US special ops may be buying too many Armed Overwatch planes, says GAO

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  2 juillet 2019 | International, Aérospatial

  Karem, Northrop, Raytheon team for Army’s future attack recon helo competition

  By: Jen Judson WASHINGTON — Karem Aircraft has forged a team with Northrop Grumman and Raytheon to compete in the Army's Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) competition, according to a July 1 company statement. Karem was one of five companies awarded a prototyping development contract in April. While details are scant as to how each company will contribute to the overall design, due in January or February of 2020, the teaming announcement says the three companies together “will apply decades of combined knowledge, skills and abilities to bring the best of vehicle and systems technologies and processes to the first aircraft within the Future Vertical Lift family of systems.” Karem is bringing its “unique active variable speed rotor technologies,” which have been developed over the last 10 years through collaboration with the Army, to the teaming effort. The company's experience “will be augmented with Northrop Grumman's manned and autonomous military aircraft development, system integration, production and support expertise and Raytheon's systems architecture, mission equipment and weapons capabilities,” the company statement adds. While Karem competed to be one of two teams selected to build a flying aircraft for the Army's Joint Multi-Role Technology Demonstrator (JMR TD), it was not selected. Instead, the Army awarded it a smaller technology development contract to continue to refine its unique technology. The JMR TD program will inform a Future Long-Range Assault Aircraft (FLRAA) program of record to replace UH-60 Black Hawks and AH-64 Apache helicopters. The JMR TD program is not a head-to-head competition between the Sikorsky-Boeing SB-1 Defiant coaxial helicopter and the Bell V-280 Valor tiltrotor aircraft, but will inform the FLRAA program. Bell and a Sikorsky-Boeing team have each built a JMR TD aircraft which is flying in that program. AVX Aircraft Co. also received a smaller technology development contract similar to Karem's award. The Karem-Northrop-Raytheon team will compete with an AVX-L-3 Communications Integrated Systems team, Bell, Boeing and Lockheed Martin-owned Sikorsky to provide design plans to the Army for FARA. The Army will choose just two teams to advance to build a flyable prototype, much like it did for the JMR TD program — except this time, one of those aircraft will be chosen for production. The Army has set an ambitious schedule for FARA, with plans to fly prototypes in 2023. A production decision could happen in 2028, but the service is looking at any way possible to speed up that timeline. Truncating the timelines for both FLRAA and FARA has been on the table for many years and the service continues to assess any way possible to bring the aircraft online faster. With the advent of the new Army Futures Command — focused on six major modernization priorities, of which FVL is third — the service is moving faster on prototyping capability to ultimately procure major weapon systems at a somewhat unprecedented speed. Through the AFC and the use of contracting mechanisms like OTAs, the Army has found a way to compress parts of the acquisition process that previously took three-to-five years into periods of time often amounting to less than a year. FARA is intended to fill a critical capability gap currently being addressed by the AH-64E Apache attack helicopter teamed with Shadow unmanned aircraft, following the retirement of the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior helicopters. The service has tried and failed three times to fill the gap with an aircraft. https://www.defensenews.com/land/2019/07/01/karem-northrop-raytheon-forge-team-for-armys-future-attack-recon-helo-competition/

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  18 mars 2020 | International, C4ISR, Sécurité

  The Pentagon is handling cyber vulnerabilities inconsistently

  Mark Pomerleau The Department of Defense has not consistently mitigated cyber vulnerabilities identified in a 2012 report, according to the department's inspector general. The DoD IG issued a follow-on report to its 2012 report, issued March 13 and made public March 17, that determined cyber red teams didn't report the results of assessments to organizations and components didn't effectively correct or mitigate the identified vulnerabilities. The new report discovered that components didn't consistently mitigate or include unmitigated vulnerabilities identified in the prior audit and during this audit by red teams during combatant command exercises, operational testing assessments and agency-specific assessments in plans of action and milestones. “Ensuring DoD Components mitigate vulnerabilities is essential to achieve a better return on investment,” the report stated. “In addition, we determined that the DoD did not establish a unified approach to support and prioritize DoD Cyber Red Team missions. Instead, the DoD Components implemented Component-specific approaches to staff, train and develop tools for DoD Cyber Red Teams, and prioritize DoD Cyber Red Team missions.” The report found that DoD didn't establish a unified approach because it didn't assign an organization with responsibility to oversee and synchronize red team activity based on priorities, it didn't assess the resources needed for each red team and identify requirements to train them to meet priorities and it didn't develop baseline tools to perform assessments. “Without an enterprisewide solution to staff, train and develop tools for DoD Cyber Red Teams and prioritize their missions, DoD Cyber Red Teams have not met current mission requests and will not meet future requests because of the increased demands for DoD Cyber Red Team services,” the report said. “Until the DoD assigns an organization to assess DoD Cyber Red Team resources, it will be unable to determine the number of DoD Cyber Red Teams and staffing of each team to support mission needs, which will impact the Do D's ability to identify vulnerabilities and take corrective actions that limit malicious actors from compromising DoD operations.” The DoD IG issued seven recommendations the secretary of defense assign an organization responsibility for. They include: Review and assess red team reports for systemic vulnerabilities and coordinate the development and implementation of enterprise solutions to mitigate them; Ensure components develop and implement a risk-based process to assess the impact of identified vulnerabilities and prioritize funding for corrective actions for high-risk vulnerabilities; Ensure components develop and implement processes for providing reports with red team findings and recommendations to organizations with responsibility for corrective actions; Develop processes and procedures to oversee red team activities, including synchronizing and prioritizing red team missions, to ensure activities align with priorities; Perform a joint DoD-wide mission-impact analysis to determine the number of red teams, minimum staffing levels of each team, the composition of the staffing levels needed to meet current and future mission requests; Assess and identify a baseline of core and specialized training standards, based on the three red team roles that team staff must meet for the team to be certified and accredited; and Identify and develop baseline tools needed by red teams to perform missions. https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/2020/03/17/the-pentagon-is-handling-cyber-vulnerabilities-inconsistently/

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  15 février 2023 | International, C4ISR

  US working with ‘Five Eyes’ nations, Japan on information warfare

  Japan has expressed significant interest in information warfare, "in a really positive way,” said Navy Vice Adm. Kelly Aeschbach.