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  18 décembre 2020 | International, Terrestre

  GM Defense begins renovating N.C. facility to build ISVs

  By Christen McCurdy Dec. 17 (UPI) -- GM Defense announced Thursday that it has started renovation of an existing General Motors building to support production of the Infantry Squad Vehicle, an all-terrain troop carrier designed to transport a nine-soldier infantry squad. The 750,000-square-foot facility is located in Concord, N.C. Construction at the facility is likely to continue into early spring, with the production line delivering vehicles in April. "We have tremendous momentum behind our ISV win, featuring a first-of-its-kind tactical wheeled vehicle that gives our Soldiers speed, durability and performance to enhance mission success," said Tim Herrick, interim president of GM Defense. "GM Defense is responsible for the design, engineering and manufacturing of the ISV. This facility will enable us to meet our customer's timeline for delivery while continuing our journey to bring commercial technologies and transformative mobility solutions to the defense market." The 5,000-pound ISV is based on the 2020 Chevrolet Colorado ZR2 midsize truck architecture and uses 90 percent commercial-off-the-shelf parts, but is engineered to fulfill military requirements and designed to provide rapid ground mobility. The ISV is light enough to be sling loaded from a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter and compact enough to fit inside a CH-47 Chinook helicopter, and includes a Rollover Protection System for transportability on any battleground. The facility is slated to manufacture 649 ISVs in support of the production of the 2,065 vehicles GM Defense is contracted to deliver per a $214.3 million award awarded to GM Defense in June. The deal is the first major award since GM created a defense subsidiary in 2017. GM Defense delivered its first ISV to the Army in October. https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2020/12/17/GM-Defense-begins-renovating-NC-facility-to-build-ISVs/4241608253661/

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  5 juin 2020 | International, Naval

  SAIC wins contract foe heavyweight and lightweight torpedo testing services for U.S Navy

  Reston, Va. - (BUSINESS WIRE) - June 2, 2020 - The U.S. Navy awarded Science Applications International Corp. (NYSE: SAIC) a prime contract worth approximately $60 million to continue to provide mission engineering support by testing heavyweight and lightweight torpedoes for the Naval Sea Systems Command. This press release features multimedia. View the full release here: https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200602005228/en/ In support of the Naval Undersea Warfare Center (NUWC) Division Newport, SAIC will handle testing and data collection for MK 48 Heavyweight Torpedoes, and MK 54 and MK 46 Lightweight torpedoes. “For more than 13 years, SAIC has supported the testing of approximately 150 torpedoes as part of the engineering, technical, and management services we provide to the NUWC's Propulsion Test Facility in Newport, Rhode Island,” said Jim Scanlon, executive vice president and general manager of the Defense Systems Group. “We look forward to continuing to support NUWC with testing of torpedoes and torpedo components over the next five years.” As part of the single-award contract, SAIC will prepare the test facility and test torpedoes, interface the test torpedo, execute the test, and collect and process test data. Additionally, SAIC will support preparing torpedoes for testing at off-site test ranges and locations. SAIC will also provide maintenance, upgrades, and operational support for test torpedo assembly and turnaround, system and subsystem testing, data reduction, test equipment operation, and data and configuration management. The cost-plus-fixed-fee and firm-fixed-price contract has a one-year base period of performance with four option years. About SAIC SAIC® is a premier Fortune 500® technology integrator driving our nation's digital transformation. Our robust portfolio of offerings across the defense, space, civilian, and intelligence markets includes secure high-end solutions in engineering, IT modernization, and mission solutions. Using our expertise and understanding of existing and emerging technologies, we integrate the best components from our own portfolio and our partner ecosystem to deliver innovative, effective, and efficient solutions that are critical to achieving our customers' missions. We are 25,500 strong; driven by mission, united by purpose, and inspired by opportunities. Headquartered in Reston, Virginia, SAIC has pro forma annual revenues of approximately $7.1 billion.​​​​ For more information, visit saic.com. For ongoing news, please visit our newsroom. Forward-Looking Statements Certain statements in this release contain or are based on “forward-looking” information within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. In some cases, you can identify forward-looking statements by words such as “expects,” “intends,” “plans,” “anticipates,” “believes,” “estimates,” “guidance,” and similar words or phrases. Forward-looking statements in this release may include, among others, estimates of future revenues, operating income, earnings, earnings per share, charges, total contract value, backlog, outstanding shares and cash flows, as well as statements about future dividends, share repurchases and other capital deployment plans. Such statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve risk, uncertainties and assumptions, and actual results may differ materially from the guidance and other forward-looking statements made in this release as a result of various factors. Risks, uncertainties and assumptions that could cause or contribute to these material differences include those discussed in the “Risk Factors,” “Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations” and “Legal Proceedings” sections of our Annual Report on Form 10-K, as updated in any subsequent Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q and other filings with the SEC, which may be viewed or obtained through the Investor Relations section of our website at saic.com or on the SEC's website at sec.gov. Due to such risks, uncertainties and assumptions you are cautioned not to place undue reliance on such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date hereof. SAIC expressly disclaims any duty to update any forward-looking statement provided in this release to reflect subsequent events, actual results or changes in SAIC's expectations. SAIC also disclaims any duty to comment upon or correct information that may be contained in reports published by investment analysts or others. View source version on businesswire.com: https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200602005228/en/ Lauren Presti 703-676-8982 lauren.a.presti@saic.com Source: Science Applications International Corp.

