24 novembre 2020 | International, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

What To Expect From Biden’s Pentagon

Jen DiMascio Michael Bruno Lee Hudson Tony Osborne November 20, 2020

One of Joe Biden's last speeches as U.S. vice president focused on nuclear security, touting passage of the New Start Treaty with Russia in 2010 and subsequent reductions in the U.S. stockpile of warheads. Four years later, nuclear modernization and arms control will be among the first major tests he faces when he assumes the presidency in January.

Under President Donald Trump, the Pentagon made notable strides in speeding up its cumbersome acquisition system, enabling the military to take better advantage of commercial technologies. The Defense Department also established what it calls “irreversible momentum” toward new space capabilities.

But it will fall to the Biden administration to shepherd many experiments in new technologies into actual programs. It will be Biden's task to sell Congress on the idea of Joint All-Domain Command and Control. The new Democratic president could be dealing with a Senate controlled by Republicans, and he faces allies that see the U.S. as a less reliable partner than it was four years ago. He also will have to balance the modernization and readiness of the force within a budget that probably peaked in 2020.

Shortly after he is inaugurated, Biden will face the Feb. 5 expiration of the New Start arms control treaty with Russia. His options are to extend the treaty for up to five years, for a shorter time frame or not at all. The Trump administration has been reluctant to agree to a full extension, given Russia's aggressive modernization of nuclear systems not covered by the treaty. Biden's advisors are likely to opt for extending the treaty to allow for more time for negotiations, predicts Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.

Republicans, meanwhile, are likely to be more focused on the threat of advanced weaponry in Russia and China, in particular the growth of strategic nuclear arsenals. Retiring Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-Texas), ranking member on the House Armed Services Committee, says he is “particularly concerned about where the Chinese are headed with the size and capability of their nuclear program.” He adds: “Like a lot of things related to the Chinese, we have probably been too complacent.”

Such tensions, and a Congress split along partisan lines, could help maintain support for nuclear modernization programs such as development of the next-generation ICBM, the Northrop Grumman Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), a program some analysts have thought a Biden administration might consider slowing or canceling. “Any serious push to retire the ICBM force and do away with the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent program would not be supported by the Senate,” Cowen analysts say.

A Biden administration likely means more of the same for the U.S. industrial base, for better or worse. The U.S. defense budget is expected to remain flat, putting pressure on the Pentagon to find ways to get more bang for its buck and better technologies against peer rivals—at the expense of traditional force structure.

“Technology investment is likely to be most important, including network integration, hypersonics, artificial intelligence, long-range strike and missile defense,” Bernstein analyst Doug Harned and his team say. “We expect a lot of activity around integration, but exactly what this means is still ill-defined. Force structure may well come under more pressure. This means lower numbers of troops, aircraft, vehicles, ships, etc.”

Downward pressure on force structure would be bad for Lockheed Martin, given its high exposure with the F-35, as well as for General Dynamics' warships and ground vehicles, says the Bernstein team. Northrop Grumman appears well-positioned long-term, based on its lean toward new technologies, but there are some risks around the GBSD. Raytheon Technologies and Lockheed have the highest Middle East exposure among the primes, and military sales there may have some added risk.

“Democrats in both the House and Senate want restrictions on [Foreign Military Sales] in the wake of reports that the United Arab Emirates will be allowed to purchase 50 Lockheed Martin F-35s,” the Cowen Washington Research Group observed Nov. 4. “We do not believe a [Republican] Senate will support restrictions. If the sale is going to happen, it will need to be jammed through . . . before Biden takes office.”

Like the Obama administration, the Trump team provided growing support for new space technologies. “I believe space will continue to be very, very important,” says Ellen Lord, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and sustainment. “I just had a briefing on a lot of [National Reconnaissance Office] projects we work on. And I'll tell you, it is absolutely eye-watering the capability that is being launched here in the next couple of months. . . . I think we have irreversible momentum.”

