leadership

The very real potential for the pandemic crisis to propel the major powers towards outright military conflict was noted recently by the Chinese Ministry of State Security, Beijing's top intelligence agency. In a report for Xi Jinping and the senior Chinese leadership it reportedly concluded that global anti-China sentiment being stoked by the Trump administration has reached its highest peak since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, and as a result China needs to be prepared for a worst-case scenario of armed confrontation with the United States.

Despite the warnings, Xi Jinping has doubled down in recent months on provocative military maneuvers in its neighboring seas, sending its Liaoning carrier battle group and military flights off the coast of Taiwan; conducting anti-submarine exercises in contested areas of the South China Sea; ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat near the disputed Paracel Islands; dispatching a fishing boat “militia” to harass Philippine counterparts near the contested Spratly Islands; and harassing a Malaysian drillship.

Some analysts see those moves as an attempt by Xi Jinping to show strength and bolster his image at home among a Chinese populace wearied by the pandemic shutdowns and economic disruptions. Those provocations are exactly the kind of saber-rattling that can escalate dangerously in a time of crisis.

George Beebe is a former director of the CIA's Russia analysis section, and author of the book “The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia Could Spiral into Catastrophe.” “My concern is that the major power leaders Putin, Xi and Trump all tend to personalize international relations and politics. They are all going through severe economic and political distress. Each of them is convinced that their rivals are trying to exploit the pandemic crisis, and not one of them is dealing from a position of strength and confidence,” he told me.

Putin has long felt betrayed and threatened by the United States, Beebe noted, and Xi Jinping is convinced that America is trying to thwart China's rise. One of the few constants in Trump's worldview is the conviction that China has taken advantage of the United States with trade going back decades.

“So there's a lot of fear and emotion and very little trust in the relationships between these leaders during a time of great strain, and their communications and diplomatic mechanisms to manage a crisis if one occurs have atrophied,” said Beebe. “Given that personalities and personal relationships among national leaders are far more important in international affairs than a lot of people appreciate, I do worry that we're entering a very dangerous period when cooler heads may not prevail among the great power leaders.”

https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/will-covid-19-kill-the-liberal-world-order

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19 mai 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