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  9 juin 2020 | International, Aérospatial

  Russia’s new nuclear policy could be a path to arms control treaties

  By: Sarah Bidgood Russia recently published a new document, titled “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence.” Its release marks the first time that Russia's official policy on deterrence has been made publicly available. As others have observed, this document is an example of declaratory policy aimed primarily at a foreign audience — and should be read with this orientation in mind. Still, it contains information that helps readers better understand how Russia thinks about nuclear weapons, and this certainly makes it worth a close examination. Some of the more useful insights this document offers pertain to Russia's threat assessments and what it sees as likely pathways to nuclear use. A number of these threats line up with American declaratory policy as reflected in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. These overlaps are noteworthy, since the U.S. and Russia have traditionally been able to work together to mitigate mutual threats even when their bilateral relationship is in crisis. As such, they can point toward ways to get arms control back on track at a time when it is in deep trouble. One such area of overlap appears in section 19C, which covers the conditions that could allow for nuclear use. This list includes an “attack by [an] adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions." The similarities between this language and that which appears in the 2018 NPR are considerable. That document identifies “attacks on U.S., allied, or partner civilian populations and infrastructure and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities” as a significant non-nuclear strategic attacks that could warrant the use of nuclear weapons. These parallels suggest that an agreement prohibiting attacks on nuclear command, control and communications systems could be of interest to both Washington and Moscow. A treaty along these lines would help to shore up crisis stability while rebuilding trust and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. It could also become a multilateral approach involving the five nuclear weapon states, which have been meeting regularly to discuss risk reduction and other topics. This would represent one of the few concrete outcomes of these discussions, which have been met with cautious enthusiasm but have so far failed to bear much fruit. Another example of mutual U.S.-Russia threats appears in section 12E of the Russian document. Here, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, technology and equipment for their manufacture” are described as risks that nuclear deterrence is meant to neutralize. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons seems to remain a focus of U.S. nuclear policy, too, and the 2018 NPR commits to strengthening institutions that support “verifiable, durable progress on non-proliferation.” This ongoing shared interest is an argument for renewed U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area, especially as it relates to strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. There is a long history of engagement between the two largest nuclear weapon states on nonproliferation, even at times of major discord in their relationship. Successful outcomes of this cooperation include the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty itself, which the United States and the Soviet Union concluded 50 years ago to stop additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Despite decades of joint work toward this shared goal, the rift between Washington and Moscow has now brought most bilateral efforts in this area to a halt. As some in Iran, Turkey and Germany contemplate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, it's time for the U.S. and Russia to shore up the credibility of the regime they built. Other sections of Russia's document offer additional glimpses into Moscow's perceived threats, although not all find ready analogs in U.S. declaratory policy. Many relate instead to the possibility that an adversary will carry out a conventional attack on Russia. Sections 12 and 14, for instance, reference the risks posed by adversary deployments of medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, non-nuclear high-precision and hypersonic weapons, strike unmanned aerial vehicles, and directed-energy weapons. They also mention the deployment of missile defense systems in space; military buildups by would-be adversaries of general-purpose force groupings that possess nuclear weapons delivery means in territories neighboring Russia; and the placement of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear weapons states, among others. There is little here that would surprise most Russia-watchers, but if the U.S. is serious about pursuing “next generation” arms control, it is useful to have a list of potential topics for discussion that go beyond ballistic missile defense. This list might also prove helpful in negotiating asymmetric treaties or in identifying confidence-building measures that cross domains. Overall, this short document does provide greater clarity with respect to Russia's deterrence strategy, but it is ambiguous on many points as well. Olga Oliker, the International Crisis Group's program director for Europe and Central Asia, noted, for instance, it does not settle the debate over whether Russia has an “escalate-to-deescalate” policy, and it is (unsurprisingly) vague about the precise circumstances under which Russia would consider using nuclear weapons. Still, despite leaving some questions unanswered, the document offers a valuable window into Russia's strengths and vulnerabilities as they appear from Moscow. While likely not the intended signal this document was meant to send, it nevertheless points to possible opportunities for engagement when other good alternatives are hard to see. https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/06/08/russias-new-nuclear-policy-could-be-a-path-to-arms-control-treaties/