During the Trump administration's final weeks in office, Lord is working to create a trusted capital marketplace, strengthen the defense industrial base and work with Capitol Hill on new ways of purchasing software. The Defense Department is working closely with the interagency Committee on Foreign Investment to block adversaries such as China or Russia from purchasing companies that are critical to U.S. national technology initiatives, she told the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics' Ascend conference on Nov. 18.

Another focus for Lord's team is rare earth minerals and microelectronics. The bulk of rare earth mineral processing occurs in China, and most microelectronics are manufactured outside the U.S.

Chris Brose, who served as policy director for the late Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), is advocating more radical change to scale up defense innovation, a priority of U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown, Jr. “The question for the new administration is going to be: ‘How do you support that vision, and how do you kind of reshape the Air Force, reshape the Space Force and really realign the [national] defense program?'” asks Brose, who is now chief strategy officer for the defense industry startup Anduril.

Brose believes that to compete more effectively against advanced military challenges, the Pentagon must rethink how it harnesses new technologies, from the requirements process all the way through the acquisition process. Today's military, he notes, is organized to purchase a platform it has seen in a presentation or read in a white paper. The goal should not be to spend a long time defining requirements and then pay a single vendor to build things such as small satellites, software-defined programs or unmanned systems.

One of the Air Force's top modernization priorities is the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). The challenge with an effort such as the ABMS is that the requirements and concepts of operation are unclear, Brose says, and ABMS demonstrations study different problems each year, making progress tough to discern.

Though the Trump administration has experienced extensive turnover among its civilian leadership, it made considerable progress in restoring aircraft fleet readiness. In 2018, then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis—the first of five men in the military's top civilian job in four years—mandated that all tactical aircraft fleets needed to be 80% ready for missions. The Navy drew on techniques from the commercial airline industry to meet that goal within about one year for its Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet fleet.

The service has since applied the same techniques to improve the readiness of Boeing EA-18G Growlers, and it is beginning to expand the process to its Northrop Grumman E-2D Hawkeyes, with an eye toward the rest of its tactical aircraft, Rear Adm. Shane Gahagan, the Navy's program executive officer for tactical aviation, said at Aviation Week's Military Aviation Logistics and Maintenance Symposium on Nov. 17.

While Biden's team will seek to build on that progress, his administration likely will take a markedly less confrontational approach with U.S. allies than Trump, who believes the U.S. has borne too much of the burden to defend Europe. As the Pentagon announced the withdrawal of 12,000 U.S. troops from Germany earlier this year, repositioning them around Europe, Trump placed the blame squarely on Germany, describing the nation as “delinquent” in failing to pay its fair share.

NATO members breathed a collective sigh of relief after Biden's election, believing it will pave the way for a relaunch of transatlantic defense relations. But Biden is likely to maintain pressure on European countries to keep defense spending up in light of Russian and Chinese threats and to align with NATO's call for members to spend 2% of their GDP on defense.

“Trump seized on the 2% and banged the table. . . . It is broadly true he got the Europeans to take seriously the demand that more should be spent on defense,” says Jonathan Eyal, an associate director at the London-based Royal United Services Institute. The cost of Trump's approach, however, has been “very heavy,” he says, leading to a virtual collapse in the relationship between the U.S. and Germany.

Less certain is how a Biden administration will deal with countries that appear to be undermining NATO values. Turkey's oil and gas exploration in waters disputed by neighbor and fellow NATO member Greece have prompted regional tension, not to mention Ankara's actions in Libya, Syria and, more recently, its support of Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (AW&ST Oct. 12-25, p. 62). Turkey's decision to recently test its S-400 ground-based air defense system purchased from Russia also remains a source of irritation for Washington.

The purchase of the S-400 prompted Washington to kick Turkey out of the F-35 program, but Trump opted not to invoke the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act against the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan despite pressure in the Senate.

