We can no longer conduct business as usual - Skies Mag

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  11 novembre 2017 | Local, Aérospatial

  Canadian air chief looks to speed up up fighter buy

  DUBAI — Canada will kick start its competition for a future fighter jet in 2019 with the hopes of awarding a contract by 2021, but the head of the Royal Canadian Air Force wants the process to move as quickly as possible. “The plan right now is to have a request for proposal out to industry by 2019. we're in discussions and have been in discussions with a number of the people who are considering competing for that, and what I'd like to see is that accelerated as much as possible,” said RCAF commander Lt. Gen. Michael Hood, in an exclusive interview with Defense News. “A 2019 RFP would get us into contract probably by 2021, and certainly my advice to government is the sooner the better.” The RCAF wants to procure 88 fighter jets to replace its current inventory of aging 76 F/A-18 Hornets, which are nearing the end of their lifespans. Canada is an international participant in the F-35 joint strike fighter program and has helped pay for the development of the aircraft. But Prime Minister Justin Trudeau vowed not to procure the F-35 during his campaign, and his government has opened up the competition to industry instead of moving forward with a sole-source acquisition. The Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, Boeing Super Hornet and Saab's Gripen E are all projected to compete for the opportunity. To bridge the gap between its Hornet fleet and a future fighter, the RCAF initially intended to procure 18 F/A-18 Super Hornets from Boeing — a move some analysts speculated could trigger a larger procurement later on. However, the Canadian government suspended the deal due to Boeing's legal complaint against Canadian aerospace company Bombardier over its commercial business. With a Super Hornet buy unlikely as long as Boeing and Bombardier feud, and Trudeau's promise not to buy the F-35, U.S. defense experts worry that Canada could be driven into the arms of a European fighter manufacturer, thus eroding Canada's long tradition of flying U.S. jets — a move that increases the militaries' interoperability. However, Hood stated that interoperability with the United States continues to be “the most important thing to me as command of the Royal Canadian Air Force.” “Every step less of interoperability is one step less of effectiveness, so interoperability is right at the top of the list beside operational advantage,” he said. “I want the young men and women that are going to be flying fighters into harm's way to have an operational advantage, and that will be key to me in the competition that's coming.” That need for interoperability with the U.S. Air Force does not diminish the chances of European fighters, he added. Canada continues to investigate alternative ways to acquire an interim fleet of F/A-18s, including potentially buying used Hornets from Australia. However, a potential deal for Super Hornets with Boeing is still on the table, Hood said. “I think the government has been presented with the FMS case for Boeing. And as they're looking at options, that's one option,” he said. “The Australian aircraft are another, and the government has not made a decision yet.” If the RCAF moves forward with a used Hornet buy from Australia, it will have to extend the lives of the airframes, which are meeting their structural ends, Hood noted. That business would likely go to L3 Technologies, which has done life extension work on the Canadian F/A-18s in the past. But Canada would still be able to acquire the aircraft “within the next couple of years” once a decision is made. Lockheed officials have said that if Canada ultimately decided not to procure the F-35, it could end its industrial partnership with Canadian firms — which totals 110 Canadian companies with $750 million in contracts, according to Lockheed — that already help manufacture the F-35. However, asked whether Canada was concerned about losing that business, Hood demurred. “I'm not privy to the industrial aspects of our partnership with Lockheed Martin,” he said. “What I can say is Lockheed Martin is a fantastic partner for Canada and for the Royal Canadian Air Force, has been for years. We remain very, very strongly engaged both in the joint project office and helping to continue with the development of the F-35, and Canadian companies continue to bid and win on contracts with that.” https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/dubai-air-show/2017/11/11/canadian-air-chief-the-sooner-the-better-on-fighter-acquisition/

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  7 juillet 2023 | Local, Autre défense

  Next defence policy must be achievable and fully funded

  The last policy lacked the two key things necessary for implementation: it wasn't fully funded and lacked agile and timely decision-making processes. That these shortcomings exist is hardly a matter for debate. 