Project Convergence: Linking Army Missile Defense, Offense, & Space
The Army wants to do a tech demonstration in the southwestern desert – COVID permitting – of how the new weapons systems it's developing can share data. By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. WASHINGTON: As the Army urgently develops its 31 top-priority technologies for future war, service leaders are studying a proposal to field-test some of them together later this year, Army officials told me. The technology demonstration, known as Project Convergence, is still tentative, a spokesperson for the Army's Pentagon headquarters cautioned me. There's no guarantee it will even happen this year, in no small part because the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted field testing, wargames, and training exercises across the Army. If it does happen, it's far from settled which systems will be involved. Nevertheless, from what I've gleaned, Project Convergence will probably try to form a “sensor-to-shooter” network that shares data between systems being developed in at least three of the Army's Big Six modernization portfolios: Long-Range Precision Fires, the Army's No. 1 modernization priority, which aims to rebuild the artillery with new long-range cannons and surface-to-surface missiles to hit ground targets; The Army Network, priority No. 4, which will link Army units using everything from software-defined digital radios to new Low Earth Orbit satellites; and Air & Missile Defense, priority No. 5, which is developing its own specialized, high-speed network, IBCS, to relay targeting data on fast-flying threats with split-second accuracy. I've not heard specifically about systems from the Army's other three major modernization portfolios: armored vehicles (priority No. 2), high-speed aircraft (No. 3), and soldier gear (No. 6). But the Army envisions all of them as sharing intelligence over the network. “The Next Generation Ground Vehicle is an important sensor and observer for Long-Range Precision Fires,” said Brig. Gen. John Rafferty, the LRPF director at Army Futures Command. “Same with Future Vertical Lift, same with the Army's space strategy led by APNT, and the network enables all of this.” In fact, the Army ultimately wants to connect its units to the Air Force, Marines, Navy, and Space Force through a future network-of-networks called JADC2. That's short for Joint All-Domain Command & Control, a vision of seamlessly coordinating operations across the five official “domains”: land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. “We have to make sure that what we technically demonstrate later this year fits into a larger JADC2 architecture,” Rafferty told me in a recent interview. “I view this as kind of the ground portion of JADC2. How do we meet JADC2 in the middle? We're going to start from the ground up, they're going from space down.” “We have to have a capability to converge these different systems at the decisive place and time,” he said. “We have to have a network.” Many of the necessary network technologies are ones under consideration for what's called Capability Set 23, a package of network upgrades set to enter service in three years. The first round of upgrades, CS 21, goes to infantry units next year. But CS 23, focused on far-ranging armored formations, aims to add extensive new long-range communication capabilities using Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) and Mid-Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites. “Every two years we're developing a new set of kit that we deliver as part of those capability sets,” Col. 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That kind of network capacity is particularly crucial for connecting “sensors to shooters.” Sure, old-fashioned radio or more modern chat-style systems work okay for reporting where a unit is moving or what supplies are running low. But targeting data, especially for moving targets, requires much more precision and becomes out of date much more quickly. “It's the second oldest challenge for artillery,” Rafferty told me, ever since 19th century cannon began to shoot over the horizon at targets their gunners couldn't see. “The oldest challenge is shooting farther, the second challenge is the sensor to shooter part: How do you minimize the time between the observation of the target and the delivery of the effects?” For the longest-range new weapons the Army is developing, like ground-based hypersonic missiles and thousand-mile superguns, the sensor-to-shooter problem is even harder, because the Army doesn't have any sensors that can see that far. Nor does it intend to build them: The service's deputy chief of staff for intelligence, Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, has said publicly the Army doesn't need its own reconnaissance satellites. So while the Army is buying new Grey Eagle -Extended Range scout drones with an estimated range of 200 miles, longer-range shots will rely on Space Force satellites and Air Force and Navy reconnaissance planes to spot targets. Another potential source of information for long-range offensive fires, Rafferty said, is the Army's air and missile defense force. While air and missile defense radars are designed to track flying targets, they can also often calculate where missiles and artillery shells are being fired from, and those enemy batteries are prime targets for the Army's own long-range weapons. It's also much easier to blow up an enemy launcher on the ground – ideally before it fires – rather than try to shoot down projectiles in flight, so, where possible, the best missile defense is a good offense. “I started to really think about this a few years ago when I did an exercise in Europe, called the Austere Challenge, when I was still a brigade commander,” Rafferty told me. “It was an eye-opening exercise for me because I'd never really operated at the theater level.... I started to see the importance of that teamwork between the theater-level [offensive] fires and the theater-level air defense systems.” Training and modernization for both offensive and defense fires are based out of Fort Sill, Okla. “We're lucky because the Air and Missile Defense Cross Functional Team is right downstairs,” Rafferty said. Rafferty's counterpart for air and missile defense is Brig. Gen. Brian Gibson. “It's about connections and access to the data,” Gibson told me in a recent interview. “Sharing the right data with the right user at the right time, along latency timelines that are useful... is really where the trick to this puzzle lies.” “The most important part,” Gibson said, “where most of the work has gone on, is to understand where the linkages need to occur” between the Army's general-purpose Integrated Tactical Network (ITN) – that's what CS 21 and CS 23 are building — and the specialized, high-performance network for air and missile defense, IBCS. As hard as it is to hit a moving target on the ground, it's exponentially more difficult to hit one in the air, especially a supersonic cruise missile or ballistic missile moving at many times the speed of sound. If your targeting data is a millisecond out of date, you may miss entirely. So, explained Gibson and his acquisition program partner, Maj. Gen. Robert Rasch (PEO Missiles & Space), you can't add anything to the IBCS network without making very sure it won't slow that data down. But IBCS can certainly output the data it's already collecting for other systems to use, including long-range precision fires. “They can be a consumer of IBCS,” Rasch told me. And since ground targets don't move as fast as missiles, he said, IBCS wouldn't have to send updates to offensive artillery batteries at the same frenetic pace that air and missile defense units require. “It doesn't have to be in milliseconds,” he said. “It can be in seconds.” Yes, seconds seem like a long time in missile defense, but to someone shooting at ground targets, that's lightning-quick. “We've got great opportunities to leverage IBCS,” Rafferty said. “The way I view it, that's another sensor, with very capable radars, and that integrated air defense network is reliable and fast.” https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/project-convergence-linking-army-missile-defense-offense-space
5 août 2019 | International, C4ISR