“One can assume that the Biden administration would take the tougher line on Turkey,” Eyal says. “Erdogan is now part of the problem rather than part of the solution.”

https://aviationweek.com/defense-space/budget-policy-operations/what-expect-bidens-pentagon

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  • Navistar’s challenge against U.S. Army over vehicle buys hangs in the balance

    2 décembre 2019 | International, Terrestre

    Navistar’s challenge against U.S. Army over vehicle buys hangs in the balance

    By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — For over a decade, the U.S. Army has used one source — Oshkosh Defense — to build its Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles, choosing to sole source to the company beyond its initial five year contract rather than reopen competition. Defense company Navistar is challenging the Army's choice to forgo competition and filed a lawsuit with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims in early August. Nov. 26 was to be the day a judge would decide whether the U.S. Army violated the law by continuing to order vehicles from Oshkosh outside of the scope of the contract while avoiding competition. And while a bench trial happened, the judge hearing the case did not make a decision. It is unclear what's next or when a ruling could happen. Navistar decided to sue the Army after it was getting nowhere in its quest to get the Army to produce documents — through a protest filed with the Government Accountability Office — that would show the service's reasoning to continue to order more vehicles from Oshkosh without competition and without proper legal justification. The company contended that the Army did not justify and improperly awarded its most recent sole source FMTV procurement to Oshkosh, and failed to provide proper notice to possible competitors in accordance with federal acquisition regulations and the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), according to an extensive review of court documents by Defense News. In addition, the Army also ignored a stop work order, which automatically went into effect when a GAO protest was filed. Navistar filed two complaints: One that claims the Army violated the law when it continued to buy Oshkosh vehicles outside of the scope of its contract without holding a competition and another that claims the Army illegally continued to work on production of those vehicles despite a required stop work order that must go into affect once a protest is filed with the GAO. Since 2009, the Army has spent over $6 billion on FMTVs from Oshkosh. FMTVs are used for a wide variety of missions to include transporting capabilities that extend from cargo to missile defense radars. Navistar contends the Army had ample time to compete for follow-on FMTV orders, and the pool was deep with companies ready to provide vehicles that met the service's requirement, but the Army never did. A long saga The saga goes much further back than just the 2019 GAO protest and lawsuit. Navistar successfully protested the Army's initial award to Oshkosh back in August 26, 2009. As a result, the Army reviewed its decision, reaffirmed its selection of Oshkosh and awarded it a contract with a performance period of less than five years, set to expire at the end of 2013. The request for proposals ahead of the original contract award estimated 23,341 vehicles to be delivered over a five-year period. Following that, it was Navistar's belief that the Army would reopen the competition to deliver more FMTVs. Through a series of justification and approvals — five of them — the Army continued to extend the contract through August 25, 2019, arguing each time that it did not have the time to conduct a new competition to meet the service's needs. In its latest J&A in September 2016, the Army justified it needed another 1,744 FMTVs at an estimated cost of $575 million for total contract duration of 10 years. The Army argued that it needed to sole source FMTVs to Oshkosh because it didn't have 24 months that it would take to conduct a full competition to meet urgent requirements, while it acknowledged there were other companies to include Navistar that could build FMTVs. The service also justified the sole source award due to its plans to stop procuring the current version of the FMTV as it prepared to take delivery of a new FMTV variant, which was also competitively awarded to Oshkosh in 2018. Navistar chose not to compete for the new variant, according to court documents. The order in 2016 was to fulfill the Army's remaining needs between the end of the current variant and the future variant expected to be delivered in fiscal year 2020. Navistar again protested with the GAO the 2016 sole source award to Oshkosh for more FMTVs and ended up dropping the protest when it settled with the Army to supply some vehicles to Iraq. Without a J&A or any other documents justifying another order of vehicles, the Army, on June 28, 2019, announced what it described as the award of a $320 million