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  7 octobre 2019 | Local, Aérospatial, Naval, Terrestre, C4ISR, Sécurité

  With billions of dollars at stake, all parties promise to fix defence purchases

  Every election, would-be prime ministers promise to cancel bad military purchases or processes, hurry along good ones, fix the mess once and for all OTTAWA — The seemingly endless effort to replace Canada's CF-18s fighter jets passed a tiny milestone Friday: fighter-jet makers participating in the $19-billion competition were required to explain how they planned to make their aircraft compliant with U.S. intelligence systems. For nearly a decade, Canadians have been inundated with talk of fighter jets without Canada ever buying them, an ever-worsening symbol of the failures of Canada's military procurement system. Every election, would-be prime ministers promise to cancel bad purchases or processes, hurry along good ones, fix the mess once and for all. Conservative Leader Andrew Scheer this week promised to “de-politicize” military procurement with new oversight bodies in cabinet and the Privy Council Office while working toward multi-partisan consensus on procurement projects in Parliament. The Liberals promise to establish a new agency called Defence Procurement Canada, which suggests taking the entire function away from the four departments that now share responsibility for buying military kit. The New Democrats and Greens promise, without detail, that they will ensure Canada's military gets the equipment it needs. The origins of what we face today can be traced back to the end of the Cold War when Canada and its allies began to cut defence spending after a decades-long arms race with the Soviet Union. There were concerns about whether or not you're getting the right kind of economic benefits “We deferred purchasing new fighter planes and did the same thing with our frigate fleet,” says David Perry, vice-president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and one of Canada's foremost experts on defence spending and procurement. “We just kicked the can down the road on fixed-wing search-and-rescue aircraft. There was a bunch of other projects that fit the same vein.” The military had to use equipment for years longer than it was supposed to and the Department of National Defence lost most of its procurement experts. But in the mid-2000s, the Forces' equipment problems were revealed in Kandahar: the military lacked transport aircraft to resupply its Afghanistan mission, artillery and tanks to support troops on the ground and helicopters to move them around. Ottawa rushed into gear, purchasing transport planes, howitzers, helicopters and tanks in short order — in most cases without competitions. New equipment flooded in but there were some big failures, starting with accusations defence officials rigged the requirements for a new search-and-rescue plane to select a specific U.S. plane. There was also a failed effort to buy new supply ships for the navy and, most explosively, a plan to buy new fighter jets, Lockheed Martin's F-35s, without a competition. In 2012, auditor general Michael Ferguson blasted the Defence Department for failing to communicate the stealth fighter's risks, including escalating costs and schedule delays, to Parliament and decision-makers. Dan Ross, who was the department's head of military procurement at the time, would later say defence officials had all the information and were willing to share it — the Harper government just wouldn't let them. Either way, the public's confidence in the system and the government's ability to manage it were shaken. The F-35 purchase was scrapped. The Tories imposed new constraints to keep costs under control and ensure Canadian industry and communities benefit from defence contracts. “There were concerns about whether or not you're getting the right kind of economic benefits, some significant concerns about whether or not process was being adhered to until you had this system recalibration where you had an injection of additional rules and governance,” Perry says. That recalibration imposed a fundamental tension on the system: the need to get the best equipment possible, with the most benefit to the economy or local industry, at the lowest cost. Every big procurement is partly about the military's needs and partly about national industrial policy — and, that means, partly about politics. Most procurements are still completed with minimal fuss. The problems largely lie with big, once-in-a-lifetime contracts like fighters and warships that are worth billions of dollars and are not only essential for the military to operate, but have the potential to benefit Canadian businesses and communities for years. The ones that involve billions of public dollars. “You're trying to get the best bang for the buck for as little buck as possible,” says Queen's University professor Kim Nossal, who wrote a book entitled “Charlie Foxtrot: Fixing Defence Procurement in Canada” in 2016. “The one comforting thing is that very few countries have got the balance right. All industrial countries, all of our allies, faces these kinds of pressures. They worry about jobs and costs and capability.” Efforts to combine the three competing priorities can lead to bickering among federal departments, lawsuits from companies and politicians sticking their fingers in things. Seconds after saying he would de-politicize the military procurement system this week, Scheer promised to negotiate the purchase of an interim naval supply ship from Quebec's Chantier Davie shipyard, which lobbied the Liberal government for years to ink such a contract without success. Davie is one of Canada's big players in shipbuilding — and it's in much-contested political territory just outside Quebec City. Alan Williams, who was the Defence Department's head of procurement from 1999 to 2005 and now advises companies on procurement matters, compares Scheer's promise on Davie to Justin Trudeau's promise in 2015 not to buy the F-35. That's because while a government can decide to purchase a piece of military equipment, procurement laws — and Canada's international trade obligations — forbid it from choosing or excluding a specific product or supplier except under extreme circumstances. Upon taking office, the Liberals twisted themselves in pretzels to get around the legal implications of their promise. That twisting led to a plan to buy Super Hornets from a competing vendor. When that fell through, four years passed before an actual competition was launched — with the F-35 now one of three planes still in contention. In the meantime, the CF-18s will fly until 2032, reinforced with second-hand Australian F-18s to buy time. https://nationalpost.com/news/politics/election-2019/with-billions-of-dollars-at-stake-all-parties-promise-to-fix-defence-purchases