Carderock Uses High-Fidelity Signature Simulation to Train Surface Combat Systems
By Benjamin McNight III, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Public Affairs WEST BETHESDA, Md. (NNS) -- In the world of simulations, getting a system to act as close to authentic as the real-world situations it represents is always the main goal. Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Carderock Division develops high-fidelity acoustic simulation and training systems, giving naval personnel the ability to practice combat scenarios virtually. The Combined Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) and Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Trainer, better known as CIAT, made its official debut in December 2018 at Naval Base San Diego. In June, Naval Station Norfolk became the site for another CIAT installation. Motions to create this trainer began in 2014, according to Rich Loeffler, Carderock's senior scientific technical manager, director for signatures, tactical decision aids and training systems (Code 705). “CIAT is what we refer to as a Combat Systems Team Trainer,” Loeffler said. “Meaning that your goal is to bring in the whole portion of the crew that would be operating the combat system and train them in a shore site how they can best utilize the system when they are at sea.” Carderock shares CIAT responsibilities with NSWC Dahlgren Division. Dahlgren is responsible for the overall system integration and manages the IAMD aspect of the trainer, while Carderock leads the development of the acoustic and ASW capabilities. Carderock also has capabilities that contribute to the IAMD training. Using the periscope simulation that creates a real-time visual simulation of what one could see through the periscope of a submarine, Loeffler said they were able to utilize that technology for the surface ship trainer in the CIAT. “In this case, they have deck cameras if they want to be able to see when a missile launches from the forward or aft launchers. We basically provide the visuals for that,” he said. By modeling the threats and the ocean environment and then stimulating the actual tactical combat system software, the CIAT system is highly flexible in the ability to train real-world scenarios. With the many possibilities of training situations that can be created within the CIAT comes the need to use multiple sources of knowledge to create effective training situations that will benefit the fleet. “We'll work with people like the Office of Naval Intelligence to get threat intelligence data, we'll work with folks like the Naval Oceanographic Office to get the latest environmental models and databases, and then we'll work with the tactical programs themselves to get the tactical software,” Loeffler said. “Our role here at Carderock has been to leverage signature simulation capabilities we have developed over the years across submarine, surface and surveillance ASW trainers and provide the system design, development, integration and testing support to implement the CIAT requirement to support the fleet's training needs,” he said. Before the CIAT existed, the Surface ASW Synthetic Trainer (SAST) was developed by Carderock as an on-board embedded training system within the AN/SQQ-89 A(V)15 Sonar system. Loeffler said beginning in 2008, they went through a series of large analyses to compare and contrast what the simulation produced with what operators saw at sea. The data from that testing helped further develop the SAST and subsequently create the CIAT. Now, they are able to represent all components of the operations they run from the physics modeling perspective, such as what sounds are generated and how they propagate through the water, interactions with interfering objects and sea-state effects on these variables. “Since we're acoustically stimulating the actual tactical software of the sonar system, the users are operating the systems just as they would at sea,” he said. Loeffler believes that there is not anything off limits for what the CIAT can do, but adapting with new threats will require the right development within the trainer to represent the real-world situation. Although the system is relatively new, discussions on the next steps in the development of the trainer are already taking place with the help of Center for Surface Combat Systems (CSCS) defining and prioritizing fleet training requirements “CSCS is basically the primary stakeholder that owns the surface-ship training schoolhouses, and they've done their requirements review to see what additional capabilities they'd like to see in the next version of CIAT,” Loeffler said. “So, we're going through that process, assessing those requirements and looking for what would go into the next version to further improve training and also address training of the new combat system capabilities as they are being introduced into the fleet.” https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=110471
26 mars 2020 | International, C4ISR