contract modification for domestic purposes and for foreign military sales for the countries of Argentina, Djibouti, Iraq, Lebanon and Romania. The order was for an estimated 1,916 vehicles and extended the performance period of the contract out to 2021, 12 years past the original contract award. The announcement, according to Navistar, never disclosed that the Army had actually already ordered roughly 1,000 vehicles in excess of what was justified in the 2016 J&A. Navistar again filed a protest with the GAO over the orders made without a new J&A, but withdrew its protest in favor of filing a lawsuit in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims when the GAO refused to require the Army to produce relevant documentation justifying the additional FMTVs. It wasn't until the company filed its complaint in federal court, that it was informed by the Department of Justice that the Army had never stopped work to produce the FMTVs ordered in 2019, Navistar reveals in court documents. Beyond the scope When the Army announced a new sole source procurement for FMTVs to Oshkosh in June, it caught Navistar by surprise because the service hadn't issued a J&A, which had been its practice after the original contract period of performance had ended, and is also required by law, the company argues in the court documents. The June announcement came on the heels of the five J&As that had included an extra 4,875 vehicles and $1.4 billion more to Oshkosh outside of the scope of the original 2009 contract and procured without competition, Navistar notes. Navistar also learned that the Army, months prior to June 28, had already placed tens of millions of dollars in sole source orders for hundreds of FMTVs beyond the scope of the 2016 J&A. Navistar argued a new J&A to cover the 2019 orders was needed because the previous J&As only provided enough authority to solve the Army's claimed immediate needs and were very specific in number and delivery time frame and laid out what trucks were needed by which units and where. The company contended that the original contract and subsequent J&As didn't and shouldn't provide the Army with “a blank check” to continue buying more vehicles without justifying competition. And it argues that the Army, three years beyond 2016, had ample time to prepare to compete for remaining FMTV orders. A contract or a blank check? While the Army's arguments are sealed under a protective order and not available for public review, Oshkosh argued in a response to Navistar's complaint, that the original 2009 contract was a “requirements” contract considered valid through August 25, 2019, for any orders placed. The J&As were essentially just amendments to the original contract. Navistar disagreed and argued that each subsequent J&A should be considered the binding contract and that previous contracts are expired. “CICA does not contain an exception to competition simply because a contract extension involves a requirements contract. To conclude otherwise would gut CICA's requirements," Navistar added. Oshkosh argued that the Army was required to fulfill all of its needs for the FMTV A1P2 through the Oshkosh contract in whatever quantity became necessary until the contract expires. The company also argued that the contract ceiling value had not been exceeded even with the 2019 orders. Oshkosh also argued that Navistar misinterpreted the difference between the ordering period under a contract and the delivery period. The company claims the contract covers the ordering period and not the delivery period, which can extend beyond. Navistar argued that the September 2016 J&A timeline covers the entirety of the contract to include delivery of the vehicles. Oshkosh also contends that the Army alerted all offerors in the original competition that except for monthly and annual limits there is no minimum quantity and no maximum of vehicles that the Army can order. And Oshkosh stated that the number of vehicles laid out in the Army's contract and subsequent J&As were just “estimates” and not a ceiling for orders. Additionally, any maximum ceiling just means a company isn't obligated to honor any orders placed above that level. For Navistar, Oshkosh's interpretation goes against the core of the Competition in Contracting Act. “These J&As do not contain any rationale that would enable the Army to procure an indefinite quantity of Oshkosh vehicles for years into the future - they only provide enough authority to solve the Army's claimed immediate problem of requiring vehicles quickly before a competition can be performed,” Navistar argues. The amendment Deviating from its normal course, the Army retroactively revised or amended the September 2016 J&A in early June instead of issuing a new J&A, scratching out original numbers and costs and replacing them with new numbers and new cost estimates. The amendment was made at the request of the Army's director of policy only after orders earlier in 2019 were discovered to have gone beyond the scope of the 2016 J&A. According to CICA, agencies are not allowed to avoid competition requirements by using the device of a contract modification. The Army did not notify potential offerors of the amendment and claimed, according to Navistar in its response to the court, that the only reason for the amendment was to alert Army leadership of the change. “There is no requirement for the Army to amend a J&A as a method of notifying its own leadership about procurement actions,” Navistar notes. Additionally, Oshkosh argued in its response to Navistar, that the director of policy's request in an email to amend the J&A because orders had fallen out of the scope, was just “the author's view.” Navistar writes, “The Army's attempt to authorize its prior illegal actions along with the Army's official position at the time the amendment was executed (that its sole source actions were “beyond the scope” of its earlier J&As) are damning indicators that the Army failed to justify its 2019 sole source contract action and that it knew its actions were wrong." Army didn't hit pause It's commonly known in defense acquisition that when a GAO protest is filed, work must stop on any contract award at issue until the GAO renders a decision roughly 90 days later. But the Army didn't stop Oshkosh from ordering parts and beginning work to build vehicles wrapped up in the Navistar protest filed July 8. The service doesn't dispute this fact, according to court documents. Navistar was not made aware the Army had continued to execute the disputed sole source orders until it filed its lawsuit at the court. Once alerted by a DOJ attorney that the Army had not stopped working, the company issued a separate complaint addressing the Army's failure to stop working on the contract in accordance with the law. The Navistar complaint states the Army continued to work in secret and did not alert the GAO or Navistar that it was proceeding with the performance of the protested contract. The Army didn't take any action to override the requirement to stop working on roughly 1,365 vehicles covered under the protest. The Army did stop work on 75 vehicles destined for Iraq and Djibouti, but that did not happen for days after the protest was filed with the GAO. The service “inexplicably”, according to Navistar's response to the Army's sealed arguments, believed in “good faith” that the only vehicles in dispute were the 75 vehicles that were bound for Iraq and Djibouti. Navistar states that the administrative record “contains no explanation, documentation or reasoning” as to why the Army failed to stop work. “The Army cannot claim ignorance of its legal obligations (as it appears to be doing) in order to avoid the consequences of its statutory violations,” Navistar argues in its response. The service's argument, according to Navistar's response, focuses on a July 12 phone call it had with Navistar's defense counsel where it claims that the focus of the call was on Iraq and Djibouti requirements, but includes nothing related to it in the administrative record provided to the court. Navistar lays out that the stop work order for the 75 vehicles came at 10:15 a.m. on July 12 before the 10:30 a.m. call with Navistar's counsel. The call was scheduled at the request of the Army's counsel and Navistar's lawyers were advised to come prepared to address the number of FMTV vehicles that it could produce on an expedited basis and the schedule under which it could deliver. According to a declaration submitted to the court, Navistar's lawyers said the Army's counsel offered to try to resolve the protest by giving Navistar contracts to provide vehicles for Iraq and Djibouti. Navistar said it would not agree to a resolution unless the Army agreed to have Navistar provide a more substantial volume of both domestic and foreign military sales vehicles. The Army's lawyers said they couldn't agree with that and indicated they would have to proceed with the protest. And while Iraq and Djibouti were discussed, “the Army could not have reasonably come away from that telephone conference with such a belief,” that the protest only covered those 75 vehicles, according to Navistar's response. To Navistar, it was clear from the beginning that its protest covered all orders in 2019 made beyond the scope of the 2016 J&A. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/11/27/navistars-challenge-against-us-army-over-vehicle-buys-hangs-in-the-balance/

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    25 juillet 2023 | International, Aérospatial

    Australia to buy 20 Hercules military transport planes in $6.6 bln deal

    Australia said on Monday it would spend A$9.8 billion ($6.60 billion) to buy 20 new Super Hercules military transport aircraft, ahead of a visit later this week by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

  • Northrop Grumman to Develop Advanced Air-to-Air Missile Engagement Concept

    12 février 2021 | International, Aérospatial

    Northrop Grumman to Develop Advanced Air-to-Air Missile Engagement Concept

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