BAE execs explain the thinking behind their latest acquisition
By: Mark Pomerleau In late January, Arlington, Virginia-based BAE Systems Inc. announced two acquisitions to bolster its electronic systems sector, a move that reflected a combined investment of $2.2 billion. The purchase included $1.9 billion for Collins Aerospace's GPS receivers business and $275 million for Raytheon's tactical airborne radios. Company leaders saw an opportunity. GPS receivers could provide secure and resilient position data that would help precision-guided munitions become more accurate. Airborne tactical radios, typically installed on rotary, fixed-wing aircraft and drones, would create a new business for BAE's electronic systems sector. The properties became available because of a proposed merger between United Technologies and Raytheon, and BAE's two top executives said they see the purchase as a way to more closely hew their businesses toward the Pentagon's long-term needs. Specifically, they point to the 2018 National Defense Strategy. A closing is dependent on the Raytheon-United Technologies merger and is expected in the first half of 2020. C4ISRNET's Mark Pomerleau spoke recently with Jerry DeMuro, BAE's chief executive, and Tom Arseneault, company president and chief operating officer, about the thinking behind the investment. C4ISRNET: How do you see these acquisitions fitting into BAE overall? What opportunities could this create? Jerry DeMuro: As we look at the National Defense Strategy and we look at the service modernization priorities and where we think customers are headed in our core markets, we think that these two businesses are very relevant. We have capabilities in those areas that these properties complement very well. Both of them happen to be very mature, well-established, strong technology-based businesses that are on the cusp of significant growth because of the relevance to the service priorities. [It's a] unique opportunity [that] only came about because of the UTC-Raytheon merger. We were very pleased to see it [and we were] opportunistic in going after them. Tom Arseneault: Precision and autonomy are two key things that run through the Defense Strategy and priorities in the services and the technologies that [Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering] Dr. [Mike] Griffin talks about. With autonomy, you need to know where you are. Position data is important. Secure, resilient position information. Military GPS is a critical underlying technology. With Collins, you've got a company that's been doing this for 40-plus years and a million and a half of these devices are out there going to M-Code [a new military signal used for GPS]. Autonomy, ditto. You need to know where you are ... certainly with precision-guided munitions. You're also relying on secure communications. You need to know where you are, and you need to be able to communicate with the systems around you. C4ISRNET: How do you see these new businesses complementing what you already have and allowing you to pursue contracts that you couldn't before? DeMuro: We've been working for a number of years now — most people don't know — but we have a precision-guided munitions business. We provide the seekers for the THAAD [Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense]; we provide all the smarts in terms of combining EW, precision locating and navigating in the LRASM [Long-Range Anti- Ship] missile. We just won the [Precision Guidance Kit] contract — precision-guided mortar. We are also the provider of the high-velocity projectile and putting these kinds of capabilities in there. It's a great fit for that business, but also in many of the other things that we produce. Combining this kind of capability gives us a whole new market that we can bring their capabilities to. And the same thing applies in the radio world, software-defined radios. We can take some of those waveforms and incorporate them in devices that we have today in our C4ISR portfolio. It's not about cost synergies; it's really about market synergies in those places where we're headed already. C4ISRNET: Obviously, some of those capabilities, such as THAAD, are dependent on a lot of disparate systems. Does this acquisition help BAE become more interoperable with a lot of other systems? DeMuro: Think about a product that we make today, the Link 16 [military tactical data link network]. Arseneault: We own the Link 16 waveform as part of the fundamental portfolio of our current communications business. Now we'll be able to add that family of waveforms, we'll be able to use it on these acquired radios and then vice versa. There's a number of waveforms — software-defined radio waveforms — that come with this portfolio, that we will be able to then market out through our existing communication devices. THAAD was more on the precision side. While THAAD, itself, is a seeker of a type, I think this is more applicable to some of the new next-generation seekers that will want to be multimodal. So it's [electro-optical/infrared], it'll be radio frequency and GPS. [We want to] have as many opportunities to get a really good sense of what's driving precision. With a million-and-a-half devices out there, there is a whole wide set of customers that these will continue to supply. But this will also be a good opportunity for us to incorporate that technology into some of our roadmaps. SECTR [Seeker Cost Transformation] is a DARPA program, a next-generation multimodal seeker. So, GPS will be a piece of that. The idea being where seekers are more modular and so you can use a seeker on multiple weapon types and reduce costs and have greater efficiency. C4ISRNET: Are you thinking of a card you can plug in? Or more software adaptable? DeMuro: Chip sets, right. Combined functionality ... because it's all about size, weight and power and cost as you get out there. But the presence of these two product families, and what has to happen to upgrade them in and of itself, supports the business case. We didn't really include a lot of synergies in the business case, but we see some real opportunity there. C4ISRNET: Can you expand on the autonomy side? I see how the GPS, and linking GPS to radio, can lead to greater precision, but where do you see opportunities on the autonomy side? Arseneault: Autonomous systems need to know where they are. Secure, resilient position information is critical ... DeMuro: Anti-spoofing. Arseneault: These sorts of devices are going to find their way into many if not all of the modern autonomous systems. Likewise, you need to be able to communicate with things around you. As we're headed to swarms, they want to know where they are. They want to know where all of their surrounding platforms are. Manned-unmanned teaming is another version of autonomy where you want to know, and you want to be able to communicate with your wingman as they call it. DeMuro: If you think about anti-access/aerial denial, doing all of this in a contested environment — it's got to be secure. M-Code is absolutely essential to that. These waveforms, low probability of intercept, low probability of detection and also software-defined radios are very agile in moving around to enable that in contested environments. Both of these properties help accomplish that. C4ISRNET: You mentioned the National Defense Strategy; what role do these non-kinetic capabilities play in future conflicts? DeMuro: They're foundational. If you don't have them, you can't operate in the future environment. https://www.c4isrnet.com/industry/2020/03/23/bae-execs-explain-the-thinking-behind-their-latest-acquisition

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